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CHAPTER I 
URBANOLOGY 
The emer3ence of a complex and highly urbanized industrial society 
has inspired great study of urbanization and urban phenomena by social 
scientists. Unfortunately, most social scientists study urbanology 
within th.e relatively narrow confines of their particular disciplines. 
Sociologists concentrate on urban phenomena arising out of human-group 
relationships, while political scientists concentrate on units of urban 
government and intergovernmental rel ations. Li kewi se, economi sts study 
urbanology from a market perspective while geographers tend to concen-
trate on urban location theory and historians are concerned about the 
history of urbanization. Moreover, urban planners and research special-
ists are principally practitioners who receive and attempt to apply the 
resulting fragments of theory to their professional practices. There has 
been altogether too little cross-tell between the academic disciplines, 
and thus little advancement toward a wholistic theory of urbanology. 
On the other hand, there have been some productive efforts to apply 
theories from one discipline to the study of another discipline--notably! 
group theory from sociology and elements of marginal ism from economics 
are being applied to aspects of political science. But this is on a 
somewhat ethereal level with only marginal integration across disci-
plines. Some of the hybrid results of this kind of academic cross-
pollination have only recently been applied in any meaningful way to 
urbanology. The point is that progress toward a more whol istic theory 
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of urbanology seems all too slow under the circumstances. 
The major contention of this work is that some progress toward 
such a wholistic theory might be made by integrating institutional econ-
omic theory and elements of the more orthodox economic theory with 
aspects of pluralist theory from political science and relating the 
resulting whole in an urban context. This chapter is the first and in-
troductory chapter in a work which attempts that synthesis. In the way 
of introducing the work, this chapter explains what is meant by "urban 
context," and it briefly traces out the theories involved in the syn-
thesis. 
URBAN CONTEXT 
The title of this work, Institutional Economics and Urban Pol itical 
Economy, implies that institutional economics and political economy have 
some kind of unique and exclusive relationship to urban affairs. It is 
the purpose of this section to disabuse the reader of any such notion 
and to explain the context in which the word lI urban ll is used. Neither 
institutional economics nor political economy is uniquely or exclusively 
related to urban phenomena. Rather, both subjects were founded and 
expanded on much more genera 1 planes. 
Institutional economics is based on anthropological methodology, 
and it seeks to analyze and describe the cultural antecedents to human 
economic interaction at all levels. Likewise, political economy attempts 
to rationalize political behavior in economic terms and economic behavior 
in political terms. Political economy is therefore as applicable to 
international and national affairs as it is to state and local affairs. 
The point is that both bodies of theory apply to all kinds of social 
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interaction--international, national, state, local, institutional, fra-
ternal, familial, and interest-group as well as urban. 
Acknowledging that neither institutional economics nor pol itical 
economy is uniquely or exclusively urban, it is no less true that the 
scopes of both subjects do include urban affairs. It is therefore pos-
sible to study urban affairs from the institutional economic point-of-
view or from the vantage point of pol itical economy. Or it is possible 
to view the latter two subjects with an urban perspective. Hopefully, 
this study will take each of these points-of-view at appropriate times 
so that the reader will sometimes find urban affairs elaborated from 
the position of institutional economics or political economy, and the 
latter will sometimes be illuminated from an urban point-of-view. 
Having said that, it remains necessary to clarify the so-called 
urban context. There does not appear to be any general agreement as to 
what is meant by the adjective urban--what should properly be incl uded 
and what should be excluded. Some persons proceed on the restrictive 
assumption that urban affairs means only those matters which take place 
exclusively within urban boundaries. Others believe that the term urban 
affairs is broad enough to include any phenomenon which has urban con-
sequences or is itself a consequence of urban-related activities. 
The restrictive assumption is at least partly based on a fallacious 
analogy. It is observed that urban areas themselves are physically dis-
ti ngui shed from other areas by pol iti cal and geographi c boundari es. It 
follows by analogy that any activity described by the adjective "urban" 
should likewise be boundaried. That is, if an activity is truly urban, 
then it must take place inside the boundaries of a city, vis-a-vis any 
and all other areas outside of urban boundaries. 
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However, urban areas do not exist in perfect isolation from other 
so-called non-urban areas. Nor do urban phenomena take place isolated 
in some kind of vacuum from other so-called non-urban phenomena. Indeed, 
no urban area is self-sufficient. It is always a part of a much larger 
whole, and the urban and non-urban areas are interdependent entities. 
To be sure, urban areas are distinguished from other geographical 
environs. But the urban areas are distinguished only in relation to such 
other environs, and they are connected by transportation and communica-
tion faci).ities to those environs--both urban and non-urban. 
Moreover, commercial as well as other social interaction takes 
place between the interconnected parts. Thus, changes in agricultural 
productivity which takes place in rural areas affect adjacent urban 
centers through the resulting changes in the prices of agricultural 
goods. And urban events which alter the s.upp1y of manufactured agri-
cultural inputs or consumer goods and services purchased by the fami1 ies 
of agricultural employees affect the rural or non-urban environs. 
Indeed, one is hard pressed to find a matter in the course of human 
affairs which does not bear consequences of some sort for cities. 
It should be clear that this writer disagrees with the restrictive 
assumption and adheres to the assumption that the term urban affairs 
includes any phenomenon which has urban consequences or is itself a con-
sequence of urban-related activities. This clarification is necessary 
because the reader may sometimes find the subject at hand only indir-
ectly or remotely related to urban affairs. This is partly because the 
work builds from economic and political theories of social interaction 
that are more general in character before applying the theories in the 
more specific urban context. Nevertheless, the nexus to urban phenomena 
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are ther~ whe., the relationships are studied in an anthropological time 
frame. 
For example, the American labor movement is used in the next chap-
ter to illustrate an institutional cycle. The connection bet:-,een a 
labor movement and urban affairs is not immediately obvious, and some 
would insist that any connection between the two is very tenuous at best. 
However, a moment's reflection recalls that labor movements arise out of 
the turmoil of imperfectly competitive labor markets, and the latter 
emerged wit!" the industrial ;zation which spawned 1 arge-scale enterprises 
employina masses of labor. It is here that the connection between labor 
movements and urban affairs becomes clear. Industrial ization ;s a 
uniquely urban affair. Indeed, at least one wave of urbanization in 
industrial nations was powered by the so-called industrial revolution--
a recent phase of the on-going technical revol ution which has set mankind 
quite apart from other anomaly. Labor movements are aspects of indus-
trialization, and they are therefore uniquely urban phenomena as well. 
Another example appears in Chapter III where the ends-means con-
tinuum, a crucial component of institutional economic theory, is illus-
trated in terms of the Roman establishment and subsequent development of 
the city of London, England. One might, of course, use any human arti-
fact or collection of such works to illustrate the ends-means continuum. 
However, it is especially appropriate to use a city as the vehicle to 
describe the theory because cities are the epitome of civilized society, 
and they are all at once the physical results and the major repositories 
of human creati ve geni us. 
Chapters IV and V, deal ing with ceremonial ism (the practice by 
which institutions discharge their social functions), explores some of 
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the ancient roots of the myriad of institutions which comprise a city. 
Not all of the institutions examined can be called exclusively urban 
institutions, but neither can they be excluded from any study of urban 
institutions. For example, a primary human institution, the family, 
exists in both urban and rural settings. It cannot, therefore, reason-
ably be excluded from any serious study of institutional matters in 
either urban or rural settings. Moreover, Chapter IV gives some insight 
into how the institutional structure eventually adapted ceremonialism to 
pennit the .feudal cities of antiquity to emerge. 
Chapters VI, VII, and VIII on technology would at first seem to 
deal with purely rural affairs. However, the urban relevance of those 
chapters lies in the relationships between technology and agriculture, 
between agricultural productivity and urbanization, and finally between 
technological advance and urban function and form. The argument is made 
in those chapters that the revolutions which incrementally advanced 
civilization from preliterate and prehistorical folk societies to pre-
urban folk cOJTU1lunities, from the latter to feudal cities, and from feudal 
cities to industrial cities were precipitated by technological changes 
which first increased agricultural production in each case. The 
increased productivity in agriculture created food surpluses and ~ 
passu emancipated some members of the corrnnunity from primary and rural 
employments and enabled them to speCial ize in secondary or urban activi-
ties such as transportation, commerce, security, manufacturing, etc. 
Finally, the essence of the last few content chapters is that 
cities are arenas in which human groups interact in the choice of social 
ends and in the allocation of means to attainment of the chosen ends. 
The interaction opera"ces to reconcile the tensions between ceremonial 
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constraints and technological opportunities, and the result is institu-
tional change. Cities are inimitably suited as habitations of human-
group interactions because cities are concomitantly the creatures of and 
the principal domiciles for human institutions. They are 1 ikewise the 
abodes of the people who populate institutions and who interact through 
groups. 
The point is that the connections between urban affairs and that 
which follows may at times appear remote and obscure to the reader. It 
is only b'y viewing the subject in light of very long-run effects that 
the urban relevance becomes clear. And that relevance achieves clarity 
with the understanding embodied in the foregoing assumption--that 
matters not narrowly construed as urban frequently have urban conse-
quences, and clearly urban matters often have consequences far beyond 
the bounds of cities. The urban context, then, construes the term urban 
affairs as broad enough to include such remote but related matters. 
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 
The first of the theories dealt with here is institutional econ-
omics. Institutional economics is a uniquely American contribution to 
the field of economics. Two of its founders are Thorstein Veblen and 
John R. Commons. 1 Institutional economics enjoyed substantial currency 
prior to World War II, but it suffered dec1 ine in the face of the so-
called new economics of John Maynard Keynes. However, it is once again 
becoming popular as a research and publication field, and the works of 
Veblen and Commons in particular have spawned a whole school of new or 
neo-institutiona1ists within the field of economics. 
The seminal 1 iterature of institutional economics exists in 
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fragments and is distinguished by a remarkable lack of correspondence. 
This is not true of any one piece of Veblen's writing, each of which is 
a gem of literary excellence. But there is no writing which integrates 
Veblen's thoughts into a single, coherent theory. While the ambitious 
and prolific work of Commons possesses better overall continuity and 
roundness--especially his last statement on theory, The Economics of Col-
lective Action--it is unnecessarily repetitive and filled with vast, 
redundant abstractions and special terminology to represent matters 
better d<;s.cribed, in the opinion of this author, using commonly under-
stood terms. 
Moreover, the works of Commons and Veblen are not in agreement on 
some fundamental and crucial points. Subsequent scholars have made 
little effort to reconcile the differences so that the modern student can 
be presented with a coherent, consistent, and integrated body of institu-
tional t.heory. While a studied and exhaustive reconciliation of differ-
ences between Veblen and Commons is an ambitious and worthy enterprise, 
it is outside the scope of this work. Rather, the goal at hand is simply 
to bring the theories into sufficient correspondence to achieve the 
purpose described at the outset--name1y, to relate institutional economic 
theory to pluralist theory from political science and relate the whole 
to urban affairs. 
The technique used to achieve consistency between the fragments of 
institutional economic theory is simply to use those parts which are 
essentially in agreement, to use those parts which this author believes 
are most val id where there is conf1 ict and where the material is needed 
to round out the whole theory, and to ignore any remaining part which is 
not particularly applicable. Accordingly, a major part of this paper is 
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given over to systematizing institutional economic theory. The follow-
ing few paragraphs are a brief outl ine of the main tenets of that theory 
as understood by this writer. The first part is a clarification of 
applicable time-period o3sumptions. The second part describes the ends-
means continuum or the temporal institutional setting. And the last two 
parts describe the Veblenian theories of ceremonialism and what C. E. 
Ayers chooses to call technology. 
Time Periods of Analysis 
An 'anthropological approach to social interaction in general and 
economics in particular, institutional economics views social arrange-
ments in what this writer 'likes to call the very long run. In this 
sense, the ideas of institutional economists tend to receive greater 
approbation from historians, anthropologists, and sociologists than 
from more orthodox economists. Indeed, institutional economists are 
viewed as somewhat necessary but anomalous appendages by more tradition-
minded members of the profession. And, as specialists in psychiatry 
must first be medical doctors, so institutional economists must first 
establish their competence in orthodox bodies of economic theory. 
Orthodox economic theory does not now concern itself with the 
institutional very long-run. Rather, it recognizes three other analyti-
cal time periods--the very short-run, the short-run, and the long-run. 
The chief feature which distinguishes one time period from the other is 
the economist1s assumptions about variability in the supply of produc-
tive inputs. In the very short-run, the supply of all productive 
resources for the end product under study -is.. assumed to be fi xed so 
that supply of the product to the market is 1 imited to whatever can be 
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produced with the resources physically on hand in that time period. It 
is therefore impossible to either increase or decrease supply of the 
product to the market in that time period. 
Absolutely fresh broccoli, available within any given week, is a 
commodity which may be in relatively fixed supply so that the price is 
primarily a function of demand. It is not usually possible within the 
week (the very short run) to increase the supply because of the growth 
cycle of broccoli. The broccoli available during the week took approxi-
mately se,Venty days from sowing to harvest. If it is cut too early the 
edible yield will be small and unpalatable. If it is cut too late it 
will be in flower and unsuitable for the table. It must be harvested, 
marketed~ and consumed during its prime week for the very best results. 
Its supply can be neither increased nor decreased by any significant 
amount within the very short run comprising its prime week. Thus, if the 
demand for absolutely fresh broccoli that week is high in relation to its 
rigid supply it will command a high price. On the other hand~ the price 
may have to decl ine below cost in order to clear markets before spoilage 
if the market demand is very low in relation to the fixed supply. 
However. some resources are assumed to be variable in the short 
run while other inputs are assumed to remain fixed. Capital goods (or 
producers I durables), the level of technology, and the land are examples 
of resources which are generally assumed to be in fixed supply in the 
short run. Land and capital goods do not become physical components of 
the products in the production of which they are employed. On the other 
hand, man hours of labor and intermediate goods which lose their identi-
ties in and become a part of the final product are assumed to be variable 
in the short run. Thus, supply of the product may be increased or 
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decreased to meet changes in market demand to the extent of the change-
ability of the variable inputs and their technical substitutibilities 
for fixed resources--for example the extent to which additional man 
hours may be substituted for equipment hours. 
Operation of a food-processing plant illustrates the economic short 
run. During off-harvest seasons, the pl ant processes only those fruits 
and vegetables which could be held over from the previous harvest in 
some temporary storage medium. The plant characteristically operates 
with a sma·ll permanent staff working a normal forty-hour week (five con-
secutive eight-hour days). Moreover, the company will vacation its 
permanent staff during the off-harvest seasons. In other words, it 
chooses to reduce its off-season operations by increasing its ratio of 
capital to labor. It accomplishes this by reducing the units of variable 
input (man hours and produce in process) used with the units of fixed 
input (permanent equipment and the real estate that houses the plant). 
This has the effect of decreasing the total cost of variable inputs 
while leaving the total cost of fixed inputs unchanged. 
However, as fresh fruit and vegetables commence to arrive at the 
plant early in the harvest season, the company will start hiring tem-
porary help to handle the accelerating input of produce. As the season 
wears on and the fresh produce backlogs, the company may increase its 
hours of operation--first by going to a seven-day work week and paying 
overtime rates to its employees and then by hiring temporary staff and 
scheduling additional operating shifts. In other words, the company 
chooses to increase its operations during harvest season by decreasing 
its ratio of capital to labor. It accomplishes this by increasing the 
units of variabl e input (man hours and produce in p:'ocess) used with the 
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units of fixed inputs (equipment and real estate). This has the effect 
of increasing the total cost of variable inputs while leaving the total 
cost of fixed inputs unchanged in the short run. 
All productive resources are assumed to be variable in the econ-
omic long run. While this assumption does not mean that the supply of 
all existing inputs is.. infinitely elastic, it does mean that technical 
substitutibility between existing and potential inputs is variable. 
Thus, a way will be found in the long run to produce any economic good 
for which there is a market demand at a price sufficient to cover all 
costs of production. 
If, in the food-processing plant example, the company found that 
it could not process all vegetables and fruits available in its produc-
ticn area during the year, and if it could not supply the market demand 
for its output, then it might find it profitable to expand its plant--
that is, to increase its short-run fixed inputs to meet the higher output 
expectations. This is a lm;g-run consideration--a time-period during 
which all inputs, including capital goods and real estate, are considered 
to be variable. In expanding its plant, the company will likely pur-
chase more land and more equipment embodying the newest technology. 
This should enable the company to substitute capital goods for man hours 
of labor insofar as the newer and better machines can be operated with 
fewer people. Thus. the company can now achieve higher levels of output 
per man hour of input. It is said to be taking advantage of increasing 
returns to scale by increasing its scale of plant and reducing its long-
run average cost of output. 
Economists study market phenomena--supply, demand, price, etc.--
under the different states of resource variability assumed in economic 
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time periods. Their tacit assumption is always that the antecedent and 
current or assumed states of institutional arrangements will not change-
even in the long run. It is application of the time-worn ceteris 
paribus to social elements which orthodox economists tre3t as exogenous 
to the markets they are studying. For this reason, orthodox economists 
will study the effects on quantities and prices of changes in what is 
called the quoefficient of technical substitutibility between two inputs. 
That is, they study the effects within the market as an institution. 
They ;gn~re the effects of technical change .Q!!. the market as an insti-
tution as well as the effects on other institutions which make up the 
social system of which the market is a part. 
On the other hand, institutional economists believe that economic 
phenomena are products of institutional systems and that markets, as 
orthodox economists see them, will exist subject always to institutional 
constraints. Attention of the institutional economist is therefore con-
centrated on the institutional milieu in which markets exist. In other 
words, the institutional economist is concerned not just with market 
phenomena according to orthodox theory, but with the feed-back effects of 
market activities on institutional arrangements as \ ... e11. He is concerned 
as well with the economic ways in which society uses and changes its USES 
of material devices and the ways in which society's use and changes in 
use of materi a 1 devi ces structures and restructures soci ety itsel f. 
While the orthodox economic time periods are necessary, they are 
not sufficient by themselves to accommodate the institutional frame-of-
reference. The economic long-run is simply not long enough to observe 
the feed-back effects of techni ca 1 change on soci al arrangements. lnsti-
tutional changes of a substantial sort are social revolutions, and they 
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take centuries and sometimes millennia to occur. At least one more time 
period is required to observe institutional change. It is, of course, 
the very long run--an anthropological time period of sufficient duration 
to study the institutional changes which result from economic and quasi-
economic activities. 
The very long run is, then, the principal time period of institu-
tional economic analysis. It often takes the analysis back in time to 
the dawn of mankind l 5 existence on earth--a time when there were no 
cities as. t~ey are known today, and when human groups were primitive 
family bands, the members of which lived short, hard, and frugal lives. 
Within that perspective the work at hand draws heavily from that of Clar-
ence E. Ayres, a second generation institutional economist. 2 Ayres 
joined the ceremonial and technological components of institutional 
economics from Veblen with the idea of an ends-means continuum described 
by John Dewey. The following is a very brief outline of the elements of 
institutional economic theory which will be elaborated in remaining 
chapters. 
Ends and Means 
According to Dewey, social interaction takes place in a temporal 
setting--a longitudinal dimension in time which is called an ends-means 
continuum, a continuum of on-going life processes. If the continuum is 
divided into two parts, a past and a future, then the present is the 
boundary between the two. All that exists in the present is the effects 
of causes whi ch 1 i e in the past. These present effects are also the 
means, the -resources, to ends which lie in the future along the contin-
uum. 3 
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Ends are states of affairs which 1 ie in the future and which exist 
in the present only as human contemplation. Some ends-in-view may be 
alternative insofar as some competing ends may be exclusive. That is, 
selection and attainment of one set of ends may absolutely preclude the 
possible attainment of the competing end. This is because means are 
either too scarce to permit all sets to be secured, or the alternative 
sets of ends may be incongruous. 
Ends are not ends-in-themselves, but once attained become means to 
on-going .ends which 1 ie farther in the future along the continuum. Ends 
have value because people, through institutions, set them out as desired, 
and means have value in part because they are instrumental in achieving 
desired future ends. The crucial questions raised by the concept of the 
ends-means continuum ar'e, how and why are particular ends-to-be-achieved 
selected from an array of competing possible ends? And against what cri-
terion and how are means selected and organized for the attainment of the 
se 1 ected ends? 
Ceremonial ism 
Part of the answer to the foregoing questions according to Veblen 
and Ayres is found in the practice of ceremonialism. Ceremonialism is 
an institutionalized practice, and it involves the conferring and valida-
tion of status upon members of society.4 The technique is instrumental 
in the social-control functions of institutions--the social ization and 
the transmission of culture needed to preserve stability throughout 
society. 
Ceremonia 1 val ues are based on the cul tura 1 bel i efs whi ch descend 
to the present from the past. They are transmitted by the myths, 
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legends, dramas, and literature which extol tribal triumphs of the past 
and the mystical powers of ancestors. The legends about those triumphs 
are pervasive and are used to transmit the totems and taboos of culture--
the "right" ethical and aesthetic values to hold. Such values connote 
social order and status. People are thus taught from their infancy the 
systems of status which descended to them from their tribal pasts. 
Through ceremonialism they come to understand and accept their positions 
in society and the roles they must play. Likewise, they come to accept 
the mana,. t.he mystical potency attaching to each social rank, and to 
recognize the distinctions between their ranks and the ranks of others, 
both above and below them in the social structure. 
People are also taught how to acknowledge rank and validate status 
in ceremonial exchanges or transactions. ceremonial gift giving, and 
ceremonial destruction of goods. And they learn the grave consequences 
and the sanctions imposed for failure to learn and conform to the pres-
cribed modes of ceremony. Finally, the cultural beliefs or tribal leg-
ends, the totems and taboos, and the mana of rank and status, are con-
stantly reinforced by the mystical ceremonies and they afe reconstructed 
throughout peopl es I 1; fetimes by the awe-i nspiring dramas, graph; carts, 
literature, and religious liturgies of their cultures. All of this 
social ization is accompl ished by institutions attempting to perpetuate 
establ i shed val ue systems. And insofar as ceremonial ism is successful 
as the social izing mode of institutions. it augurs toward structure and 
stabil ity in society. 
Ceremonialism is necessarily backward-looking in terms of the ends-
means continuum. It 1 inks present arrangements with the causal conquests 
of the past, and it prescribes the successful methods of the past as the 
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best ways to organize means to achieve future ends. Likewise, those 
ends are measured as desirable or undesirable in terms of the values 
descended from the past. The ceremonial aspect of society extends the 
past forever into the future never changing and never ending. Such is 
the mucilage of society in modern as well as primitive societies. 
Technology 
17 
However, institutions rise and some even decl ine, and society and 
social ways do sometimes change from generation to generation. The ques-
tion is, 'what causes such changes in the face of the powerful backward-
urging of ceremonialism? The answer, according to Veblen and Ayres, is 
found in the social effects of new technologies, where technology is 
simply that quality of a tool that enables it to reduce or be substituted 
for human effort in the creation of any good or service having human 
value. S Technique, the human propensity and skill to employ particular 
technologies, aims to convert ends to means as a pervasive and on-going 
process. This process is continuous, dynamic, progressive, and future-
oriented. 6 
The innovation of new technologies tends to be unstabil izing to 
institutional environments because the innovation of new technologies 
organfzes means (divides labor) and opens ways of distributing social pro-
ducts in ways differing from the ceremonially-prescribed methods des-
cending from the institutional past. Moreover, new technologies often 
radically change even the ends selected to be achieved because some 
ends formerly beyond the available means are brought within reach by the 
new technologies. New technology therefore opens opportunities to 
change prior existing social status and ceremonial systems of rank, and 
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it affords new avenues of soci al mobil ity--avenues toward higher status 
for some and diminished status for others. 
The ensuing environment is, of course, fraught with confl ict 
between those persons who wish to preserve the ceremonial values upon 
which their ranks and statuses are founded and those persons who stand 
to gain in position and status by the innovation of new technology. 
Thus there is an endless struggle between the tradition-bound and 
backward-cl inging forces of ceremonialism and the progressive and for-
ward-leanin~ forces of technology, both as to choices between competing 
future ends and the a 1 ternati ve ways of organi zi ng means toward the 
attainment of the selected ends. 
How much of known new technology is actually innovated depends 
upon the relative strength of ceremonialism--or, in other words, the 
strength of institutional values and institutional resistance to change. 
Insofar as new technology is innovated, certain ceremonial aspects of 
institutional value systems wither and become quaint cultural vestiges 
of the past--but never without anomy and social uPheaval. 7 The question 
is, by what means does sOciety reconcile the tensions between ceremon-
i ali sm and new techno 1 ogi es as the future ascends to the present and 
fades into the past in an endless continuum of on-going life processes? 
ORTHODOX ECONOMICS 
The answer to the foregoing question is found in techniques for 
weighing values and for balancing those measured values in some sort of 
matrix, the outcome of which is social choice--choices that do or do not 
lead to the innovation of new technologies. These techniques are found 
principally in orthodox economic theory and in political theory--
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particularly pluralist political theory. 
Ralph Barton Perry has made convincing arguments to show that any-
thing about which a person or group of persons has concern possesses 
value.S A definition as broad as Perry's admits valuations across an 
infinite range, and therefore a IIIYriad of competing val ues and confl ict-
ing interests. In other words, values perceived by persons and lnstitu-
tions are as multifarious and disparate as society is pluralistic, and 
there is no simple or direct method to structure and weigh competing 
values in. selecting ends and ways of organizing means toward achieving 
those ends. 
The problem is to resolve those conflicting interests in a selec-
tion of social ends and an allocation of means which somehow maximizes 
social welfare. Such resolution involves optimizing in the allocation of 
social means to the creation of social welfare. Vilfredo Pareto des-
cribes an efficient allocation as one in which means have been allocated 
such that it is impossible to improve anyone's welfare without adversely 
affecting the welfare of another. 9 J. R. Hicks and Nicholas Kaldor argue 
that social welfare can be improved, even though a Pareto-optimal alloca-
tion of means exists, if social product is redistributed in such a way 
that those persons losing welfare value their losses less than those 
persons who gain welfare value their gains. 10 
Kenneth Arrow's IIposs ibil ity theorem" asserts that there are some 
conditions of choices under which no market or pol itical arrangements 
will necessarily define, much less achieve, a social-welfare function 
amenabl e to Paretian measurement. ll Nevertheless, the Pareto criteria 
remain a compell ing ideal to be as nearly achieved as possible. How-
ever, any movement toward that ideal should be based soundly on 
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empirically accurate valuations. Valuations function to weigh costs and 
benefits, where benefits are the hUman satisfactions achieved by secur-
ing particularly desirable sets of ends, and costs are the alternative 
ends foregone to achieve those benefits. 
Both costs and benefits may possess either internal attributes 
(aesthetic, private, divisible, personal, visceral, etc.) or external 
attributes (ethical, institutional, public, indivisible, collective, 
etc.) or part internal and part exte,'na1 attributes. Economists have 
shown hal"( goods and services (and outcomes) which possess only internal 
benefits and costs may be efficiently provided through the pricing mech-
anisms of free markets. Such goods are viewed as so-called private goods. 
Francis Bator and others have argued convincingly that goods and 
services (and outcomes) which possess substantial external benefits or 
costs cannot be efficiently provided through free markets because the 
goods are not divisib1e. 12 Once such goods have been produced, no one 
can be exel uded from enjoying the benefits or suffering the costs aris-
ing from their production. Goods posseSSing substantial external ities 
are therefore collective goods or public goods. Since public goods 
cannot be divided, they cennot be packaged and sold in consumer units. 
And since each person val ues his benefits and costs differently, there 
is no way to discover the true magnitude of the benefit or cost any 
person experiences with public goods. Persons, therefore, tend to ufree 
ride ll in the consumption of public goods by understating their benefits 
and overstating their costs. Goods possessing substantial externalities 
must be provided wholly Of" in part under some other institutional 
arrangement than free markets. 13 
The usual alternative arrangement to free markets for allocating 
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public goods is some variation of government institutions and the elec-
toral process. Whatever institutional arrangement is set upon, some 
technique for weighing social benefits and social costs is needed. The 
technique enjoying currency in recent years is lIbenefit-cost analysis. II 
Mishan and others have described the process and some of the issues 
involved. 14 
The issues surrounding cost-benefit analysis raise substantial 
doubt as to its accuracy in valuing publ ic goods. The problems surround 
the following questions: 
- Which costs and benefits will be included in the analysis? 
- Which are internal and which are external? 
- What pecuniary values will be assigned to external costs and 
benefits? 
- What social discount rate will be used to discount future bene-
fits and costs back to present val ues? 
- Over what useful 1 ife will the future benefits and costs be 
discounted? 
- What is to be maximized or minimized in the outcome? 
- And the most important question of all, which institutional 
values will reign over the processes deciding these questions? 
Clearly, the cost-benefit analysis of any potential public activity 
can lead to many different conclusions depending on how the foregoing 
questi ons are answered, and they can be answered any number of ways. 
Despite its obvious limitations, cost-benefit analysis appears to be the 
best tool available for evaluating alternative public ends. All of 
which points up the problem--values as perceived by persons and insti-
tutions are multifarious and disparate, and there is no simple or direct 
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method to structure and weigh competing values regarding ends and means. 
How, then, does society reconcile the tensions between ceremonialism and 
technology in selecting ends and in organizing means? 
URBAN PLURALISM 
The answer is found in institutional changes that are brought 
about through collective action and interest-group politics. Theories 
of collective action are components of institutional economic theory, 
and they ,are the original products of John R. Commons. Theories regard-
ing interest-group politics stem f,om contemporary political theory. 
The two bodies of theory attempt to explain how institutions adjust to 
unstabil izing social aberrations through changes in custom and law. 
Coll ective Action 15 
According to Commons, conflicts of interests rise between IIgoing 
concerns II (institutions) over the present and future uses of scarce 
resources. Resources are scarce because of property ri ghts, and the 
confl icts of interests are resolved through "transactions iJ that affect 
interinstitutional changes in property rights. Transactions take place 
within the 1 imits of custom and law operating as uworking rules.!! At 
the same time any transaction involves establishment of the particular 
working rules that will govern the exchange with which it deals. Thus, 
customs change as working rules change and become routinized through 
transactions. 
Transactions are classified by Commons as bargaining transactions, 
rationing transactions, and managerial transactions. Bargaining trans-
actions are voluntary arrangements between going concerns of 
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approximately equal powers, and they tend to be juridical in nature. 
Rationing transactions involve legislative powers, and they take place 
between collective superiors and legal subordinates. They are, for the 
most part, involuntary. Managerial transactions involve executive powers 
in which involuntary actions arise out of decisions about organiz~d uses 
of properties and other rights previously established out of bargaining 
or rationing transactions. 
All transactions involve conflicts of interest arising from 
scarcity" interdependency of interests arising from the need for exchange, 
and order arising from a need for working rules to facilitate exchange. 
Transactions function to convert conf1 icts of interests to interdepen-
dencies of interests. And collective action, through the power of trans-
actions, creates and changes the working rules--unorganized custom, 
organized custom in the form of cOnJllon law, and the co·dified laws of 
nation-states, including constitutional, statutory, and administrative 
laws. 
Parties to a transaction include the social organizations between 
which property rights are to be exchanged, the best alternative exchange 
on both sides, and collective action operating through custom and law. 
Bargaining power in a transact;on is the right to deny others the future 
uses of properties. It is seldom equal between the going concerns 
involved in transactions; however, any exercise of bargaining power is 
legal so long as the transaction is completed within the parameters of 
custom and law. This defines what Commons calls "reasonable value ll --
whatever bargaining power is allowed in custom and law. 
The dynamism of this process is in the relationships between trans-
actions, customs, and laws. Transactions are structured by custom and 
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out of the routine practice of transactions. Such determinations 
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establish and change property rights and thus the power relationships 
between going concerns in transactions. The legal foundations of govern-
ments are in the natures of the predominant forms of transactions in the 
governed societies--bargaining transactions (juridical power), ration-
ing transactions (legislative power), and managerial transactions 
(executive power). 
Interest-Group Pol itics 
As customs evolve out of the routine practice of transactions, law 
slowly changes to conform to the evolving customs. How changes in the 
law come about in an industrial democracy is explained by the pluralist 
theOl·y of pol iti cs. Much has beeh written si nce World War I I about the 
group basis of politics, in which group theory from the field of soci-
ology has been app1 ied to the study of pol itica1 interactions. The 
fruits of that union are pluralist political theory.16 Pluralist theory 
does much to explain how political stability is maintained by the inter-
action of interest groups in which groups are free to form and dissolve 
coalitions with other groups in support or opposition to issues about 
which people feel strongly enough to create, join, leave, and dissolve 
interest groups. 
According to Dewey, any social activity involves at least two 
groups, those directly involved in the activity, and those indirectly 
affected for good or bad by the activity. Those persons who are 
indirectly affected and who perceive their interests involved in the 
activity will organize to protect those interests. Dewey called the 
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organized interest a public, and insofar as the public commissions 
agents to operate in its behalf regarding the activity, there exists the 
institution CT government. 17 
Earl Latham, a political plural ist writing somewhat later, argued 
that social activities take place in groups.18 All values cherished by 
people are realized through groups. There are a great many accommoda-
tions made through group interactions--the common and the universal, 
the diverse and the particular. Latham included both privately and 
publicly ,organized groups in his observations. 
According to Latham, groups are in constant motion and it is 
through group interaction that the rules of government are made and 
changed, and the community is governed. Groups organize, as Dewey said, 
to concentrate power and to use that power to come to terms with their 
environments. So-called official groups are those organized as public, 
and they function to provide levels of compromise in writing the rules 
(laws) for other groups. This is, of course, accomplished in the United 
states under the Constitution by the various branches and levels of 
governments--legislative, executive (including the myriad of administra-
tive and regulatory agencies) and the judicial branches, as well as 
federal, state. and local levels of governments. 
The whole idea ;s that consensus can be reached, the laws can be 
created and changed, and human welfare can be enhanced through small-
group interactions in which individuals are free to join or leave any 
group, and any group is free to form coalitions with other interest 
groups in support or opposition to any action or issue. In this way. 
a public-interest equilibrium results from public opinion and the 
interaction of opposing forces. Equil ibrium is maintained by the 
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interaction alone and no outside authority is needed to maintain 
stability. 
Thus, the tensions between ceremonialism and technology are 
reconciled through transactions between going concerns in which the 
transactions change working rules, and the working rules alter customs 
according to the collective action theories of John R. Commons. More-
over, laws are changed by interest-group interactions to conform to 
evolving customs according to political pluralist theories. Finally, 
the result .is very long-run changes in the institutional system while 
social stability is maintained. 
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This chapter has introduced the work at hand as a partial synthesis 
of institutional economic theory and political pluralist theory and the 
appl ication of the results to urban affairs. The chapter sets forth the 
assumption that urban phenomena cannot be effectively studied in isola-
tion of other phenomena. That is, any event that has urban consequences 
or is itself the consequence of urban activities is appropriately a 
subject of study by urbanologists. This is followed by a brief outl ine 
of the institutional economic theories, the orthodox economic theories, 
and the political pluralist theories that are components of the synthesis. 
The next chapter, Chapter II, is a brief review of selected social 
science literature on institutions. The review is undertaken to define 
the word lIinstitution ll in a way that will serve throughout the remaining 
chapters. The remaining chapters are elaborations of the foregoing 
theories in the context of urbanization and urban affairs. 
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CHAPTER II 
INSTITUTIONS 
The word "institutional" appears frequently in the preceding chap-
ter, and the word lIinstitutionU is in daily common usage. Most persons 
have a good notion what the word means. However, a good word definition 
of "insti.tution" remains elusive, and social scientists are not in com-
plete accord on a precise definition. This chapter attempts to develop 
a definition of "institution ll which will serve throughout the remainder 
of this work. In pursuit of such a definition, the first section 
examines the relationship between institutional and non-institutional 
groups. The next few sections examine respectively the origins of instt-
tutions. their social functions, their structures, and the attempts to 
classify them. The last section loosely relates institutions to urban 
areas and poses severa·] questions which will occupy the remaining 
chapters. 
INSTITUTIONS AND GROUPS 
Political science contemplates the distribution and application of 
social power--the capacity of one agent or coalition of agents to 
control the powers and direct the actions of other agents and groups--in 
the authoritative allocation of values. In so doing, political theorists 
tend to treat interest groups as more or less homogeneous and of approx-
imately equal power. That is, they tend to ignore intergroup differ-
entials--although criticism over recent years has caused political 
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scientists to reexamine these and other simpl ifying assumptions which 
undergird pluralist theories. 
The assumption of approximate intergroup homogeneity is a crucial 
weakness of pluralist theory. It seems clear enough that there are 
striking differences in power between groups. A group is defined as "two 
or more people between whom there is an established pattern of psychol-
ogical interaction [such that the aggregatioD? is recognized as an 
entity by its own members and usually by others because of its ... col-
lective behavior."l This definition may be applied to any human aggre-
gation from an entire civilization to a whole society, a nationality, a 
municipality, a neighborhood or other community, or simply two persons. 
Clearly the power of a community consensus to expand a city park located 
in the neighborhood is weak as cOl:npared to the remaining members of the 
much larger municipality who do not wish to expand the park under any 
circumstances. Thus, the magnitude of the aggregation is relevant in 
some sense to a group' 5 magnitude of power. 
Of equal importance ;s the relative positions of groups regarding 
particular social issues. Even groups with approximately equal numbers 
of members enjoy or suffer inequalities of power simply because of their 
relative positions regarding the issues of their collective concerns. 
For example. groups which support an established or institutionalized 
practice generally need not exert much power to justify continuation of 
the practice. That is, the position itself may possess the power 
because of the institutional nature of the practice. On the other hand, 
groups which seek changes to such established practices must usually 
exhaust every power at their disposal in advocacy for change. 
The issues of slavery and civil rights in the United States are 
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cases in pOint. Despite the Declaration of Independence, which loudly 
proclaimed in 1776 that "all men are created equal ,II and the revered 
Bill of Rights to the U. S. Constitution, which guarantees certain human 
freedoms, the then existing institution of black slavery persisted until 
1865. It ended then only after a bloody Civil War anu ratification of 
the Thirteenth Amendment to that Constitution. 
Likewise, the Fourteenth Amendment and a variety of Civil Rights 
laws in the 1870's failed to operationalize the rights of freedmen, or 
former sl,a.ves, until the landmark Supreme Court decision, Brown et al Y1. 
Board of Education of Topeka et al in 1954. That case released a verit-
able landslide of pent-up and bitter protest from black citizens who had 
tolerated discrimination at the hands of whites, based in part upon the 
prior inferior social status of slavery. These protests were met with 
angry and often violent reactions from whites, many of whom may go to 
their graves bel ieving that black people are inferior and whites superior. 
Discrimination continues even now in spite of recent Civil Rights Acts. 
The point is that the powers of institutionalized practices and beliefs 
doggedly persist even when they are demonstrably bankrupt and great 
human suffering has been spent in the advocacy for change. 2 
Perhaps of even greater importance is the relative character of 
the groups regarding particular social issues. That is. groups of 
approximately equal numbers of members possess unequal powers because of 
differences in their essential characteristics. For example, the 
officials of a municipal government--the mayor, members of the city coun-
cil. city manager. city engineer, city planner, and members of the plan-
ni ng commi ssi on--wi 11 generally possess more coll ective power to deci de 
land-use issues for their community than any other interested group 
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The quality which distinguishes the municipal government from other 
groups in this simple example is its institutional character. That is, 
it possesses some of the coercive powers of the institution of govern-
ment, powers which it may apply to community land-use issues as well as 
to a wide range of other municipal issues. And these particular institu-
tional powers are not generally shared with other groups immediately 
intereste.d .in the issues over which the institution enjoys province. 
Thus, institutional groups generally possess crucial and decisive powers 
regarding issues because of characteristics which distinguish them from 
non-institutional groups. 
Institutional groups are therefore unique and distinguished from 
other social groups with sufficient Significance to make them objects of 
especially concentrated study. Research into the nature of institu-
tions has occupied sociologists for more than a hundred years and some 
economists for more than seventy-five. While it is intended to dwell 
here on the work of economists, it seems appropriate at the outset to 
summarily review some of the more significant conclusions of other social 
scientists regarding institutions--notably sociologists and cultural 
anthropologists. Much has been written by those scholars which illumin-
ates some of the essential character of i nsti tutions--thei r ori gi ns, 
soci al functions, structures, methods of operati on, and c1 ass ificati ons. 
What follows at this point is an ontological exploration of institutions 
out of which will emerge a concise and hopefully clear definition of 
institutions which will serve throughout the remainder of this work. 
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ORIGINS OF INSTITUTIONS 
Social scientists have differing perspectives as to the origins of 
institutions. Institutions have "come· out of mores, II according to Sumner, 
where mores are folkways, which are commonly understood to enhance social 
welfare, and the breaches of which are more severely and formally pun-
ished than breaches of ordinary folkways. Ordinary folkways are popular 
habits, the breaches of which are punished informally by avoidance, exclu-
sion, or ostracism. Likewise, Veblen vaguely defines institutions as 
clusters aT habits and customs--ways of doing and thinking about things--
that are sanctioned by long practice and by approval of the community. 3 
The custom by which a groom carries his bride over their first 
threshe>ld is a happy 1 ittle folkway which is one of a number of cere-
monies marking the advent of the couple's matrimony. The practice enjoys 
the universal approbation of the community, but the state of matrimony 
wi 11 not be di sso I ved nor wi 11 the groom suffer more than verbal chas-
tisement if he omits it from the ceremonial steps to the nuptial chamber. 
However, the admonition "thou shalt not commit adulteryll is an example 
of a more which has been codified into the laws of most nations as 
inimical to the institution of monogamous matrimony--an institutiolJ which 
has grown out of that and other related mores. Persons who breach those 
mores are generally subject to formal sanctions which may be pressed by 
the injured spouse, or brought by the state, or both. 
On the other hand, Chapin believes that institutions arise out of 
the fundamental needs of mankind. According to this view, institutions 
come into existence because they stabil ize the behavior of people who 
are striving to deal with such fundamental needs as fear, hunger, and 
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stabilizes social relations in dealing with the human need for sexual 
expression. It clearly defines the roles of husband and wife and the 
socially acceptable limits upon their marital and extramarital sexual 
express i cns. 
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Martindale disputes the biological !lneeds theoryll because institu-
tions are social phenomena and hUman needs are not immutable pre-
requisites of social existence. He believes that "group needs II are a 
more real,istic basis for institutions. Among group needs are the need 
for security, social stability, and perpetuation of the group. These 
needs necessarily imply constraints upon the liberties of individual 
members in the interest of the group. 4 
For example, the institution of private property has evolved in 
part as a guarantee of minority rights for the owners to enjoy the quiet 
use of that attractive cape-cod cottage down the block along with all of 
its contents. Perhaps more important, that right also impl ies the power 
to deny their use to all nonowners of those particular properties. While 
the nonowners probably possess different properties of their own, they 
are a nonowning majority regarding that particular cape cod and its con-
tents. Private property rights are, of course, reciprocal insofar as the 
owners of that cape cod jOin the nonowning majority regarding the pro-
perties of others. They therefore tacitly agree to respect the private 
property rights of others as others have honored their property rights. 
These institutional arrangements augur toward the stability of intra-
group relations in uses of the myriad of nonhuman things which are nec-
essary in some measure for the satisfaction of human needs--both human 
group needs and the needs of the human individuals who comprise the 
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group.5 
Still other social scientists distinguish several periods of insti-
tutional development in what is called an "institutional cycle"--(l) 
incipient organization, (2) efficient functioning, (3) formalism, (4) 
disintegration, (5) disappearance or reformation. According to this 
idea, an institution may rise in its incipient phase as a reform move-
ment during a social crisis which demands new techniques for handling 
social problems. The movement develops leaders, organizational structure, 
norms (ru.les or standards of behavior) for dealing with the social issues 
of its special concern, and the material accouterment necessary for its 
efficient operation. During its phase of efficient functioning, the 
institution comes to enjoy legitimacy and prestige and to have the power 
to direct the actions of others. Eventually, the institution becomes a 
cherished end-in-itself. Its functionaries grow complacent and reaction-
ary and its structure becomes inflexible during its formal phase. As 
society progresses, the institution may find itself overtaken and unable 
to cope in a new and changing social environment. Thus, it disinte-
grates and disappears, or, if it serves some crucial social purpose, it 
is drastically reformed during another social crisis. 
The rise of labor unionism and the institutionalization of labor 
organization and collective bargaining in the U. S. illustrates aspects 
of the institutional cycle. Labor unionism is a modern phenomenon which 
arose concomitant with modern urbanization from the social crises 
accompanying what is popularly called the industrial revolution. During 
the immediate preindustrial age there were no labor unions, and industry 
and commerce took place between very small business and consuming units 
in small but often competitive markets. Transactions were direct and 
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face-to-face. The buyer knew the seller and usually the maker as well. 
The maker was intimately acquainted with whomever he employed Indeed, he 
rarely employed more than one or two persons in his enterprise. 
It was the belief that atomistic and competitive markets would make 
the most efficient allocation of resources and distribution of income 
that could be achieved. These beliefs gave rise to a Common Law prohibi-
ticn against any conspiracy which would restrain trade--that is, to con-
spiratorially and artificially reduce the supply of goods and services 
to markets and thereby raise prices and wages above those which would 
prevail under competitive conditions. The Common Law prohibition 
against such conspiracies was later codified in the U. S. as the nSherman 
Anti-Trust Act of 1890.,,6 
Likewise, it was bel ieved that there was no need for government 
regulation of private economic activities so long as competitive markets 
functioned as they were supposed to. Indeed, government economic inter-
vention was viewed as undesirable intrusion: into the private affairs of 
citizens. This, coupled with a general distrust of governments resulted 
in a number of well-known limitations on the powers of governments in the 
U. S. Constitution. One such limitation is Section 10 of Article I which 
prohibits governments in the United States from enacting any law impair-
ing the obligations of contracts. 7 This provision and the Common Law 
and statutory prohibition against conspiracies which restrain trade and 
commerce effectively barred the organization of labor and collective 
bargaining in the United States for more than a century. 
Agreements between an employer and his employee were, after all, 
private contracts with which governments could not tamper, according to 
the Constitution. And is it not true that employees who organize and 
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meet to set wages, working conditions, and other matters of employment 
are conspiring to restrain free and competitive trade in labor markets? 
These, then, were the pre-industrial institutional arrangements govern-
ing employment and wages. Each agreement between an employer and an 
employee was a separate, private contract arrived at by individual bar-
gaining between the two parties. No one else was privy to the contract 
and therefore no one but the two parties could have any cause of action 
on the contract under the Common Law. 
However, the early Nineteenth Century witnessed the first sparks 
of the industrial revolution in the United States. Social events which 
mark the succeeding era include the innovation of new power, transporta-
tion, manufacturing, and agricultural technologies, the emergency of 
large-scale corporate enterprises each employing many workers, and the 
migration of labor from rural areas and agricultural employments to urban 
areas and manufacturing and service employments. This latter event 
effectually decreased individual or famil ial independence and greatly 
increased social interdependence insofar as the revered family farm pro-
duced much of the sUbstance it consumed while the urban family relied 
entirely upon a wage-earner's buying power to satisfy its consumption 
needs. 
Urban product markets lost their competitive flavor, becoming mono-
polistic and oligopolistic with large-sca1e business enterprise. like-
wise, urban labor markets lost their competitiveness, becoming oligop-
sonistic and in some cases monopsonistic with the massing of many workers 
in urban areas dominated by a few large enterprises. Relationships 
changed from primary to secondary. Transactions between consumers and 
producers, and between employers and employees became impersonal and 
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took place at armIs length. Thus, employer-managers came to possess 
great power to dictate wages and working conditions to workers who had 
little choice but to accept whatever was offered. 
As one might expect, employers took advantage of the situation to 
exploit labor for private gain. Wages were abysmally low in most areas, 
working conditions were primitive and working hours were long. The 
fantastic profits realized from these cost savings were used to further 
fuel the industrial revolution and to enrich the corporate owners. The 
instituti.Dn~l arrangements which descended from the preindustrial past 
were simply not appropriate to the social situations introduced by the 
industrial revolution. The resulting crises gave rise to the American 
labor movement and the incipient phase of the institution now known as 
the labor union. 8 
The labor movement was a long, mighty, and often violent struggle 
for the legitimacy of labor's right to organize and bargain collectively 
with employers. The movement was met head-on by the intransigence of 
private businessmen and the formidable juridical powers of the courts 
upholding the Common Law and the Constitution. Time and space do not 
permit further elaboration of the long struggle which eventually culmin-
ated in the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA), the so-called 
IIMagna Carta of Labor." The act formal ized the legitimacy of labor 
organization and collective bargaining, and it marks the beginning of 
labor unionism's institutional phase of efficient functioning. The Act 
passed its constitutionality test in 1937 when the Supreme Court handed 
down its landmark decision IINational Labor Relations Board ~ Jones and 
Laughlin Steel Co.,,9 
The labor mores which arose with the labor union movement and which 
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were not codified in the NLRA were formalized in legislation following 
the Jones and Loughlin case. Labor unions have become a fact of insti-
tutional 1 ife in the United States. They have recognized leaders who 
possess prestige and influence. They have organized structure (the 
local, the international, the federation, and the convention) and insti-
tutional norms (strike, picket, union shop, check-off, col1ective bar-
gaining, and much more). And finally, they possess the power to direct 
the actions of others. 
It .appears that the labor union may now have passed into its formal 
phase in terms of the institutional cycle. The union has become a cher-
i shed end-in-itself--something 1 i ke motherhood, the Constitution and 
democratic government in the U. S., all of which stand above serious 
criticism. All of American labor ' s major objectives stand long achieved--
the forty-hour week. paid holidays and vacations, union security, min-
imum wages, bargaining on a11 wage and employment conditions, etc. Its 
structures are inflexible in the face of labor force changes which 
threaten the foundations of the union movement. Its officers and other 
functionaries have become complacent and even reactionary at a time when 
labor's role in inflation~ unemployment~ and discrimination suggest the 
need for changes in both the cherished labor mores and union powers at 
the bargaining table. 
What the future may hold for the institution of labor unionism 
cannot be known. However, if its structural inflexibil ities and the 
complacent and reactionary attitudes of its leaders cause it to be over-
taken and unable to cope in new and changing social environments, it will 
likely disintegrate and disappear. Or, if it continues to serve some 
crucial social purpose, it win be reformed during the ensuing social 
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crisis. The poir:t is simply that the rise of labor unionism and the 
institutiunalization of labor organization and collective bargaining in 
the U. S. illustrates aspects of the institutional cycle, incipient 
organization, efficient functioning, formalism, disintegration, and 
disappearance or reform. 
The foregoing ideas do not appear to be alternative theories of the 
origin of institutions. Rather, they are complementary explanations. 
Even the apparent dispute over the hUman needs '!.2. group needs theories 
seems superficial. Institutions may and probably do arise to meet either 
or both kinds of needs. At any rate, these explanations are compatible 
with the idea that institutions come out of mores, or widely understood 
and held values and with the idea of a so-called institutional cycle. 
Whatever theory one holds of the origin of institutions, it seems clear 
that they evolve with or from some particular system of values--whether 
those values center upon human interacti on, materi a 1 thi ngs, or proced-
ures governing human uses of material objects, and whether those values 
are aesthetic, ethical, technical, or pecuniary in character. 
SOCIAL FUNCTIONS OF INSTITUTIONS 
The theory of the origins of institutions is suggestive of the 
principal function of institutions, that of maintaining social stability. 
As already noted, Chapin argued that institutions come into existence 
because they stabilize the behavior of people seeking to satisfy basic 
needs. r~ead stresses the same phenomena, hol ding that group ex; stence 
presents each member with a number of similar or identical 
situations which yield to common responses. These responses are insti-
tutional in the sense that institutions represent aspects of group 
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group attitude toward those activities. 10 
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Likewise, Parsons argues that certainty and stabflity in social 
interaction result. because institutions are urol e integrates" which 
organize onels expectations in any given social context. 11 For example, 
the participants in a common economic transaction will play the roles of 
buyer and seller. Presumably the buyer wishes to acquire possession and 
legal title to some object which the seller either owns himself or is 
selling as an agent of the true owner. The institution of law--more 
narrowly. commercial or contract law--will govern their transaction. 
Each party. having knowledge of contract law, will know what ;s expected 
of himself and the other party as the transaction proceeds. 
They both know that the object of their transaction must have a 
1 ega1 purpose--that ; 5, the contract cannot be undertaken in contempl a-
tion of breaking the law. They also know that each must have contractual 
capac ity before the transaction wi 11 resul tin a bi ndi ng contract. The 
seller knows that he must make an offer to sell and the buyer knows that 
he must make an acceptance of the offer in order to reach the agreement 
(or mutuality of assent) necessary to the contract. Finally, there must 
be consideraticn. or something in exchange. given by the buyer to the 
seller at the time the seller gives over possession of the object to the 
buyer. Having met all of these conditions, both the buyer and the seller 
may der-art with certainty that all other members of society will honor 
the outcome of their transaction. 12 
Certainty and stabil ity in social interaction result in this case 
because the institutions of law and the market have integrated the roles 
of buyer and seller in their economic transactions. Thus the principal 
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function of institutions is that of maintaining social stability so that 
members of society might interact with some degree of certainty as to 
outcomes. Other functions are subsidiary and supportive of this one. 
There are at least three of these subsidiary functions: exercise social 
control, socialize persons, and transmit culture. 
Institutions are the social groups which exercise social control--
the modicum of processes through which society or any social subgroup 
obtains conformity by its members to its mores or norms of expected be-
havior. In addition to his many other observations on institutions, 
Sumner stressed the social-control function. Likewise. John R. COrmlons, 
one of the founders of institutional economics, defined institutions in 
terms of their social-control function--IlInstitutions are collective 
action in control. liberation, and expansion of individual action.,,13 
The preceding description of how the institution of law achieves 
certainty and stab;l ity in social interaction by integrating the roles 
of buyer and seller in their transaction serves equally well to illus-
trate the social-control function of institutions. In that case, the 
institution of law controlled the social interaction by prescribing the 
essential elements of a binding contract; legal ity of purpose, contrac-
tual capacity, mutuality of assent, and consideration. Social behavior 
which achieves these elements is reinforced by execution of the contract 
and consurrmation of the transaction to the satisfaction of all concerned. 
The foregoing emphasizes the regulatory character of social con-
trol--the power to prescribe certain social actions, to proscribe other 
actions, to reward proper behavior and to impose punishments for non-
compl iance. Clearly members of society must understand and accept their 
roles and the social norms under which they must play out those roles if 
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social control is to be effective and social stability a reality. Thus 
another function of institutions is socia1ization--a social-psychological 
process whereby the personal ity is conditioned to the fo1 kways and mores 
and is shaped to fit the social roles it will play in society. It is a 
process of initiation which commences when a person is born and ends for 
him when he dies. 
For example, the male infant, who possesses certain biological 
characteristics which distinguish him from the female, immediately com-
mences to learn about his distinctions and the roles he will play because 
of those distinctions. The first institution to socialize him is the 
family. The family dresses him in blue and his sisters in pink. The 
family applies rewards to reinforce behavior which fits the male role in 
life. He learns that he should expect to one day become a husband, 
father, and bread-winner. And he is introduced to a II1Yriad of folkways 
which enforce these roles. Likewise, he is discouraged from behavior 
which does not comport with the male roles he is expected to assume. 
This socialization into male roles will be carried on by every other 
institution in which the maturing male finds himse1f--the school, the 
law, the church, the economy, the government, etc. He will, therefore, 
learn to submit to social control and do his best in his male role to 
help achieve social stability through institutional processes. 
In addition to initiating persons into their roles, socialization 
also transmits culture from gelleration to generation. Malinowski 
alludes to this when he calls institutions the "real units of culture" 
which organize the activities of people who are attempting to satisfy 
basic needs--where cul ture is a term meaning all socially-acquired 
behavior patterns that are communicated by symbols. This includes all 
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material artifacts of mankind as well as the fol kways and mores, or the 
nonmaterial attributes of society.14 
One may cite virtually any procedure, or material object generally 
used by mankind as an example of a culture item which is transmitted 
from generation to generation through the process of social ization. All 
the attributes of language, as well as the books, road signs and other 
physical manifestations of language are examples of cultural trans-
mission, albeit that language also happens to be an institution. More-
over, all language skills are learned. That is, none of the language 
skills are inherited genetically or arise as normal biological phenomena. 
The process by which the culture of any particular language capa-
bi1 ity is imparted to the young is one of social ;zation in which the 
reciprocal roles are those of transmitter and receiver or writer and 
reader. The social ;zation commences in the institution of the family and 
is carried on by the institution of education as well as a variety of 
other institutions. The result ;s the transmission of cultural norms by 
which people may communicate meanings to one another through the use of 
sound and graph; c symbol s. The abi 1 ity to successfully communi cate 1 ends 
itself to certainty and stability in social interaction. It is in and 
through institutions that society gets it all together--both the material 
and non-material aspects of culture and all of the values attending 
thereto. And it is through the socialization process of institutions 
that culture is transmitted from generation to generation. 
In summation. it may be said that institutions function to preserve 
social stabil ity through exercising social control. social izing persons 
and transmitti ng cul ture. On a hi gher 1 evel of general izati on. it may be 
claimed that institutions are the social guardians of culture and the 
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proper discharge of institutional functions serves to preserve and per-
petuate cultural attributes in the society of which the institutions 
are a part. 
INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE 
Turning now to institutional structure, it is said that institu-
tions are organized social groups--groups structured so that their pur-
poses are achieved by dividing their functions among members or agents 
who carry out those functions as individuals or as sub-groups. SUmner 
distinguishes between an institutional "concept" of socially-sanctioned 
activities and a Il structure ll which provides organizational patterns for 
the real ization of the concept. Of course this organized character is 
not unique to institutions. MacIver defines institutions as established 
forms of procedure which are characteristic of group activity, while 
associations are organized groups with structure, identity, and 
membership.15 
It seems clear that institutions might be divided into their human 
and non-human components, as Maciver attempts to do. However, it also 
seems artificial to refer to the non-human components as the institution, 
and the human components as something else. An institution is a 
uniquely hUman and social phenomena, even though it may involve other 
cultural attributes. And it is difficult to comprehend how an institu-
ticn can possess any being or significance without its human components 
and its social character. Thus, an institution is an organized social 
group which is united with and employs the establ ished forms of pro-
cedure to which MacIver refers. 
Terms frequently associated with institutional groups are bureau 
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and oligarchy. That is, institutional life ;s a bureaucratic existence 
in which the officers or agents of the institution occupy positions or 
offices and play the roles in society dictated by those offices. Role is 
behavior expected of an individual who occupies a particular social posi-
tion in which the behavior is determined by the group or culture of which 
the person is a member. The positions or offices are generally arranged 
in some scalar fashion with some offices connoting higher rank and status 
or greater power than other offices in the institutional structure. 16 
The modern business corporation aptly illustrates an economic 
institution which possesses a scalar bureaucracy. The corporation ;s a 
legal individual created by the state through the issuance of a corporate 
chat'ter. The owners possess shares of stock as evidence of their owner-
ship and of their rights to participate in the election of a board of 
directors and to receive a share of the net profits of the corporation. 
The board of directors has the power to name the corporation preSident, 
delegate operating authorities to the president, hold him accountable for 
results stemming from those authorities, and declare the dividends by 
which the owners--or shareholders--participate in profits of the corpor-
ation. 
Shareholders and members of the board of directors do not typically 
engage in the day-by-day management of the corporate business. Rather, 
this is the function of the person apPOinted to the position and playing 
the role of president. He is usually the general agent of the corpora-
tion with powers to bind the corporation into contracts with persons and 
other corporations. The president has an organization conSisting of 
positions occupied by persons who play the roles of subordinate corpor-
ate officers and other functionaries. 17 
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The typical small manufactL!""ing firm would probably have four divi-
sions: finance, materials, production, and marketing. Examining only the 
production division for a moment, the 1 ine position titles in descending 
order of rank, status, and power might include the vice-president for pro-
duction, the superintendent of plant operations, the plant manager for 
plant #2, the plant #2 swing-shift foreman, the 1 ine A lead foreman on 
plant #2 swing shift, and the assembly technician on line A in the plant 
#2 swing shift. The persons occupying each of these corporate positions 
take on the habits of dress and customs of behavior primarily as they 
perceive thei r ro1 es and status through the expectations of others, both 
inside and outside the institution. Thus, the modern business corpora-
tion, like other institutions, possesses a scalar bureaucracy. 
Insofar as there is bureaucratization and organized structure, it 
is often claimed that institutions are also oligarch',cal in that there is 
control within institutions by the few officers who possess the highest 
rank. And it follows that these same few officers exercise the institu-
tional powers in interaction with other interest groups over issues of 
their collective concerns. The point is, that institutional groups are 
organized social groups, and this characteristic, coupled with other 
institutional attributes, endows the institution with formidable pOi'Jer 
in deal ing with non-institutional groups or social issues. 
Hence, the unique powers of institutions are functions of their 
strategic positions on social issues and of their essential character-
istics. That is, arising from mores, institutions stand to preserve the 
status quo on any issue while groups opposing the status quo stand to 
challenge the mores or the fundamental beliefs of most people. Moreover, 
institutions possess special powers for the preservation of the status 
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quo--or the maintenance of stabil ity and certainty in social interaction. 
These special powers are crucial to the functioning of institutions 
exercising social control, in socializing initiates, in transmitting 
culture, and thus in maintaining stability. 
The special powers of institutions are to maintain and prescribe 
norms of expected behavior, award and reinforce behavior conforming to 
expectations, proscribe non-conforming behavior, and impose sanctions 
for non-conforming behavior. In speaking of religion, Dewey writes: 
To .say it is institutional ized is to say that it invol ves a 
tough body of customs, ingrained habits of action, organized 
and authorized standal"ds and methods of procedure ... Faith 
in these ideas, or at least in the catch words which express 
them, become obligatory, necessary fyS social salvation; 
disbelief or indifference is heresy. 
Noninstitutional groups may possess some capacities to employ these 
powers as amongst their particular memberships. However, they generally 
possess no legitimate powers to coerce persons who are not members of 
their particular groups into compliance with their norms. Indeed, their 
members are free to unilaterally terminate their relationships with the 
groups if they find themselves in such disagreement with group norms 
that they cannot conform. Finally, the sanctions of non-institutional 
groups are informal in nature: avoidance, exclusion, and ostracism from 
the group. And these sanctions are rarely significant outside the 
groups imposing them. 
On the other hand, institutions possess the power to prescribe and 
proscribe behavior of persons who hold !!.Q. offices inside the institu-
tional bureaucracies but who are members of the society whose culture 
the institutions preserve and transmit. Moreover, institutions generally 
possess the power to formally coerce nonconforming persons into 
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adherence with mores, or institutional norms. In the case of the state--
one of the political institutions of a nationality--such institutional 
coercion may achieve the ultimate force, the power to deprive nonconform-
ing members of their lives. 
Likewise, institutions award and reinforce conforming behavior by 
conferring status and the trappings of status upon persons who behave in 
accordance with the expectations attending the social roles they play. 
But more important, such conferred status is universally recognized and 
acclaimed throughout the society of which the institutions are a part, 
whereas the status conferred by noninstitutional groups is generally 
acknowledged only within the groups conferring the stat"s. 
For example, one who has managed to comply with all of the require-
ments is awarded the status of medical doctor. He must first be 
graduated from a baccalaureate institution, usually with honors, and the 
completion of a pre-medical curriculum. He must score high on the 
medical aptitude tests. He must then apply to many medical schools and 
hope that one will accept him. If he gains admittance, he must complete 
three or four years of rigorous professional schooling in medicine. The 
degree of doctor of medicine or medical doctor will be conferred upon him 
by the institution from which he is graduated if he completes his work 
successfully. 
However, he is not yet prepared to practice medicine without 
restrictions. He must next complete a residency of one or two years at 
some accredited hospital, after which he must take and pass his medical 
board examinations. He will then be certified by the state as qual ified 
to practice medicine and he may thereafter play the role of medical 
doctor without legal restrictions. If he chooses to special ize in some 
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narrow field of medicine, he must usually complete some additional pro-
fessional training and more internship. He may then practice in his 
specialty as well as in general medicine. He is addressed as I1doctor" 
and he is accorded great admiration and respect by all and envied by 
many. If he is in the least successful in his practice, he will enjoy 
the institutional status conferred upon him as well as great prestige, 
influence, and income for the rest of his life. 
This then is the modus operandi of institutions--they function to 
stabil ize social relations by maintaining the status quo. This is 
aecampl ished through the processes of social control, social ;zatian, 
and cultUre transmission. These latter functions are carried out through 
the unique institutional powers of prescribing and proscribing behavior, 
formally awarding behavior which comports with institutional expecta-
tions. and formally punishing nonconforming behavior--all of which is 
widely recognized, accepted and acclaimed throughout the society of 
which the institutions are a part. 
CLASSIFICATIONS OF INSTITUTIONS 
Having distinguished institutions and institutional groups from 
noninstitutional groups, it needs to be noted that institutions differ 
amongst themselves. That is. they are different as to their powers and 
their cultural attributes. Notwithstanding these di fferences, all 
institutions perform the functions, possess structures and operate as 
described above. The distinctions between institutions are therefore 
differences of magnitude rather than of essential character. These dif-
ferences have provoked attempts by social scientists to classify 
institutions. 
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For example, Herbert Spencer advanced a typology of institutions 
containing three main classes--maintaining and sustaining institutions 
(marriage and the family), producing and distributing institutions (the 
economic system), and regulating and restraining institutions (religion 
and the government). Anthropologists and others have divided institu-
tions into a primary class and a secondary c1 ass. According to this 
classification, primary institutions are found in all hUman societies 
and include marriage, the family, the economic system, and religion. 
Secondary; ;~stitutions are those derived from or functionally 
amplifying the primary institutions. Secondary institutions are language, 
art, education, recreation, government, and whatever others one might 
choose to list. 19 
Chapin writes of "diffused" institutions as those which stabil ize 
social behavior throughout a societY--language. art, recreation, etc.--
and of "nucleated" institutions as those which structure behavior 
within smaller units of society--the family, the business enterprise. 
the church. etc. On the other hand. Parsons distinguishes between rela-
tional, regulative, and cultural institutions. Relational institutions 
are those which prescribe reciprocal role expectations. Regulative 
institutions prescribe socially agreeable ways of striving toward certain 
ends. And cul tural i nstituti ons organize a peopl e' s cul tura 1 ori enta-
tions. Finally, Martindale sees so-called social institutions which 
organize the attainment of instrumental values. and cultural institutions 
which see intrinsic values as ends-in-themselves. 20 
The perception of this writer is that classifications of the fore-
going sort tend to obscure the essential likenesses of institutions by 
streSSing spurious and fallacious differences. For example, it appears 
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institutional functions with structures and methods of operation. In 
this regard, both Spencer and Parsons call one class of institutions 
"regulating and restraining insti tutions ll --while regulation or social 
control is a function of all institutions. 
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Likewise, Chapinls classification apparently assumes that the sa-
called diffused institution of language does not operate to structure 
behavior in the smaller units of society, the family, school, etc. Or, 
conversely, that the so-called nucleated institutions possess no capacity 
to stabilize social behavior throughout society. And finally, Parsons 
and Martindale write of so-called 'lcultural institutions Ii as a class by 
itself, while it has been shown above that all institutions are 
repos itori es and transmi tters of cul ture. The poi nt is, that classi fi-
cations of institutions of the foregoing sort may serve some narrow 
purposes, but they a1 so obfuscate the ontology of institutions. 
A further paint against arbitrary classifications of institutions 
is that institutions tend to be interdependent and intersupportive. For 
example, the institution of the family is dependent upon the institutions 
of marriage, the church, the state, and ',nstitutions of the economic 
system--to say nothing of language, 1 a ....... , art, education, and the like--
to create the social bonds which unite the couples who are starting the 
famil ies, to enforce the sets of property and other social arrangements 
which protect families within society, and to produce and distribute the 
goods and services which the family needs but cannot produce for itself. 
Similar institutional interdependencies abound and they greatly enhance 
the powers of institutions in the discharge of their stabil ;zation 
functions. 
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Likewise, one person may simultaneously play roles in many institu-
tions. That is, one woman may occupy the position and play the role of 
wife in the institution of matrimony, of mother in the institution of the 
family, of owner, manager, or worker in an economic institution, and city 
councilwoman in an institution of government, to name only a few of her 
possible institutional roles. Thus, the interdependencies of institu-
tions is matched by interlocking institutional memberships in which one 
person will occupy positions and play roles in many institutions. 
Thi.5. institutional interdependency has fostered a number of elitist 
theories about interinstitutional relationships. For example, C. Wright 
Mills believes that the oligarchies which control the economy, the 
government, and the military establishment also control all other groups. 
This idea is advanced in part as an alternative theory to the theories 
of political p1ura1ism--which, of course, tend to treat all groups as 
more or less homogeneous and of approximately equal power.21 
Control is maintained within an elite group of persons, according 
to Mills, each of whom has achieved status within the economy, the 
government, or the mil itary establ ishment by being male and caucasian, 
graduating from the right schools, belonging to the correct churches and 
clubs, living in acceptable neighborhoods in the right cities, and 
driving the right cars. ~~oreover, the oligarchy has made it easy, 
according to Mills, for persons with the proper status to fill positions 
and play roles in any of three controlling institutions and to shift to 
other positions, either within one institution or from one institution 
to another, whenever the situation demands it. 
Examples of persons who can and have played roles with high status 
in several or all of the el ite institutions are legion. One who comes 
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immediately to mind is Dwight D. Eisenhower. He graduated from the 
mil itary academy at West Point, New York. He achieved the highest active 
military rank attainable in the United States. He retired from the 
profession of arms to become the president of Columbia University. He 
returned from there to a military post for a time before seeking and 
winning election to the presidency of the United States. U. S. Grant, 
George C. Marshall, and Douglas MacArthur are among others who accom-
p1 ished similar transformations after graduation from West Point. 22 
This writer has no particular quarrel with Mills or with mast 
e1 itist theorists as regards the internal consistencies or the empirical 
relevancies of their arguments. Nor does he have cause to quarrel with 
·p1ura1ists an either of those two criteria. However, it appears some-
what hyperbolic for elitists to claim that their world view is alterna-
tive to pluralism, or for pluralists to argue that there is no elitism 
operational in a democratic society.23 
In the first place, one need only admit to imperfections in the 
political sphere to see that the democracy of pluralism is flawed toward 
oligarchy in the same way that imperfections in the market place flaw 
sa-called "perfectly competitive markets" toward 01igopo1istic markets in 
economic affairs. Mertons alludes to such imperfections when he claims 
that all institutions are nat equally supported by all social groups 
because certain existing institutions may preserve a status quo which is 
oppressive to same and very beneficial to others. He thus argues that 
nonconformity may reflect an unreasonable lack of opportunities within 
the existing institutional fabric of society.24 
The lack of opportunities to which Mertons alludes derives from 
unreasonable barriers to access to positions of institutional status and 
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power. Many trade and most professional associations function in part to 
erect and maintain barriers to entry into their skill s and professions. 
The object of these barriers is ostensibly to protect the pub1 ic from 
inferior craftsmanship and faulty professional practice. In fact, the 
real object is all too often to protect the existing craftsmen and pro-
fessional persons from competition and to restrict the supply of skilled 
labor and professional services so that persons already admitted to the 
trade or profession may enjoy 01 igopo1 istic or artificially high wages 
and fees_ 
This is every bit as true of union apprenticeship programs as it 
is of admission requirements to the practice of law or medicine. One 
can hardly argue that intensive special training is not needed to 
produce skilled medical doctors and competent attorneys. Likewise, one 
should not be expected to tolerate shoddy workmanship from a plumber or 
an electrician. The question is not whether there should be training; 
r.ather, it is how much training is really necessary to produce quality 
workmanship and competent professional service. 
Competence in most craft skills can be acquired by the average 
citizen with one year or less of training in an industrial arts school 
and one additional year working as an apprentice to a journeyman or 
master craftsman. But the usual union program calls for a minimum of 
four years of apprenticeship in the union before advancement to journey-
man regardless of other experience or training. The difference amounts 
to an unreasonable barrier to entry into the trade. Similar differ-
ences exist in the artificially protracted requirements for admission to 
medical and legal practice as well as to other professional vocations. 
The point is that these unreasonable barriers to entry restrict 
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opportunities to otherwise qualified aspirants. And these aspirants 
thereafter and therefore regard the institutions with skepticism and 
give them only grudging support. 
One may, of course, cite other barriers, many of which are based 
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on more noxious criteria--religious beliefs, racial characteristics, sex, 
national origin, etc. One may also cite other social imperfections 
which flaw pluralism toward oligarchy. However, this does not mean that 
a democratic pol itical system cannot achieve some measure of stabil ity 
while it _allocates values in its usual authoritarian manner any more than 
similar imperfections in a market system means that the market does not 
or cannot achieve some measure of market equil ibrium while it allocates 
1 imited resources to a 1 ternati ve and competi n9 soc; a1 ends. 
But, more important, both elitists and plural ists appear to have 
committed and compounded some significant errors. Pluralists tend to 
treat groups as though they were all noninstitutional in character. On 
the other hand, elitists tend to treat groups as though they are all 
instituti ona 1 in character. Neither vi ew squares properly wi th reality; 
for there are indeed both institutional and noninstitutional groups, as 
they have been distinguished here, operating in society. But, as 
further analysis will hopefully show, the concern of both of their 
operations centers on institutional change. However, it is inappro-
priate to expand further on that pOint at this time because that is the 
subject which occupies the remainder of this work. 
Rather, it is appropriate at this point to rational ize this brief 
search into the ontology of institutions. The purpose has been to 
establ ish a suitable working definition of an institution. Drawing from 
the ideas in the foregoing discussion, the definition of an institution 
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which will serve throughout the remainder of this work is: 
An institution is an organized social group which has evolved 
from and is united with some particular system of cultural 
val ues, and it serves through processes of soc i a 1 contra 1 to 
stabilize social interaction by preserving and perpetuating 
those values in the society of which the institution is a part. 
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The foregoing look at institutions has drawn principally from the 
works of sociologists and cultural anthropologists. While institutional 
economi sts do not essentially dispute other soc; a1 sci enti sts, they do 
possess a unique perspective on the functioning of institutions. Hence-
forth con,centration will be upon that institutional economic perspective. 
INSTITUTIONS AND URBAN AREAS 
The close and inextricable relationship between urban affairs and 
institutions is of particular importance to this paper. Institutions, 
of course, abound in urban areas. Indeed, nearly all institutions reach 
their zenith in cities. While the traditional view is that cities exist 
to house people and the things people need, it is not clear that people 
need cities solely for domiciliary purposes. Rather, the people are all 
involved in social interactions under the social control of the 
institutions which flourish in the cities. In this context, the city's 
principal raison d'etre may be viewed as to domicile the institutions 
needed to maintain social stabil ity in a complex society. It seems that 
people should have little need for cities were this not so. 
Moreover, the city itself is a creature of institutions. That is, 
city government with all of its trappings, educational institutions, 
and the myriad of family and business institutions from which the former 
two derive their tax bases and which tlley regulate in the interest of 
social stability, are institutions without which the city would have no 
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legitimacy and 1 ittle or no being. 
Hence, it is hoped that some progress toward a more wholistic 
theory of urbanology might be made by integrating group theory as it has 
been applied to political science with institutional economic theory and 
other aspects of traditional economic theory and relating the results to 
urban affairs. Toward that end, the remainder of this work will explore 
the following questions: 
1. What is the temporal setting of institutions and cities? 
(Chapter III). 
2. How do institutions function in that temporal setting? 
(Chapters IV - V). 
3. What are the underlying causes of institutional instability, 
change, and discontinuity, and what are the consequences of 
thi s to the city? (Chapters VI - VI II). 
4. How are institutional values measured in deal ing with the 
stresses leading to institutional change? (Chapter IX). 
5. By what processes do societies reconcile the social tensions 
which lead to institutional change? (Chapter X). 
6. What are the apparent social impl ications of the conclusions 
stemming from the foregoing questions? (Chapter XI). 
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CHAPTER III 
URBAN CONTINUUM 
The foregoing was an abbreviated. cross-sectional view of institu-
tions out of which a definition of institutions emerged. The view was 
cross-sectional in the sense that it explored the ontology of institu-
tions as static bodies or as entities at rest. It was like a picture of 
an object~ capturing its essence at some instant in time. The view 
purposely avoided the dynamics of institutionalism except by implication. 
It was, of course, implied in the descriptions of institutional 
characteristics that institutions take actions which are ordered in time. 
That is, institutions are not in fact static bodies. Rather, they are 
social mechanisms of choice which operate over time. But this aspect of 
institutions was not explicitly constructed in the preceding chapter. 
Henceforth, concentrati on wi 11 be upon the dynami cs of ; nst;tutions 
and the group and urban environments in which they exist. This is the 
realm of institutional economics--not uniquely, to be sure. for 
sociologists and anthropologists have studied the dynamic attributes of 
institutions. But i nsti tutiona 1 econom; sts have concentrated the; r 
works on these dynamic attributes. And, as economists are inexorably 
bound to do, they have posited theories about such matters. 
The theories of institutional economics have to do with the first 
four questions raised at the conclusion of the preceding chapter. They 
have to do with the nature of the institutional environment, its setting 
on a t~mporal plane. They have to do with the manner of action and 
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interaction of institutions in that environment. And institutional 
economic theory posits causes of institutional instability, change, and 
discontinuity. Finally, along with the more traditional theories of 
economics, they suggest ways of measuring institutional values in deal-
ing with the stresses leading to institutional changes. 
While political pluralist theory is in evidence throughout the 
search of the first four questions because of an inherent parallel 
between institutional economics and pluralism, no effort is made to 
point out the evidence or explicate the parallelism. Rather, it is in 
pursuit of answers to the fifth question that pluralist theory is brought 
into the analysis to solve the institutional dilemma developed in the 
early chapters by suggesting ways in which societies reconcile the 
social tensions leading to institutional changes. However, the explicit 
introduction of plural ist theory must wait until chapter six. 
LIFE PROCESSES AND TEMPORAL SETTING 
Returning then to the point at hand, the first institutional 
economic theory explored here addresses the first question at the 
conclusion of chapter one--what is the temporal setting of institutions 
and cities? Stated concisely, the temporal setting of institutions and 
cities--indeed, of virtually everything--is a longitudinal dimension in 
chronological sequence called an !lends-means continuum," a continuum of 
"ongoing life processes." This chapter will deal with the character-
istics of the ends-means continuum. But first, it is important to 
briefly clarify "life processes" and ntempora1" in the meanings 
intended here. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
63 
Homo Mensura 
Turning first to the matter of IIlife processes," it is observed 
that man is a living creature in terms of the usual meaning of the word 
"1 ;ving." He shares that distinction with the universe of both animate 
and inanimate biological forms. Mankind, therefore, has a very special 
interest in life and in anything which acts upon or interacts with life 
forms. Moreover, mankind has established an order of things in which 
biological forms are classe-d higher than geological forms, the animate 
biological forms are classed higher than the inanimate, and man is 
classified as the highest animate form--chiefly because of the relatively 
greater intellectual capacities of his brain--the power of conceptual 
thought--and the adaptability which this gives him. Thus, man's great 
adaptability is manifest in the wide range of choices afforded to him by 
his relatively larger intellectual capacities. l 
One may, of course, dispute this homocentric order of things with 
appeals to metaphysical, teleological, or spiritual criteria. However, 
this writer eschews the opportunity to specul ate upon the reJ ative merits 
of alternative ways of ordering things. Rather, the position assumed 
here is consistent with the homocentric view. It is homo mensura, a view 
enunciated by the great sophist, Protagoras, II man is the measure of all 
things. II This means that if there is no actor, there can be no choice. 
If there is no choice, there are no consequences of choice. No conse-
quences means no criticism. And man is, above all else, a critical 
animal and his criticism focuses on the consequences of choices made by 
himself and his human cohorts who are taking actions on their choices. 2 
Choice naturally connotes alternative courses of action from which 
to choose as well as an agent to make the choice. There are some actions 
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in which there are no known alternatives from which man may choose. For 
example, an unpredictable and cataclysmic celestial aberration which 
destroys all life environments in the sub1unar realm of man might 
present mankind with no known alternatives. Mankind, along with other 
1 i fe forms, waul d become ext; net in those env; ronments. Such a 
catastrophe cannot be said to be part of a life process in the homo 
mensura sense. The agent perpetrating the aberration, the actor, was 
not man and was not known to man. That is, the situation resulted from 
a so-called event of nature, a happening over which mankind possessed no 
known power of control. While there were indeed consequences stemming 
from the event, the consequences were not relevant because they did not 
arise from the choices made by man from alternatives which might affect 
the outcome. 
Use of the word "catastrophel! in the preceding paragraph implies 
that an event resulting in the extinction of life forms on earth would be 
undesirable. The question is, for whom would it be undesirable? To 
measure it as undesirable assumes a preconception that 1 He forms on the 
planet are desirable. And who or what is most likely to harbor such a 
preconception? Man, who is heavily invested in life processes, certainly 
harbors that preconception. L i kewi se, other forms of intell i gent 1 i fe, 
insofar as they too might conceptual ;ze survival in such terms, might 
also harbor that preconception. However, this latter pOint is lTere 
anthropomorphic speculation. The point is. that valuing outcomes as 
desirable or undesirable is most 1 ikely a 5ubsumption of homo mensura. 
One further point about life processes, the alternatives open to 
hUman choices have proliferated down the centuries of man's earthly 
habitation. This is partly due to mankind's ability to organize itself 
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and its activities around institutions and urban institutional complexes, 
and partly from man's unique tool-usi ng capabil ity. Both of these ideas 
are more fully developed in succeeding chapters. It is important in 
passing to acknowledge that both of these abilities arise from mankind's 
relatively larger intellectual abilities and that they greatly enhance 
manls adaptability by further widening the range of choices open to him. 
In summation, 1 ife processes are sequences of events involving 
interactions with matter in any form in which the actor, man, exercises 
some element of choice, bears the consequences of his choices, and is 
open to critical analyses of the choices and their consequences. The 
ends-means continuum is a continuum of on-going life processes in this 
homo mensura context. 
Temporal Setting 
Turning now to the word titemporal,'· a temporal event or environ-
ment must be understood as transitory or temporary, as worldly or 
sublunary, as secular, and as ordered in time or chronological sequence. 
Conversely, it is not permanent or eternal, neither spiritual nor 
ecclesiastical, and not spatial or latitudinal in character. 3 
A temporal event is temporary or transient, not eternal. It occurs 
in some relationship to other events in which each event is unique in 
onels awareness of its existence. For example, when one travels from 
his home to his place of employment, the travel is an event which 
occurred after some other event in one I s awareness--after compl eti ng a 
breakfast of kippered herring and baked tomatoes. It likewise occurred 
before some other event in onels awareness--before placing his brown bag 
in a locker and walking to the turret lathe he will tend until coffee 
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break. 
The travel was not existential in one's awareness during breakfast~ 
existential perhaps, but not an actual occurrence. Nor was it exis-
tential while he was placing his brown bag in the locker, experiential, 
perhaps! but not an occurrence presently in process. The travel was a 
transitory event which was existential to the traveler after his break-
fast and before his arrival at his work station. It was, therefore, not 
eternal ;n terms of the person' 5 present awareness of its actual 
occurrenc.e. 
A temporal event is a worldly or sublunary event rather than a 
spiritual phenomenon. It is a real thing which can be observed, measured 
and verified by empirical means. It can be experienced through one or 
more of the human senses. One can see, hear, touch, smell, or taste the 
evidence of the event either directly through natural senses or through 
technical ampl ification of the evidence so that it is perceptible to 
one I s natural senses. 4 For exampl e. one may measure hi s rate of speed 
as he travels from his herring and tomatoes to his turret lathe by 
observing the rate reflected on his automotive speedometer as he moves 
between the two. Such observation is one of many pieces of evidence 
that one is indeed traveling. It is not a spiritual phenomenon insofar 
as one need not rely solely on his divine faith to verify the evidence 
of travel (rate of speed, in this illustration). 
Likewise, a temporal event is secular, not ecclesiastical. That 
is, it is not something which can only be verified or interpreted by 
priests or other ecclesiastics who purport to possess supernatural means 
by ~/h;ch to verify the existence of the event. For example, one may 
become convinced of the existence of some divine, omnipotent being 
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through litanies, supplications, lamentations, testimonials, and other 
ceremonial applications by clergymen. While this may become a spiritual 
reality in one's awareness, it is not temporal within the meaning of 
that word. 5 
Finally, a temporal event is ordered in time or chronological 
sequence rather than in spatial relationships. One might relate events 
to one another in space by showing, for example, that breakfast took 
place at one's domicile while tending a turret lathe took place some 
distance .away at a place of employment. On the other hand, one might 
relate the events in sequence of their happening--breakfast, travel, 
tend turret lathe, etc. This latter way of relating events ;s temporal. 
The former is spatial. 6 
The chronological sequence is longitudinal insofar as the sequence 
is a chain of events which are related in some ways and which extend into 
the past in a time continuum. Conversely, a spatial relationship is 
latitudinal or cross-sectional because it views events either at some 
point in time or without regard to time or sequence. That is to say, 
spatial relationships are not dynamic. They are static and they take 
no account of change-over time. Thus, a temporal environment is dynamic 
because it is not eternal. It is temporary, transitory, and reflective 
of change. It is not spiritual, but ;s sublunary, worldly. It is not 
ecclesiastical, but is secular. And, it is not a spatial relationship 
but a chrono 1 ogi ca lone. 
Once again, the temporal setting of institutions and cities is a 
longitudinal dimension in chronological sequence called an !lends-means 
continuum," a continuum of on-going life processes. The continuum is a 
setting for human choices involving interaction in the sense of life 
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temporal sense also described above. The remainder of this chapter is 
given over to an elaboration of the ends-means continuum in these 
contexts. 
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The elaboration will first divide the continuum into a past, a 
present, and a future. It will then examine present conditions in terms 
of the past, the principal idea being that all existing in the present 
is the effect of causes which lie in the past. It will next examine the 
present conditions in terms of the future. The principal idea is that 
the present effects of prior causes are also the means to ends which lie 
in the future along the continuum. The elaboration will then examine the 
nature of ends and their relationship to means. Finally, the nature of 
ends and their relationship to on-going life processes will be explored. 
CAUSES, EFFECTS, AND MEANS 
If the continuum is divided into two parts, a past and a future, 
then the boundary between the two is the present. The present is, of 
course, the only existential part of the continuum. All that occurred 
in the past is experi enti a 1 and the future is expectati a 1. One essen-
tially spends his life at the boundary between the past and the future. 
Human real time is the present, a time when the past and the future con-
verge upon one's act of choosing. All else is a great fantasy conjured 
up out of the pages of history books and the speculations of prophets and 
urban planners. The aged, whose lives have been spent in the past, often 
1 ive out the present in fond or remorseful recollection of their past 
experiences. The young, whose lives are still short and whose life expe,.. 
iences are few, generally live out the present in anticipation of the 
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uncertain future into which their 1 ives extend. Either way, the past is 
memory and the future is speculation. Only the present is existential. 
Present Effects of Past Causes 
Hhile the past is history and only the present is existential, all 
that exists in the present is the effect of causes which 1 ie in the past 
along the continuum. Thus, the past and the present are inextricably 
linked by the milieu of creatures, artifacts, materials, and ideas which 
descend to the present out of the past. 7 A moment's reflection reminds 
one that he- himself is an effect of prior causes--the deliberate or 
accidental sexual union of his mother and father as well as all preceding 
generations of like unions and a multitude of other events which 
ultimately led to his conception, birth, and maturation. 
Another moment's reflection reveals that one is born into an 
environment which, like himself, is the effect of prior causes--some of 
which resulted from planned and deliberate choices and actions by the 
generations of mankind which preceded him in the world, and some of which 
were human accidents of chance or so-called events of nature extrinsic 
to man and over which man possessed no known powers. One can only marvel 
at the magnitude of the celestial universe, the geological real ity vf 
the earth. the majesty of a Mt. McKinley, the vast emptiness of a Sahara, 
and the cascading splendor of a Victoria Falls. But these natural 
wonders did not always exist. They are the effects of who-knows-what 
causes, but causes nevertheless. 
On the other hand, much of civilized man1s habitat, and the struc-
tures, artifacts. people. and institutions which comprise that habitat, 
are effects which are more clearly linked to known past causes. In most 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
70 
cases, the causes were intrinsic to man. They grew out of human deliber-
ations and resulted in human actions and interactions both with other 
mankind and with other aspects of the environments in which humans found 
themselves. A city, any city, is the effect of guch past causes. 
Take, for example, the modern city of London, England. One who 
disembarks at Heathrow Airport gives little thought to why or how London 
came to be the city it is today. He usually accepts it as it is, enjoy-
ing the commercial and cultural amenities the city offers and suffering 
the congestion and other disamenities which are part of metropolitan 
existence anywhere. And yet, London is the effect' of causes which 
reach back more than two millennia. The city is the result of human 
deliberations and actions spanning more than 2,000 years of time. 
The embryonic city of London was established in the First Century 
6. C. at the beginning of the Roman occupation of Britain. No doubt the 
site was a market and perhaps a mil itary post before the Romans occupied 
it because nature endowed it with a number of attributes which commended 
it to human use. London lies forty miles inland at one of the last 
places along the Thames River accessible to deep-draft vessels. More-
over, the city is located at the eastern terminus of a low hill system 
which extends westward between the lower Midlands in the north and the 
Salisbury Plain in the south to the Severn River and the Bristol 
Channel on the west coast. All of which is to say that London occupies 
a very strategic location in respect to traffic to and from mainland 
Europe. It commands the most convenient north and south access routes, 
and it lies astraddle a major water barrier to that access, a barrier 
which is also a major water route to the English Channel and mainland 
Europe. 8 
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The Romans were no doubt quick to perceive the natural strategic 
advantages of the site for they established their seat of government in 
Britain at what they called Londinium. The Romans built a basilica on 
land now occupied by Leadenhall Market on what is presently Gracechurch 
Street leading from London Bridge up to Cornhill. This was the hub of 
Londinium in Roman times. It;s now the center af the financial district 
of London with the Bank of England, the Stock Exchange, the Royal 
Exchange, Lloyds of London, and other financial institutions clustered 
nearby. 
The original selection of that particular site as a seat of govern-
ment and its subsequent transformation for use by financial institutions 
in modern times refiects tiie present effects of literally millions of 
human choices and actions over the intervening millennia. One cannot 
hope to capture the magnitude of the transformation in such a brief 
treatise as this. But the choices range from the decision of the Roman 
governor to establ ish an institution of government there to the less 
portentous but very necessary logistical and technical choices by the 
architects, engineers, and craftsmen who constructed the edifices to 
house the institutions as well as the choices of the multitude of plain 
folk and civil servants of every rank to live in London and to work in 
the i nstituti ons located there. 
The point is, that the metropolitan amenities and disamenities one 
experiences as London, England did not emerge in full flower from the 
thin air in an instant of time. Rather, the present effects one knows 
as London were caused largely out of human deliberations, choices, and 
toil extending more than 2,000 years into the past. The principle is 
that present effects, be they perceived as good or bad, are inextricably 
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tied to the past causes which brought them into existence. 
Effects-Means 
The next principle is that the means available in the present, the 
resources for the attainment of ends which lie along the continuum in 
the future, are the same present effects of prior causes which occupied 
the irrnnediately preceding discussion. That is, the future ;s inexorably 
built upon the means available in the present. And insofar as those 
means are the effects of prior causes, the future is inextricably linked 
to the past. That 1 inkage is through the effects-means which exist in 
the present at the boundary between the past and the future. 9 
One set of such effects is an understanding of causal relationships 
themselves. An understanding of those relationships arises from empir-
i cal observations and deduct; ve ins; ghts which 1 i nk effects to causes. 
These descriptions of causal relationships are synthesized into theories 
which may then be employed to predict future outcomes with some calcul-
able degree of certainty. Theories likewise enable persons to prescribe 
present actions to effect desired future outcomes. It is by these 
proces sua 1 a rrangements--descri pti on, predi ct i on, and prescri pt i on--
that knowledge of past causes are instrumental toward achieving future 
ends. Thus, an understanding of causal relationships is itself an 
effect-means which may be employed like other means toward achieving 
ends which lie ;n the future. 10 
In another example, the city of London was established by the 
Romans with the end in view or purpose of domiciling the seat of their 
institution of government in Britain. The means available at that time 
were the effects of causes which lie along the continuum in the past. 
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The strategic advantages of the site were geological obliquities of 
nature created over millions of years of terrestrial upheaval, erosion, 
and sedimentation. It remained only for the Roman intelligence to 
discover it and for her legions to secure it. The legions needed to 
secure the site were drawn from the far reaches of the empire where 
their mil itary doctrines and prowess were sharpened in more than two 
hundred years of sporadi c warfare--notab1y the Puni c Wars, the Mithri-
datic Wars, and the Gallic Wars which ultimately brought Caesar and his 
legions to Britain. The architects and artisans required to improve the 
site were available from projects in other parts of the empire where 
they learned their skills after the centuries-old Athenian architectural 
tradition of the post and 1 intel, to which the Romans added their monu-
mental arch. The stone. wood, and other materials required for site 
improvements were no doubt prov;dences of nature in proximity to the 
site. The institutionalized norms of Roman provincial government were 
the accreted experi ences of thei r Hell eni sti c predecessors. embell i shed 
by their own experiences in governing the empire from the Caspian Sea to 
the Straits of Gibralter and from Egypt to Gaul. Finally, like the 
legionnaires and the architects and artisans, civil servants were 
available from other parts of the empire where they were sired, reared, 
and trained in the art of administration. All of these means were the 
effects of past causes, and they were employed to attain the end in view 
of creating the domicile of Roman government in Britain. l1 
Effects-means, 1; ke those at the time of the Roman establ i shment 
of London, possess several attributes which are important to the institu-
tional thesis. The first is that means have value in part because they 
are instrumental in attaining desired future ends. The second is that, 
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they are in limited supply in the present. And finally, means are 
unidirectional as to the ends toward which they are employed. 
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The first attribute of effects-means, that they have value in part 
because they are instrumental in attaining desired future ends, is 
analogous to the demand side of the orthodox economist's partial equil-
ibrium condition in so-called factor markets. That is, the demand for 
any resource is derived from the demand for the good or service in the 
production of which the resOurce will be employed. Thus, if there is no 
economic demand for an end product, there can be no effective demand 
for the resources to produce it. L i kewi se, the ; ntens i ty of demand for 
the end product will reflect in the intensity of demand for the resources 
to produce it. 12 
One can easily apply this idea to the effects-means, or resources, 
in the example of Roman London. The good or service demanded was a 
domicile for the seat of Roman government in Britain. This arose from 
the end chosen by the Romans to establish their government in Britain--
ignoring any reasons why the Romans might choose to do that. From that 
decision flowed all of the choices and decisions regarding subsidiary 
ends--where to locate that government? How to secure the site? How to 
develop the site, and on ad infinitum? From each decision arose a series 
of new demands for means, and the values of those means were determi ned 
in part by how instrumental they were in attaining the desired future 
end toward which they would be employed. 
However, the foregoing attribute accounts for only part of the 
value of means. Another part is accounted for by the second attribute--
that means which are available in the present are in 1 imited supply. 
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This is. of course. analogous to the supply side of the orthodox 
economist's partial equilibrium condition in factor markets. Resources 
will be suppl ied to those employments which yield the highest incomes or 
greatest benefits to their owner. And, given an effective demand, those 
resources which are in the shortest supply will command the highest 
incomes. However, this goes beyond the point to be made at this time, 
which is simply. that the means available in the present are 1 imited to 
whatever effects of past causes exist at the time. 13 
All of the means described above for Roman London--the site, mili-
tary legions to secure the site, architects, craftsmen and materials to 
improve the site, institutional ized norms of Roman provincial govern-
ment, and civil servants trained in the art of administration--were 
available in the present as the effects of causes which 1 ie in the past. 
While they were supplied partly in response to the Roman decision to 
establish its government in Britain, they were not available in unlimited 
quantities. Indeed, they were 1 imited both because they were not created 
in infinite numbers and because some were required to pursue similar 
enterpri ses e1 sewhere in the empire. The pri nci pl e was ful fill ed for 
the Romans as it was for the empires before theirs and as it has been 
down all the ages of man. The means available to attain ends which lie 
;n the future are 1 imited to the present effects of past causes. 
The last mentioned attribute of effects-means is that means are 
unidirectional as to the ends toward which they are employed. That is, 
means which are spent in the achievement of particular ends become 
embodied in those ends.· The spent means yield their identities to the 
ends toward which they were spent. 14 In the example of Roman London. 
the site, materials. and labor of architects and artisans lost their 
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identities in the physical facilities of Londinium. The people who pop-
ulated Londinium labored in and yielded their identities to the ir.sti-
tutions which were domiciled there. P,nd the institutions of the city 
and the city itself merged their identities with that of Roman government 
in Britain. 
The consequence of this ;s simply that means or resources which 
are imprudently allocated to unworthy ends are at least partially wasted 
An unworthy end is one which yields less social welfare in the homo 
menSlJra context per resource-means than a competing and alternative end 
in view at the time the former was chosen. The allocation is imprudent 
if the relative social costs and benefits of the foregoing ends-in-view 
were accurately known before the choice could no longer be retracted 
without expending resources in the retraction. 
Resources are wasted under such circumstances insofar as greater 
social welfare could have been achieved if the same resource-means had 
been allocated to the alternative end rendering the greater social 
benefit. This is analogous to maximizing net social benefits, in the 
vernacular of the orthodox economist. There are, of course, situations 
in which one may choose other normative criteria than maximizing net 
social benefits. However, those options go beyond what is intended here, 
and they will be considered in a subsequent chapter. It is enough at 
this point to define waste in these rudimentary terms. 15 
The foregoing attri butes of effects-means--that means have value 
in part because they are instrumental in attaining desired future ends. 
that means which are available in the present are in limited supply, and 
that means are unidirectional as to ends to be reached--imply a need to 
economize in the employment of means. They admonish care in avoiding 
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waste of needed and limited resources. They argue for full and efficient 
utilization of available resources. And these normative implications 
extend logically to another--that great care to be taken in the se1ec-
ticn of ends-to-be-attained or reached from the array of ends-in-view so 
that the selected ends render the greatest possible social welfare in 
terms of the homo mensura criterion. 
ENDS, MEANS, AND PRDCESS 
It ,is appropriate then to take up the nature of ends and to 
examine their relationships to means and to on-going life processes. 
Ends are simply possible alternative states-of-being which do not exist 
in the present but lie in the future along the. continuum and are open 
to human chaices. 16 It is important at this point to distinguish between 
the possible future outcomes of so-called natural phenomena and the 
possible future consequences of present choices by mankind. Given the 
homo mensura assumption and certain distinguishing characteristics of 
mankind, only the latter can be viewed as ends. 
Natural or Artificial Selection 
One might imagine a state of nature in which the environment is 
devoid of human presence and thus of hUman influence. Pristine forests 
are rooted in virgin soils, and there is a perfect ecological balance 
between the vegetation, atmosphere. and animal life in the Eden-like 
environment. The whole scene is an idy-llic state in which the 
ecological balance is thought to be natural because whatever selections 
occur are made by agents other than man. 
There are events. to be sure, which constantly tip the 
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environmental equilibrium this way and that way so that minuscule changes 
are discernible after some time. The establ ished weather pattern might 
change 51 ightly year by year for some obscure reason so that less vege-
tation is set before the animate creatures low in the food chain. The 
change will cause a decline in the population of vegetarians. Some will 
simply starve to death while the fecundity of survivors will decline and 
their progeny will be less prolific than they were during more verdant 
times. 
The effects of the famine will reflect all the way to the top of 
the food chain. Some of the carnivores.w.i:l.l starve for want of edible 
flesh. Others may perish in conflicts with competitors over whatever 
flesh and carr.ion-:is available. The whole process may bring extinction 
to some of the weaker species. But, eventually, the natural balance 
will be restored by the brutal law of survival-of-the-fittest. And, 
according to this line of reasoning, nature will be strengthened in the 
process. Moreover, the whole process is correct and proper--primarily 
because it came out that way without the fettering influences of man. 
It was so-called natural selection in which the selections were made by 
agents other than man. l7 
This so-called state of nature is one in which future outcomes are 
the results of natural phenomena. That is, they become actual outcomes 
because of the present reactions of both geological and biological matter 
to incipient aberrations in their environments. Moreover, the reactions 
occur with practically no conscious contemplation by the reactor of pos-
sible future consequences. Stated another way, the reactor has no cap-
acity to analyze and therefore no capabil ity to describe causal relation-
ships in situations it faces. Thus the reactor cannot predict probable 
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outcomes or prescribe ways of effecting a desired outcome. There are 
therefore very few or, more likely, no choices for the reactor. Rather, 
the reactions are in a sense programmed by nature so that if a particular 
environmental stimulus arises, then a corresponding reaction is initiated 
and will bring forth a nearly certain predetermined result so long as 
there is no foreign interference with the reaction process. 18 
Take, for example, the common barn swallow, Hirundo rustica, a 
migratory insectivore. The northern hemisphere perceptibly warms 
shortly after the earth-track of the sun passes the vernal equinox in 
its annual sojourn to the cancer equinox. The seeds which have lain 
dormant during the dark days of winter germinate and thrust tiny roots 
into the warming earth. The longer and warmer days open the buds on 
trees and bushes, invite the small green tips of monocots out of the 
ground and initiate the photosynthetic process that win grow the plants 
upon which most insects and their larvae feed. i9 The eggs laid in the 
fall by the insects which could not hope to survive the bitter winter 
now respond to the warmth of spring, opening and releasing nymphs and 
larvae and initiating the metamorphosis which will produce the flying 
insects upon which the barn swallows feed. 20 
As the track of the sun moves closer to the northern equinox, the 
barn swallows arrive as far north as southern Alaska in the northern 
temperate zone. Guided by the sun, they have come from the seasonally 
colder southern hemisphere seeking moderate cl imates and flying insects 
suitable to their tastes. The older birds who have migrated before 
respond to a mating urge by returning to established nests. The young 
birds, who have migrated for the first time. seek out mates and set 
about building new nests of mud. dried grasses. animal hair. and feathers 
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in which to lay and hatch their eggs. The swallows will take turns set-
ting their eggs so that each mate can respond to pangs of hunger by 
gathering food in the only way it knows, catching and devouring 
indigenous insects in flight. After the chicks hatch, the parent 
swallows spend their days gathering insects in the same way to take back 
to the gaping beaks that fill their nest. 
The days grow shorter after the sun passes the cancer equinox. The 
whole natural process commences to slow and the insect population 
declines as the season wears on. By now the chicks have matured and are 
learning to feed on flying insects just as their parents have done. This 
combi nat; on of factors--shorter days, cool er weather. fewer insects, and 
matured brood--signals time for migration to the warming c1 imates in the 
southern hemisphere. The spatial situation is reversed and the swallows 
leave their nests, flock together. and again guided by the sun, journey 
to the southern hemisphere. Some flocks fly a distance of 9,000 miles 
to the southern reaches of Argentina ;n this migration. 21 
The swallows have been primarily reactors in the foregoing episode, 
respondi ng to both external and internal stimul i. They responded to the 
changing weather patterns and subsequent ecological transformations by 
migrating. They responded to the biological urge to mate by nesting, 
laying, and hatching eggs, and nurturing their young. They essentially 
sought out env; ronmenta 1 condi tions wh; ch conduced to thei r welfare. 
They took natural phenomena as they found them, adapting only to the 
extent of building a crude nest of indigenous materials ;n which to ful-
fill their biological urges to propagate. And when the environment 
turned adverse with season, the swallows responded by migrating to whence 
they came. The duration of the future into which the swallows' 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
81 
deliberations consciously projected was very brief, if indeed they pro-
jected at a11. 22 That is, they possessed no analytical capability and 
they could therefore not describe past causes of present effects, predict 
future outcomes, or prescribe actions to effect desired future outcomes. 
Man is, of course, a reactor like other animals. Once conception 
has taken place, the prenatal events attending a human pregnancy are 
essentially of the reaction sort. Likewise, the biological processes of 
physical maturing and aging are genetic reactions to time and other 
features .of environment over which man has only a 1 imited power of 
control. The foregoing examples focus on stimuli and processes which 
are biological and intrinsic to the reactor. Man also reacts to some 
extrinsic stimuli in his environment with little conscious thought to 
pass i ble future consequences. 
But more often, man does deliberate on the probable future outcomes 
of his present choices. And when his present choices are influenced by 
his del iberations, man becomes more than a reactor. He is an actor who 
makes choices from an array of possible future ends. He bears the con-
sequences of his choices and those choices are open to critical evalua-
tions on the basis of their consequences. Man is unique among etirthly 
creatures in terms of his time-span of discretion--the duration of the 
continuum over which his deliberations and choices project. He possesses 
the analytical ability to discover and describe causal relationships 
descending from the past, and he can use the knowledge of those relation-
ships to predict probable future outcomes and to prescribe ways of 
effecti ng desirabl e outcomes. 23 
Thus, the state of nature might be contrasted with a state of man 
in which so-called artificial selection takes place. The selection ;s 
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artificial, according to this line of reasoning, because the choices are 
made by man. Man destroys the pristine forests in order to build and 
heat his houses. He clears the land of all natural vegetation, levels 
the ground, and tills the virgin soil to plant and cultivate crops for 
food and fiber. He consumes the food and spins the fiber into yarn which 
will produce the textiles to fashion his clothing and household fabrics. 
Eventually, he builds cities here and there to house the myriad of insti-
tutions which flourish wherever man abounds. Finally, he builds roads 
to connect the farms to the cities and the cities to one another. 
Many species of animals which formerly foraged the land can no 
longer survive there. They are driven into other areas, upsetting the 
Iinatural balances" in those regions. And man, who now occupies their 
former habitats, takes measures to keep the natural fauna off his land 
and out of his cities. On the other hand, man does keep domestic animals 
on parcels of the land which he holds out of cultivation for use as 
pasture. But these creatures are not generally capable of surviving 
without man's maintenance. They are the products of so-called artificial 
selection, of husbandry choices made by man to more efficiently produce 
meat for food and animal fiber for textiles. 
This latter situation, the so-called state of man, is clearly one 
in which man is very much involved in the selection process. He has 
looked upon the primeval region, and in the place of pristine forests he 
sees a house, barn, and outbuildings surrounded by crop land and pasture. 
In the place of natural fauna he sees beef and milk cattle, swine, sheep. 
poultry. and other domesticated creatures grazing between his fences. 
The images of possible future uses of the land which cross his mind as 
he contemplates the forest in its natural state are ends-in-view. They 
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exist unless the man chooses to take up tools and carve his homestead 
out of the wilderness he sees before him.24 
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Clearly, the possible future outcomes of natural phenomena cannot 
be considered ends in the absence of an actor such as man--one who can 
visual ize a possible state of being which does not exist at the time of 
the vision, but a state which can be brought into being at some future 
time only if the actor chooses and couples his choice with appropriate 
action. While possible future outcomes of natural phenomena are not ends 
in the absence of an actor such as man, the ultimate fruition of a possi-
ble natural outcome becomes an effect of whatever causes brought it into 
existence as soon as the creative event ascends from the future to the 
present and passes into the past. And, insofar as the effect may be 
instrumental to ends perceived by mankind as lying in the future along 
the continuum, such effects are potential means for man to achieve those 
future ends. 
Moreover, while the possible future outcomes of natural phenomena 
cannot be viewed as ends in the absence of an actor such as man, such 
possible outcomes are, in fact, ends-in-view if man looks upon them as 
among the alternatives from which he may choose. For example, choosing 
to hold entire regions as wilderness areas in order to pass them to 
future generations as examples of states of nature is an artificial sel-
ection. And, in this sense, all the natural events which take place in 
those regions are artificial insofar as they would not be taking place 
were it not for the deliberate social choice and its complementary 
actions to hold the regions in those uses rather than in other viable, 
alternative uses. Thus, it can be argued that all sublunar selection is 
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artificial so long as an actor such as man inhabits the earth. 25 
On the other hand, it can be argued that all of mankind's advance-
ment--some would call it a descent out of a state of nature or a fall 
from grace26 __ i5, in essence, the acquisition and actualization of ways 
in which natural outcomes can be del iberately arranged to adapt the 
environment to a more agreeable habitat for man. For example, at some 
time in the ancient past, a member or members of the human species dis-
covered how to ignite fires by means initiated by themselves. They found 
that they could choose to ignite certain common materials--probably by 
briskly rubbing them together--at times and places of their choosing. 
Moreover, they discovered that they could control their fires by contain-
ing them in stone and earthen hollows and vessels and by regulating the 
rate at which combustible materials and air were added to them. Fire 
thereby became a tool of mankind for heating abodes and cooking food. 
It subsequently led to a multitude of other techniques employing a 
variety of fire forms for an even greater variety of hUman purposes. 
Did the human species create the natural phenomenon known as fire? 
Indeed, did the species create the elements needed to ignite fires? Or, 
did humans give fire the qualities which make it at once destructive of 
bei ngs and things and i nstrumenta 1 in adapt; ng the en v; ronment to a more 
agreeable habitat for man? Clearly, the answer is no. All of these 
features accrue to fire naturally. Rather, mankind through analysis 
simply discovered and described these natural characteristics and 
acquired and actualized techniques by which fire could be employed as 
means to future ends selected by humans. Thus man, a creature of nature, 
is simply employing natural phenomena to secure a balance in nature which 
conduces toward his own welfare. Damming a stream ;s no less natural 
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altered the ecology in the vicinity of the dam in order to adapt the 
environment to their special needs. Accordfng to this line of reason-
ing, all selection is natural. 27 
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The point raised by this seeming diversion from the central argu-
ment is the question--is there real distinction between so-called 
natural selection and artificial selection? Or is the distinction 
itself specious and artificial? Is it possible that all selection is 
artificial so long as man inhabits the earth? Or is it possible that 
all selection is natural insofar as man is a creature of nature and, in 
the temporal context, is forever limited to natural constraints no 
matter what his time span of discretion? 
The position of this writer is that the distinction drawn between 
natural selection and so-called artificial selection is specious and can 
lead s-yllQJistically to dubious conclusions and thereby to questionable 
policies. Moreover, this writer tends to the view that all selection is 
natural. Mankind are creatures of nature. At most they are instruments 
of nature in the context of on-going life processes. Man discovers 
qual ities about natural phenomena and he devises and employs techniques 
for applying his discoveries to adapt his environment to a more 
habitable abode for himself. But he is constrained by nature and can 
never successfully exceed the parameters of nature for very long, if at 
all. In short, man is not supernatural. 28 
How then does one account for the distinctions described above? A 
first step is to cease conceptualizing selection in terms of the falla-
cious dichotomy, natural and artificial. Rather, one can treat all sel-
ections as natural and distinguish them on the basis of the time-span of 
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discretion within the selection agent's capabilities. Man stands quite 
apart from other mortal agents with this method of classification. All 
other agents are substantially of the reactor sort, while man possesses 
the capacities of both reactor and actor. The essential difference is 
that the latter possesses the capability of visualizing alternate ends as 
complex states of being which are not in existence and which will not 
come into existence unless the actor chooses one or another and couples 
his choice with equally complex series of actions usua1ly carried on over 
some protracted period of time to bring his chosen state into being. 
In summation, ends are possible alternative goals which lie in the 
future along the continuum and which are open to hUman choices. They are 
possible future consequences of present choices by mankind. Possible 
future outcomes of selections by agents other than man are therefore not 
ends in this homo mensura context un1ess they are among the alternatives 
from which man ·chooses. 
A1ternative Ends and Limited Means 
Returning now to the nature of ends. ends possess certain attri-
butes which are of particu1ar importance to the institutional thesis. 
The attributes are: ends have value because people. through institutions. 
prize them as desired. Moreover, ends cannot be severed from the means 
to their attainment. Therefore, some ends-in-view are alternative 
because means are 1 imited so that only some of the competing ends-in-view 
are attainable with the available means. Some ends-in-view are alterna-
tive because they are exclusive--they are incongruent with other 
competing ends-in-view. Ends are not ends-in-themselves because, once 
they are attained, they become means or impediments to on-going ends. 
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And finally, on-going life processes are processes which convert ends to 
means in some continuing fashion. 
The first attribute of ends is that ends have value because people, 
through institutions, prize them as desired. Ends are prized or desired 
as they show likelihood of satisfying perceived human wants. The human 
wants may arise from deficits or conflicts which render existing or 
probable future states of affairs objectionable. Objectionability is of 
course a relative matter in that one compares alternative possible 
future states of affairs and ranks them according to their preferredness 
on the basis of their least objectionability. Thus, the ends are 
appraised on the basis of their ser'viceabil ity toward erasing objection-
able states of affairs by filling the deficits or resolving the conflicts 
out of which the human wants arise. 29 
Ends are, in this sense, analogous to consumer goods and services 
in the orthodox microeconomic theory of product markets. And the 
behavioral phenomena described above are similar to the concept of utility 
on the demand side of the same microeconomic theory. Economic goods and 
services are chosen in the economic institution called the market place 
according to the wants or preferences and the buying powers of people as 
consumers. The goods and services yield util ity or satisfaction by 
filling deficits which render an existing state of affairs with the 
deficits less preferred than other expectant or possible states of 
affairs without the deficits. 30 
These ideas have far greater applicability than to choices in 
economic institutions alone. Ends have been defined as possible alterna-
tive states of being which do not exist in the present but which lie in 
the future along the continuum and are open to hUman choices. Ends may 
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therefore repose in what is narrowly defined as the realm of pol itical 
institutions or in the realm of other institutions than market or 
political institutions. And in like manner, the valuing of alternative 
ends, whether by economic, political, or other social institutions. can 
be done, with some adaptation, in the marginal frame-of-reference of 
orthodox microeconornic theory. However, this moves ahead of the point 
to be made here. which is simply that ends have value because people 
through institutions prize them as desired. 
It is possible to illustrate this by relying, once again. on the 
example of Roman government in Britain. In this case, the question is, 
why did the Romans choose to establish (select the end) dominion over the 
Britons? The answer ;s Simple. The Roman world view was of a distinct 
empire insulated from the barbarians on all sides. This view eventually 
led to the Gallic Wars and the conquest of western Europe. Britain 
became a feature of that conquest because the northern coast of Gaul was 
not secure from raids and pillage by some of the thirty or so barbaric 
tribes that populated Britain at the time. 
Thus, the Roman conquest of Britain was initiated to resolve con-
flicts which rendered an existing state of affairs more object':onable to 
the Romans than the future prospect of a secure western frontier popula-
ted by conquered and submissive peoples. The choice to secure the 
submission of the Britons by military means was made by the Roman 
institution of government during the reign of Emperor Claudius 1. The 
campaign was prosecuted by Roman mil itary institutions over a period of 
forty years, touching the reigns of Emperors ClaUdius, ~!ero. and 
Domitian. It was successfully concluded by General Agricola during the 
reign of Domitian. The point at hand is simply that the Roman conquest 
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of Britain had value to Romans because Romans, through their ;nstitu-
tions, prized that conquest as sufficiently meritorious to allocate 
substantial means to its prosecution over a span of forty· years touching 
the reigns of three Roman emperors. 31 
The second attribute of ends within the institutional framework is 
that ends cannot be severed from the means to their attainment. This 
proposition seems so self-evident that it is hardly worthy of statement. 
However, one often hears persons speak of certain goals as possessing 
such merit that they shaul d be attai ned whether or not there are means 
to do it. Such statements are, of course, based on highly idealistic 
beliefs--views which lead the ideologue to believe that the relationship 
between ends and means ;s so tenuous as to be of no practical 
consequence. Such views are not realistic inasmuch as ends as outcomes 
are neither more nor less than the interaction of the ensemble of means 
which brought them into existence. The obverse side of this is a 
previous observation that means yield their identities to the ends they 
achieve. Which is to say that goals, no matter how worthy, cannot be 
secured without the means to do so.32 
This idea--that ends cannot be severed from the means to their 
attainment--coupled with a previous observation leads to the next 
attribute of ends. The previous observation is that means-resources are 
1 imited to the present effects of past causes. Taken together, these 
two propositions admonish that some ends-in-view are alternative because 
means are 1 imited so that only some of the competing ends-in-viei'l are 
attainable with the means available. Ends-in-view are, of course, ends 
which are discerned by people to be possible of attainment under 
prevail ing circumstances. 33 
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Clearly, there are many ends which qualify as ends-in-view. When 
taken singly they are possible of attainment under prevailing circum-
stances. That is, there are available means which might be allocated to 
their achievement. However, when all ends-in-view are taken together, it 
is generally discovered that the available means are insufficient to 
attain all of them simultaneously, or perhaps even seriatim. The paucity 
of means was elaborated above and will not be further labored here. Suf-
fice it to say that ends-in-view are constrained by available means so 
that ends compete with one another for selection as ends-to-be-reached. 
Ends-to-be-reached are ends-in-view which have been set apart as 
more desired than competing ends. They become ends to the achievement of 
which some of the scarce means will be a~~ocated. An end-to-be-reached 
therefore, becomes the coordinating activity around which all other sub-
activities are organized. Once the choice of a particular end is made 
from among competing ends-in-view, the selection and organization of 
appropriate means to attainment of the chosen end follows almost 
pro-forma. 34 
One may deduce from the preceding observation that ends justify 
their means. Indeed, this conclusion is unavoidable, notwithstanding the 
often heard proclamations to the contrary, if the word justify is under-
stood to mean lito supply good grounds II or lito warrant ll the employment of 
the means for the chosen purposes and ways. 35 However, persons who argue 
that any particular means are justified by the ends they are meant to 
secure appear to do so either because they have more interest in the 
employment of those particular means than in the ends they are supposed 
to achieve (in other words, they contemplate ulterior ends) or because 
they view the ends-to-be-reached as worthy of attainment at any cost 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
91 
(in other words, the ends are vi ewed as ends-in-themsel ves). On the 
other hand, it would appear that persons who vehemently claim that means 
cannot be justified by the ends toward which they will be employed do so 
either because they believe that there is little correspondence between 
ends and means or because they actually believe that there are other 
means more suitable or that the chosen ends are not worthy. In fact, 
which combinations of means ought to be employed toward achievement of 
which particular ends is problematical and is the subject of other chap-
ters in t,his monograph. All of which does not defeat the pragmatic 
conclusion that ends justify the means. 
There is another reason why some ends-in-view are alternative, and 
it has nothing whatever to do with paucity of means. The next attribute 
of ends is that some ends-in-view are alternative because they are 
exclusive. That is, they are incongruent with other competing ends-in-
view $0 that it is simply impossible to attain all sets of such 
exclusive ends at the same time and place. This is so even if means 
are sufficiently abundant to do so.36 
Examples of this abound. One cannot present his actual physical 
being in two or more spatially different places at precisely the same 
instant of time. He might place an image of his physical being in many 
different places instantaneously. Or he might seek to be in different 
places at different times. But it is quite impossible to place one's 
actual physical self in two different places simultaneously. 
Likewise, one cannot occupy the position and play the role of 
husband in the institution of matrimony and. at the same time, remain an 
eligible bachelor in terms of the same institution. At some point both 
ends may stand open to selection and the means may be available to secure 
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either. One may choose to mount a campaign with the end-to-be-reached 
of wooing an e1 igible female into marriage. And once he has exchanged 
nuptial vows with her, he has taken on the role of husband. But after 
initiation in that position, he is no longer an eligible bachelor. On 
the other hand, one may eschew every opportunity to involve himself in 
any activity, the result of which is matrimony. In which event, he 
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cannot honestly play the role of husband in the institution of matrimony. 
The point is that the two ends are existentially exclusive and they 
cannot be simul taneously attained. 
Another institutional attribute of ends is that ends are not ends-
in-themselves because, once they are attained, they become means or 
impediments (or perhaps some of both) to on-going ends. The distinc-
ticn between ends and means is relational in the temporal sense. It was 
demonstrated earl i er how present means to future ends are the effects of 
causes which 1 ie in the past. This is the same as stating that the 
present means are in part the ends or consequences of choices made in 
the past. Likewise, everything that does not exist in the present but 
must be brought into existence to serve as means to a further end are 
ends themselves. 37 
This can be traced out in the context of the continuum developed 
to this potnt. ' An end-~n-v~e\'J is an intellectual phenomenon. It does 
not exist except in contemplation. If it is selected as an end-to-be-
reached, the end becomes expectatial and it is the activity around "hich 
immediate means and intermediate ends are organized. As each event which 
brings the chosen end into existence ascends from the future to the pre-
sent, the end emerges and becomes existential. And as those events all 
pass into the past, the residual components of the end which remain in 
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the present, the embodiment of the means which brought the end into 
being, become the effects of causes which 1 ie in the past. Thus, the 
continuum has brou9ht the contemplation to consequence. And the conse-
quence may facil itate or impede or both facil itate and impede the 
attainment of on-going ends. 
For example, the founding of the City of London ;s seen to be a 
long series of events related to one another in a continuum of ends and 
means. The coordinating element around which all subactivities, 
immediate means, and intermediate ends were organized, was the Roman 
world view of a distinct empire insulated on all sides from raids and 
pillage by barbarians. This ideal became an end-to-be-reached. The 
means to that end were the intermediate ends of establ ishing dominion 
over and maintaining peace in all contiguous lands harboring barbarian 
tribes. This led to the Gallic Wars as Rome allocated immediate means 
in the form of Roman Legions to the intermediate end of conquering 
Western Europe, including Britain. 
The conquest of Britain achieved an intermediate end and became a 
means to a further intermediate end. the establ ishment of a Roman 
government in Britain with which to maintain the peace. The construc-
tion of a domicile for that government was an intermediate end to 
establishment of the Roman government. And, of course, the City of 
London \"/as founded with the construction of that domicile. Thus, 
construction of Roman London became one of the means to establ ishment 
of a Roman government in Britain. The establ ishment of that government 
became a means to maintaining the peace in Britain, and maintaining 
peace in Britain became a means to insulating the Roman Empire from 
pillage by barbarians on its north-western periphery. 
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The foregoing example treated all attained or existential ends as 
though they were, ipso facto, means to on-going ends. It is sometimes 
the case that such existential ends are found to be impediments rather 
than means to some on-going ends. 38 Such a situation may come to pass 
either because the attained end was selected deliberately to impede some 
on-going ends, or because there was an inadequate prediction of probable 
on-going consequences of attaining the selected end. An inadequate 
prediction might result if the persons choosing ends did so either 
without sufficient information upon which to estimate the outcomes 
accurately or because they applied defective theories as to causal 
relationships, and they therefore drew unrealistic conclusions. What-
ever the reasons, it sometimes happens that existential ends are 
impediments rather than means to some on-go; n9 ends. 
Suppose, for example, that a person owns some open land on the 
edge of an older urban area. Suppose further that the urban area is 
shifting from mixed residential and light commercial use to industrial 
use. And finally, suppose that the owner chooses to develop the land by 
constructing private, single-family dwellings to accommodate upper 
middle-income famil ies, speculating that the proximity to 1 ight commer-
cia1 enterprises might be an inducement for such famil ies to buy 
residences in the area. t-Jhat are the 1 ikely consequences of the private 
owner l s choice if the established trend toward industrial uses continues 
on adjacent lands? 
The most probable result is that the owner-developer will not suc-
ceed in selling his new units to upper middle-income families, if indeed 
he can sell them at all. 39 Thus he may not real ize sufficient revenue 
from sales to cover his costs of development, and he may find himself 
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pushed into bankruptcy. The owner's fail ure caul d have ori gi nated in 
either inaccurate information about the land-use trend in the area (stem-
ming from indifference on the owner l s part, an inadequate estimate of the 
land-use trends in the area, or a sheer paucity of data) or defective 
theory as to the causal relationship between the established trend and 
its most probable effect on the potential future uses of his property. 
Some would argue that the owner should not be deprived of his 
folly--that he should be free to make his private market choice and to 
succeed or fail upon its merits. On the other hand, there are some sound 
social reasons why his venture should be truncated before losses occur. 
Insofar as means are unidirectional as to the ends to which they are 
all ocated, they cannot always be economically recovered. Thus, resource-
means will be wasted because they have been imprudently allocated to the 
unworthy end of constructing private single-family dwell ings in a loca-
tion which is not suitable for residential purposes. But. perhaps more 
important. new housing is a very durable product, and it can be expected 
to remain serviceable for up to twenty years with 1 ittle maintenance and 
for much longer with sUbstantial maintenance. Moreover, the cost to 
reclaim the land from small residential parcels into large industrial 
units is prohibitive. 40 Therefore, the housing, as an existential end, 
stands as an impediment to the on-going end of developing the land for 
industrial uses, its probable highest use. 
Comprehensive urban planning is seen as an effort to avoid problems 
of the foregoing sort in urban land-use. The plan usually starts with a 
catalogue of existing land uses and land-use regulations. Based upon 
explicit assumptions, the plan attempts to project probable demographic 
and economi c changes whi ch will affect future 1 and uses. It then 
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proposes ways of incrementally changing zoning ordinances and other 
land-use regulations so that land-use transitions occur in an orderly 
fashion in accordance with some preconceived and explicit notions about 
what future land-use patterns ought to be and why they should be that 
way. Finally, the plan is updated periodically to keep it current with 
changes which take place over time. The comprehensive plan is usually 
the product of careful del iberations by a city planning staff, a city 
planning commission, and the elected members of city government. It is 
usually subject to extensive public hearings before ratification and 
before any changes are enacted. 41 
In short, comprehensive city planning looks at land-use in a 
continuum which extends from the past to the future. And it looks at 
present land-use effects of past cause, at the present effects-means to 
future ends and at an array of ends-to-be-reached along with the combin-
ations of means which might be organized to their attainment. One of 
the functions of the plan is to assure with reasonable probabil ity that 
existential ends become means, not impediments, to on-gOing ends in 
urban land use. 
On-Going Life Processes 
The foregoing elaboration of the temporal setting of institutions 
and cities reduces deductively to the proposition that on-going 1 ife 
processes operate to convert ends into means in some continuing fashion. 
That is why the continuum is called an ends-means rather than a means-
ends continuum. All means were something else before they were means-
resources to on-going ends. They were either the outcomes of phenomena 
not invo1ving deliberation and selection by man, or they were ends in 
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Ends, as ends-;n-v;ew, were inte1lectual phenomena which existed 
only in the contemplation of members of the human species. They were 
states of being which did not exist at the time and which would come 
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into being only if the persons contemplating them chose them as ends-to-
be-reached and coupled their choices with actions to effectuate the ends. 
Ends became existential as immediate means and intermediate ends were 
selected and organized toward securing the ends-to-be-reached. And. 
in-as-much as ends are not ends-in-themselves. they became means (or 
impediments or both) to some on-going ends when they became existential. 
Thus, ends we:--e transformed into means by on-going 1 ife processes and 
on-going 1 ife processes operate to convert ends into means in some 
continuing progression. 
In summation, the temporal setting of institutions and cities is 
a longitudinal dimension in chronological sequence called an ends-means 
continuum, a continuum of on-going life processes. The setting is one 
for making social choices of ends-to-be-reached from an array of 
competing possible ends-in-view and for selecting and organizing 
immediate means and intermediate ends toward attainment of the chosen 
ends. Finally. the setting is one in which ends are transformed into 
means in some continuing fashion by on-going life processes. The next 
two chapters examine the functioning of institutions in this temporal 
setting as well as the significance this has for cities. 
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CHAPTER IV 
CEREMONIALISM AND THE URBAN PAST 
The second chapter defined institutions in terms of their 
essential character and the third chapter described a temporal setting 
in which institutions exist. This chapter will examine the operation of 
institutions in the setting described in Chapter Ill. It is first 
useful to recall the central ideas from the first three chapters. The 
definition arising from the examination of institutions in the second 
chapter is: 
An institution is an organized social group vl/hich has evolved 
from and is united with some particular system of cultural 
values~ and it serves through processes of social control to 
stab;l ize social interaction by preserving and perpetuating 
those cultural values in the society of which the institution 
is a part. 
The stress here is on cultural values, ways of knowing and doing 
regarding all manner of social interaction. 
The temporal setting of institutions which was described in 
Chapter III is an ends-means continuum; a continuum of on-going life 
processes; a setting for hUman choices. It was found that the continuum 
consists of a past, a present, and a future. It was argued that all 
that exists in the present is the effects of prior causes, and that 
those same effects are the means available in the present to the 
attainment of ends which lie in the future along the continuum. It was 
likewise argued that ends are alternative because available means are 
limited and because some ends are incongruous so that not all competing 
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ends-in-view are attainable. Finally, it was argued that ends are not 
ends-in-themselves. Once they have been attained, ends become means to 
on-going ends which 1 ie farther in the future along the continuum. 
Human choices involve the selection of ends-to-be-reached from among 
ends-in-view, and the allocation of scarce means to the attainment of 
the chosen ends. 
The question is, how do institutions operate in the temporal set-
ting described in Chapter III? An answer to that question is attempted 
in this and the next chapter. The central idea in these chapters ;s 
that institutions achieve social stability and perpetuate their under-
lying cultural values by influencing social choices, choices involving 
the selection of ends-to-be-reached from among competing ends-in-view, 
and choices concerning the allocation of means to the attainment of 
chosen ends. Moreover. institutional influences in social choices will 
be consistent with the cultural values out of which the institutions 
arise and which they are determined to preserve and perpetuate in 
service to social stability. How, then, do institutions exercise this 
influence in the temporal setting described in Chapter III? 
Institutions discharge their social functions and influence social 
choices through the practice of ceremonialism. Ceremonialism is an 
i nstituti anal practi ce for perpetuati ng cul tura 1 val ues by conferri n9 
and rei nforci ng rank and soc; al status. Ceremoni ali sm is therefore the 
method by which institutions exercise social control, socialize 
initiates, and transmit culture, and thereby maintain social stab;l ity. 
Thus. any understanding of the way institutions operate in the temporal 
setting described in Chapter III comes down to an understanding of 
ceremonial ism. 
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Ceremonialism can best be understood in terms of the attributes of 
institutions described in Chapter II. Thus, ceremonialism will be 
related in this chapter to the cultural values. This comes down to 
explain how ceremonialism is the social technique by which the urban 
present is related to the institutional past in terms of the ends-means 
continuum. Chapter V will examine ceremonialism in terms of institu-
tional structure, socialization, and social control. Finally, the 
operation of ceremonialism in social choices will be examined in the 
last part of Chapter V. The essence of Chapter V is that ceremonialism 
is the chain which binds the urban future to the institutional past in 
terms of the temporal setting of cities described in Chapter III. 
The main purpose of this chapter is to explain how the urban 
present is inextricably linked by ceremonialism to the institutional 
past in terms of the ends-means continuum. The main ideas are: 
ceremonialism arises out of cultural beliefs which descend to the 
present out of the past. Moreover, ceremonialism is the transmission 
media of those same cultural beliefs. It recounts the ethos of ancestors 
in dramas, folk history, legends, and myths. Of course, the ancestors 
are dead and gone, and the cultural beliefs are therefore unalterably 
fixed. The cultural beliefs take the forms of taboos and totems--mores 
and traditional things and ways of knowing and doing. The totems and 
taboos possess a compell ing mystique because of their 1 inkages to the 
ancestors and the past. l 
The following parts of this chapter will examine more closely each 
of these aspects of ceremonialism and cultural beliefs. The first part 
will explore the transmission of cultural beliefs, followed in 
succession by the origin of cultural beliefs, totems, and taboos, and 
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the mythical past, mystical justifications, ritual and role playing, and 
ceremonialism and law. Once again, the thrust of this chapter is the 
explication of ceremonialism as the chain which binds the urban present 
to the institutional past in respect to the temporal setting of cities. 
It is the agency for informing the present with prototypes of human 
interactions from the past. And insofar as those prototypes become 
models for present actions. they tend to reduce uncertainty and create 
social stabil ity by regularizing social intercourse. 
THE TRANSMISSION OF CULTURAL BELIEFS 
One cannot know the true origins of cultural bel iefs with perfect 
certainty. He can only say that they originated sometime in the past 
and that they were transmitted to the present through a variety of media 
involving language in some form. No doubt, the earliest method of 
transmission was oral tradition ;n which the bel iefs were transmitted 
from generation to generation by way of folk legends and tribal myths. 
The legends were recalled from the memories of parents and conveyed to 
children in auspicious ceremonies commemorating particularly important 
events in the lives of ancestors and in the annals of the tribe. 
The mystical ceremonies involved role-playing in everything from 
simple rituals to complex dramas that acted out in symbolic form the 
events commemorated by the ceremonies. The dialogues usually took the 
forms of lyrics and other poetic styles which were prescribed by custom, 
recalled from memory, and expressed in chants, songs, and spoken 
discourse. The oral expressions were experiences of the human mind 
recalling the ancestral and tribal events of the past so that they 
caul d be transmitted to others and the receptors mi ght come to understand 
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and believe the who, the what, the when, the how, and especially the why 
of the culture. 
Written language evolved later to represent the spoken words, and 
in part to record and preserve the ancient ceremonies so that the 
cultural legacies of the past might be transmitted with greater fidelity 
to future generations. Written languages at first took the form of 
pictures or ideograms representing words, word fragments, or comb; nations 
of words in the spoken language. The modern Chinese written language is 
one comprised of characters which have evolved from ancient word pictures. 
However, character writing is tedious to learn and burdensome of 
memory. Thus alternatives evolved to simplify the written language. 
The Devangari script, in which Sanskrit and Hindi are written,. evolved 
employing symbols to represent whole syllables with each syllable 
containing both consonants and vowels. The Phoenician script, from 
which the Greek alphabet developed, was of the syllabic-type employing 
only consonant:;. The Greeks appropriated some of the Phoenician 
consonantal signs for which there were no Greek sounds to represent 
Greek vowel sounds. Thereby emerged a wholly phonetic alphabet that was 
quickly adapted to the uses of most of the Indo-European world. 
From the archaic Indo-European languages evolved most of the 
modern languages. From Latin emerged the romance languages. Italian. 
French, Spanish, Portuguese. and Romanian. From the Indian and Sanskrit 
branched Hindustani, Bengal i, and the whole range of middle Indian 
languages. From the Balta-Slavic came Czech, Polish, Russian, Bulgarian, 
and Lithuani an. And from the Germani c evol ved Swedi sh. Dani sh, German. 
Norwegian, Icelandic. Yiddish, Dutch, and modern English. 2 
Language emerged, first in oral expressions and later in written 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
107 
form, as an institution in concert with other institutions to help 
stabilize social interaction. Language augurs toward social stability 
by reduCing the uncertainties of communication--by increasing the 
assurances of the speaker or writer that the information transmitted is 
the information received by the recipient, and the assurances of the 
receiver that the information received was the information transmitted 
by the speaker or writer. That is, language makes possible the 
receiving, decoding, recording, recalling, organizing, encoding, and the 
transmitting of information which could not be intell igently 
communicated without language. In short, language makes possible 
transactions or exchanges of all sorts between people--exchanges which 
would be impossible without language. 
Early written languages arose from two dominant purposes--to 
account for commercial transactions and to record and transmit cultural 
beliefs by way of the folk legends and myths contained in and reinforced 
by the rituals and ceremonial liturgies of tribal societies. From this 
latter purpose flowed the great pieces of ancient writing which are 
extant today; the great Sanskrit texts of the Aryans, the Rg-Veda, the 
Upanishads, the Bagavad-Gita, the Tantas, and more; the non-Sanskrit 
texts of the Hindus, the Kabir, the Caitanya, and the Ramakrishna to 
name only a few; the Torah in the Hebrew texts of Judaism; the Sutras 
in many languages, containing the Dharmmas of the Buddha, Siddhartha 
Gautama. And from the Greek and Latin languages survive the enduring 
tragedies of Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides as well as the comedies 
of Aristophanes; the epic poems of Homer and Horace, and the lyrics of 
Virgil; the histories of Herodotus, Thucydides, and Tacitus, and the 
biographies of Plutarch; the great oratories of Demosthenes and Cicero; 
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the philosophical works of Plato, Aristotle, Lucretius, Epictetus, and 
Marcus Aurelius; and the Bible of Christendom. 3 
Upon these anci ent works are founded most of the subsequent 
artistic and philosophic creations of Hestern Civilization. Examples 
are, of course, legion. The influence is so pervasive that space in 
this tY'eatise does not permit an exhaustive development of the point. 
Nevertheless, one representative example may suffice to show the 
linkages between kernels of thought in ancient works and the influence 
of those ideas in elaborations by subsequent artists. authors, and great 
thinkers. 
The Last Supper, the magnificent surreal istic painting by the 
modern artist Salvadore Oa1i, hangs in the National Gallery of Art in 
Hashington, D. C. ft. realistic painting of the same subject was completed 
by Leonardo da Vinci nearly 450 years earl ier on a wall in the refectory 
at the monastery of Santa Maria della Grazie in r~ilan, Italy. One views 
the paintings with marvel at the superb craftsmanship of the artists and 
with awe at the inspirational messages they convey. The paintings stir 
deep and abiding emotions in the hearts of Christians who are reminded 
of the actions and words of Jesus Christ ai; the beginning of the 
Christian era. 4 
For in the night in which he was betrayed, he took bread; and 
when he had given thanks he brake it and gave it to his 
disciples, saying, take, eat. this is my body which is given for 
you; Do this in remembrance of me. Likewise. after supper, he 
took the cup; and when he had given thanks he gave it to them 
saying, Drink ye all of this; for this is my blood of the New 
Testament, which is shed for you and for many, for the remission 
~:.5ins. 00 this as oft as ye shall drink it. in remembrance of 
Hi story and ceremony record that Chri st died upon a cross of 
crucifixion on the day following the last supper. The meaning of the 
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events, the Last Supper and the crucifixion is that God made a sacrifi-
cial offering of Christ, his son, that mortal mankind might be redeemed 
of sins. In the words of one holy book: 
All glory be to thee, Almighty God, our heavenly Father, for 
that thOll, of thy tender mercy, didst give thine only Son, Jesus 
Christ, to suffer death upon the cross for our redemption; who 
made there (by his one oblation of himself once offered) a full, 
*~~f~~!. s~~~ ~~fr~~i:~~l !a~~;f~~g' obl at; on, and satisfaction, 
The Holy Eucharist, the ceremony of the Last Supper, has descended 
to modern times as a sacrificial offering in expiation of trespass or 
atonement for sins. That is, an exchange takes place between a 
communicant and God through the intermediation of Jesus Christ in which 
the communicant gives up some material possession to the body of Christ, 
the Church, and God gives the communicant full remission of his sins. 
The entire event is celebrated by a feast in which a victim, Jesus 
Christ, is sacrificed on an altar to God. The slaughter of a victim 
symbol izes the just fate of the sinning communicant. God accepts the 
sacrifice and God and the communicants then consume the body and blood 
of the victim in commemoration of the event. 
The Holy Eucharist, the most holy of all Christian ceremonies, is 
reenacted each Sunday and on other holy days in most Christian churches 
throughout the world. liorshipers, playing the roles of Christ's 
disciples, recite a creed of faith, make an offering--usually in cash--
and confess their sins. After absolution in which the worshipers ' sins 
are forgiven, a priest symbolically repeats the actions and words of 
Christ in consecrating and serving the bread and wine (the symbolic body 
and blood of Christ). Following a priestly oblation and invocation, the 
communicants receive and consume the body (the bread) and the blood 
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(the wine) of Christ. The priest recites a prayer of thanksgiving and 
renders a benediction, and the communicants depart content in the belief 
that the ceremony of exchange has resulted in the complete and 
unequivocal remission of their sins, whatever they might have been. The 
ceremony serves to purge the communicants of debil itating feel ings of 
guilt, while reinforcing their commitments to live, however imperfectly, 
by the teachings of Christ--that is, to play the roles of Christians 
within the institutional church. 
Th~ priests are of course reenacting a ceremony which was 
instituted by Christ for the Church founded in His name. HOI,ever, Christ 
was simply reenacting a much more ancient ceremony--albeit that he 
endowed the ceremony with a very dramatic variation by placing himself 
in the role of Issac, Abrahamls son, and making himself the immolation 
victim. Nevertheless, the idea of a sacrificial offering has a much 
more ancient lineage. For example, read of God instructing Moses 
approximately 1200 years before the Last Supper: 
And the Lord spake unto Moses, saying, If a soul commit a tres-
pass and sin through ignorance, in the holy things of the Lord, 
then he shall bring for his trespass unto the Lord a ram without 
blemish out of the flocks, with thy estimation by shekels of 
silver, after the shekel of the sanctuary, for a trespass offer-
ing. And he shall make amends for the Harm that he has done in 
the holy thing, and shall add the fifth part thereto, and give 
it unto the priest; and the priest shall make an atonement for 
him with the ram of the trespass offering, and it shall be 
forgiven him. 7 
Or consider the actions of the Patriarch Abraham as he carries out 
the commandments of Yahweh on Mount Moriah nearly 2,000 years before the 
Last Supper. 
And they came to the place which God had told him of; and 
Abraham built an altar there and laid the wood in order, and 
bound Isaac his son, and laid him on the altar upon the wood. 
And Abraham stretched forth his hand, and took the knife to 
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slay his son. And the angel of the Lord called unto him out of 
heaven and said, Abraham, Abraham; and he said, here am I. And 
the angel said lay not thine hand upon the lad, neither do thou 
anything unto him; for now I know that thou fearest God, seeing 
thou hast not withheld thy son, thine only son, from me. And 
Abraham 1 if ted up his eyes and looked and behold, behind him a 
ram caught in a thicket by his horns; and Abraham went and took 
the ram, and offered him up for a burnt offering in the stead of 
his son. 8 
111 
The sacrificial offering has yet more ancient origins. Indeed, 
one can trace the practice to its ultimate origin only by speculation. 
However, reference is made to the sacrifice of victims for many purposes 
in the most ancient Sanscrit texts of the Aryans. the Indo-European 
ancestors of the Hindu, Greek, and Roman cultures. The practice was 
clearly widespread throughout the ancient world several millennia 
before Christ instituted it as the principal sacrament of His Church. 9 
Thus, ceremonies of sacrificial offerings as atonements for 
trespasses against cultural codes came into being sometime in the 
prehistorical era of man. The ceremonies were transmitted by celebrants 
down the generations of prehistoric man by the actions and oral 
recitations of chants, hymns, and other spoken discourse. As written 
languages emerged at the dawn of history, the chants, hymns, and prose 
of the ancient sacrificial ceremonies were recorded so that they might 
be transmitted to future generations with greater fidel ity. The written 
texts became media for transmission of the idea of sacrificial offerings 
as means of atonement. And upon this kernel of thought is erected 
philosophies, institutions, impressive edifices of worship, codes of 
ethics, great works of art, and much more. 
This is but one set of a boundless number of examples which might 
be cited to illustrate the point that the institutional practices of 
ceremonialism arise out of cultural beliefs which descend to the present 
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out of the past. The cultural beliefs are transmitted in folk history, 
literature, works of art. holy symbols, ceremonies, legends, and myths 
which recount the pathos of ancestors and the ethos of the tribe. And 
the cultural beliefs inspire the production of art, literature, 
philosophy, and a myriad of other cultural vestiges, all of which are 
designed to perpetuate further the cultural beliefs by linking the 
temporal present to the institutional past. 
ORIGINS OF CULTURAL BELIEFS 
Although one cannot know with perfect assurance the ultimate 
origins of particular cultural beliefs, a notion of those origins can 
often be deduced from the texts and artifacts by which they were 
transmitted to the present. A careful examination of those remnants 
from the past has occupied archeologists, historians, anthropologists, 
and other scholars for many years. The results of that scholarship 
reveal much about the origins of certain cultural beliefs, and thus 
much about the ceremonialism which arises out of those beliefs.'O 
Many cultural beliefs are founded on faith out of the fear and awe 
of natural forces over which man has no apparent power. Those forces 
take two general forms--the fear of death and the awe of natural 
phenomena such as the annual seasons, rain and flood, volcanic eruptions, 
earthquakes, and the like. The cultural beliefs allay primitive fears 
by ascribing unexplained phenomena to supernatural forces and 
rationa1izing them in terms of mystical causes. These mythical 
justifications invoke a spirit world of mystical potencies which act and 
react upon one another as though they were causally related in some 
natural way. Therefore. to the primitive mind, they could be 
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beneficially manipulated in quasi-causal ways by ceremony and magical 
ritual. Ceremonial behavior involves just such ritualistic role-
playing according to the dictates of the ancient and traditional totems 
and taboos which descend to the present out of the past. ll 
An early example of the social consequences of the fear of death 
was discovered in excavations at Chapelle aux Saints, France. The 
excavations revealed the imaginative thoughts of the primitive Mouster-
ians (a subgroup of Homo neanderthalensis from the upper paleolithic 
period, ca. 100,000 to 50,000 years ago) regarding death and the needs 
of the deceased. Several skeletons were found in shallow graves dug 
into the cave floor. The dead were carefully interred. their heads 
sometimes resting on stone pillows. The graves were placed near the 
hearths so the deceased could be warmed by the fires. They were 
provided with tools and joints of meat, the better to serve their needs 
after their earthly 1 ives ended. 
The terrifying fact of death and its ravages shocked the ~1ouster­
ians into unexpected and uneconomic directions of human thought. They 
could not accept the complete cessation of earthly life, but vaguely 
imagined that life must somehow continue and that the dead would have 
need of the food and tools they buried with them. The Mousterians 
ceremonially tended the dead as an act of faith. Their faith in magical 
remedies was proportif'.r1ate to their perceived helplessness in the face 
of death. Objective judgments simply gave way to fear and hope and the 
Mousterians desperately grasped and accepted the nearest explanation at 
hand while ignoring any reason to believe there could be any other 
answer. In short, fear was the sire of faith. 12 
These kinds of fears augur huge in the early formation and descent 
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of the complex of cultural beliefs which survive in modern times. The 
font of those beliefs was the religion of the ancients. The domestic 
branch of the religion was founded in a fear of death not unlike that 
of the Mousterians. Indeed, the religion arose from prehistoric Indo-
European traditions and traces of it are found in the ancient Aryans and 
Vedas of the Hindus as well as the classical writings of the Greeks and 
Romans. 
Unable to accept the notion of the cessation of life at death, the 
ancients believed that the soul continued after death and that it must 
have a dwelling. Without a tomb, the soul became a wandering spirit 
seeking the repose it deserved after the labor and anguish of life. It 
was believed that the un tombed soul was disquieted, an evil spirit, 
delivering pestilence, famine, and disease upon its living descendants, 
admonishing them to give sepulture to itself and its physical remains. 
Thus it was in pursuit of their own peace in 1 ife and the assur-
ance of repose and happiness after death that the living performed the 
funeral ceremony. That is, their faithful service to the dead reinforced 
their own convictions that all would not end for them when they them-
sel ves di ed. Rather, their fast; di aus rituals assured the 1; ving that 
their souls would also continue after death and that their living 
descendants would perform the ceremonies which would provide the 
sustenance needed by their souls after death. This mythical belief was 
a powerful force compelling the living to ceremonially organize their 
lives to worship and serve their dead ancestors. The deceased ancestors, 
the manes whose feats were perpetuated among the 1 iving by ceremonial-
ism, legends, and myths, were the family gods. The primitive religion 
of the ancients was a purely domestic institution. 
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Service to the dead, therefore, did not cease with the funeral 
ceremony. On the contrary, since the soul of the deceased survived 
death, it had need of food and drink and it was the duty of the 1 iving 
to satisfy that need. Supplying sustenance to the dead was an 
obligation not to be left to chance or the capricious sentiments of 
men. Every Greek and Roman household contained a totem, an altar upon 
which a few coals must always be burning. The fire was called Vesta by 
the Romans--Vesta, the goddess of the hearth. 
The fire existed to warm the manes, the souls of the ancestors, 
who were buried nearby and to prepare the offerings which would sustain 
them. It was the sacred duty of the master of each house to rna; ntai n 
the fire without cessation. An extinguished hearth fire was taboo. The 
fire ceased to burn upon a family altar only when there was no one left 
to maintain it. An extinguished hearth meant an extinct family to the 
anci ents. 13 
The damest; c rel i gi on of the anci ents forbade two fami 1 ies to 
mingle. The particular religious practices of each family were sacred 
and unique. Thus each gens. or extended family, occupied its own canton, 
a family territory surrounding the sacred fire and its structure. This 
of course limited social intercourse so that the family was no doubt the 
sole form of society for many centuries. However, the restrictions 
imposed by the ancient religious beliefs were t"dO narrow to allow 
families in the emerging civilization to cooperate in the amelioration of 
inter-gens disputes without bloodshed or in providing common security and 
material needs. 14 It therefore became expedient for several fami1 ;es to 
join in another worship which was common to all of them. This was 
accomplished without sacrificing any part of the special religions of the 
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constituent families. Indeed, it was essentially an expansion of the 
domestic religion beyond the family. However, it was based on the 
same precepts which undergirded the antecedent domestic religion of the 
ancients. 
This eventual ity led to the formation of "hat came to be known as 
a phratry' in ancient Greece. and a curta in ancient Rome. It required 
some enlargement of preceding rel ;9;OU5 ideas. Members of the 
constituent famil i es had to accept the common di vinity, a divinity that 
was 5uper:ior in Some respects to those of the households. Once accepted, 
the worship was founded by the erection of an altar and the lighting of 
a sacred fire. Like the patron in the domestic worship. a curion 
presided at sacrifices for the curia. The worship was in all other 
respects 1 ike that at the domestic altars. It consisted of preparing a 
repast on the altar and consuming it in common, for the ancients 
bel; eyed that nour; shment prepared and consumed in that way establ ished 
a sacred bond between people which lasted until death. 15 
The tribe came into existence when several curies found it advan-
tageous to join in common association. The tribe was constituted to be 
a separate society knowing no higher authority. Like the cury and 
phratry, the tribe was founded by the erection of an altar and the 
creation of unique divinities--usually men who were deified and called 
"heroes." The tribe had an annual feast day on which the entire tribe 
participated in a sacrifice presided over by a tribunus. The tribal 
worship was like that of the curies which made it up, identical in form 
to the domestic worships of the constituent households and based upon 
the same underlying notions .16 
Fi nally. a ci vitus or city was establ i shed when two or more tri bes 
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found it expedient to organize on some common basis. The ancient city 
was at first a confederation which had to respect the religious beliefs 
and c.ivil independence of the tribes and curias which made it up. 
Unlike modern cities which evolve from village to town and from town to 
city, the ancient city was created by the gods in a single day. 
Founding a city was a religious event involving the founding men and 
their gods. 
For example, the city of Rome was founded by Romulus on the 21st 
of April-.-probably in the seventh century 8. C.--an anniversary which 
is still celebrated by the residents of Rome. Of course, there were 
cantons populated by members of Latin and Etruscan tribes already 
establ ished on and around the seven hills of what has come to be the 
City of Rome, for Rome was near the frontier between Latium and Etrusca. 
But a collection of curias and gentes from several different tribes in 
a common region does not a civitus make. In the modern vernacular, it 
lacked a corporate charter, and the charter could only be granted by the 
gods who would live in, protect, and assure the good fortunes of the 
city for its mortal citizens. 
Romulus first consulted the gods for only they could say where the 
city should be. Being a Latin from the city of Alba, he consulted the 
gods by observing the flight of birds. The birds indicated that the 
gods meant Rome to be establ i shed on the Pal atine. Romul us offered a 
sacrifice at the top of Palatine Hill. He and his companions built a 
fire of brushwood, and each man purified himself by jumping through the 
fire. Romulus then dug a small circular trench which he called mundus, 
meani ng regi on of the manes. Into thi s trench he threw a clod of earth 
which he had carried with him from the city of Alba. Each of his 
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companions likewise cast bits of earth into the trench. Like Romulus, 
they had brought the earth from the cantons of thei r fathers. 
The purpose of mundus was to bring the domestic gods from their 
native sepulchers and install them in a tomb at the new urbs. For it 
was a taboo that one must not desert his manes and the lesser gods, the 
lares and penates familiaris, and it would be hoped that those gods 
would not desert their descendants. With the gods properly entombed in 
their new location, Romulus built an altar and 1 it a sacred fire to what 
now were Jh~ lares compitalis and penates publici of Rome. 
With his head veiled and wearing a white robe, Romulus traced the 
boundaries of the new urbs or place of civitus by plowing a furrow 
around it with a copper plowshare drawn by a ~'hite bull and a white cow. 
The furrow was interupted at places where gates (portae) would be 
installed, for the furrow was sacred and it was a sacrilege to cross it. 
Romul us I companions foll owed sil ently, throw; n9 the clods turned up by 
the plow back into the enclosure so that none of the sacred earth would 
remain outside. Finally, a wall was built inside the sacred furrow, and 
several meters of earth were reserved along each side for religious 
purposes. 
Just as the gens, the cury, and the tribe had its hearth and chief 
priest, so did the city. The chief priest of the ancient city was 
called king, and the position and title were inherited in proper 
patriCian fashion by the eldest son upon demise of his father, the king. 
Worship at the public hearth fire was the basis of his dignity and power. 
Just as the patron was all at once the chief prieo::"S, ;n','lgi~trate, and 
master of his family. so the king was also the political chief of the 
city.l? 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
119 
So pervasive were the powers of the primitive rel i gion that it was 
many centuries of bloodshed and human anguish before the gods revealed 
the cury and the tribe to men that they might cooperate beyond their 
gentes in common interests. And it was doubtlessly many more centuries 
of bloodshed before the gods revealed how to establish civitus and found 
urbs at some place to the same end. The new social organizations gained 
currency then only when their founders in each case left the powers of 
the patrons undisturbed and emulated the traditional rel igious trappings 
and sacrificial offerings of their constituent gentes. That is, ante-
cedent ceremonial behavior continued as before. Likewise, it 
constrained the new social organizations so that they possessed only the 
powers allowed to them by the former. Finally, the new social organ-
izations took on and applied the antecedent ceremonial behavior. 
The lives of the ancients were dominated by religious experience. 
Every action brought men into the presence of one or more gods. The gods 
prevailed at birth. at the sunrise and awakening, at each repast, at 
every going in and coming out, at and during repose, in war and peace, 
and at and after death. Indeed, the pantheon of domesti c gods arose 
from the fear of death and a consequent preoccupation with the human 
soul--with god-in-man, or approximately what Christians think of as the 
Holy Ghost. 
Many of the ancient beliefs about religious worship persist into 
modern times. The idea of an individual soul for each person is a well 
known example. The heroes of the ancient tribes are similar to the 
saints worshipped by some modern Christian denominations. One can find 
a column dedicated to the hero George Washington at Washington, D. C., a 
city named after the same hero. Likewise, that city contains temples to 
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other national heroes--Thomas Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln, and the unknown 
soldier to name a few. And how many of the continuous states have cities 
named after those and other national heroes as well as other cities with 
streets, parks, and monuments likewise commemorating the national demigods. 
The idea of worshipping an omnipotent God, albeit a single and 
universal god, rather than a pantheon of deceased ancestors, is a well 
established practice. The worship involves initiation. adoration, 
thanksgiving, invocation, sacrificial offerings, and the receiving of 
absolution and benediction in some order and form in most religious 
denominations. Some sects also hold tenaciously to other ancient, 
sacred forms. For example, it is a practice of orthodox Judaism to make 
a fire offering in which an altar fire must be perpetually burning, and 
a meat offering in which God is believed to consume His portion in the 
flame and the remainder is to be consumed by the priests and others 
involved in the worship.18 Such is the stuff of the modern institutional 
church, or synagogue. or mosque, or temple, or whatever. 
The point is, that an enormously complex and powerful institutional 
system founded at 1 east in part upon a human fear of death and other 
matters over which man has little or no known powers has evolved out of 
ancient and mostly intuitively validated beliefs. Those beliefs were 
transmitted to the present by ceremonial practices, and the 
institutions which have grown out of those beliefs and practices will 
continue to perpetuate them into the future. 
But more than that, those ancient religious beliefs founded as 
they were upon primitive fears of death, gave rise not just to religious 
institutions, but to a proliferation of other institutions which also 
survive in modern times. A further examination of the writings of the 
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Greeks and Romans, civilizations from which Western Civilization traces 
its origins, reveals that the primitive religion established paternal 
authority, matrimony, private property ri ghts. inheritance, and much 
more. After enlarging and extending the paternal family to the cury and 
tribe, that primitive religion exerted its powerful influence in the 
formation of and dominion over the ancient city. All of the institutions 
of the ancient world evolved from it. And the ceremonial remnants of 
many of those institutions and laws persist into modern times. 
TOTEMS AND TABOOS 
The cultural beliefs, upon which ceremonialism are founded, take 
the forms of what anthropologists call totems and taboos. Totems are 
physical objects, trees, stones, altars, household objects, animals, 
etc., "'/hich are bel ieved to possess mana, or supernatural powers or to 
be inhabited by a god or gods which possess such powers. Taboos are 
approximately analogous to mores as they have been defined elsewhere in 
this treatise. That is, they are traditionally or divinely prescribed 
and proscribed modes of behavior. t~uch of the preceding descriptions of 
both ancient and modern rel igious practices are, in fact, descriptions 
of totems and taboos. The altar, the physical materials of sacrificial 
offerings, the bread and wine of the Holy Eucharist, and all other so-
called sacred mater; a 1 s are totems. Likewise, the prescri bed worshi p 
ceremonies, as well as such admonitions as the Ten Commandments of the 
Judea-Christian code, are taboos. 
Much of that which is described in the remainder of this chapter 
and the next wi 11 be found to fit the descri pti on of totem or taboo. 
However, it is intructive to press further the illumination of ancient 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
122 
bel ;efs and thei r infl uence on the ceremonial ism of modern instituti cns 
in terms of totems and taboos.1 9 
It is thought that the rna 1 e-domi nant househo 1 d evolved from a 
distant antiquity. At a predatory and more barbarian stage of culture, 
women were seized from the vanquished enemy and prized as trophies of 
war. This gave rise to a form of ownership-marriage in which the male, 
who had acquired his female trophies by his predatory prowess, was head 
of the household. However it came to be, the households of ancient 
Greece and Rome were headed by their senior male members. 20 
The ceremonial behavior, the chants and pr:.:tyers--;n short, the 
taboos--which were part of the domestic religions of the ancients were 
a patrimony. a sacred tradition which members of the family were 
forbidden to disclose to persons outside the family. Those taboos were 
ceremonially passed from father to eldest son. In giving life to his 
son, a father also gave him the right to continue the ceremonies of the 
hearth fire, to make the sacrificial offerings. and to speak the sacred 
prayers. In this way, a mysterious and sacred bond was established 
between the infant son and all of the manes, lares. and penates. the 
ancestral gods of the family. The domestic religion was patriarchal, 
and the father of the household was the high priest, the pater famil ias 
who alone possessed the mana or mystical potency needed to carryon and 
to perpetuate the family worship. 
As priest of the hearth fire. the father recognized no superior--
not the ci ty, not hi s officials, nor any other power caul d change hi s 
worship. He was the supreme chief of the domestic religion. He alone 
possessed the paternal mana to perform all of the ceremonies of the 
worship as he had seen his father perform them before him. He alone 
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was responsible for the perpetuation of the family and its religion. It 
was his first concern, and from that concern stemmed all of his powers, 
powers which he shared with no one. 
The father was master of the household as well as its magistrate 
and chief priest. According to the ancient taboos of patrimony, the 
father had the right to accept or reject a child at its birth. He could 
repudiate his wife either for steril ity or adultery so that the family 
would become neither extinct nor debased. The wife had no such powers. 
The father had the right to give his daughters in marriage, and the 
right to sanctify the marriages of his sons. He had the power to 
emancipate or exclude a son from the family worship. And he had the 
right to adopt or to introduce a stranger into the domestic religion. 
Finally, at his death, he could name a guardian for his wife and 
children. In short, he had the powers--indeed, the duty--to do anything 
necessary to perpetuate the family and its damest; c worshi p. 21 
While the powers of modern husbands and fathers are no longer as 
prodigious as those of the ancient world, it has been only during the 
last century that those traditional taboos have yielded in any 
substantial way to liberalizing influences in modern industrial 
countries. Indeed, husbands and fathers in some countries continue to 
wield the traditional powers little changed from those of antiquity. 
Moreover, it is still very much the case in the more liberal nations 
that the husband and father is the traditional, if only titular, head 
of the modern household. A wife continues to take her husband's surname, 
and that name becomes the surname of all acknowledged children sired by 
the man. ~..Jhen generic reference is made to the human race, it ;s 
called IImankind, II not womankind. The male-dominant role, which was so 
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soundly entrenched in antiquity and before, continues to be reinforced 
in modern societies in thousands of seemingly insignificant ways. 
Many practices of the ancient religious taboos have been 
integrated into some modern ecclesiastical practices. For example, 
ordination is a ceremony for transmitting the mystical potency 
possessed by the bishop or patriarch to the novice priest so that the 
latter can execute his fatherly function of ceremonially feeding the 
children of the church. Moreover, this is a vocation of men for only 
men can possess paternal mana. It is believed that the bishop acquired 
his mystical powers from his own ordination in which the hands of a 
previously ordained bishop were laid upon him, and those hands were 
carrying on a lineage which originated with Jesus Christ Himself and 
was transmitted through Simon Peter, Christ's apostle and the first 
bishop of Rome. Only properly ordained priests possess the mana to 
carryon the worship.22 The modern worship ceremony continues to 
conform to many of the ancient paternal taboos. 
The cultural heritage upon which the ceremonialism of paternity 
has descended out of the past is an ancient taboo based upon the 
rel igious bel iefs of the ancients--a bel ief that was founded upon a 
fear of death. And the ceremonies of modern institutions continue to 
reinforce and perpetuate the ancient taboos. 
THE MYTHICAL PAST 
The totems and taboos possess a compelling mystique because of their 
linkage to the past. Linkage to the past necessarily means that the 
the totems and taboos are unalterably fixed because they are founded on 
the conquests of the ancestors, the legends about whom have become a part 
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of the cultural heritage. The beliefs are unalterable because the ancestors 
are dead, their physical remains interred and their psychic presences 
resident only in the dramas, folk history, legends, and myths descended from 
the past. The myths tell it the way it was and one cannot change them. 
He can only accept on faith the totems and taboos as transmitted. 
Of course, one may reject and deny the cultural beliefs, but he 
must bear an enormous cost to do so. Rejection involves denial of the 
essential beliefs of the society of which one is a part. It consists of 
denying the myths, folk history, legends, literature, customs and law--
in short the ceremonial ism which binds together the institutional 
network of society. It is putting oneself obverse to the values held 
most sacred by his contemporaries. It is heresy, and it invites social 
sanctions which include everything from simple avoidance by family and 
friends to suffering death by fire at a stake erected by one's friends 
and nei ghbors. 
As a matter of fact, almost everyone conforms in bel i ef and 
behavior to the taboos and the proper use of totems. Moreover, they do 
so on the force of intuitive faith with little, if any, understanding of 
the origins of, the implicit character of, and the behavior called forth 
by the beliefs they hold. They do so in part because they are social 
creatures--an idea which is more fully developed later in the following 
chapter--and peer acceptance requires conforming beliefs and behavior. 
In short, most persons accept the totems and taboos on faith and on the 
nearly fl awless 1 ogi c that one' 5 forefathers prospered and brought forth 
the present happy state of affairs by conducting their affairs in the 
ceremonially prescribed patterns. One should therefore emulate the cere-
monialism of his forefathers ifhe is to perpetuate his euphoric state. 23 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
126 
For example, the traditional marriage ceremony descends little 
changed in character and meaning from that of the ancients. Modern brides 
and grooms conform to the taboos and the proper uses of totems according 
to the ancient ceremony. They do so on the strengths of their own faiths 
in social customs, and usually with no knowledge of the origins or mean-
ings of the customs. They conform to the customs simply because that is 
the way everyone does things, and because they fear that their union may 
somehow be blighted if they fail to pay homage to tradition. 
The. modern marriage ceremony, conforming to tradition, is a sacred 
event which takes place before an altar. The bride wears a white gown 
and her head is covered with a veil. The father of the bride gives her 
to the groom. The ceremony proceeds with incantations, pledges, and 
prayers by and on behalf of the bride and groom. The bride takes the 
surname of her husband. The bride and groom light nuptial candles at or 
near the altar. They share a wedding cake in the presence of family and 
guests. And the groom carries the bride over their first threshold, 
taking care that her feet do not touch the threshold. 
The modern marriage adheres remarkably to many of the ancient 
taboos even though some of the underlying beliefs have long been lost to 
antiquity. The ancient ceremony, like that of the modern ceremony, 
marks the advent of matrimony in the 1 ives of the bride and groom. 
However, the institution of matrimony was inextricably related to the 
domestic religion of the ancients, and it was no doubt one of the first 
institutions to rise from those religious beliefs. The ancient wedding 
ceremony was an essential ingredient of the domestic religion for 
perpetuating the sacred hearth fire and the sacrificial offerings while 
avoiding intra-family marriage and inbreeding. Thus, each element of 
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the ceremony had special meaning to the ancients. 
In the ancient world a daughter took part from her birth in the 
rel igion of her father. Every day she invoked his sacred fire and 
offered it libations. His hearth fire was the altar of her gods. More 
was involved than simply passing from one household to another when a 
man from another family asked the daughter's hand in marriage. She must 
be released from the sacred fire of her father and thereafter invoke the 
gods of her husband, for it is a taboo that one person shall not worship 
before two different ancestral fires, before two sets of totems. Proper 
ceremonies were therefore instituted to formalize the binding of a man 
and a woman in matrimony--to emancipate her from her father's worship 
and adopt her into that of her husband. 
A sacred ceremony of marriage, differing only in modest detail, 
was practiced throughout the ancient world. It began in the paternal 
dwelling of the bride. Surrounded by his family and in the presence of 
the bridegroom, the father of the bride offered a sacrifice at the 
conclusion of which he sacramentally declared that he gave his daughter 
to the bridegroom. She was thus severed from all attachments to her 
paternal hearth and she was free to adopt her new rel igion. 
The bride was attired in white to proclaim her chastity. She wore 
a veil so that her presence did not offend the domestic gods of the 
groom before the groom caul d remove the cause of offense by maki ng them 
her gods a 1 so. Properly attired, the bride was carr; ed to the dwell ing 
by her husband. However, she dared not enter the dwelling on her own 
accord for she had no right to do so. Her husband must seize her and 
take her by force into the presence of his gods. She had to resist--
although perhaps not too vigorously--while her husband raised her in his 
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arms and carried her over the threshold, taking care that her reet not 
touch the threshold, for the threshold was a sacred totem barring 
strangers from the hearth fire. The bride was sprinkled with lustral 
water in the presence of her new domestic divinity. Prayers were spoken 
as she touched Vesta, the sacred flame. Finally, she shared a cake with 
her husband in the presence of the hearth fire, plaCing herself in 
corrrrnunion with her husband and his family, including the manes, lares, 
and penates of the family. 
It .is easy to understand that matrimony under such solemn 
circumstances must be monogamous. It involved much more than shallow 
affection or a simple sexual relationship. Husband and wife were united 
by the compelling bond of the same religious beliefs and by the 
worship of the same unique gods. But, more than that, the purpose of 
the union was to produce an acceptable male offspring who would continue 
the hearthfire and immolations necessary to the sustenance and 
tranquility of the gods. Those effects were so grave that men did not 
bel ieve it possible to have more than one wife in each house. And for 
the same reasons, such marriages were dissolvable only under the most 
grave circumstances. 24 
The modern weddi ng ceremony demonstrates that the totems (the 
regalia and setting) and the taboos (the behavior of the participants) 
possess a compelling mystique because of their linkages to the past The 
modern bride and groom are compelled by the mystique to conform in 
adornment and behavior to the ancient and unchanging customs. The 
mystique is compelling because of the couplels faith that adherence to 
the ancient myths and traditions will somehow bless their union with 
durability, success, and happiness. The faith is founded on the 
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conviction that the traditional ceremony was mysteriously instrumental 
in producing those qualities in the matrimonial unions of their 
ancestors--unions which, after all, produced the present bride and 
groom. Moreover, the strengths of their convictions are independent of 
any knowledge of the so-called pagan origins of tile totems and taboos. 
MYSTICAL JUSTIFICATIONS 
The cultural beliefs which have descended from antiquity to the 
present are mystical justifications. They are rationalizations invoking 
a spirit world of mystical potencies which act and react upon one another 
as though they were causally related in nature. The spirit world is man-
ipulated in quasi-causal ways by traditional rituals. It is thought that 
one can appeal through prayer, lamentati cns, and ceremony to omn; potent 
spirits to use their mystical powers to perpetuate a present euphoria or 
to cause and bring forth a particularly desirable future state of affairs. 
Moreover, when the desirable end is achieved, its achievement is 
attributed to the liturgy and ritual which invoked the spirits to employ 
their mystical powers on behalf of the ends sought by the mortal litur-
gists. Failure to achieve the desirable end ;s rationalized away as a 
sign from the spirits that the end was somehow unworthy or the means 
were inadequate. The gods have spoken either way and their mystical 
message just; fi es whatever outcome ensues. Li kewi se. it reinforces the 
faith of mortals in the mystical powers of their ceremanies--their 
totems and taboos. 25 
For exampl e. the anc; ent antecedent to the modern marri age ceremony 
was a supplication to the domestic gods to sanctify and bless the union 
of a man and woman for the purpose of preduc; og another who waul d carry 
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on the worship. As already noted, a daughter was incapable by reason of 
her sex to perpetuate the domestic worship. The ceremonies of sacrifice 
and offering must be performed by a son of the patron. ~1oreover, a son 
born of any other union was a bastard and was thereby unworthy of the 
domestic pr;esthood--just as Ishmael, son of Abraham and Hagar, was 
unworthy to sire the Jewish people because Hagar was only Abraham's 
concubi ne and the hand-servant of Sarah, Abraham' 5 wedded wi fe. Rather, 
the tribes of Israel descended from Isaac, Abraham's son by Sarah, even 
though Isaac was born after Ishmae1.26 The point is that the son who is 
fit to perpetuate the hearth fire and perform the sacrificial offerings 
must be born of the union sanctified by the gods in the we(d'~ng ceremony. 
Of course, even a union sanctified through proper ceremony might 
fail to produce a male descendant eligible to continue the line. The 
greatest misfortune that could befall the domesti c pi ety, the dead 
ancestors whose souls inhabited the hearth fire, was that its line of 
descendants might end. If this should happen, its fire would be 
extingui shed and the enti re ancestral 1 i ne woul d pass into ob 1 i vi on and 
endless misery. Therefore, a man discharged his debt to his ancestors 
and assured immortality for himself when his wife delivered him a son 
who could assume the paternal priesthood, tend the hearthfire, and make 
the sacri fi ci a 1 offeri ngs. 
For these reasons, the ancients believed that a man belonged to 
his family--not to himself. He was a link in the family chain which 
connected the ancestors to future descendants who would carryon the 
domestic worship, and the chain must not be broken by him. A taboo 
therefore prohi bited eel i bacy. It a1 so permitted--perhaps requi red--
divorce if the wife were sterile. Likewise, it required that a brother 
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or other relative be substituted in the husband's place if the latter 
were sterile, and that a childless widow marry her husband's nearest 
available relative. A son born of either of these unions was treated as 
the son of the original husband for purposes of carrying on the domestic 
worship. All else failing, one last chance to escape extinction was in 
a ceremony of adoption in which a young male, not the first son of the 
patron, was admitted to the sacred hearth and placed in communion with 
the family gods. The ceremony of adoption was a symbolic fiction, 
namely the ceremonial rebirth of the adoptee into a new life. 27 
These options to perpetuate the family worship in the face of an 
inconsummateor barren matrimonial union were more frequent that one 
might suppose. For example, Augustus (Gaius Octavious), the first 
emperor of Rome was the adopted son of his great-uncle, Julius Caesar. 
Moreover, Augustus failed to sire a son in three marriages. He divorced 
his fi'rst wife, Claudia, who was barren, and his second wife, Scribonia, 
who produced only a daughter. Finally, Augustus adopted his stepson, 
Tiberius, who was the son of his third wife, Livia, by her divorced 
husband, Tiberius Claudius Nero. Tiberius became the second emperor 
of Rome, succeeding Augustus, his father by adoption. 28 
All of those arrangements were means to perpetuati ng the domest; c 
worship in ways suitable to the family gods. But none of the means were 
undertaken wi thout sacri fi cial offerings and appropri ate ceremoni es 
appeaSing the names and invoking the blessings of the lares and penates. 
It was the "elief that a fruitful outcome could not be forthcoming with-
out appealing to the mystical spirits to exert their omnipotence toward 
the ends sought by the appellants, whether it be in a ceremony of 
marriage, divorce, adoption, or emancipation. And if the desired outcome 
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was not forthcomi ng, then the spi ri ts had somehow measured the outcome 
as unworthy or the means as inadequate. Like Augustus, who was thrice 
wed and twice divorced, and who finally acquired an heir by adoption, 
one must petition the gods by other means until they bring forth the 
desired outcome. But whatever the outcome, the cause is attributed to 
the mythi ca 1 gods whose mysti cal powers were invoked by ceremony. 
RITUAL AND ROLE PLAYING 
Ceremonialism involves ritualistic role playing according to the 
dictates of the ancient taboos. The role attaches to a social position, 
and the role playing is the ceremonial behavior expected of one who 
occupies the position. The role, its social rationale, its powers, and 
its status and rank are prescribed by tradition. The legends and myths 
surrounding a role are the agents which prime social expectations regard-
ing the role. And when one comes to occupy a social position, he is 
expected to play the role and perform the rituals required by the 
position. Moreover, he automatically acquires the status, rank, and 
powers--or lack of powers--associated with the position. Likewise, per-
sons occupying reciprocal role-playing positions will respond to incum-
bents according to the same ancient taboos with deference to their own 
status and rank relative to that of the incumbent. The point is, the 
ceremonialism involved in role-playing is a make-believe or contrived 
situation based on mystical justifications descended from the ancient 
and mythical past. 29 
Take, for example, the modern institution of private property. 
Few institutions have had such pervasive effects on Western Civil ization 
Private property is the basis of personal wealth. The creation, 
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exchange, and preservation of private property and its rights occupy 
most human activities directly and indirectly most of the time. Onels 
status, rank, and powers are very much affected by his position within 
the institution of private property--by how much and what kinds of 
property he and hi s pri nci pa 1 s own or do not own. And the role one is 
expected to play is likewise affected by his position in the institu-
tion of private property. 
What is not generally understood is that the modern institution 
of private property is finnly rooted in the domestic religion of 
antiquity. While modern beliefs about private property depart 
significantly from those of the ancients, much of the ritual and role 
playing of the ancients has descended to the present and is evident in 
modern role expectations. It is therefore instructive to briefly 
examine the ancient origins of private property and the attending ritual. 
A state of propinquity existed between the ancient family. its 
hearth, and its ancestors. When they established a hearth and buried 
their deceased members at some place, it was with the intention that the 
family should always remain there--not for the life of one man but for 
as long as descendants remained to feed its Vesta and to support its 
sacred fl arr:e by ceremoni a 1 offer; ngs. The family was inextricably 
attached to the altar and the altar was attached to the soil under and 
around whi ch the ancestors were buri ed. The concept of dami cil e 
followed quite naturally from those circumstances. 
The hearth must be isolated from everything foreign to the domestic 
worship. The worship was an intimate family affair. It was a sacrilege 
for a stranger to be in sight of the altar when the family worship cere-
monies were performed. Thus, a sacred enclosure surrounded the hearth. 
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Likewise, no part of the sacred enclosure could be profaned by any other 
use. Structures could not be joined together. Each family must have 
its own free-standing dwelling much like the typical modern family dwell-
ing. A family did not build for the lifetime of one man, but for the 
descendants who would succeed one another generation after generation. 
The idea of property was easily extended from the domicile and the 
family tomb to the land which surrounded them. If the family were to 
survive to carryon the domestic worship. then there must be resources 
at hand to provide the sustenance, the food, clothing, drink, and other 
means of livelihood to support the descendants who would repeat the 
worship ceremonies in future generations. Those means of lifelihood 
came from the soil. The contiguous lands were therefore a property of 
the domestic religion. The entire domain was under the watch of the 
household divinities who, when properly appeased with sacrifices, 
maintained a benign benevolence so that peace and bountiful harvests 
would prevail season by season. 
The land comprising the domestic domain was bound by a band of 
sacred soil a few feet in width which was never touched and which was 
marked by totems or termi ni of 1 arge stones and tree trunks. On 
appointed days, the father of the family drove victims around his bound-
aries singing hymns and making sacrifices to his gods that they would 
continue to bless his properties with good fortune. No power on earth 
could displace the totem called terminus once it was established and 
maintained according to the required ceremonies. Indeed, one who over-
turned a terminus had committed a horrible sacrilege by disturbing a god, 
a totem, and encroaching upon another familys field. Expiation required 
irmnolation of the person responsible and any beasts involved with him. 
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Property was such a pervasive part of the domestic religion that a 
family could not abandon the former without renouncing the latter. Nor 
could a family be deprived of its property against the will of its 
patron. A man might be subjected to servitude to discharge his 
obligations, but his land could not be sold to the same end. His lands 
followed him into servitude, but he remained their proprietor. 30 
Much about private property has obviously changed since antiquity. 
The concept of private property was intermingled with that of sovereignty 
during the medieval period, and it emerged during the Protestant Refor-
mation in a much altered state. Indeed, the institution of private pro-
perty has been in a more or less constant state of revolution from its 
beginning. The point stressed here, however, is its remarkable durability. 
and the property ritual and ceremony which have survived from antiquity. 
The ritual expected of persons playing roles involving private 
property is remarkably unchanged from antiquity. When one becomes a 
property owner he is thought to have a mystical bond or relationship 
with the property. It is his to enjoy as he sees fit. Most units of 
private property are related somehow to domiciliary purposes, and most 
residential real properties contain free-standing dwellings occupied by 
single families. The real properties continue to be defined by bound-
ari es marked by totems, or monuments. The owner no longer dri ves 
victims around his boundaries singing hymns and making sacrifices to his 
gods. However, it is still expected that a property owner know and 
preserve his properties, and, on appointed days, offer his sacrifice to 
the god of state by paying the taxes assessed on his properties. The 
state reciprocates by enforcing laws which preserve the owner1s quiet 
use of the properties. And one who encroaches upon another person1s 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
136 
property can be prosecuted for trespass or conversion. The modern 
property owner may now be depri ved of hi s property under a vari ety of 
circumstances, but usually not without good reason, and only with due 
process of law in the United States. Finally, one's properties descend 
to heirs by testament or by process of statute if the owner expires 
intestate. If the owner dies intestate, the priority of claims by heirs 
is established in most jurisdictions according to the survivors' blood 
relationships to the deceased. 31 
Th~ modern institution of private property clearly involves cere-
monial role playing in accord with many of the taboos which descend from 
the domestic religion of antiquity. The social rationale for the role, 
its mystical powers, and the status and rank of one who occupies a role-
playing position within the institution of private property are pre, 
scribed by custom and law. The law, legends, and myths surrounding the 
role of property owner create self-fulfilling expectations in the minds 
of persons involved with the institution af private property. Persons 
who occupy positions in the institution are expected to play the roles 
and perform the rituals attending the positions they occupy. 
Literally everyone is involved in some way with the role playing and 
ritual of the institutional system in the societies of which they are 
parts. ~lost persons believe they are executing edicts of the gods or 
commissions of the state, or mandates of the people, or orders of some 
other abstract authority in situations that are natural or inevitable, or 
under the mystical powers of the spirits. In fact, the ceremonialism 
with which they play their roles is very real, but it is contrived by 
men. It is make-believe fabricated by men who allay their apprehensions 
by ascribing unexplained or unexplainable phenomena to supernatural forces 
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and rationalizing them in terms of mystical causes. And the role playing 
employs the ceremonialism by which mortals attempt to manipulate the 
spirits in quasi-causal ways to perpetuate a tranquil state of affairs. 
CEREMONIALISM AND LAW 
The whole matter of institutional class, rank, and status has been 
obscured by the institution of the st.ate which has codified cultural 
bel iefs in the law. The law, whether it be constitutional, statutory. 
administrative, case, or common law, grows out of custom and traditional 
beliefs, and it reinforces those beliefs by placing the enforcement 
pO\'Jers of the state behind them. likewise, the law gives the customs 
embodied in the law an air of added permanence because it is often more 
bothersome to change a law to fit evolving changes in custom than to 
simply let custom evolve as it will. Moreover, the law often speaks 
with many tongues. There are, after all, many diverse sources of 
custom and thus many conflicting customs. There are. therefore. many 
conflicting laws. 
For example, the laws of the ancient city were nothing more than 
rel igious rites. prayers, and 1 iturgical directions intermixed with 
1 egi s1 ati ve matters. The 1 aws of succession and property were contained 
in rules for burial. sacrifice, and worship of the dead. In brief. 
they were simply the codification of prevailing religious beliefs. And 
those beliefs descended from the past in legends, myths, and folk 
histories. The laws of the ancients were immutable because they were 
the work of the gods. New laws might come into being, but the old laws 
remained even when they conflicted with the new ones. And all laws 
demanded the same respect. 
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The ancient law remained unencumbered by concerns about justice 
or equity. Its concern was re 1 i gi on and there was no need to go beyond 
that. Likewise, the ancient law was mute as to reason. It was above 
discussion. It was imposed by the gods and men obeyed the law because 
they saw themselves bound to their gods. The law was holy, and it was 
a sacrilege to break it. Where there was a common religion, there was 
a common 1 aw. 
Legislation, as it is understood in the modern world, never 
existed among the ancients. The laws simply presented themselves with-
out being sought. As much of the preceding part of this chapter 
attempts to demonstrate, the laws were the direct and necessary exten-
sion of beliefs. A fear of death, bel ief in the sacred hearth, and the 
passage of its stewardship from father to eldest son was all that was 
necessary to erect the laws of the ancients. The legislator of the 
ancients was no man; it was the religious beliefs entertained by men. 32 
It seems that much has changed in modern law. Constitutions are 
enacted by conventions and changed in a variety of ways. Laws are 
passed as statutes by legislative assemblies. Regulations are written 
by administrative agencies. And case law pronounces judicial decisions 
dealing with interpretations of constitutions, statutes, and adminis-
trative regulations. f~odern practice does not seem to rely upon 
revelation or law by the gods. Moreover. modern law seems preoccupied 
with questions of justice and equity. 
On the other hand. one mi ght ask by what med; urn ; s the 1 aw revea 1 ed 
to the legislator, the regulatory commissioner, and the judge? Have 
these learned persons conjured up their statutes, regulations, and 
decisions as exercises of sheer intellectual power? On the contrary. 
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they have come to their professions usually with great learning in their 
fields of expertise--which is to say, they have been educated in the cul-
tural beliefs of their societies. Many, if not most, are members of 
churches and synagogues which have had a hand in shaping their beliefs 
about right and wrong and about justice and equity. All have emerged 
from school systems bent upon shaping their bel iefs in a common direc-
tion. And most have attended colleges and universities which have 
further refined their professional preconceptions about right, justice, 
and equity. The fact is that all come from a common cultural heritage, 
and it would be very unusual if the products of their enterprises 
departed in any significant way from their cultural preconceptions. 
If one examines the laws which are products of the legislator, the 
administrator, and the judge, he finds that they depart as little as 
possible from antecedent customs. He will find that transgression 
against most of the commandments given to Moses by God on Mount Sinai 
are still classed as felonious crimes just as they have been down the 
intervening centuries. He will find that many statutes are simply the 
codification of the common law which descended from custom in Great 
Britain and was adopted in most of the states comprising the United 
States because the settl ers who founded the country were predominantly 
of the British cultural heritage. 
And if one asks from whence arises English common law he finds that 
the answer is: The common law is simply well-established cultural be-
l iefs which have evol ved from antecedent traditi ons. 1 egends. and myths. 
Thus the common law contemplates the surviving remnants of the institu-
tions which were founded in antiquity and which descended to the present 
out of ceremoni a 1 practi ces. The common 1 aw is concerned with the 
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regulation of interhuman relations within that institutional framework.33 
Moreover, the notions of justice and equity in American juris-
prudence as well as those of other nominally Christian nations are very 
much influenced by Christls response when the Pharisees asked Him which 
was the greatest commandment. It maybe recalle.:! that Christ replied: 
Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with 
all thy soul, and with all thy mind. This is the first and great 
commandment. And the second is 1 ike unto it, thou shalt love thy 
neighbor as thyself. On these two commandments hang all the law 
and the prophets. 34 
The first half of Christ's reply was in part an admonition to live 
by Godls commandments. Those commandments comprise the law component of 
justice. The second part was an appeal for equity in justice. 
Therefore, on closer examination, it appears that the essence, if 
not the substance, of modern law remains firmly grounded on godly revel-
ations and that the legislator, the regulator, and the judge are as much 
the cultural or religious beliefs of modern man as they were of the 
ancients. It is in that sense that the institution of law raises cere-
monialism to its ultimate as the instrument of institutional efficacy. 
SUMMARY 
The cultural basis of ceremonial ism has been stressed at great 
length. Thi s was done to soundly establ ish the poi nt that ceremonia 1 i SI1\ 
the principal technique of institutions in discharging their social 
functions, both rises out of bel iefs which descend to the present out of 
the past and is a potent mechanism for the transmission of those bel iefs. 
Ceremonial ism was therefore found to be the social practice which links 
the present to the institutional past in terms of the ends-means 
continuum, the temporal setting of cities. The preceding parts of this 
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chapter cited a number of examples to illustrate and expand on these 
points. Each illustration selected an institution founded in antiquity-
language, religion (and its influence on the gentes, cury, tribe, and 
city), patrimony, matrimony, adoption, private property, and 1aw--and 
described how many of the ceremonial attributes of the ancient 
institutions have survived and continue in the ceremonial practices of 
the modern descendant of those ancient institutions. 
In elaboration of these points, it was demonstrated how cultural 
beliefs are transmitted in folk history, legends, and myths. The 
legends recount the conquests of ancestors and the annals of the tribe. 
The beliefs are unalterably fixed because the events out of which they 
grew occurred in the past, and there is no way of changing accounts of 
actions which descend from the past. 
The cultural bel iefs take the form of taboos--mores or traditional 
and customary ways of knowing and doing. The taboos possess a 
compelling mystique of their linkage to the tribal past. And they are 
mystical justifications or rationalizations invoking a spirit world of 
supernatural powers which act and react upon one another as though they 
were causally related in some natural way. Those spiritual potencies 
are manipulated in quasi-causal ways by ceremony and magic ritual. 
Finally, ceremonial behavior involves ritual istic role playing in 
contrived situations according to the dictates of totem and taboo. It 
is in these ways that ceremonial ism is the yarn which knits the urban 
present with the fabric of antiquity. Ceremonialism informs the present 
with models of social interaction from the past. Such models augur 
toward social stability because they regularize present social 
interact i cns. 
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CHAPTER V 
CEREMONIALISfl ANO URBAN CHOICES 
The preceding chapter related the institutional practice of cere-
monialism to the ends-means continuum. the temporal setting of cities, 
by explaining the origins of urban ceremonial ism. The chapter descri bed 
how urban ceremonialism is founded upon cultural beliefs which descend 
to the present from the past. Likewise, it stressed the institutional 
function of transmitting culture and described how ceremonial ism is the 
vehicle by which the institutional system carries out that function. 
This chapter examines ceremonial ism in terms of other functions of insti-
tutions. In particular, it explains the relationships between ceremonial-
ism and institutional structure, socialization, social control, and 
social stabilization. In these latter functions, ceremonialism is found 
to be the social mechanism which 1 inks the urban future to the institu-
tional past in terms of the temporal setting of the city. 
The main idea in this chapter is that ceremonialism links the future 
to the past in regard to the ends-means continuum by ;nfl uencing choices 
made in the present of ends which 1 ie in the future, and choices as to 
the ways of organizing present means to secure the chosen future ends. 
Ceremonialism wi11 point to choices which tend to be least disruptive to 
institutional taboos. This follows since ceremonialism is the practice 
by which institutions maintain social stability. Likewise, ceremonialism 
will point toward choices which depart the least from customary and tra-
ditional ways--in other words, choices which adhere to institutional ized 
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ways. This follows because ceremonialism arises from and is the institu-
tional transmitter of the cultural beliefs which descend from the past. 
In this way, ceremonial ism serves to extend the institutional past for-
ever into the future along the ends-means continuum. And it is the con-
tinuity of a present and future enl ightened by precedents from the past 
which tends to stabil ;ze social interaction.' 
CEREMONIALISM AND INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE 
A latter part of Chapter IV described how ceremonial behavior 
involves role playing in social situations contrived in accordance with 
the ancient taboos. That is, roles and their reciprocal expectations 
are prescribed by customs which descend from the past. The phenomenon 
of role playing gives rise to and is the most visible evidence of institu-
tional structure. Thus, the mores and the customary ways of knowing and 
doing operate through ceremony to structure society into institutional 
systems of class and rank. And one's status is evidenced by the mystical 
totems of rank--the phYSical symbols of rank. The resulting institutional 
system promotes social stability by creating a structure of social rela-
tionships within which persons may relate to one another. 
It is thought that rank and status correspond to the technical com-
petence of the persons to whom the rank is assigned. Such correspondence 
is a feature of the make-believe quality of ceremonialism. The distinc-
tions of class and rank were contrived first and the positions accorded 
the status of class and rank \lJere thereafter assumed to coincide with 
technical competence. That is, technical competence was assumed to exist 
so long as the position and its incumbent fulfilled the canOnS of cere-
monial competence. And ceremonial competence or adequacy is judged, not 
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by merit or technical adequacy, but by the ritual which extols the mana 
of rank and validates status. 
Institutional Structure 
An explanation of institutional structure was made in Chapter I, and 
it need not be repeated here. It needs only to be added that institu-
tional structure arises from the ceremonial role ?laying carried on by 
persons in fulfillment of the cultural bel iefs which descend from the past. 
The role playing involves reciprocal role relationships in which a cere-
monial action e1 icits ceremonial responses from persons occupying recip-
rocal role positions. The responses are likewise consistent with tradi-
tional and customary practices in a sol idly structured institutional 
system. The special nature and importance of ceremonial actions and res-
ponses is more fully developed later in this chapter. 
Reciprocal role relationships imply class and rank. That is, each 
role pertains to an institutional position which relates in some way to 
other roles which likewise pertain to other institutional positions. 
The relative positions may be of the same or different c1asses--as 
between two corporate business executives in the institution of private 
enterprise, or between a corporate business executive and a minister in 
the institution of religion. And the relative positions may be of the 
same or different ranks within their respective classes. The preceding 
example probably illustrates positions of approximately equal rank within 
respective classes. Positions involving different ranks within their 
respective classes might be those of a corporate business executive and 
a production-line assembly man in the institution of private enterprise, 
or a production-1 ine assemblyman in the institution of private enterprise 
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and a minister in the institution of religion. 
In fact, class and rank may be defined according to a great veriety 
of different criteria. In general, classes are thought to be related in 
a horizontal plane. Thus, class represents relationships between entities 
with dissimilar characteristics--as between federal, state, and local 
classes of governments; or between mercantile, industrial, financial. and 
service classes of business; or between classes of skilled trades such 
as carpenters, electricians, and plumbers. 
On the other hand, rank connotes a vertical or scalar relationship. 
Thus, rank represents relationships between entities within a class--such 
as the population size relationships between cities; or the power rela-
tionships between officers in state governments; or the levels of skill 
within a trade, as with apprentice, journeyman, and master carpenters. 
It must be noted that there is also a vertical dimension to class in 
that certain social classes may enjoy greater or lesser prestige than 
other classes. For example, medical doctors as a class may enjoy greater 
social approbation than plumbers as a class, even though both classes 
are, in a sense, involved with plumbing. 
Another exampl e drawn from the hi story of the ancients illustrates 
the ceremonial nature of class, rank, and institutional structure. It is 
easy to see how inheritance came to be another institution in the social 
fabric of ancient Greece and Rome. Since the eldest son must continue 
the ceremonies of the hearth fire after the demise of his father, he must 
also inherit all of the properties and powers of his deceased father. 
And since the property could not be divided, only the eldest son inherited 
it. I~othing changed except the patron. The eldest son continued in his 
father's place following his father ' s demise. The inheritance principle 
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was one of primogeniture. The other offspring of the deceased father 
simply continued with unchanged status under a new chief priest. 
l4~ 
The manner of perpetuating the family worship in cases of steril ity 
were noted earl ier. It need only be said that the succession passed col-
laterally to the next eldest son if the oldest son expired before marry-
in9. On the other hand, the succession never passed to a daughter. How-
ever, a father could give his daughter in marriage with the requirement 
that her first-born son belonged to her father for purposes of continuing 
his domestic worship.2 
The family, perhaps the earliest institution devised by man, took 
on special qual ities in the ancient world. It is clear that only agnate 
relationships were important in matters of family, inheritance, and the 
like. Persons were related to one another who could trace their paternal 
1 ineage back to a common patron. No other rel ationship \lias important in 
what came to be known as the patrician society of Ancient Rome and the 
Eupatridae in ancient Greece. Matrilineage had no standing whatever. 
That is, cognate and consanguine relationships which did not also involve 
the patril ineal feature of agnation were of no consequence in the ancient 
world. 
The combination of agnation and primogeniture gave rise to a struc-
ture of family and extended family relationships in patrician society. 
Clearly, the family patrons were at the head of the structure. Each was 
master, magistrate, and chief priest of his family. And under the 
ancient taboos, a patron would sire as many sons as possible in order to 
increase the assurance that at least one descendant would survive to con-
tinue the domestic worship after he jOined his manes. However, only the 
eldest surviving son would inherit t-he patrimony. While most daughters 
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might be given in marriage, the unmarried daughters and other surviving 
sons remained in the family. The collected patrilineal descendants of 
the patriarch were known as the gens in Roman society. Famil ies in 
ancient India and Greece were constituted in the same way. 
It is probable that the gens were the only form of original society. 
Indeed, their members were the aristocracy of the ancient world. They 
were related by birth. They worshiped the same domestic gods. They could 
inherit from one another according to the rules of agnation. They had a 
common tomb. and they had a common fami 1 y name. Moreover, 5 i nee they all 
shared an undivided patrimony. it was necessary that the entire gens 
should answer for any of its members in matters of debt and wrongs com-
mitted against others. Likewise, the gens had to come to the aid of any 
of its members who were troubled by outsiders. Finally, scattered members 
of the gens assembled at their family shrine to make annual offerings to 
their manes, penates. and lares. 3 
Of course, not all persons could call themselves patriciu5 even 
though the ancient societies of which they were a part were patrician. 
That is, warfare, disease, crime, civil conflicts, and other such events 
served to extinguish some hearth fires and other\l'Jise permanently separate 
persons from their domestic gods. There arose, therefore. at least three 
distinct classes of people in the ancient world who were not patrician 
members of gentes. Those classes were servants or slaves. clients and 
plebes. 
Persons who knew no paternal hearth fire might enter into the ser-
vice of a gens. That relationship may have been reciprocal on some basis 
of mutual need--the patron and his gens for personal and manual services 
for which the gens could afford to support an outsider, and the outsider 
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for the material support and physical security he might receive from the 
gens in exchange for the services he rendered to it. More likely, the 
outside persons were trophies of martial conquest who became the slaves 
and concubines of the patrician members of the gens. However the union 
was initiated, the servant was in fact the slave of the patrician house-
hold because a voluntary servitude which might end at the will of the 
servant was not in accord with a society of families living in isolation. 
Moreover, the domestic religion had no toleration of strangers in 
the ancient family. Rather, the stranger must be initiated into the 
domestic worship by proper ceremony. Properly admitted, the servant 
shared in the family religion. He was protected by the family manes and 
hearth fire. He belonged to the paternal gods and they to him. He took 
part in the family festivals and worship ceremonies. And he was buried 
in the family tomb when he died. He lost freedom for himself and his 
descendants .by acquiring a worship. The master, who was also his magis-
trate an~ priest, might raise the slave to a freedman or cl ient, but the 
former slave became a retainer of the family and remained bound by the 
family worship to the gens and subject to its patron. 4 
Clients, many of whom were freed from slavery by their masters or 
were offspring of freedmen, were a class inferior to all paternal descen-
dants in the gens. Like the slaves, they could not trace their 1 ineage 
back to a patron no matter how far they might ascend in their genealogy. 
The meaning of this was that neither the client nor his descendants 
could inherit a patrimony or its properties, and they could never become 
proprietors. Indeed, the cl ient possessed and used property and his 
personal belongings at the pleasure of the patron and subject to the 
patron's needs. i4oreover, while the client took part in the domestic 
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religion, sacrifices were offered for him. He could not offer them for 
himsel f even though he acknowl edged the fami ly gods as hi s gods and 
sought their blessings in all that he did. On the other hand, the gens 
reinforced its cl ients in their deal ings outside the gens just as it 
reinforced its patrician members. 5 
Finally, the lowest class of all was that of the plebes. The 
plebeians were, in a word, persons without a hearth. They possessed no 
domestic altars and could petition no family gods to deliver and preserve 
them in times of tribulation or to' bless their transactions and inter-
actions with good fortune. Thus, the plebeian had no extended family, no 
paternal authority OVer offspring, no sacred marriage, no right of pro-
perty, no law, no justice, and no political rights. The plebeian and 
the patrician were as far apart as rel igion could place two men. The 
plebeians had no status in patrician society. They were a despised lot, 
beyond the veil of religion and thus of the family, society, and law. 6 
Hence, ancient society was rigidly structured in accordance with 
the taboos of the domestic religion. The patrons capped the structure 
with their priestly powers. The patrician members of the gens, the blood 
descendants of the patriarch, were next in rank to the patrons. The 
clients were a class of free men who, possessing no paternal lineage of 
their own, worshiped at the hearth of a gens, a family which traced its 
agnate 1 ineage back to a patron. The servants or sl aves of the gens, 
differing from the clients only in their degree of freedom and servitude, 
were next in class to the lowest social class. Finally, plebes, who had 
no part whatever in the domestic re1 igions of the ancients, were the lowest 
class--if indeed it can be said that they had any standing at all. 
Such were the institutions which evolved from the domestic rel ;gion 
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of the ancients. The few institutions described to this point--language, 
rel igion, patrimony, matrimony, adoption, and emancipation, domicile and 
property, law, inheritance and primogeniture, family, patrician aristoc-
racy, slavery, and clientship--were founded on the cultural beliefs of 
the domestic religion whi1e that religion, a modicum of totems and taboos, 
was itself founded on a primitive fear of death. The institutions have 
prevailed--though substantially changed--and have descended out of the 
ancient past into the present. They have done so on the power of the 
mystical ceremonies which served to perpetuate the cultural values upon 
which they were founded. The ceremonies transmitted those values down 
the generations of descendants into the present, thereby 1 inking the cul-
tural pa,st to the institutional present and future. 
The point is that both class and rank are attributes of positions 
within institutional structures. Those positions rise out of the cere-
monial role playing carried on by persons who are fulfill ing role expec-
tations created by cultural beliefs. And the cultural beliefs are tradi-
tional and customary ways of knowing and doing which were transmitted to 
present generations by 1 egends, myths, and fol k hi stories. 
Rank and Status 
Class and rank connote social status. That is, one who occupies 
a particular institutional position does so within a class and possesses 
the rank assigned to that position by the institutional system. The rank 
and class of the, position confer social status on the person who occupies 
the position. His social status may be the same or higher or lower than 
the social statuses accorded other positions of different ranks or 
classes or both ranks and classes. 
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Status is evidenced by the mystical totems of class and rank--the 
physical and behavioral symbols of class and rank. The symbols are some-
times very discreet habits of speech, customary gestures, and the like. 
They are sometimes more conspicuous habits of dress, symbols of military 
rank. place of residence. and kind of automobile owned and operated. Two 
totems of prestige have persisted from the earl iest times. They have 
taken the forms of conspicuous leisure and conspicuous consumption. The 
stress is upon the word "conspicuous, II which is to say, periods of 
leisure and levels of consumption which are beyond the means of most 
people and which are indulged as symbols to others of the honorific status 
one enjoys by virtue of his class and rank; or more properly, his potency 
in conspicuously acquiring and consuming goods and services. 7 
Modern social attitudes have been warped toward conspicuous leisure 
and consumption as means of ceremonial expressions by the legends, myths, 
and folk history which descend out of the past. The myths rise from a 
more primitive and more barbarian stage of hUman development--a stage 
characterized by a predatory 1 ife style in which honorific status was 
accorded to those who infl ict injury by strategy or force. The hunter-
warrior enjoyed the highest status in such societies because of a divi-
sion of labor based upon physical strength and prowess. The hunter-
warriors were always men because of their superior physical strength and 
because their strengths were never impaired by childbearing. However, 
men who were physically weak were not admitted to the exploitative class. 
All women and men who were unfit for the predatory activities of 
the exploitative class were members of the drudging class. They were 
ceremonially barred from the barbarian exploitative class, and they were 
restricted to the drudging enterprises--activities which were victual, 
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logistical, submissive, peaceful, and physical. This involved the indus-
trial and manual vocations of agriculture, housekeeping, cooking, child 
rearing, weaving, handcrafts, porterage, etc. These activities were 
vulgar, demeaning, and undignified, and all members of the inferior 
class were engaged in them in some way. 
Those men in the tribe who possessed the strength and prowess were 
ceremonially initiated into the hunter-warrior class. Their talents were 
restricted to exploitative enterprises--activities which were barbarian, 
violent. aggressive, animate, and spiritual. This involved the managerial 
and non-industrial vocations of governing the tribe, engaging other tribes 
in warfare, conducting rel igious ceremonies, and hunting. They were not 
permitted, even if they were so inel ined, to engage in the drudging 
employments of the tribe. Members of the hunter-"arrior class engaged 
in competitive sports any time they were not involved with other exploi-
tative activities. All activities of the exploitative class were digni-
fied, honorific, and invidious. Only members of the superior class were 
permitted to engage in the exploitative activities. 
The exploitative vocations were social activities which made very 
1 ittle or no material contributions to the welfare of the tribe. On the 
contrary, with the possible exception of hunting, they all involved 
material drains on the tribe. They were activities which occupied man-
power that might have been employed to increase the material welfare of 
the tribe. And that manpower occupied domiciles, ate food, wore garments, 
and demanded personal services, all of which had to be supplied by the 
drudging class. Moreover, the food they consumed, the garments they wore, 
and the domiciles they occupied were the best the tribe could supply. 
That is, they consumed goods conspicuously and their leisure time was 
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taken with invidious and honorific games and ceremonies. 8 
Many of the totems and taboos of the barbarian cultures have sur-
vived to modern times. Chiefs of state, governors, legislators, judges, 
generals, admirals, popes, bishops, chief executive officers of business 
corporations, and a host of lesser exploitative functionaries are the 
modern ceremonial descendants of the hunter-warriors of the barbarian 
stage of human development. They are modern members of the exploitative 
class. They occupy their leisure in invidious sports--tennis, golf, 
hunting" yachting, deep-sea fishing, skiing, etc. All that they do is 
dignified, honorific, and invidious. And, 1 ike their barbarian ceremonial 
ancestors, they are engaged in activities \'o'hich make very 1 ittle or no 
material contributions to the public welfare, while they receive the 
greatest economic· rewards society can render. In a word, their consump-
tion and leisure are conspicuous and their 1 ifestyles set the mode for 
the drudging classes. 9 
There seems always to have been an overwhelming propensity for the 
vulgar classes to emulate those invidious activities of the superior 
classes which the former regarded as conveying honor and dignity. That 
is, one is thought to absorb mana and gain honorific status by doing 
those things which occupy persons of high social esteem. How else does 
one explain the modern hunting party in which three or four men and some-
times a woman or two spend several hundreds or thousands of dollars each 
to hazard injury or death from a myriad of probable accidents in traveling 
to and from and foraging about in the wilderness? They chance possible 
heart attack from over_exertion; collapse from dehydration, heat pros-
tration, ,exposure or hypothermia; fall from unimproved trails over preci-
pitous terrain; poisoning from reptiles, insects, toxic vegetation, and 
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natural water pollution; and the stray bullets of other exuberant, care-
less, or drunken hunters. They hazard all of this to acquire a few 
rounds of game. It is obviously much less costly and dangerous under 
ordinary circumstances to purchase the same weight of U.S.D.A. choice 
beef from a local market if one is trulY. after qual ity meat. 
In fact, the hunters are only incident.il1y. after the flesh of game. 
They are actually spending their leisure and their money in a conspicuous 
way. They are spending in a way which appears to be irrational when 
measured in a detached economic sense because the pecuniary costs of 
their expedition far exceed any material benefits they can hope to secure--
even if the expedition is fortunate enough to achieve its most ambitious 
intent. Indeed, the hunters are seeking a benefit which cannot be easily 
measured in the mundane terms of the market place. 
The hunters depart with their minds filled by the image of Ernest 
Hemmingway attired in a pith helmet and bush jacket, on safari over the 
grassy veldt below [(j1imanjaro, and hunting for trophies for a lodge in 
Idaho or a plantation in Cuba. Or possibly they envision themselves as 
Theodore Roosevelt similarly attired, and hunting big game trophies in 
Africa for the wildlife collection of the Museum of Natural History in 
Washington. Or they see themselves as a party of hunter-warriors from a 
primitive cul ture setting forth with crude weapons into an uncertain 
wi 1 derness to secure game to feed the tri be duri ng the comi ng wi nter. 
Whatever the image, it is a phantasy etched vividly into their minds by 
myths and legends, and they are setting out to reenact the hunting exploits 
of those phantasies. If their expedition fulfills their phantasies, they 
will return to recall their exploits for friends so that the friends will 
know that the hunters possessed the means, the potency, to spend thei r 
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leisure and money conspicuously in invidious activities out of which they 
could realize little or no material gain. In short, the benefit for which 
they are paying so handsomely is the personal satisfaction of flouting 
invidious symbols which validate their honorific status. 
Hunting was selected to illustrate the ceremonial nature of con-
spicuous consumption because the actions of a hunter more closely resemble 
the predatory 1 ifestyle of the lower barbarian cultures to which hunting 
is akin. In fact, one might as easily select any of the modern forms of 
participatory recreation--skiing, gambling, back-packing, golf, tennis, 
horseback riding, etc.--as we11 as some forms of spectator entertainment 
in which the reenactment of phantasies is accomplished for the spectator 
by surrogates. Whatever the form of conspicuous leisure and consumption, 
it is behavior in which the pecuniary cost ;s intended to greatly exceed 
any material benefit that might result for the participants, and in which 
the nonmaterial benefit is in its use as an invidious symbol of honorific 
status. 
On the other hand, the supply side of recreation and entertainment 
has fostered profitable and expanding enterprises. There are highly 
organized (and drudging) institutions devoted to satisfying the demand 
for the growing numbers of people who are allocating more of their pecun-
iary means to conspicuous leisure and consumption. For example, hunting 
has led to the organization of local and national hunt and gun clubs, 
state fish and game commissions, national fish and wildlife services, as 
well as the commercial enterprises which manufacture and sell the totems. 
the hunting materials and equipment. required to engage in the sport. All 
are involved in some way with preserving and perpetuating the invidious 
sport--including the licensing and regulation of hunters. the creation and 
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management of hunting preserves, and the propagation of the game which 
is the ostensible object of the hunting expedition. All of this has 
emerged out of the propensities of the vulgar classes to emulate the 
invidious activities of the exploitative classes in the quest for honor-
ific status. 
Both conspicuous leisure and conspicuous consumption require sub-
stantial economic means. Both are therefore bound to the economic rewards 
accorded positions of class and rank within the institutional system. 
A consistency of institutional systems is that one must play the role 
expected of the position he occupies--that is, he must maintain the hon-
orific status of the position by partaking of leisure and consuming at 
levels expected of one possessing his rank--and the economic rewards 
accorded the position are precisely the means required to play the role. 
For example, one who has managed to enter a particularly favored 
social class and ascend to a high rank in that class will be rewarded by 
the institutional system with the economic means required to maintain 
himself in accordance with the canons of taste expected of his position. 
That is, one who was born into and reared as a member of a wealthy family 
and who manages to inherit a large quantity of productive wealth will 
possess sufficient income from that wealth to maintain the wealth almost 
in spite of himself. This is accomplished by the simple expedient of 
using some of the income to place the wealth under the stewardship of 
persons who are technically competent to manage it productively. More-
over, the remaining income is available and necessary to finance the 
conspicuous consumption required to fill the hours of conspicuous leisure 
required to fulfill the status expectations attaching to the class and 
rank enjoyed (or suffered) by the owner of the wealth. 
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The wealthy heir might be expected to possess a substantial amount 
of nonproductive property--nonproductive in the sense that it does not 
enter into the creation of money income, or the income created does not 
cover the cost to maintain it. For example, he might own a penthouse 
apartment in Manhatten, a bungalow and yacht in Bermuda, and a ski lodge 
at Jackson Hole. And he would need a Lear jet to travel between the 
three and wherever else he might choose to go. He would need automobiles 
" in each location--a chauffeured limoUs.ine in New York, a Ferrari in Bermuda, 
and a Land Rover at Jackson Hal e. A small resident staff must be on hand 
at each location to maintain the properties and to cater the needs of the 
heir and his guests. 
Likewise, the tycoon would devote most of his time to invidious 
forms of recreation. There would be skiing and hunting from Jackson Hole; 
yachting, deep-sea fishing, scuba diving, golf, tennis, and sun-bathing 
in Bermuda; and the theater, cocktail circuit, more golf, handball, and 
business arrangements in New York. To fill his spare time he might make 
gambling junkets to Monte Carlo and Las Vegas, hunting expeditions to 
Africa and India, pleasure cruises on the Mediterranean and Aegean Seas, 
and world tours to places not regularly visited in the course of his 
other activities. 
On the other hand, one who suffers (or enjoys) a state of poverty 
because of class or rank or both, is sustained by economic rewards which 
comport with the status accorded him in the institutional system. He 
possesses very little personal wealth--perhaps only the clothing he and 
his family wear--and his only income is whatever he can obtain from the 
wages he can earn in unskilled classes of employment or from private 
charity and public welfare. There is no surplus for invidious recreation, 
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and his leisure is demeaning in the eyes of others. In both the case of 
the very wealthy and that of the poverty-stricken, the economic rewards 
accorded the institutional positions are precisely sufficient to play 
the roles expected of persons occupying the positions. 
Choice of class and rank are not always elective. For example, 
both men and women are born into the unique and distinctive biological 
classes of male and female, and it is not usua1ly possible for members 
of either class to change their memberships to the other classes. More-
over, one is born of particular parents with particular descendants and 
genetical composit,ions. These genetic qualities might be manipulated, 
but there is no presently known way to change them from one order to 
another. Likewise, one is born at a particular time in the ends-means 
continuum and at a particular geographical place, and he matures success-
ively through infancy, childhood, adolescence, young adulthood, and aged 
adulthood. Finally, he expires at a particular geographical place and 
at a particular time in the continuum. While one may hav~ _some choices 
about this last personal event, he has practically no control over the 
rest. Each stage of biological development possesses different powers of 
rank and levels of status, and the direction of movement and the speed 
with which one passes from one stage to another is beyond his deliberate 
control. 
Excepting cases like the foregoing biological classes and ranks, 
other barriers to social mobil ity are ceremonial and they are therefore 
a part of the institutional system. A rigidly structured institutional 
system very 1 ikely affords few or no opportunities for persons to improve 
their status by changing their social classes or institutional ranks. 
The class and rank system of ancient institutions aptly illustrates a 
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rigidly structured institutional system. 
The family arrangement of the ancients created a system of rank in 
the patrician family. It has already been stated that the patron held 
the highest rank and status. Below him in rank and status followed his 
sons in descending order by age, the eldest of whom held the highest rank 
next to his father by virtue of his eventual inheritance of the patrimony. 
After the patron I 5 sons came hi 5 grandsons and great-grandsons followed 
by his brothers, nephews, grand-nephews, etc. in descending order accord-
ing to their agnate relationships to the patron. The lowest in rank, if 
they could be said to possess any rank independent of that of their hus-
bands, were the women of the gens, the wives and unmarried sisters, 
daughters, nieces, etc. of the patron. One entered the patrician class 
by chance of birth and his rank in the class was also unalterably set by 
the order of his birth. 
Likewise, the class, rank, and status of all other members of 
ancient society were fixed by the same set of patrician relationships 
even though the other members were not born into patrician families. 
This was simply because the patrician class was the aristocracy of the 
ancient world, and all other social relationships were measured by patri-
cian criteria. At any rate. three other classes existed in the society 
of the ancients. Their statuses were based upon class, and all three 
classes were inferior in status to the patrician class. In descending 
order of status, the three were clients, slaves, and plebes. Again, the 
status of each class depended upon the relationship of the class to the 
patrons. And a person became a member of one of the inferior classes 
either by birth or by calamity. It was possible for a plebe to become a 
servant or 51 ave and to ascend to cl ient. But there were only two ways 
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patron or by adoption by a patron. 10 
16a 
While these barriers to social mobility were very real, they were 
not created by the gods as the ancients thought. Rather, they were insti-
tutional arrangements created and perpetuated through ceremony and role 
playing by men. This is equally true of social barriers in the descendant 
institutions of the modern world. They, too, are institutional arrangements 
created and perpetuated through ceremony and role playing by mankind. 
However, most modern societies do contain ceremonially regulated 
opportunities for their members to improve their social statuses by chang-
ing their classes or ranks or both. Insofar as persons achieve greater 
satisfaction from higher levels of social status, they are incentivated 
by ceremonial inducements to change toward positions of more favorable 
classes and higher ranks when the institutional system permits the changes. 
The purpose of this portion of the chapter has been to illustrate 
how one who occupies a particular position in the institutional system 
enjoys the social status of the class and rank assigned to the position. 
Status is evident from the invidious symbols traditionally associated 
with the class and rank of the position, and the person occupying the 
position is expected to maintain the status of the position by employ-
ing the appropriate ceremonial symbols in his role playing. 
Rank and Technical Competence 
It is thought that rank and status correspond to the actual merit 
of the person to whom rank is attributed. Such correspondence ;s actually 
a contrived feature of ceremonial ism. Distinctions of rank and status 
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were establ ished first and thei~eafter assumed to coincide with technical 
competence. The person possessing a rank within a class ;s assumed to 
possess the technical competence imputed to the position so long as he 
demonstrates ceremonial adequacy. And ceremonial adequacy is judged by 
the quality of ritua 1, not by the meri t of the incumbent. The qua 1 i ty 
of ritual is judged by how closely the role played by the person conforms 
to the ideal role communicated to the present by tradition and custom. ll 
It is generally believed that rank and status are based upon the 
actual merit of the person who possesses them by virtue of institutional 
position. People believe that rank and status were derived from and 
emerged out of techn; cal competence and mer; tori aus capabil ity, and that 
the latter were the first and sale criteria determining the former. This 
idea conjures up a notion that Elizabeth I was the Queen of England 
during her reign because she possessed the technical qualities most 
needed at that time--that she was the only person technically qualified 
to wear the crown and wield the authority of the emerging British 
Empire. At least she was the most qualified. That is, Elizabeth 
possessed the rank because she was technically competent. 
However. the supposed correspondence between El izabeth I s rank and 
her merit is another contri vance of ceremoni al i sm. The di sti nctions of 
rank and status were established first and were thereafter assumed to 
caine; de with technical competence. The posit; on of Engl i sh monarch 
descended out of history to the time of Elizabeth I. It was a well-
establ ished institution in Great Britain long before El izabeth was sired 
by Henry VII I. The offi ce descended from the past and was thought to be 
a needed and effective institution because it existed. Existing, it had 
to be filled. Elizabeth ascended the throne simply because she was alive 
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and next in line after her sister, Mary I, according to the ceremonial 
rules of succession. which forces the conclusion that she was fit and 
competent to reign over the empire because she did. This tempts a 
further conc1usion--a1most anyone might have done as well or better. 
Hi story judges the rei gn of E1 i zabeth lin terms of the outcomes 
supposed to have resulted from her rule. That is, the emergence of 
England as a formidable world power during and after the reign of 
Elizabeth is attributed in part to the mystical or royal powers of 
E1 izabeth. Her powers were connected in some mysterious way to the 
ceremonies by which she received and maintained those powers and to the 
material objects, the totems, which were the physical evidences of her 
honorific rank and powers. For example, she was coronated as queen when 
the crown of England was placed on her head and the scepter and orb of 
the realm were placed into her hands. All of this was done with appro-
priate pomp and religious ceremony as with previous and subsequent 
Engl ish monarchs. Li kewi se, El izabeth demonstrated ceremoni al adequacy 
in her exercise of state powers in matters of royal court--the use of 
sword and incantations in elevating heroes and patriots to the peerage, 
placing the seal of state on treaties and royal decrees, issuing patents 
and papers of marque, receiving ambassadors from other countries, 
appointing ministers of state, worshiping in the church of England (which 
by then the monarch in Eng1 and headed as well), and a host of other 
ceremonial actions. The point is, that Elizabeth's merit and technical 
ability was judged by how adequate she was in ceremony. And her 
ceremonial adequacy was measured by how well her behavior conformed to 
the dictum of custom and the traditional bel iefs. 12 
Taking another example, the position of patron, or curion, or 
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tribunus, or king was established first in the ancient world and whoever 
fulfilled the rubrics of agnation inherited the patrimony and was, iI!§2. 
facto, technically competent to fill the position, assume the rank, and 
enjoy the status of the office. The question of technical competence 
simply never arose. The scion was qualified, according to the gods, solely 
by fortune of birth. Moreover, his merit was judged, if at all, by how 
meticulously he adhered to the traditional forms descended from his 
ancestors in performing the sacrificial offerings and pronouncing the 
liturgies which were his patrimony. Nothing else mattered. From his 
relationship to Vesta, the goddess of the hearth, and his paternal ances-
tors stemmed his powers as chief priest, magistrate, and ru1er. 13 
This leaves open the whole question of whether the patron's hokus 
pokus performed any instrumental or technically redeeming services. It 
likewise leaves open the question of whether the patrician institutional 
system in which the patron was accorded such lofty status possessed 
sufficient redeeming qualities to justify either its initiation and 
emergence as a powerful force in the forging of Western Civilization, 
or its enduring longevity down through the generations of man. The 
fact that it did emerge and has had such prodigious influence on modern 
institutions is a necessary but not sufficient vindication of the 
system. One can counter that Western Civil ization has somehow managed 
to evolve in spite of patrician institutional influences. 
It is also true of modern institutional systems that the ceremonial 
distinctions of rank and status were established first and the person who 
has managed to come into rank is therefore assumed to possess technical 
competence. For example, so long as a person is more than thirty-four 
years of age, is a natural-born citizen of the United States, has resided 
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within the United States for at least fourteen years, and can somehow 
convince enough people to vote for him in appropriate primary and general 
elections, he will become the President of the United States for four 
years unless he dies before his term expires. There is nothing in this 
list of qual ifications about technical competence. 14 
It is, of course, imp1 ied that the people will judge the candidate's 
competence during the campaign, and that the most desirab1e--or, more 
likely, the least undesirab1e--man will miraculously emerge victorious 
after the votes have been counted. In fact, the electorate is not judg-
ing technical competence at all. The voters are making their judgements 
on the basis of the institutional positions the candidate has occupied 
in the past (what marks of honorific status does the candidate possess?), 
what he says (do his remarks conform to the cultural bel iefs?), and his 
demeanor (is he dignified or does his appearance otherwise conform to a 
ceremonially correct image of the office?). In short, the voters will 
judge his competence on the basis of his apparent ceremonial adequacy. 
And the misgivings of his detractors notwithstanding, the ryew1y inaugur-
ated president will, all at once, possess a charisma and mystical power 
which somehow escaped even his most ardent supporters before the election. 
Thi s part of the chapter has attempted to show how the ceremony of 
role playing gives rise to an institutional structure of class and rank. 
While such structure is real, it is contrived. Likewise, the technical 
competence imputed to class and rank is a contrived feature of ceremonial-
ism. Class and rank and the statuses associated with them evolved first 
from ancient bel iefs, and technical merit was thereafter assumed to cor-
respond to the institutional positions accorded the status of class and 
rank. Moreover, technica~ adequacy is assumed as long as the incumbent 
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person in the position demonstrates ceremonial competence. And cere-
monial competence is judged by the rituals of rank--not by merit. Fin-
ally, the institutional structure formed by ceremonial role-playing 
serves to stabilize society by providing a framework for social inter-
action. 
CEREI10NIALISM AND SOCIALIZATION 
Ceremonialism, the functional technique of institutions, achieves 
socialization by conferring rank and status on persons. Socialization 
helps create social stability by matching persons to institutional roles. 
Rank and status are conferred within the institutional system according 
to how well one adheres to the mystical taboos. Ceremonialism can 
achieve socialization because of the relationship between human emotions--
love, fear, frustration, anger, etc. --and the taboos. One gains in 
mora 1. stature by str; ct adherence to code or taboo. One absorbs mana 
or mystical potency in this way by contact with virtue--with totem. One 
suffers loss of personal integrity by the unceremonious exposure of 
transgressing a taboo. Such behavior diminishes mystical potency and 
one loses face by unvirtuous conduct. 15 
Socialization. a process by which a person is taught to adjust him-
self to the mores and folkways so that he can be a functioning member of 
his community, is achieved by the institutional system through cere-
monialism. All institutions practice ceremonialism in the discharge of 
their socialization functions. Ceremonialism accomplishes socialization 
by conferring class. rank. and status on persons. That is, persons are 
psychologically conditioned by ceremony to accept role playing positions 
in the institutional system. They are taught by ceremony the taboos 
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relating to their positions, and they are advanced into those positions 
with ceremonies appropriate to the classes and ranks conferred by the 
system. 
Recalling the explanation of socialization from the second 
chapter, it need only be emphasized that the process is carried on by 
ceremonialism. For example, it commences as soon as the infant wails 
acknowledgement that the midwife's unceremonious slaps to its backside 
have provoked breathing. The very next step is usually to ceremonially 
initiate the child ' 5 social existence by giving it a name and recording 
the name on whatever registry of births is required by law. The 
innocent and unknowing babe shal1 ever after be known by that name 
unless she elects and is able to change it. 
In the first moments of life the infant has been ceremonially 
assigned to several social classes and ranks by the institutional 
system. If the infant is assumed to be a girl, her birth wi 11 most 
likely be recorded with a female name. She falls in the female class--
not the male class. Her initial rank is set by the date and time of 
her birth. The birth registry will indicate that she is the daughter 
of her parents, and she is immediately assigned thereby to whatever 
racial and national classes distinguish them, and to their economic and 
social ranks. Her place of birth may determine her citizenship. These 
ceremonial vestitures will remain with her all her life, sometimes 
enhancing her social relationships, sometimes hindering them, but 
always ceremonially constraining her within the institutional system. 
As the infant gains greater sensory al'lareness, she will be initiated 
by awe-inspiring ceremonies into additional classes and ranks. And she 
will learn by ceremonial practice the behavior expected of her in all 
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manner of institutional situations involving her class and rank. If she 
lives a more or less nannal life in most regions of the United States, 
she might expect to experience the initiation ceremonies of christening 
or baptism, registration and advancement in the church or synagogue 
school, registration and advancement in the Campfire girls, registration 
and advancement in the publ ic school system, graduation from high school, 
registration and advancement in college, registration to vote, admission 
to a sorority, admission to sundry social clubs, college graduation, 
marriage, registration in social security, registering the births of her 
own children, licensing to operate a motor vehicle, contract recording, 
registering titles to properties, employment, court judgements, enroll-
ment in Medicare, retirement, grandmotherhood, death, and burial. No 
matter of social significance, no change in rank or status, can happen 
to her without ceremonial acknolfJledgement. 
Each of the foregoing initiation ceremonies will confer status upon 
her by assigning her to another class or rank in the institutional system. 
The psycholog·ical conditioning carried forth by ceremony will teach her 
the ceremonial role expectations for each class and rank into which' she 
is advanced. And she wi 11 most 1 i kely do her best to ful fill those 
expectations in her role playing. The question is, why is she likely to 
do her best to fulfill the ceremonial role-expectations of the institu-
tional positions in which she finds herself? 
Ceremonialism achieves socialization because of the relationships 
between human emotions and the mores and folkways. Coupled with the 
unique intellectual qualities of the human mind, emotions make possible 
the psychological conditioning of people so that they adjust to the 
institutional taboos and play their roles accordingly. The range and 
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complexity of human emotions are extensive, and it is beyond the scope of 
this treatise to attempt a fully enlightened elaboration of them. However, 
four sets of human emotional situations will illustrate the point. Each 
set is marked by two polar states. The four sets are: love and hate, con-
fidence and fear, satisfaction and frustration, and tranquility and anger. 16 
Love, which is- a strong affection or attachment to another person 
or group of persons, is generally a pleasurable state that creates depen-
dencies in which the person experiencing love treasures, seeks, and comes 
to rely on the loved persons both as objects for expressions of love and 
as reciprocators who reinforce the affections with like expressions. The 
affections which bind people together commence to develop in a person 
from birth. The affection matures during a long period of childhood 
development in which the child is dependent upon others--principally her 
parents in the institution of the family--for the satisfaction of most 
-biological needs. 
For exa~ple. the infant experiences physical discomfort from pangs 
of hunger. She cannot sleep, and the longer she must go without gratifi-
cation of her desire for food, the more frustrated she feels. If action 
to ease the hunger pangs is delayed for some reason, the infant1s frus-
tration turns to anger and she cries out for someone to do something 
about it. When her mother feeds her, her anger fades and her frustration 
diminishes as her hunger is satisfied. She soon learns to connect the 
countenance of her mother with the pleasant physical sensations of 
ingesting milk and satisfying hunger. She comes to depend upon that 
relationship and each new feeding is another pleasant reinforcement of 
an emerging affection of the babe for her mother. 
In like manner, the child learns to depend on her parents for other 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
171 
foods to satisfy her hunger, water to quench her thirst, clothing to pro-
tect her from the elements, a domicile to give physical security, a bed 
in which to satisfy her need for sleep, and physical contact with other 
persons to gratify her infantile and emerging sexuality. 
Thus, affection for others arises initially from the states of con-
fidence, satisfaction, and tranquility created by others in the family 
institution in meeting onels biological needs while she is in a state of 
nearly total dependency. Confidence is a pleasant state of full assur-
ance and freedom from fear. Satisfaction is a state of contentment 
usually achieved when most of one's appetites have been gratified. And 
tranquil ity is a state of peace in which one is free from agitation. 
These, states--confidence. satisfaction, and tranquility--are periods of 
pleasant existence because they are free from physical and emotional 
tensions. In short, love arises from states of pleasure induced by others. 
Once the infant associates the receiving of pleasure with the coun-
tenances of her immediate family, it ;s only a short time before she 
becomes receptive to other influences at their hands. After all, if they 
possess the power to induce such pleasures, what they think, say, and do 
;s not just important. It is correct. The child therefore becomes 
receptive to learning from her parents. The learning takes place when 
the child seeks their praise and avoids their condemnation--when she 
accepts instruction from them and emulates their behaviors. The parents 
come thereby to have great power over their daughter and can reinforce 
certain kinds of behavior by inducing the pleasant states of confidence, 
satisfaction, and tranquil ity. 
Likewise, the parents can deter other behavior by inducing the pain-
ful states of fear, frustration, and anger. These latter states are very 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
172 
important to social ization because they excite responses in a person 
which are useful in conditioning her to accept and play roles in the 
institutional system. Fear, which is an anxiety and agitation caused by 
the presence or poss; bi 1 ity of an undesirable occurr.ence, can provoke one 
into action to forestall the undesirable occurr.ence. Frustration, which 
is disappointment at failure to gratify desires, can provoke inquiry, 
introspection, and further action directed at securing satisfaction of 
the frustrated desires. Anger, which is an intense feeling excited by 
a real or supposed injury and accompanied by the desire to obtain retri-
bution from the offending party, can provoke one to seek redress of 
unceremonious behavior. 
HUman emotional states, when joined with the unique capabilities 
of the human mind, make it possible for ceremonialism to condition per-
sons psychologically to play their institutional roles correctly. The 
hUman intellect is uniquely capable of discovering complex relationships 
between past causes and present effects. And it can apply the knowledge 
of those relationships to employ the effects as means to the achievement 
of ends which lie in the future. Likewise, the hUman intellect has an 
equally unique capability of visualizing complex and alternative states 
of possible future conditions. It can weigh the relative merits of thos~ 
alternative future ends, select those which appear to be the most desir-
able to achieve within the means available, and organize the means to 
achieve the selected future ends. 
The young child soon learns which parental responses connote appro-
bation and cause pleasure and which ones mean disapprobation and cause 
pain. She likewise learns which of her actions precipitate parental 
approval and praise, and which ones initiate their disapproval and 
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condemnation. Thus, she can discover and devise ways to play her role 
so as to accomplish the former and avoid the latter. That is, she can 
visual ize ends for herself and she can measure their relative merits on 
the basis of their ceremonial adequacy or their inadequacy according to 
the cultural values she has learned within the family institution. She 
is most likely to choose that combination of ends which are within her 
means and which render the greatest confidence, satisfaction, and tran-
quility to her. The ends she chooses will, therefore, conform to the 
ceremonial expectations of the persons for whom she has the greatest 
affections. 
The process of socialization which commenced in the institution of 
the family continues in every other institution in which the individual 
finds herself. She simply transfers and adapts the associations she has 
learned within the family to other institutions. The ceremonial person-
ages of the father, mother, and the brothers and sisters are transferred 
to the priests and perishioners in the institution of the church; to the 
city officials and citizens of the city; to the teachers and students in 
schools; to the managers and workers on the job; and to herself and her 
husband and children in her own family. 
Every other institution carries on the socialization process in the 
same general way. That is, the institutional system reinforces behavior 
which conforms to its ceremonial norms and condemns behavior which does 
not. One aspect of reinforcement involves the conferring of rank and 
status in the system according to how well one adheres to the mystical 
taboos. That is. one gains in moral stature by strictly adhering to code. 
She absorbs mystical potency and achieves confidence, satisfaction and 
tranquil ity in that way by contact with virtue. On the other hand, one 
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suffers loss of moral stature and experiences fear and frustration by the 
transgression of a taboo. Such transgression diminishes mystical potency 
and one suffers loss of face. 
The ultimate transference occurs as one substitutes the institution, 
its totems and taboos, its legends and myths, and its ceremonial vesti-
tures for the persons who nurtured her to maturity and who were the fi rst 
objects of her love. Th'is occurs It/hen one sees the institutional system 
as produci n9 confi dence, satisfaction, and tranquil ity. That is, one 
comes to love the institutional system because it augurs toward social 
stability in which adherence to institutional norms are perceived as 
reducing fear, frustration, and anger. When that happens, one will make 
choices which confann to ceremonially correct institutional taboos. 
Clearly, modern techniques for conferring rank and status are con-
tinuous with primitive techniques. The human infant of antiquity was as 
dependent upon her parents as are modern infants. The satisfaction of 
biological needs were as instrumental in engendering love of parents in 
the ancient child as in the modern. Likcy,tise. the influence of parents 
in the development and maturity of ceremonial beliefs in the ancient child 
were as great as in the modern. The institution of the family was as 
important in introducing the ancient child to ceremonial ism, class, rank. 
and status as are modern fam;l ies to their children. Moreover. while 
modern institutions may vary in substance from ancient institutions, they 
are similar in form and the same in essence. They achieve social ization 
by assigning class and conferring rank and status through ceremony. And 
socialization creates social stability by advancing persons to ceremonial 
roles in the institutional system from which they can interact with con-
fi dence and certa i nty. 
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CEREMONIALISM AND SOCIAL CONTROL 
There is no clear line between socialization and social control in 
terms of ceremonia11sm. The two institutional functions converge on 
rank and status. Socialization views rank and status in terms of the 
ceremonies of investiture in which rank and status are conferred on a 
person as part of the institutional indoctrination process. Its purpose 
is to initiate persons into the institutional system by convincing them 
through ceremonies that the positions they occupy and the roles they 
will play in the system are ceremonially correct for them. It is a way 
of reducing social dissonance by harnessing individual human energies to 
the institutional structure or neutralizing them outside the structure. 
On the other hand, social control looks to the maintenance of 
social stability by ceremonially reinforcing the status and rank of 
persons already established within the institutional system. This is 
accomplished by the periodic validation of status. Status is validated 
by the reciprocal acknowledgment of rank in appropriate places and at 
appropriate times. Such acknowledgment occurs in ceremonial exchange 
and in ceremonial gift giving. Such practices tend to stabilize a 
community by keeping its members bound in a network of reciprocal 
obligations according to their classes and statuses. 17 
Ceremoni a 1 Exchange 
Ceremonial exchange is a process by wh1ch the statuses of the 
exchange parties are validated between them. The validation takes the 
form of mutual acknowledgment of class and rank. This may involve little 
more than an exchange of salutations which make the acknowledgments in 
some customary way. However, ceremonial exchange is by no means 1 imited 
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to simple greetings. The more important exchanges acknowledge class and 
rank by the giving of totems of value and the receiving of other totems 
of value in exchange. Each party to the exchange occupies an institutional 
position and possesses the class and rank of his position. How he plays 
the role of his position in the exchange is prescribed in the law or by 
ceremonial custom as applied to his position and rank. 
Ceremonial exchange facil itates social control by periodically rein-
forcing the rank and status structure of institutions. It does this by 
affording opportunities for one to experience acknowledgement of his own 
status by others and to acknowledge and therefore recall the ranks and 
statuses of others. It is an institutional feedback mechanism which 
helps maintain the system. It keeps persons united within a structure 
of reciprocal obligations. Ceremonial exchange is a practice of long 
standing. and it has been found to exist in primitive as well as advanced 
cul tures. 
The kula ring is a primitive example of ceremonial exchange. It 
took place among the Tobriand Islanders of Melanesia in the South Pacific. 
The natives inhabited islands comprising an atoll-like ring several hUn-
dred miles in circumference. The exchange involved necklaces made of 
red shells and bracelets made" of white shells. The necklaces were 
exchanged for bracelets ;n one direction around the islands, and the 
bracelets were exchanged for necklaces in the opposite direction. ~1any 
of the kula totems had names and some had histories. The necklaces and 
bracelets were durable, but they were neither used as consumption goods 
nor as a media of exchange outside of the kula ring. Rather, they were 
used to maintain rank and prestige. 18 
The kul a exchange operated over estab 1 i shed trade routes and with 
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fixed ceremonial patterns. Only a limited number of men could partici-
pate in the exchanges, and each man had trading partners on adjoining 
islands. The partnerships were permanent and they involved mutual trading 
obligations. The ku1,a trader would travel by canoe to the island next to 
his in one direction where he would exchange bracelets for necklaces. 
When he traded >lith his partner in the opposite direction, he exchanged 
necklaces for bracelets. Every detail of the exchanges was regulated by 
custom and traditional taboos. Some exchanges were accompanied with 
extensive ritual. 
Ordinary trading parties accompanied the kula expedition. The 
latter were involved in the exchange of consumption goods and in other 
commercial transactions. However, the two fonns of activity never inter-
mingled. The commercial trading was done by women and other drudging 
persons of inferior status. The men involved in the kula exchange never 
lowered themselves to commercial duties. They were men of invidious 
leisure. Likewise. they never admitted persons of inferior rank into 
the kula exchange. The exchange was entirely ceremonial and it served 
to val idate the institutional statuses of the men involved. 
The kula exchange validated status in part because of its exclu-
sivity. Only men of the highest ranks were admitted to the ceremonies, 
and admission was one of the marks of rank. The process of bartering and 
exchange served to validate the status of trading members because each 
party to a transaction gave a totem of high value and received another 
totem of high value in exchange. The exchange was acknowledgement by 
each trading party of his own status as a giver of mystical potency and 
the status of the other party as a receiver of mystical potency. Since 
each party both gave and received mystical potency, the val idation was 
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completely reciprocal. The kula exchange served to stabil ize social 
relations by binding its elites in a network of reciprocal obligations. 
The discharge of obligations in the kula exchange served as a veil, ifnot 
a reason, for social intercourse of a perhaps more instrumental nature. 19 
Certain aspects of modern commercial or economic exchanges are 
somewhat akin to ceremonial exchanges. For example, transactions in the 
common stocks of any of a number of widely held corporations smacks of 
ceremonial exchange. The investor/risk-bearer is accorded high status 
in most industrial societies--especially if he is at all successful in 
his investment strategies. One can attain the institutional rank and 
status of such a person by simply establishing an account with a stock-
broker and by buying and sell ing stocks through that account. 
The buying and sell ing of corporate securities involves so-called 
economic transactions in which the buyer places his buy order for a 
security with his stockbroker. The stockbroker transacts the order and 
delivers a totem, a receipt, which records the transaction. The 
investor gives the broker a piece of paper called a check, another 
totem, in exchange for the receipt. Of course, the receipt is only an 
interim totem to suffice until the big totem, the certificate of stock, 
arrives. The mystical potency of the totems exchanged attaches to the 
reei pi ents ; n the exchange. 20 
It will be argued that the foregoing transaction was an important 
economic exchange and that it was one of many similar transactions which 
are important as a means of raising risk capital for an industrial system. 
Indeed, that may be true. However, one must seek further. What ~ 
has happened in the stock transaction? Clearly, the transaction has vali-
dated the status of the buyer as an investor/risk-bearer. li kewise, it 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
179 
has val idated the statuses of the buying broker, the sell ing broker, the 
exchange specialist, the selling party, the corporation and its officers 
(involved in canceling the seller's stock certificate and issuing the 
buyer's stock certificate) and a myriad of other persons less directly 
associated with the transaction. 
Moreover, one must inquire as to the true instrumental significance 
of the stock transaction. Will the economic value exchanged actually 
result in the creation of new capital goods? The answer is, not likely. 
In fact, in the vernacular of the kula exchange, the transaction simply 
shifted some ceremonial necklaces and bracelets about in a role-playing 
situation which had as its object the validation of status. The stock 
transaction, while very real, is hardly more than a ceremonial exchange, 
a game in prestige economics. While someone might gain wealth and some-
one might lose wealth from the transaction. their real gains and losses 
are in tenns of ceremonial rank and status. 
There are, of course, a great many other so-called economic trans-
actions which contain traces of ceremonial exchange. The exchange of 
money as prices for consumer goods in retail markets validates the statuses 
of purchasers as consumers, vendors as purveyors of goods. and all others 
associ ated with the exchange in thei r own ways. The 1 andl ord I s status 
is val idated as well as that of the tenant when the latter pays his rent 
in exchange for his tenancy. Each acknowledges the class. rank, and 
status of himself and the other party in the transaction. The same is 
true of employer-employee relationships in i'Jhich labor is exchanged for 
wages; government-citizen transactions in which tribute in form of taxes 
is pa i d to the state, etc. Each of these exchanges ; s part of an enormous 
institutional network of reciprocal obligations which serves to maintain 
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unity in a community. And to that end, ceremonial exchange is an instru-
ment of social control which operates to perpetuate social stability. 
Ceremon i alGi ft-Givi n9 
Another institutional practice of social control is ceremonial gift-
giving. Like ceremonial exchange, ceremonial gift-giving is used to 
val idate the statuses of the parties involved. Ceremonial gift-giving 
involves a donor who gives a gift to a recipient. The gift must be equal 
to the rank of the donor and appropriate to the rank of the recipient. 
The recipient is usually expected to reciprocate the gift-giving at some 
future time--although this may not be the case if the recipient is of 
very low rank in relation to the rank of the donor. Ceremonial gift-
giving val idates the status of the donor by demonstrating his powers in 
giving a gift of value, and it validates the status of the recipient by 
the donorls acknowledgement of the recipientls rank in the value of the 
gift given. Ceremonial gift-giving reinforces institutional structure by 
tying the community together in a web of reciprocal obligations. 21 
A primitive example of ceremonial gift-giving is the potlatch of 
the Kwakiutl and Haida tribes and other American Indian cultures along 
the Northwest Pacific coast. The form of potlatch varied with the tribe, 
but the ceremony had certain general characteristics. The ceremony invol'l/~' 
ed the distribution of gifts to val idate social status. The larger and 
more valuable the gifts distributed, the higher the status of the donor. 
Likewise, the size of the potlatch gathering reflected the rank and 
status of the donor. Therefore, guests vlere invited from a wide territory. 
and the potlatch accompanied very generous hospital ity and sumptuous 
feasting. Careful formal ities were observed in speechmaking and in the 
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distribution of donor properties according to the ranks of recipients. 22 
The potlatch val idated the status of the donor by demonstrating his 
potency in acquiring and giving great wealth. It validated the statuses 
of recipients because the values of gifts were determined by the ranks of 
the recipients. The higher the recipient rank, the more mystical potency 
his gift totems must possess. 
Of course, potlatch recipients were expected to give their own 
potlatches when they had accumulated enough properties to do the ceremony 
justice. It was expected that the recipients would give gifts at their 
own potlatches which were at least equivalent in mana to the totems they 
received. Thus, like ceremonial exchange, ceremonial gift-giving involved 
reciprocity. However, since recipients of low rank and inferior status 
received gifts of very little value, they rarely reciprocated with their 
own potlatches. 
The potlatch sometimes involved competitive destruction of goods. 
The object was to validate the statuses of the tribes and their chiefs 
by demonstrating their capacities to destroy wealth as well as to give 
it away. The potlatch proceeded as with one involved solely with cere-
monial gift-giving. However, the potlatch ended with a huge fire in 
which all of the donOi~rS remaining properties were destroyed while the 
guests sat around the fire and watched them' burn. Ceremonial destruc-
tion of goods was not a widespread practice. It seems to have been an 
aberration of the gift-giving potlatch. 
Almost any event was occasion for a potlatch--marriages, births, 
and deaths, as well as very trivial matters. The potlatch was not to 
celebrate the event, but to validate the status of the donor. Therefore, 
potlatches were geared more to the economic capacity of the tribe than to 
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whatever event served as the ostensible occasion to have one. The effect 
of a potlatch often was to impoverish the donor tribe. It thereafter 
became necessary for the tribal members to apply their industries to 
building up the tribal wealth in anticipation of their next potlatch. 
However, like ceremonial exchange, the potlatch served to unify the 
participant tribes into a network of mutual obligations. Those obliga-
tions no doubt led to other social intercourse of a less ceremonial nature. 
The sacrificial offerings which characterized the domestic rel igion 
of the ancients were forms of ceremonial gift-giving--as well as forms 
of ceremonial exchange as with the trespass offerings of Judaism. The 
gifts were given as offerings to the ancestral gods through the interme-
diation of Vesta, the goddess of the hearth. Like the potlatch, the 
sacrificial offerings were feast occasions. However, unlike the potlatch, 
no guests were invited and no visitors were allowed. Only members of the 
gens participated in the feast. The sacrificial victim was a totem which 
acquired mystical potency as it was offered to the gods according to the 
patrician taboos. It became the meat of the communal feast which bound 
the members of the gens together and further bound them to their domestic 
deities. That is, the offering val idated the statuses of gens members 
by acknowledging their kinship and it validated the statuses of the 
domestic gods in the same way. Finally, the gods were expected to reci-
procate by protecting the gens and blessing it with plentitude in peace, 
and prevalence in adversity. 23 
Ceremonial gift-giving is not limited to primitive cultures. It 
is a much more widespread practice in so-called advanced cultures than 
is generally understood. ~lost of it is harmless enough--even useful in 
many cases. For example~ small remembrances given at parties to 
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corrunemorate birthdays, Christmases, weddings, and the like validate the 
statuses of both the donor and the recipient in the same sense as in the 
potlatch even though the gift-giving does not usually impoverish the 
donors. These modest celebrations usually take place between family 
members, very close friends~ and business partners, and they serve to 
bind them together in reciprocal role situations within the institution 
of the family and the extended family. If the extended family is viewed 
as a worthy institution, then ceremonial gift-giving of the kinship 
sort ought to be encouraged. 
However, the apparently harmless but useful practice of ceremonial 
gift-giving in the family institution should not blind one to other 
aspects of its social significance. The social significance of 
ceremonial gift-giving is in the validation of status and the tacit 
reciprocal obligations involved. While perhaps useful and relatively 
harmless within the family institution, these aspects of ceremonial 
gift-giving raise ethical questions when gift-giving takes place between 
certain other donors and recipients. Ethical questions arise with gift-
giving when the gift involves charity or welfare and when it involves 
contract relationships and gifts between special-interest groups and 
agents of governments. 
An act of pri vate charity is generally appl auded as bei ng a very 
humanitarian and generous overture on the part of the donor. And, 
indeed, it may very well be. However, if examined in light of the social 
dynamics involved, the supposed generosity and humanitarianism might be 
viewed differently. Insofar as the action validates status, the donor 
is found to be reinforcing his own status as social superior by giving 
the gift while the recipient is seen as reinforcing his status as social 
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inferior by accepting it. Moreover, the donor's supposed humanitarianism 
might, in fact, be personal avarice if he is allowed to deduct the cost 
of his charity from income for tax purposes. Finally, the reciprocity, 
if any, in this kind of gift-giving must be in the recip'jent's acceptance 
of the gift and his acknowledgment thereby of the donor's clearly superior 
rank and status. This can only be a demeaning experience for the recip-
ient, albeit that he is remunerated fo~~ h'is charity in accepting the gift. 
Public welfare (that is, accepting income or goods and services 
from a government on the basis of one's poverty classification) is hardly 
better, and it might be worse than private charity when viewed in terms 
of the social dynamics of ceremonial gift-giving. The essential difference 
between the two is that the donor is a government rather than a private 
individual. Public welfare, as with private charity, validates the 
status of the donor as a social superior and the recipient as a social 
inferior. However, the donor governments act only through agents, and 
the superior status must attach to the visible persons of governments~ 
to the agents which act for them. The class, rank, and institutional 
importance of this phenomenon for democratic government should be obvious. 
Of course, if one does not consider democratic government to be a redeem-
able feature of the modern world, then the foregoing aspect of public 
welfare may not be an issue. 
Ethical questions arise on at least two other issues surrounding 
public welfare. The first has to do with the consequence of validating 
the status of recipients as socially inferior. One must keep in mind that 
the practice is mandated by the traditions of the hearth fire, the primi-
tive potlatch, and a host of other taboos which have descended in one 
fonn or another from prehistoric times. That is, the social control 
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powers of ceremonial gift-giving are institutional ized cultural bel iefs 
which are unl ikely to change perceptively from generation to generation, 
whether or not they are socially congruent bel iefs. Thus, simply 
declaring that accepting public welfare because one is poverty-stricken 
is not demeaning, will not change the cultural beliefs which have des-
cended from antiquity and are so firmly integrated into the institutional 
system. And those beliefs declare that one who accepts a gift which 
exceeds his powers and his intentions to reciprocate val idates his status 
as a social inferior. This is not just because others believe it, but 
because deep in his heart the welfare recipient believes it also. After 
all, he accepted the welfare gift on the basis of his poverty in a 
society that accords high status to wealthy persons. 
The problem becomes more pervasive as the welfare recipient comes 
to accept the inferior status validated by his acceptance of the welfare 
gift. Acceptance and adjustment to his inferior status will be reinforced 
each time he accepts another gift of public welfare. Each time it 
becomes easier for him to accept the inferior class and rank assigned to 
him by the institutional system. He will eventually play the role of 
that class and rank with little or no notion that it could or should be 
any different. 
The second question has to do with the tacit reciprocal obligations 
of welfare gift recipients. The taboos of ceremonial gift-giving require 
that the recipient reciprocate in some way consistent with his status and 
that of the donor. The economic circumstances of the welfare gift 
recipient make it clear that reciprocation will not invol ve money or 
goods and services in the usual sense. Rather, reciprocation can take 
only one form. That form is political support for the agents of the 
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governments tendering the welfare gifts. The conclusion follows that, 
in terms of the taboos of ceremonial gift-giving, public welfare is a 
way of purchasing votes in a democratic form of government, and a way 
of buying acquiescence to government pol icies in a total itarian form. 
The second classification of gift-giving which raises ethical 
questions is when the gifts are between certain contracting or potential 
contracting parties and between members of special-interest groups and 
the agents of governments. In the former group is the gift-giving 
between business executives and the union leaders who represent the 
interests of workers employed by the businesses and between business 
executives and the purchasing and contracting agents of governments. In 
the latter group is the gift-giving between members of special-interest 
groups and the legislative and regulative agents of governments. 
Gift-giving of the foregoing sort might be considered as between 
social equals. Ethical questions therefore come down to the matter of 
reciprocity. The questions are: what are the tacit reciprocal obliga-
tions incurred when an official of the International Brotherhood of Elec-
trical Workers accepts a gift from an electrical contractor whose elec-
tricians are members of the brotherhood? What are the tacit reciprocal 
obligations incurred when a contract administrator in the Department of 
Defense accepts a gift from a contractor whose contract he is administer-
ing? What are the tacit reciprocal obI igations incurred when a member 
of the Labor and Public Welfare Committee of the United States Senate 
accepts a campaign gift from an officer of the AFL-CID? What are the 
tacit reciprocal obI igations when a member of the Security and Exchange 
Commission accepts a gift from a senior partner of a major brokerage 
fjrm on the New York Stock Exchange? 
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It is difficult to see how the donor in each of these cases can 
have any interest beyond the recipient's tacit reciprocal obligations. 
And, the recipient's denials notwithstanding, he is almost certain to 
understand the meaning in his acceptance of the gift. Clearly, gift-
giving under any of these and like circumstances raises the spectre of 
conflicts of interest and possible graft, extortion, and bribery when 
measured by the taboos of ceremonial gift-giving. 
One might extrapolate the policy implications of the deductively-
drawn relationships described above into a great many possible scenarios. 
However, that moves the discourse beyond the bounds of this paper. 
Rather, the foregoing situations were described to illustrate the social 
control possibilities of ceremonial gift-giving. For good or bad, the 
practice maintains social stabil ity by weaving members of a community 
into a fabric of reciprocal obl igations based upon the ranks and statuses 
of the members within the institutional system. 
CEREMONIALIS~1 AND SOCIAL CHOICES 
The time has come to complete the answer to the second question 
posed at the end of Chapter I--how do institutions function in the urban 
temporal setting? It is recalled that institutions were defined in 
Chapter II, and that the urban temporal setting was described in Chap-
ter III. The present and preceding chapters (Chapters IV and V) pro-
ceeded on the premise that institutions discharge their functions of 
perpetuating cultural values and preserving social stability by influenc-
ing social choices. The choices concern which alternative and compet-
ing ends shall be achieved and how means shall be allocated to the 
attainment of the chosen ends. It was posited that institutions 
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influence social choices through the practice of ceremonialism--an 
institutional practice of perpetuating cultural values and beliefs by 
conferring and reinforcing rank and social status within the institu-
tional system. 
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This chapter and the preceding chapter examined the workings of 
ceremonialism in the discharge of institutional functions. It was 
argued that ceremonialism is the method by which institutions transmit 
culture, structure society, socialize members, and exercise social control. 
Properly executed, these functions serve to discharge the institutional 
ra i son d latre--to perpetuate their own eul tural val ues and thereby pre-
serve stability in the larger community of which they are parts. The 
following four paragraphs summarize the expanded arguments of chapters 
IV and V. 
Ceremonialism arises from the cultural beliefs which descend to the 
present from the past. likewise, ceremonialism is the agent for trans-
mitting the cultural beliefs. Ceremonialism recounts the legends and 
myths of ancestors in literature, drama, and folk history. The cultural 
bel iefs are rigidly fixed because the ancestors are dead and buried, and 
there are no ways of changing the things they did and believed. The 
bel iefs take the fonn of totems and taboos, or customary and traditional 
ways. The totems and taboos have an aura of mystique about them because 
of their linkage to the ancestral past. The beliefs are mythical justi-
fications invoking a supernatural world of mystical potencies which are 
presumed to be causally related in some way. It is thought that these 
spirits can be manipulated in quasi-causal ways by ceremony to use their 
mystical powers on behalf of the living. The cultural beliefs tend to 
stabilize society by giving it precedents to guide human interaction. 
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Thus, ceremonialism involves role-playing in social situations 
which are contrived from the ancient taboos. The taboos operate through 
ceremony in this way to structure society into institutional systems of 
class and rank. Ooels social status is communicated to others by his 
invidious behavior and by the physical and honorific symbols, the mystical 
totems, of the rank he possesses. Rank and status is assumed to corres-
pond with technical competence. However, such correspondence ;s a crea-
tion of ceremonial ism because the distinctions of class and rank were 
created first, and the technical reasons-to-be thereafter. ~loreover, 
technical competence is assumed to exist as long as one occupying a posi-
tion of class and rank demonstrates ceremonial competence. And cere-
monial competence is judged by the quality of onels ritual, not by his 
technical merit. The institutional structure tends to stabilize society 
by providing a matrix of human relationships in which to carryon social 
interaction. 
Ceremonialism discharges the socialization function of institutions 
by conferring rank and status on members of society. One is advanced in 
rank and status according to how well he adheres to the ancient taboos. 
Ceremonialism has power to accomplish socialization because of the rela-
tionship between human emotions and the taboos. One gains in moral 
standing and he absorbs mana by carefully adhering to the ceremonial 
taboos. He suffers loss of mana by the unvirtuous violation of a taboo. 
It is by means of social ization--the conferring of rank and status--that 
ceremonialism increases social harmony by assigning persons to roles in 
the institutional system from which they can interact with assurances. 
Likewise, ceremonialism;s the institutional instrument of social 
control. Ceremonial ism reinforces the rank and status of persons already 
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within the institutional structure by the periodic validation of status. 
Status is val idated by regular acknowledgments of rank in ceremonial 
exchanges and ceremonial gift-giving. Both practices involve giving 
totems of values appropriate to the ranks of the parties involved. And 
both practices involve reciprocity--irrmediate quid pro guo in ceremonial 
exchange, and an obligation for a future quid pro guo in ceremonial gift-
giving. The validations of statuses in these ways tend to stabilize a 
community by occupying its members with a flurry of reciprocal obligations. 
Ceremonialism is, therefore, the instrument with which institutions 
perpetuate their own cultural values and maintain social stability. It 
follows, therefore, that the institutional influence, through ceremony, 
is applied in social choices to maintain the status quo according to the 
cultural values Qut of which the institutions arise. That is, cere-
monialism is backward-looking and backward-clinging in terms of the 
ends-means continuum. Its great powers are exerted to select those ends 
and organize means to attain the ends which are consistent with institu-
tional, or cultural values. Ceremonialism opposes choices which depart 
in even minor ways from the descended taboos. 24 Indeed, the whole cere-
monial thrust of culture transmission, socialization, and social control 
is toward a stable state, a state which is fixed, immobile, unchanging. 
The practical effect of a successful institutional influence on social 
choice is to perpetuate ancient customs, traditions, and taboos forever 
unchanged and unchanging into the future. 
Of course thi s has not happened. Institutions have changed. Some 
have receded or disappeared entirely, and new institutions have emerged 
to cope with nelN problems. Indeed. if anything is clear about institu-
tions. it is their lack of continuity. All of the ancient institutions 
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described in this and the preceding chapter have changed--many of them 
radically--between then and now, even though the essence of institutions 
has remained unchanged. This is a strange outcome in view of the func-
tions of institutions. How is it that institutions which function so 
powerfully to perpetuate their underlying cultural values and thereby 
preserve social stability have at least partly failed to fulfill their 
functions? Why are modern industrial cities different from the cities 
of a"tiquity? And why is there instability and sometimes revolution in 
human societies? 
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CHAPTER VI 
TECHNOLOGY 
The preceding two chapters related a theory of social relationships 
based upon ceremonial ism, a practice by which institutions attempt to pre-
serve social stability by perpetuating the cultural beliefs that underlie 
institutional values. Ceremonialism operates toward those goals by 
influencing social choices. Ceremonial influences admonish choices of 
future ends-to-be-reached which are in harmony with the ancient taboos 
that comprise the cultural beliefs. Moreover, ceremonialism points to 
methods of organizing present means to future ends in ways that are like-
wise consistent with the customary and traditional techniques. Cere-
monial ism is backward-looking and backward-cl inging, and it resists any-
thing that threatens to change traditional ways. The continuum effects 
of ceremonialism are to relate the past to the present and future and to 
extend the past forever into the future. 
And yet it is clear that ceremonialism has not entirely succeeded 
in either preserving perfect social stabil ity or perfectly perpetuating 
cultural values. Rather. society has been racked by revolution--some-
times violent and destructive conflagrations and sometimes slow and 
incremental changes, but always changes that undermine confidence in 
traditional ways of knowing and doing and that precipitate cultural change. 
Either way, the resulting changes are marked by social instabil ity as 
people and institutions struggle to adjust to the new and revolutionary 
realities. The social instability occurs somehow despite institutional 
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attempts through ceremonialism to preserve social tranquility. 
In like manner, ceremonialism has not been entirely successful in 
perpetuating unchanged and unchanging cultural bel iefs. While there are 
lingering ceremonial vestiges from antiquity, the present is not a carbon 
copy of the past. Times have changed, and conditions and methods have 
changed almost imperceptibly with them. People do not all believe pre-
cisely the things their ancestors believed. New institutions have evolved, 
some have gained greater social significance, others have receded in 
power, and some have disappeared altogether. The modern industrial city 
is not exactly like the feudal city. And neither the modern nor the 
feudal city is the same as the prehistorical folk communities which pre-
ceded them. 
The question is, what has caused the changes? Why has social 
instabil ity occurred even whil e powerful ceremon; al forces were operati n9 
to preserve it? Why have cultural bel iefs changed, and what has provoked 
institutional discontinuities? Why is the modern industrial city dif-
ferent from the feudal city, and why are the industrial and feudal cities 
different from the ancient folk villages? An answer to these questions 
is attempted in this and the next two chapters. 
The principal idea in this and the following two chapters is that 
the innovation of new technologies causes instability in institutional 
environments because the new technologies organize means in ways that 
are different from the ceremonially approved methods of the past. New 
technology often changes even the ends selected to be achieved by bring-
ing some ends within reach that were formerly beyond available means. 
And it opens opportunities for distributing goods and services in ways 
differing from the ceremonial past. Thus, the innovation of new 
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technologies affords new avenues of social mobil ity by creating oppor-
tunities to change existing ceremonial systems of rank and social status.' 
This chapter will expand on certain crucial aspects of the fore-
going ideas. The chapter seeks to discover what technology is. It will 
explore questions 1 ike: How is technology distinguished from and related 
to technique and hUman skills? The next chapter will ask from when does 
technology arise, and how does it come into being? How does it relate to 
ceremonial ism, and how does it affect institutional systems? Finally, 
how is it related to the ends-means continuum, the continuum of on-going 
1 i fe processes? 
TECHNOLOGY AND TOOLS 
The first matter to be settled is the question, what is technology? 
Technology has been defined generally as applied science having commercial 
value, or as the practical or industrial arts. There are, of course, 
much more elaborate definitions, but they all resolve into something like 
part or all of the above. 2 These definitions are deficient in several 
ways. First, they are too general and imprecise. They do not distinguish 
between human and material aspects of culture. Nor are they specific 
regarding important distinctive aspects of material culture. Second, the 
traditional definition of technology gives insufficient attention to the 
functional aspect of technology. Finally, the social context of tech-
nology is virtually ignored in the traditional definition. 
The argument is made here that technology is that qual ity of a tool 
which enables it to be sUbstituted for human effort in the creation of 
any good or service having human value. As will be shown, this defini-
tion is consistent with institutional economic theory which, alas, also 
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does not precisely define technology. 3 In pursuit of precision, then, 
it is useful to more carefully consider several components of this 
definition. For example, what is a tool? What is meant by a good? 
What does human effort mean in the context of this definition? The 
question of human value is considered in subsequent chapters. 
Too 1 s and Goods 
There are a number of dictionary definitions for the word tool. 
The definition most suited to its meaning here is that a tool is an 
implement used by persons to work, shape, form. attach, etc. materials. 
Another word having close meaning is II machine. II A machine is 
lIa structure consisting of a framework and various fixed and moving 
parts, for doing some kind of work. II Others have described a machine as 
consisting "of three essentially different parts, the motor mechanism, 
the transmitting mechanism, and finally the tool or working machine. 114 
This latter description makes the tool the working part of a machine. 
On the other hand, the machine serves the tool. That is, its raison 
dl~re is to energize and perhaps control the tool. Thus, any machine 
is merely an extension of the tool to which it gives power and control. 
For this reason, the word tool shall serve in this paper as short 
notation for ntool n in its restricted sense, for "machine!! according to 
the foregoing logic, and for "capital good" is a final, productive, 
material, economic good other than land. This latter term, capital 
good, is more fully explained in the following paragraphs. 
The preceding dictionary definition of the word tool is incomplete 
for purposes of this paper. To complete the definition, one must somehow 
rationalize the working of materials in terms of human purposes or reasons. 
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A number of possible reasons come to mind--to occupy human time and 
energies with mental and physical activities; to destroy other materials; 
to wear out the tools; etc. Whatever reasons one might conceive, they 
all appear to resolve into one, and that is: materials are worked, 
shaped, formed, attached, etc. by tool s for the purpose of creating or 
preserving other goods. And goods are simply material and immaterial 
things external to man that satisfy hUman wants. 
The goods created by applying tools to materials may be either 
intermediate or final goods. Intermediate goods are of course not final 
goods. They are partially processed material s or sub-assembl ies which 
will enter into and lose their identities in final goods. Intermediate 
goods include lumber that has been cut from trees but which has not yet 
been used to build urban housing, manufacture furniture. or any other 
final uses to which the lumber might be put. Intermediate goods also 
incl ude sheet and tube steel and a 1 um;num, agri eul tura 1 fertil izer, vege-
table and grain seeds, gasoline engines, transmissions, auto bodies, 
asphaltic cement, crushed rock, crude oil and every other partially pro-
cessed good which will ultimately be used in some final good. 
All final goods have reached the end of whatever processes have 
gone into their production. They have taken the forms in which they will 
be used by people. And all final goods are used up in rendering services 
to people. The services are of two general sorts, consumption services 
and production services. Final consumer goods include all household and 
some public properties--furniture, appliances. food, automobiles, cloth-
ing, jewelry, art objects, etc. Consumer items render services directly 
to the people who use them for their personal comfort and satisfaction. 
On the other hand. final production goods render services to persons 
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who are using the goods to produce both intermediate goods and other final 
goods of both the consumption and production sort. Final production goods 
are called capital goods or producers' durab1es in the national product 
accounts of most countries. Final production goods are tool s within the 
meaning intended here. They are final goods because they have reached 
the end of the processes that created them, but they are used to process 
other goods--not to render personal services directly to the people who 
use them. The definition of the word tool then is: A tool is a capital 
good, a producer's durable good, or any implement or machine which is 
used by hUman producers to work materials in the creation of other goods 
and services having human val ue. 
The kind of implement that usually comes to mind when the word tool 
is used is something held in the hand of a skilled craftsman who is using 
it to shape or join materials in the production or repair of things used 
by other people. The carpenter's saw, the plumber's pipe wrench, and 
the welder's torch are examples of this kind of tool. However, the word 
is not 1 imited to the implements of a skilled craftsman. Any implement 
which is itself a final good and is used in the production or repair of 
other goods is a tool. Thus, a thermostat is a tool for regulating the 
heat of an industrial power plant or a blast furnace. A calculator is a 
tool to do mathematical computations. An assembly 1 ine is a tool which 
brings sub-assembl ies together in a process that results in the creation 
of some product. The point is that many different kinds of items fit 
the deseri pti on of a tool. 
Moreover, tools are tools simply because they make it possible for 
people to manufacture and repair other things the accompl ishment of which 
would be impossible, or at least very difficult, without tools. That is, 
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tools embody technology because they do, by their very natures, reduce 
human effort in the creation of goods having human value. For example, 
how long might it take a sawyer to produce a properly shaped and sized 
wooden beam from a rough log without the use of a tool? Presumably, he 
could tear the log apart with his fingernails or his teeth. But it 
would take a very long time and the work would surely debilitate him in 
a short time. Rather, a sawyer ;s a sawyer because he uses a saw to cut 
wood. It is the technical qualities of his tools that distinguish the 
sawyer and that enable him to cut and shape wood. 
Likewise, tools possess technical qualities which make them suit-
able for certain uses and unsuitable for other uses. A motor truck is 
instrumental in transporting its cargo over roads between its starting 
point and its destination. However. given the present state of automotive 
science, a motor truck is absolutely useless as a tool for measuring the 
amount of radiation emitted from a cathode tube. Some tools are also more 
efficient than other tools at performing the same kind of work. The 
sawyer can trim out his beam more quickly with a saw than with an adze. 
And he can do it even more quickly with a power saw than with a hand saw. 
The power saw therefore embodies greater technology because it enables the 
sawyer to produce more units of 1 umber per man-hour than he can produce 
wi th an adze or a hand saw. 
Finally, tools are future-oriented. While tools are themselves the 
existential ends of means which were employed to create them in the past, 
they were produced in contemplation of future use. The sawyer1s saw 
was the end product in a long and complex process commencing with the 
mining of iron are and concluding with the shaping and filing of the 
teeth with which the saw will bite into wooden fibers. The are was 
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deliberately mined with the expectation that it would be smelted, refined, 
forged, and machined into things for human use. The latter stages of its 
production were undertaken with the intention of creating a tool for saw-
ing wood. And this expectation was a human vision looking beyond the saw 
as an end product. It comprehended the existential end, the saw, as a 
means to on-going human ends. The saw was future-oriented even in its 
creat; on. 
The future orientation of course extends to the use of tools. Tools 
are always brought into use for the purpose of creating states of affairs 
which do not obtain in the present. Just as the mining, smelting, and 
machine equipment produced a saw in contemplation of future use, so the 
saw now produces lumber in contemplation of future use. The timbers 
trimmed and shaped by the saw will be used as forms to shape concrete 
foundations, as beams, joists, sins, studs, caps, trusses, sheathing, 
siding, subfloor, door and window trim, base board, and many other 
components in resi dentia 1, commerci a 1, and industrial structures < Like 
all tools, the saw is employed to produce other goods having human value. 
In this context, use of the saw is future-oriented and it will be instru-
mental in bringing to fruition states of affairs which exist in the pre-
sent only as human contemplation. 
It is sometimes thought that materials should be included with tools 
in the definition of .techno1ogy. Materials are physical substances which 
are or can be a constituent part of a good. A substance becomes a material 
in its use or contemplated use in a good. Thus, materials, like tools. 
are future-oriented. Likewise they do possess technical characteristics 
and they are used in the creation of goods having human value. However, 
materials fail to meet the technological criterion of tools for at least 
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two reasons. The first reason is that, unlike tools, materials lose their 
identities in the goods of which they become parts. Whatever technical 
characteristics they possess are merged with those of the other materials 
in end products. That is, materials are intermediate goods--not final 
goods. And they are not used in their intermediate form to shape or 
attach other materials in the creation of other goods having human value. 
The second reason materials fail to meet the technological criterion 
is that physical substances become materials only in some relationship to 
the tools with which they are extracted, refined, and combined with other 
materials to produce goods. That is, raw materials or resources are 
defined in terms of existing technology. For example, coal, crude oil, 
natural gas, and uranium all coexisted on earth .with men far many centuries 
before the tools needed to use them came into existence. It was not until 
the discovery and innovation of coal technology that coal became a raw 
material. Likewise, it was not until petroleum technology had advanced 
substantially that crude oil could be refined into gasoline, engine oil, 
fuel oil, diesel oil, cleaning solvents, lubricating oil, bearing grease, 
asphaltic cement, plastics, and a host of other intermediate products. 
Petroleum technology is defined by the tools with which crude oil is 
extracted, refined, and used in all of its refined forms. Without the 
tools, crude oil would remain crude; a sticky substance that is more a 
hindrance than a help to mankind. The point is, that materials reflect 
only the technology of the tools that shape them. 
The foregoing discussion leads by reduction to the conclusion that 
a tool is a finished good, a capital or producer1s durable good, any imple-
ment or machine which is used by human producers to work materials in the 
creation of other goods having human value. Moreover, technology is that 
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quality of a tool which enables it to be substituted for human labors in 
the production of goods and services. 
Tools and Skill 
One often hears the term IIlabor productivity. n The term represents 
a measure of industrial efficiency stated as lIoutput-per-man-hour.1I The 
measure is calculated by dividing the market value of all final goods and 
services produced in an economy during some period of time (in other 
words, the gross national product) by the total man hours employed in 
the economy during that time. On the basis of output-per-man-hour, the 
American worker ;s said to be the most productive in the world. That is, 
the goods and services produced with each hour of American labor is 
greater than that produced by the 1 abor of any other country. 
The terms labor productivity and output-per-man-hour conjure up 
images of highly skilled men in industrial attire furiously manufacturing 
goods with crude tools powered by the brawn of their own sinewy biceps. 
The impression is that industrial efficiency is exclusively the product 
of the working man. His physical power, individual skill, and personal 
industry are solely responsible for the efficiency of the system. However, 
most economists and a good many other people know that the picture drawn 
above is far off the mark. It is true that these labor characteristics 
account at least in part for industrial efficiency. And it is true that 
the efficiency of an industrial system can val idly be, and perhaps should 
be, measured as output-per-man-hour. However, these terms foster certain 
presuppositions which obscure the nature of industrial efficiency. 
The fact is that the cognitive skills of the worker are neither 
inherited genetically--although the capacity to learn them may be 
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transmitted genetically--nor are they acquired in an environmental vacuum 
as an intellectual and manipulative tour de force. Rather, the cognitive 
skills of workers are derived from the tools they use. This is easily 
observed by contrasting the skill s of two workers separated in time. The 
first is a tribes person in a hoe-culture during the early neolithic 
period, and the second is an American farmer in the modern, industrial age. 
Cultivation to the tribes person of the hoe-culture meant simply 
clearing and digging up a small patch of ground with a stick or hoe. Her 
motive power was the physical strength of her own body. She seeded the 
patch and left it to grow and ripen. Her seeds were those of indigenous 
grasses and other edible vegetation. She added no manure or other fertil-
izers. She used no insecticides. fungicides, herbicides, or pesticides, 
and she did nat irrigate. At the end of the growing season she harvested 
whatever her patch produced. Her patch of ground was never fallowed. She 
cultivated the same plot each year. After a few seasons the soil was 
depleted and her yields declined. She simply cleared another patch and 
repeated her technique until that plot was also depleted. After she had 
exhausted the land near her hovel she simply moved elsewhere and began 
anew. 5 
The technology of the early neolithic tribes person was very primi-
tive. It consisted of her hoe. Her technical skill was in her ability 
to apply technique to her tool in the creation of goods. Technique is 
simply the procedure by which her tool--the hoe--was put into operation 
to perform the productive service for which it was designed. The tribes 
person's technical skill was, therefore, as rudimentary as her hoe was 
primitive. It consisted of her ability to manipulate the hoe in turning 
or stirring the soil sufficiently to create a suitable bed for her seeds. 
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And technique involved her judgments about when, where, and how to employ 
her hoe. Her skill was derived from her tool. 
Likewise, the cognitive skills of the modern farmer are derived 
from his tools. The modern farmer cultivates his land, plants his seeds, 
and reaps his crops mechanically. Unlike the primitive farmer who had 
only her own physical strength as motive power, the modern farmer relies 
on the mechanical power of his tractor and other farm implements to do 
the work for him. He is able to increase his yields by using carefully 
prepared seeds of hybrid and bl ight-resistant crop strains. He uses 
engine-powered irrigation systems to protect his crops from the weather 
vagaries of nature; and he uses insecticides, fungicides, pesticides, and 
herbicides to protect against crop wastage by vermin, blight, and weeds, 
because of the chemical technology which supplies him with nitrogen, 
phosphorus., potash, 1 ime, and trace elements to rebuiid his soil. 
The tool s of the modern farmer are much more complex than the 
simple hoe of the neal ithic farmer. The technique by which the modern 
farmer employs his tools in the productive functions for which they were 
designed is likewise much more complex. His technical skill. his ability 
to apply technique to his tools in the agricultural production of food 
and fiber. is commensurately greater than that of the neolithic farmer. 
The modern farmer must not only know how and when to operate his complex 
pieces of farming equipment, he must also know how to properly maintain 
them. The point is that his t~chnical skill is concentrated on his tools 
and their use in producing goods. It follows that the tools are the 
sources of his technical skill. and his skill is the measure of his mastery 
of his tools. 
To place this in better illumination. one might imagine that the 
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mate of the neolithic farmer is all-at-once plucked out of his primitive 
enironment and is advanced to the present. He and the modern farmer are 
separated from their tools and all cultural symbols so that they stand 
bared before their examiners. The question explored by the examiners is: 
What are the visible differences between them? 
If each man is a more-or-less average representative of his era, 
one difference will inunediately stand out. The primitive man will be 
smaller in all or most of his physical dimensions. This is simply the 
result of differences in the nutritional and sanitation environments in 
which the two were raised; which is, incidentally, a technological factor. 
If the two are from the same racial stock, there will not likely be 
other physical differences. Each man will have the same external 
appendages and sensory organs, the same internal structure and 
functi onary organs. Each man is homo sapi ens and there wi 11 be no 
generic differences between them. 
What is it then that distinguishes modern man from his primitive 
ancestor? It will surely be stated that modern man is II smarter," and 
that this will not appear as a physiological or anatomical difference. 
If, by "smarter," the meaning is that the average primitive man possesses 
less innate intelligence than his modern descendant, the evidence does 
not support the contention. 6 On the other hand, if the meaning is that 
modern man possesses more acquired knowledge about himself and his environ-
ment, then one must agree. It is not that modern man has greater intellect 
than his ancestor, but that his intellect has been better developed. 
The next question is: Why is the modern intellect better developed? 
The answer is blatant--because modern man has more tools and tools which 
are technologically superior to those of neolithic man. It can be 
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countered that the reason is because modern man possesses more goods of 
all kinds. One can have no disagreement with this statement because it 
simply reinforces the original contention. To see this one need only 
inquire how the goods of modern man came into existence. The answer is 
that they were produced with tools employed by people. Thus the intellect 
of modern man is better developed because of the concentrated thought 
processes required of him to fully master the techniques for productively 
employing his tools. The skills of both neolithic and modern man are 
derived from tools. The essential difference between them is therefore 
the relative quantity and quality of their tools. The physical attributes 
of man remain essentially unchanged, but the properties and technical 
attributes of his tools have changed substantially over the centuries. 
Tools and Productivity 
The preceding section of this chapter commenced with a discussion 
of the terms "labor productivity" and "output-per-man-hour. II The impres-
sion conveyed by those terms is that productivity is a function of the 
skill and industry of labor. It was demonstrated in the preceding sec-
tion how the skill of labor is derived from the tools employed with labor 
to produce goods having human value. Thus, one is left with only one 
major nexus between labor and productivity, and that is the so-called 
industry of labor. However, even that nexus is on shaky premises. This 
section will argue that labor productivity and the productivity of a 
modern industrial system is only minutely dependent upon the skill and 
industry of labor. Rather, productivity is mostly determined by the 
quantity and technical quality of the tools employed in the system. 
The preceding section conc1 uded that the essential d1fference 
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between neolithic and modern man is the relative quantities and qualities 
of their tools. A major significance of that difference is in the pro-
ductivity of each man relative to the other. The technical quality of 
the neolithic hoe limits the tribes person to the tillage of a very small 
plot of land, probably less than a hectare. She simply could not turn 
enough soil fast enough to bring more land under cultivation in the time 
available to her. Thus, her crop yield was small in relation to the 
amount of time she spent in cultivating her land because of the 1 imita-
tions of her tools. 
Moreover, the primitive fanner's yield was small because she did 
not have the modern advantages of supporting technologies. That is, she 
had no access to seeds of blight-resistant and hybrid strains of crop. 
She had no sources for fertilizers. insecticides, fungicides, herbicides, 
or pesticides, and she had no way of irrigating her crop land if she 
suffered drought during her growing season. She had to rely on the exist-
ing fertil ity of her soil and on the vagaries of season for the right 
combinations of rainfall and sunl ight to bring in a meager crop. And 
after her losses to insects, rodents, fungus, and weeds, she might have 
enough harvest to feed her family if she supplemented her larder by hunt-
ing game, the game brought in by her husband, and by occupying her family 
gathering indigenous berries, nuts, and roots. Most assuredly there were 
few seasons of surplus, and there was rarely enough to simply feed her 
own family. The primitive farmerLs productivity was constrained by the 
technical pauclty of her tools. 
The size and richness of hUman society based on such a primitive 
technology was absolutely constrained by its abysmally low agricultural 
productivity. There could be no villages, towns. or cities, or any other 
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cohesive human conmunities which substantially exceeded the family number. 
The self-sufficient family unit was the principal if not the only insti-
tution of the mesolithic and early neolithic periods. While there were 
undoubtedly intra-family special izations, there was no time for the 
inter-family specializations which led to trade and ultimately to the 
proliferation. and agglomeration of the extra-family institutions which 
comprise urban areas. Such specializations had to await a time when 
agricultural productivity could support substantia11y more than the 
farmer and her family. Urbanization was, at root, an agricultural revol-
ution, and the latter was precipitated by technological developments 
which increased agricultural productivity. 
Like the early neolithic farmer, the modern farmer's productivity 
is a function of the quantity and quality of his tools. By using mechan-
ica11y-powered equipment, the modern farmer can farm several thousand 
acres of land. Indeed, he must usua11y cultivate at least a thousand 
acres (approximately 400 hectares) in order to secure enough income to 
allow him to 1 ive moderately (by modern standards) at farming alone. 
Moreover, he must special ize in one or only a few crops in order to take 
advantage of the economies in large-scale production. He cannot afford 
to waste his time on the diverse kinds of farming that characterized the 
traditional, small, family farm--an institutional entity which was rela-
tively self-sufficient. 
The modern farmer's yield per unit of land is much greater than 
that of the neolithic farmer because he has abundant sources of support-
ing technologies. That is, he can obtain the very best seeds to plant 
from firms which specialize in developing and producing b1i'ght-resistant 
seeds. And he can assure a verdant crop by applying chemical fertilizers 
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that are specially formulated to compensate for deficiencies in his soils 
in terms of the nutritional needs of his crops. Likewise, he can protect 
against drought by irrigating, and against crop wastage from insects, 
rodents, fungus, and weeds by applying appropriate chemicals to his grow-
ing crops. Finally, he can multiply his yields by double and sometimes 
triple cropping his land most years without dep'Jeting his soil. 
The modern farmer I 5 harvest measured as output-per-man-hour is very 
great. He and his family could not consume even a small fraction of the 
crop he produces, and the chances are that they consume none of it at all. 
Rather, the entire crop is sold to urban food-packing firms which process 
it and sell it to both urban and rural consumers. Thus the farmer lives 
off the proceeds of his sales just as urban workers live off their wages 
and salaries. 
Only a fraction of the fannerls net income is spent on agricultural 
goods, and whatever agricultural goods his family consumes are thoroughly 
processed, packaged, distributed, and sold to him by business firms 
operating in urban centers. Rather, the major part of his net income is 
spent on precisely the same kinds of goods and services consumed by urban 
dwellers. It is spent on housing, electricity, telephone, heating fuel, 
transportation, household appl iances, television, clothing, and other 
goods and serv; ces manufactured or processed in urban areas. L i kewi se, 
he 1 istens to the same radio programs and watches the same tel evision 
programs as his urban counterparts. His children attend schools in urban 
areas, and he pays taxes on his properties and his incomes just the same 
as urban dwellers. In terms of his household style and the consumption 
pattern of his family, the modern farmer is very much an urban creature. 
Likewise, the technologies which supply the farmer with mechanical 
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equipment, fuel, irrigation pipe, pumps, chemical fertilizers, insecti-
cides, herbicides, fungicides, pesticides, and a host of other goods are 
products of urban industries. The farmer is, all at once, a buyer of 
products produced by industries which are essentially urban, and a major 
supplier of food and fiber resources to urban industries. Indeed, it is 
precisely the phenomenal productivity of the agricultural sector which 
has released manpower from the production of primary goods to special ize 
in urban industrial employments. Urban industries produce the rich variety 
of relatively low-cost manufactured goods and services which are character-
istic of an advanced industrial society.7 
Farmers today comprise approximately two percent of the population 
of the United States. And yet, the farm sector is so productive that the 
U. S. Department of Agriculture must pay the farmer not to farm and must 
purchase certain agricultural surpluses after the farmer has sold all of 
his output that the U. S. economy can consume and as much as the inter-
national economy can absorb. It has been the innovation of mechanical 
and chemical technologies in agricul ture which has enabl ed the modern 
American farmer to produce enough food and fiber to support a great many 
urban famil ies, while the neal ithic farmer with her hoe could barely pro-
duce enough to support her own family. 8 
The land and weather patterns of the North American continent have 
not significantly changed while the transformation in American agriculture 
occurred. Likewise, the physiognomy of the farmer has changed not at all. 
He has no new anatomical appendages. On the other hand, he has acquired 
greater knowledge of himself and his environment. This knowledge derives 
from his tools. and the tools of the American farmer are the means behind 
his amazing output-per-man-hour. More specifically, it ;s that quality 
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of American farm tools which enables them to be substituted for human 
effort in the production of agricultural goods. In short, like his skill, 
the American farmer's productivity is essentially a function of the tech-
nology embodied in his tools and the tools of those urban enterprises 
which support him. 
Of courSE\ it remains true that the skills and industry of labor are 
a major source of productive eff; ci ency in a subs; stence economy. But 
even a capital-scarce economy relies heavily on the tools it has. More-
over, the ability of a more primitive economy to improve the welfare of 
its members comes down to its success in somehow increasing its stock of 
capital goods or tools relative to its labor force, and in improving the 
technical qual ities of its capital goods at the same time. Improvements 
in the technical qualities of tools means acquiring and employing new 
units of capital goods that increase the units of output-per-man-hour for 
the whole economy--in other words, new units of capital goods which sub-
stitute for more units af labor in producing all kinds of goods. It means 
somehow replacing the sawyer's hand saw with a power saw. It means some-
how replacing the Mountagnard 1 s hoe and bush knife with modern agricul~ 
tural equipment. This is~ of course, a tall order~ and the issues sur~ 
rounding it are examined in subsequent chapters. 
TOOLS AND HUMAN EFFORT 
What happened between the early neol ithic era and the modern times 
to change man1s productivity so markedly? Indeed, what has happened since 
primeval times before man succeeded in domesticating animals? The simple 
answer is that tools have been perfected and substituted for hUman labors 
to produce goods down through the ages of man. Yet the answer is not as 
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simple as that. The complexities of substituting tools, or capital goods 
for labor in production processes are taken up in the next few chapters. 
It is sufficient for the moment, however, to deal with the simple state-
ment--too1s have been substituted for human labor in the production of goods. 
Consider a thankfully by-gone era, a primeval time when man stood 
bare of textile adornment and with only the most primitive stone, bone, 
and shell tools. Ten thousand years ago, at the end of the pleistocene 
geological period when the Wurm glaciers of the last ice age receded from 
Centra 1 Europe. neanthropic man, or homo sap; ens, emerged probably from 
the Aurignacian, Sol utrean , and Magdelenian cultures of the upper paleo-
lithic period. Human culture was of the food-gathering kind Agriculture, 
the domestication of animals, pottery, and polished (rather than chipped) 
stone tool s that typified neal ithic culture had not yet emerged. 
Except for very crude implements fashioned from stone. bone, and 
shell, one finds that mesalithic man possessed practically no tools. In-
deed, man himself ;s the essential tool. There were no domestic beasts 
to provide power. The motive powers to manipulate his crude implements 
came from mesalithic man 1 s O\'1n anatomy. It was from the dexterity and 
strength of his own back, arms, and hands that man marshalled the power 
to slam his stone axe into the skull of a wild beast. More than that, 
it was his legs that prope11ed him on the hunt--and it was his sight, 
hearing, and senses of smell, taste, and touch that enabled him to 
navigate, avoid calamity while moving about, track and find the beast. 
land the killing blow, and return the meat to his abode. Finally, it 
was his own mind that coordinated the entire episode according to the 
techniques learned from his tools and his ancestors. 
The hi story of techno1 ogi ca 1 development during the mill enni a that 
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separate modern man from his mesol ithic ancestors is one of systematically 
removing man from the processes by which he produces goods and services. 
This has been accomplished by substituting tools for human effort in pro-
duction processes. The first great technological innovations created 
opportunities to remove the muscles of man's legs, back, and arms as 
primary sources of industrial power. The second wave of technological 
advance opened the way for removal of his skeletal frame, his manipula-
tive dexterity, from industrial processes. The third advancement made 
it possible to remove man's voice and nervous systems, and the most 
recent advances are opening opportunities to supplant man's brain as a 
device for coordinating industrial activities. These advances are not 
so discreetly organized as they appear here. Rather, they overlap one 
another. For example, research in power technology. the first stated 
above, continues to produce new and revolutionary tools to the present. 
Power Devices 
The first major technological innovations were the initial steps 
in a long series of advances toward removing man I s body as a source of 
power in industrial processes. They started at the outset of the neal ithic 
period with the first human efforts to gain better control over the food 
supply. The effort advanced along two lines--the tillage of crops and the 
domestication of animals. The domestication of animals brought the meat 
supply under man's dominion. However, as animal husbandry merged with 
crop tillage, domestic beasts came to be used as work animals as well as 
for meat. It was soon discovered that the oxen which suppl ied the primi-
tive·meal was also useful as a beast of burden. The ox replaced man at 
the draw of the plow, a primitive tool that was little more than a pointed 
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stick. The plow replaced the hoe as a tool for turning the soil in pre-
paration for planting. The ox also came into use to draw cargo sleds and 
wagons. Eventually the ox gave way in western civilization to the horse 
as the principal draft animal. 9 
The substituti on of fi rst the ox and then the horse for man as the 
source of industrial power had the effect all at once of freeing man for 
other activities and of increasing the output-per-man-hour for those hours 
of human labor devoted to production. For example, an average draft horse 
is capable of exerting 120 pounds of force at a velocity of 3.6 feet per 
second for 432 foot-pounds per second of power or work. This compares 
with approximately 18 pounds of force exerted by a man turning a 'o'/inch 
at a velocity of 2.5 feet per second for 45 foot-pounds per second of 
work. The average man can only produce about one-tenth the amount of 
work as the average draft horse per unit of time (45 ; 432 = .104 or 
10.4%). The power of the ox or horse pulling the plow simply turned more 
earth more rapidly than could be done by a single man. The change to a 
power technology based on draft animals was so significant and prevailed 
so long that mechanical forms of power continue to be measured today in 
draw-bar horse power or brake horse power. 10 
The advance of technology did not stop with shifting the power load 
from human muscular systems to those of domesticated draft animals. Water 
power and wind power were developed between 150 B.C. and 1500 A.D. to 
operate grain, textile, and other mills and to propel cargo and passenger 
vehicles and vessels. Like the ox and the horse, wind and water power 
have fallen into disuse in the face of power produced by mechanical 
devices discovered and innovated since the eighteenth century. Water 
power continues to be significant only in the generation of electricity 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
216 
in a few regions of the world. ll 
The next major advance in power technology occurred in England in 
the eighteenth century when James Watt perfected a steam engine from a 
reciprocating steam device developed earl ier by Thomas Savery and Thomas 
Newcomen. By the beginning of the twentieth century, the steam engine 
had been adapted to power pumps, ships, rail locomotives, electrical 
power generators, and a variety of industrial mills. The widespread 
innovation of the steam engine made it possible to shift industrial 
loads from the backs of draft animals and from the more 1 imiting wind- and 
water-power devices to the more powerful and versatile mechanical power 
units fueled by wood and fossil fuels. 12 
The development and widespread use of internal combustion engines 
marked the next major advance in power technology. The first of these 
was the reciprocating, gasoline-powered engine built in 1820 by ~4. Cecil 
of Cambridge, England. Cecil's engine was improved in 1823 by Samuel 
Brown. an English scientist. The Brown version was produced and sold 
in quantity. The reciprocating 9a501 ine engine has since been adapted 
for use to power automobiles, aircraft, sma11 electrical-generating 
plants, agricultural equipment and countless other units. The diesel 
engine, 9a501 ine turbine engine, jet engine, and rocket motor are all 
internal-combustion engines developed and innovated subsequent to the 
reci procating gaso1 ine-po~Jered engines. 13 
Dr. William Gilbert, physician to Queen Elizabeth I, discovered 
electricity in 1600 A.D. while examining the properties of magnets and 
amber. There have been many other persons associated thereafter with 
discoveries built upon electricity--Benjamin Franklin, Luigi Galvani. 
Alessandro Volta. Hans Christian Oersted, Andre Ampiere, Michael Faraday. 
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and others. It was Faraday who, in 1831, discovered electromagnetic 
induction, the principle upon which the electric generator and the 
electric motor are based. These tools--the electric generator and the 
electric motor--enable power to be transformed from such other forms as 
fossil fuels, water and wind power, and nuclear energy into electrical 
energy for transmission over wires to users and for further transforma-
tion into usable motive power. For example, electricity might be gener-
ated by a generator or dynamo which is powered by water spill ing over a 
dam. The electricity is carried by transmission lines to users who 
reconvert the electricity to power by use of an electric motor. The 
electric motor is, of course, connected to other industrial tools used by 
the recipient to produce goods. 14 
The most recent innovation in power technology is the nuclear-
fission reactor. The nuclear reactor is coming into wider use for energiz-
ing large electrical-power generators. It has also been used to replace 
steam and internal combustion engines in ocean-going vessels. Nuclear 
technology remains very much inchoate with additional research pointing 
toward development of so-called IIfast breeder ll fission reactors and the 
possible development of .fusion reactors. Finally, a great deal of 
interest now centers on ways to harness the sun I s rays as a power source. 
Likewise, more attention is given to possible ways of improving wind- and 
water-power technologies and ways of developing geothermal potentialities. 
These latter efforts anticipate the eventual depletion of fossil fuels 
as sources of energy to fuel steam engines and internal-combustion engines. 
The practical effect of emergent power technologies has been and 
remains the extrication of man's muscular system as the source of physical 
power in industrial processes. As the power requirements of industry in 
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agriculture was shifted from the body of neal ithic man to the bodies of 
draft animals, so the power requirements of all industrial activities 
were systematically shifted from the backs of oxen, horses, el ephants, 
and other draft animals to wind- and water-power devices, to steam 
engines, internal-combustion engines, and to electric motors powered by 
electrical generators attached to one or more of the foregoing power 
sources or by nue 1 ear reactors. 
Moreover, the physical power of man's body is less than puny when 
compared to the physical powers of the various tools devised by man to 
give motive power to his industrial processes. For example. consider 
the comparative transportation efficiency between a man on foot and a 
modern jet aircraft. If the purpose is simply to move one's self and 
his baggage from Los Angeles to New York, there is clearly no contest. 
The aircraft will accomplish the feat in a few hours with hardly any 
human hardship. The man afoot will take several months, and he will 
endure great physical hardships. The difference is the tool, the jet-
powered aircraft, which can move many people and their baggage in one 
trip between the two cities in a few hours. The powers of the tools 
substituted for hUman effort utterly dwarf man's pitiful meagerness by 
comparison. 
Transmission Devices 
The second wave of technological advance could as well be called 
the first because it originated and developed concomitant with power 
technologies. Indeed, the devices here allocated to the second wave 
complemented power devices by translating the forces created by the latter 
into directed motion. They are known in the realm of physics as simple 
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machines--the wheel and a_x1e, the lever and fulcrum, the wedge (or inclined 
plane), the pulley, the screw, and the gear. These devices might be 
called transmission or manipulative technologies because they transmit 
force from the motor mechanism to the working component of a machine or 
tool--much as manls skeletal structure transmits the force of his muscular 
system in whatever he is doing. Thus, the simple machines make it pos-
sible to remove much of man's manipulative dexterity from production 
processes. 
Evidences of simple machines are found in the works and arts of the 
ancients. Some simple machines have doubtlessly been in common use at 
least since the early centuries of ancient Egypt. For example, the prin-
cip1e of the lever is found as a sweep to lift >later from a well in 
Egypt as early as 1550 B.C. The works of Phi10n of Byzantium and 
Vitrivius Pollio, the Roman architect, dating from the first century B.C. 
contain some of the earliest descriptions of simple machines. The Greek 
scientist, Hero of Alexandria, authored works in mathematics, physics. 
and mechanics during the third century A.D. Herols writings contain care-
ful descriptions of the Simple machines corrunonly understood and used in 
all forms of industrial activity today.15 
A simple machine translates force into directed motion in some com-
bination of force and motion called work. Thus, if a fifty-pound weight 
is 1 ifted vertically a distance of ten feet, 500 foot.-pounds of work have 
been accomplished (10 feet X 50 pounds = 500 foot-pounds). However, one 
can lift the weight ten feet (ignoring friction; etc.) by employing a 
force of only ten pounds in combination with any of the aforenamed simple 
machines having a mechanical advantage of at least five--where mechanical 
advantage is the ratio of the force exerted to the weight moved, or the 
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ratio of the distance over which the force moves to the distance moved 
by the weight. The simple machine accomplishes this by substituting 
motion for force, or force for motion. That is, the ten-pound force 
must move fifty feet to produce 500 foot-pounds of work, or enough work 
to 1 ift the fifty-pound weight ten feet. The simple machine is an 
implement which enables this to be done. 16 
Taking the wheel and axle as an example, it is found that a draft 
horse pulling a loaded two-wheeled cart can move 1500 pounds over a level 
surface at 3.6 feet per second produci ng 5400 foot-pounds of work per 
second. Recall ing from a previous example that an average draft horse 
can produce 432 foot-pounds per second of work on a straight draw-bar 
pull, it is seen that the wheel and axle under a cargo compartment har-
nessed to a horse has increased the power efficiency of the horse by more 
than 12 times. The mechanical advantage of the wheel and axle in this 
example is probably something between eleven and twelve, taking account 
of power lost to friction~ etc. By comparison, a man can move approx-
imately 225 pounds in a two-wheeled barrow at 1.66 feet per second for 
work of 372 foot-pounds per second. While this ;s an improvement over a 
man simply carrying a burden, note that a man's work capability with a 
two-wheeled conveyance is only about 6.9% of that produced by the horse 
under similar conditions. 17 
However, even the power of the horse ;s dwarfed by the immense 
power of a diesel engine. Such an engine linked by gears and other drive 
mechanisms to the wheels of a locomotive can draw fifty or more rail cars, 
each rolling on steel wheels and carrying a hundred or more tons of cargo 
over steel rails across the breadth of a continent. The combination of 
power technology and the manipulative technology of simple machines has 
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enormously multiplied mankind's capacity to accomplish work. More than 
that, these technologies have made it possible to remove the muscular 
power and the structural dexterity of man's body from many of the produc-
tive processes by which mankind produces goods and services having human 
value. 
Control Devices 
The third great advance came with the discovery and innovation of 
communications technologies. The tools arising from this advance have 
made it possible to remove much of man's perceptual equipment, his nervous 
system, and his voice from production processes. Communication tech-
nOlogies have advanced most rapidly since the discovery and development 
of electricity. More specifically, modern tools of communication are 
based on the electromagnet and the vacuum tube--or the vacuum tube's 
modern descendants, the transistor and the integrated circuit. The 
entire world of electronic communication is built upon these tools. 
William Sturgeon, an English electrician, invented the electromagnet 
in 1823. It is considered by many scientists to be the greatest inven-
tion of modern times. And yet it is a simple device consisting of an 
iron bar around which coils of insulated wire are wound. The bar is not 
magnetic until electrical current passes through the coil, and its magne-
ti sm ceases as soon as the current stops. The magneti c strength of the 
electromagnet is a function of the size of the coil and the amount of 
electrical current passing through the coil. It is so sensitive to fluc-
tuations in current that it will precisely reproduce the voice and words 
spoken into a telephone by a person at one end for a listener at the 
other end of a circuit spanning many miles. 
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The amazing electromagnet is unconsciously used many times each day 
by everyone in the modern world. All push-button switches are connected 
to electromagnets (solenoids or relays) to control door bells, elevators, 
traffic signals, self-opening doors, automobile starters, automatic 
washers and dryers, and thousands of other implements in daily use. It 
is an essential component of all control devices in modern homes and in 
offices and factories. And it is a technical basis of all electrical 
communication of sound and symbols by telephone, radio, intercom, and 
tel e-typewriter. 18 
Consider for a moment the use of an electromagnet in a simple, 
servo-mechanism, the ordinary thermostat used to control heating units 
in urban households. The heat inside a dwelling was adjusted before the 
thermostat by a person whose sense of feel detected a drop in the room 
temperature. When the temperature dropped sufficiently to cause discom-
fort, the person would place another log or shovel of coal on the fire. 
If this produced too much heat, the person might open the damper on his 
fire unit to allow more heat to escape up the chimney. The point is that 
the person's sensory apparatus was needed to detect the temperature 
change. His brain recognized the problem and transmitted instructions 
over his motor nervous system to take appropriate action. The needed 
physical action was then taken by the person to correct the temperature 
problem. 
But no more. A servo-mechanism has entirely replaced man in this 
process. The change in temperature is detected by a thermometer composed 
of pieces of metal held apart by an adjustable plastic device. As the 
temperature drops, the metal contracts and warps until the pieces touch, 
closing an electrical circuit wired to a solenoid (Dr electromagnet) 
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in a furnace installed in some unobtrusive place in the home. The ener-
gized solenoid turns on a switch to a motor powering a pump and igniter. 
The pump forces oil through a nozzle, atomizing it in a firebox where the 
igniter sets the oil afire. The heat builds up in the firebox until 
another thermostat, sensing the rising temperature ;n the firebox, 
activates a fan which distributes the heat through a duct system to the 
rooms requiring the heat. When the temperature in the dwelling reaches 
proper levels, the thermostat senses it and reverses the process to 
extinguish the flame and inactivate the fan. And the human occupants 
are relieved of the burdens to sense temperature changes and take action 
to make physical adjustments to the heating unit. Moreover, the thermostat 
is a slave which never tires and which operates with far greater precision 
than any human sensory and motor nervous systems. 
Impressive as its powers are, the electromagnet alone does not 
account for the proliferating myriad of communication devices. The 
electromagnet is essentially a terminal device. It converts transmitted 
impulses to action. The impulses are transmitted by other means--copper 
wire, radio waves, etc. Transmission by radio wave was made possible by 
invention of the vacuum tube and its modern successors, the transistor 
and the integrated circuit. 
Many scientists working over a span of time invented the vacuum tube 
and its variations. The "Edison effect" was patented by Thomas Edison in 
1883. The effect was ignored until 1899 when Sir J. J. Thomson, a 
British SCientist, offered what came to be an accurate explanation of 
the Edison effect. The effect was achieved by enclosing a small copper 
plate near but not in contact with the filament inside an electric light 
bulb. When the plate is charged with positive electricity, the electrons 
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emitted by the energized 1 ight filament are attracted to the plate. The 
attraction continues so long as the filament is energized and heated to 
the correct temperature. The flow of electron current is the means by 
which the gap between the plate and filament is bridged, closing the 
circuit in the tube. 
It was not until 1904 that Sir John Fleming, a British physicist, 
produced a vacuum tube from the principles underlying the Edison effect. 
Fleming's tube is a diode, a two-element device. It is used today as a 
rectifier to convert alternating current to direct current. It was two 
years later that Lee DeForest, an American engineer, created the triode 
or audion tube by inserting a wire grid between the filament and plate of 
the Fleming diode. It is the DeForest triode that has been the basis of 
all amplification in radio. television, radar, sound movies, electron 
microscopes, photo transmission, calculators, computers, X-ray sets. and 
scores of other electronic imPlements. 19 
Radio, television, and all forms of wireless transmission occur when 
sound and light waves are converted to electrical pulsations. Those pul-
sations are much too weak to be transmitted. The vacuum tube modulates 
and amplifies the pulsations until they are millions of times more power-
ful and broadcasts them across the face of the earth and into space. The 
journey around the world actually takes less than a fiftieth of a second. 
But when the amplified pulsations arrive a continent or more away, they 
are once again too weak to register on video screens and speaker systems. 
The vacuum tube in the receiver set once again ampl ifies the weak pulsa-
tions until they are powerful enough to energize the speaker and video 
systems at the receiver end. 20 
Prior to discovery and innovation of the vacuum tube, industrial 
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data and cantrall ing responses had to be received through the sensory 
organs and nervous systems of humans located at industrial sites, and 
had to be transmitted through the motor nervous systems and voices of 
the same persons. That is, the measurement, recording, and analysis of 
data, and the formulation and transmission of controlling reactions to 
the data were all manual, immediate, and on site. By the use of electronic 
sensing devices and radio and television communication equipment, it is 
now possible for persons on the earth to measure, record, and analyze 
data from unmanned vehicles traveling millions of miles in space at 
thousands of miles per hour and to control the vehicle direction, velo-
city, and much more. The radio and television transmission and recep-
tion of data and commands are possible without the sensory and motor 
nervous systems of man because the vacuum tube--or, more accurately, the 
transistors and integrated circuits which are replacing vacuum tubes--
performs the transmission functions both more accurately and at a tremen-
dously greater range than is capable with man's innate physical endowments 
alone. 
The vacuum tube has taken many forms and was used wherever elec-
trical current had to be rectified, modulated, or amplified. The simple 
Fleming valve, a diode, was elaborated into the triode, the pentode, the 
photo-electric cell, and the many other variations used in electronic 
devices. However, important as it was to the invention of these signif-
icant devices, the vacuum tube is rapidly giving way to the transistor, 
the discovery in 1948 of John Bardeen and Walter Brattain of the Bell 
Laboratories in New York. Transistors and integrated circuits are capable 
of all that can be accompl ished by vacuum tubes and much more. Moreover, 
additional research is exploring the possible use of laser beams as a 
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technique for transmitting electri cal pul sations. 21 
The invention and development of radio, television, and the plethora 
of other electronic devices which abound in modern industrial societies 
depended upon other discoveries by many scientists--men like James Clark 
Maxwell,. Heinrich Hertz, and Marchese Marconi for the radio, and Vladimir 
Zworykin and Philo Farnsworth for television. Nevertheless, all modern 
electronic communication and calculating devices are based upon the 
amazing electromagnet and the vacuum tube, and it was the discovery of 
these technical implements which opened the way to the latter. 22 
The discovery and innovation of communication technologies based 
upon the vacuum tube and the electromagnet have revolutionized the produc-
tion of goods and services by enabling people to coordinate and control 
complex and widely-separated industrial processes from locations which 
are mobile and far removed from those processes. But more than that~ 
communication technologies are resident in tools such as telephones, 
radi as, and tel evi s ions, whi ch repl ace human sensory and motor nervous 
systems in the creation of goods and services having human value. Moreover, 
those tools and the technologies resident in them are far more durable 
and much more reliable than the human components which they replace in 
industrial processes. 
Thought Devi ces 
The most recent wave of technical advance is the innovation of the 
digital computer, a device that thinks. The computer supplements and in 
some cases completely replaces man l s brain in production processes. The 
computer, 1 ike the servo-mechanism described in the preceding section, 
receives input and produces output. However, the servo-mechanism simply 
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measures a single input against predetermined and rigid parameters and 
produces a single output as a reaction to the measured input. The 
servo-mechanism is a simple reaction device within a closed feedback 
loop. It is a very simple form of an analogue computer. The digital 
computer, by contrast, can be programmed to process complex bodies of 
input data from diverse sources and to produce output choices according 
to the controlling program. Moreover, the program can be written to 
produce many different combinations of output from a given body of data. 
The digital computer is a true thinking device. 
Electronic data processing (EDP), as it is performed on a digital 
computer, is based upon the binary numeri c system. The system uses a 
base of two and consists of only two digits--zero and one. The digits 
translate as no and yes, or stop and go, or on and off, or reject and 
accept in electronic data processing. The binary system was elaborated 
in Principia Mathematica. a pioneering work in symbolic logic produced 
in the early part of the twentieth century by the philosophers Bertrand 
Russell and Alfred North Whitehead. 23 
Application of the binary system in electronic data processing was 
pioneered in the late 1940s by the Eckert-Mauchly Company. The 
e1 ectroni c components of the Eckert-MauchlY computer were vacuum tubes. 
Eckert-r~auchly was purchased by the Remmington Rand Corporation (now 
Spery-Rand) in the early 19505. International Business Machines 
Corporation, which had an early background in punch-card tabulating 
machines, entered the field in 1953 and gained a clear and enduring 
lead in electronic data processing by 1956. The vacuum tubes of the 
early Eckert-Mauchly computer have long since given way to transistors 
and integrated circuits in modern digital computers. 24 
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All computers consist of input and output hardware connected to 
central processing units (CPU). Input hardware and software are imple-
ments and techniques for translating man-readable data to machine-
readable data and for reading the data into the computer's CPU for pro-
cessing. The input side of the computer is analogous to the perceptual 
apparatus and sensory nervous system of man. The output hardware are 
implements for translating data processed by the CPU from machine-read-
able language to man-readable language for practical application. The 
output hardware is analogous to the motor nervous system and the commun-
ication and action extremities of man's body. The functions of the sensory 
and motor nervous systems were described under "control devices" above. 
The heart of any computer is its central processing unit. The 
central processing unit is analogous to the brain of man, and it 
functions to process data read into it through the input hardware and 
to feed the processed data to the output hardware. The CPU of a digital 
computer consists of doughnut-shaped, magnetic cores each of which is 
smaller than the head of a pin. The cores are organized into core 
planes which are stacked horizontally or vertically. Each core can be 
placed in two possible states, magnetized or not magnetized. Or they 
can be magnetized in two possible directions--clockwise or counter 
clock~/ise. The magnetized cores therefore operate in a program 
language like IIgates" in a fence system to control the information in 
the process. The two magnetic states correspond to the two digits of 
the binary system--zero and one. For this reason, a core state is 
called a bit--short for binary digit. 25 The bit can signal no or yes, 
stop or start, reject or accept, etc. as well as zero and one. 
There are, of course, other ways to wire a CPU. A recent innovation 
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involves integrated circuits built into sil icon, a semiconductor. A 
single silicon chip small enough to hold in the palm of the hand may con-
tain as many as 30,000 electronic parts. This innovation holds the pros-
pect of revolutionizing electronic data processing because it has increased 
computer speeds--100,OOO,OOO instructions per second and retrieval times 
of 1/4,000,000 of a second. It is significantly reducing the size of com-
puter storage units, with an attending reduction in their costs. Whatever 
the wiring method, computer memories operate on the binary principle, and 
a core magnetic state is called a bit. 
A computer core is analogous to a neuron cell in the human brain. 
A human brain is estimated to contain approximately ten bill ion neuron 
cells which. rea.ct like computer electronic cores by transmitting excitatory 
or inhibitory electrical impulses to other neurons. Each neuron cell may 
be connected to as many as 10,000 others. Most researchers believe that 
human learning is related in some way to the number and strength of inter-
neuron-cell connections. 26 Of course, the number of cares in a computer 
CPU is only a small fraction of the number of neuron cells in a human 
brain. The neuron cells are numbered in the billions while computer cores 
are numbered in the thousands. 
Just as neuron ce 11 s are connected wi th one another, so computer 
cores are further organized in one of several different combinations 
depending upon the computers and programming systems used. One common 
system divides the CPU into segments of eight adjacent cores. An eight-
core segment is called a byte and can have 256 different combinations of 
magnetic core states. The various combinations of magnetic-core states--
zeroes and ones--in a byte are known as the Extended Binary Coded Decimal 
Interchange Code (EBCDIC). Each particular code is assigned to an 
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alphabetic, numeric, or special character. Each byte, (indeed, each bit) 
can be addressed separately in a program using the EBCDIC code. It is 
therefore possible to encode anything known by man, and represented by 
alphabetic, numeric, or other symbols and to place it in a computer CPU--
subject, of course, to the physical core 1 imitations of the computer. 
A portion of the CPU cores of any computer is given over to a con-
trol unit while other parts are allocated to a main storage unit (memory), 
and an arithmetic-logic unit (ALU). The control unit contains the computer 
program, and it functions to interpret the program instructions placed in 
the computer by the programmer and to direct the actions of other units 
of the computer. It initiates execution of computer programs. It trans-
mits data into and out of the main storage unit. It appl ies the arith-
metic-logic from the ALU to process data according to program instructions. 
And it initiates input and output devices. 
The arithmetic-logic unit of the CPU is in essence a calculator. 
It is an electronic calculator in a true digital computer and it consists 
of a series of electronic storage units (registers) and other circuits 
capable of performing mathematical operations. The ALU may be a 
nomographic device in an analogue computer. An analogue computer is to 
a digital computer as a slide rule is to an electronic calculator. And 
as the electronic calculator is more precise and more rapid than a slide 
rule, so the digital computer is both more accurate and more versatile 
than an analogue computer. The ALU suppl ies the patterns of logic by 
which data from main storage are processed according to the program instruc-
tions in the control unit of the CPU. 
The main storage, or memory, occupies whatever cores remain in the 
CPU after allocation of cores to the control unit and the ALU. The main 
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storage unit is used to hold bath reference data required to execute the 
computer program (tables of constants, cades, etc.) and variable data 
for processing. Since all information handled by the computer must pass 
through the CPU, the CPU must have sufficient care capacity to handle 
control unit and ALU requirements as well as to stare all data needed in 
the program under process. 
The relatively small number of cares which may be built into a com-
puter CPU at the present state of technical development poses a restric-
tion an computer use. For example, it requires 40 cares to write a five-
letter ward using the EBCDI code described above--one byte per letter and 
eight cores per byte. Thus, one can effectively store fewer than 25, 
five-letter wards in one thousand cores in the main storage. At the 
present mast computers have less than 1000-K (1,000,000) storage units or 
bytes in the CPU. 
The paucity of care capacity has been partly overcame by creating 
shorter codes and by devising auxil ;ary storage hardware. The Binary 
Coded Decimal (BCD) system uses six consecutive cares to represent 64 
different characters. The American Standard Code for Information Exchange 
(ASCIE) uses seven consecutive cares to represent 128 symbols. Auxiliary 
or secondary storage of data is achieved by use of sequential access media 
in the farm of magnetic tape, or direct access media in the farm of data 
cells, magnetic drums, and magnetic disks. The CPU accesses auxiliary 
storage through a technique called sequencing so that the auxil iary stor-
age capacity is thought of as "virtual memory II because it is easily 
accessible to the main storage unit of the CPU. 27 
Whatever the limitations of computers, their powers and potential-
ities in production activities are impressive. Examples of effective use 
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of computers abound in the worlds of business and government. One of 
many examples that might be cited is the experience of Lockheed, one of 
the worl d's 1 eaders in aircraft and aerospace manufacturing. Lockheed 
had used computers since the early 1950s for such things as calculating 
trajectories and designing airborne and space vehicles. 
In 1958, Lockheed's Missiles and Space Division sought a system 
capable of cantrall ing its production. The division's production accounted 
for approximately 40% of Lockheed's total employment. The plants at 
Sunnyvale and Van Nuys, California had between 40,000 and 60,000 different 
items in different stages of simultaneous production. Ranging from min-
iscule electronic devices to entire space vehicles, each item had its own 
production schedule. Moreover. the specifications of many items were 
often altered after they were well into production. A staff of more than 
600 expediters was required to monitor and control this complex production 
maze. 
After more than a year of study, Lockheed settled on R.C.A. data 
gathering components which could be connected with ordinary telephone 
wire and coupled with computer hardware. The outcome was what Lockheed 
called its Automatic Data Acquisition system (ADA). The system is a 
ureal time" one, meaning that access to the computer is random and 
immediate from the 260 input stations located around the plants, and 
that constantly updated output can be obtained from any enquiry station. 
The system works by reading each item of material entering the 
plants into computer memory. An employee records each time the item is 
moved or worked by inserting his card and punching appropriate variable 
data into the nearest input station. The computer, therefore, knows at 
all times where an item is, who has worked on it, and the wage cost of 
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the work performed. The computer also controls inventory on common items, 
calculating control levels and reordering when stocks drop below reorder 
points. More than simply co~nting items, the computer acts heuristically, 
making judgments about usage factors, etc. By 1965, ADA had accomplished 
the following: 
It saved more than $2,000,000 per year against an original one-
time development and installation cost of only $2,300,000. The saving 
was achieved by the discharge of 400 expediters and 200 clerks who were 
no longer needed to control production. 
It enabled Lockheed to accurately forecast manpower and plant needs 
by providing timely and accurate production-machine and manpower costs. 
Supervisors tended to conceal the real output and capacities of their 
departments under the old system by averaging out workloads over the work 
week. With ADA, management knows exactly how long each job takes and 
how much work a department can perform on any day or week. 
Line employees readily accepted ADA because they felt that they 
were able to corrununicate directly to the top management without the 
sometimes prejudiced interpretations of their immediate supervisors. 
Work in progress could be located irrunediately to incorporate the 
frequent engineering changes inherent to the rapidly changing aerospace 
world. It was not uncommon under the former system to occupy an expediter 
two or more days simply trying to locate an item subject to engineering 
change . 
. Ready access to the qual ity and cost of goods purchased in the 
past enabled purchasing agents to make more rapid and accurate decisions 
about what, how much, and where to buy. Under the ADA system, inven-
tories could be kept at optimum levels. 
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Finally, ADA relieved top management of superfluous details by com-
pressing data and supplying only "exception information!! or information 
requiring action by top management. 28 
The results obtained by Lockheed's ADA are characteristic of results 
generally achieved by successful management appl ications of computer 
systems "in government and business. The surface has only been scratched 
in the possible uses of computers in planning and cantrall ing production 
processes. The chief advantages of computers over antecedent manual 
techniques are speed and accuracy in information retrieval and processing. 
That is, the computer is superior to the human brain in sifting and 
evaluating large. complex bodies of data to reach conclusions and make 
choices. The natural consequence is that computers are being brought 
into more and more uses to augmer"· hUman brain power or to replace it 
altogether in some cases. 
The use of the computer is only the most recent in a series of 
technological advances commencing at the advent of the neolithic revolu-
tion and having the effect of removing the physique of man from produc-
tion processes. To be sure, man 1 s body has not and perhaps will never 
be totally unburdened with productive 1 abor. But the mi 11 ennia between 
mesol ithic man and modern man are witness to an unburdening of fantastic 
magnitude. 
The first advance was the commencement of a revol ution in power 
technology which continues to the present day and which has had the effect 
of substituting power devices--draft animals, water and wind power, fossil-
fuel powered engines, electrical energy, and nuclear power--for man 1 s 
muscular systems in production processes. The second stage of technical 
advance involved the innovation of transmission or manipulative 
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techno10gies--the wheel and axle, the lever and fulcrum, the inclined 
plane or wedge, the pulley, the screw, and the gear. The effect of the 
second stage was to reduce reliance on man's skeletal structure for the 
transmission of force in production processes. The third great advance 
occurred with discovery and innovation of control devices based upon the 
electromagnet and the vacuum tube. This advance shifted much of the 
control of production processes from man' 5 perceptual endowments, and his 
sensory and motor nervous systems to electronic tools. And the last per~ 
ceptible advance has commenced in the last thirty years, and it involves 
the use of computers in production decision-making. This last advance 
has only begun, but it holds the prospect of at least partially supplant-
ing man I 5 brain in production processes. 
The total effect of these technological advances has been to remove 
man more and more from the mundane, day-to-day labors of production while 
substantially increasing the productive powers of society--both as to the 
quantity and quality as well as the tremendous diversity of goods and 
services available to all of society. This has been possible because of 
the technology resident in the tools which have been substituted down 
through the ages of man for human labor in the creation of goods and 
services having human value. 
It has been the purpose of this chapter to precisely define tech-
nology in a new and different way and to justify that definition in terms 
of institutional economic theory. The concl usion is that technology is 
that quality of a tool which enables it to be substituted for human effort 
in the creation of any good or service having human value. This has 
required a distinction between tools and other artifacts of material 
culture. And it has made the tool, broadly defined, the repository of 
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technology as well as the harbinger of the material progress attributed 
to technology. It has mandated a distinction between the techno10gy-
embodying tool and the hUman skill applying technique in the employment 
of the tool. Finally it has been necessary to briefly outline enough 
history of technical advance to demonstrate that the unique character of 
technology is its power to facilitate the sUbstitution of tools for 
human labor in production processes. 
While the social consequences of technologies have been broadly 
implied here and there in. the foregoing discourse, they have not been 
examined in any explicit or systematic way. It has been more than suf-
ficient to deal here with the attributes of technology alone. It remains 
for the next chapters to briefly examine social questions surrounding 
technology--How is it discovered? When is it innovated? What are its 
soc i a 1 consequences? 
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CHAPTER VI I 
TECHNOLOGICAL DYNAMISM 
The preceding chapter commenced with the question: What are the 
underlying causes of institutional instability. change, and discontin-
uity~ and what are the consequences for the city? The tentative answer 
was that the innovation of new technologies tends to be unstabil izing 
to institutional environments. and institutions along with their under-
lying value beliefs change as they react toward the new technologies. 
And since institutions are principally domiciled in cities, and since 
cities are creatures of the institutions that populate them, cities 
al so change with the urgings of new technologies. 
Chapter VI did not directly address the question or provide an 
answer. Rather, the chapter laid the foundation for an answer by 
precise1y defining technology, technique, and hUman skill. The 
conclusions were that technology is that qual ity of a tool which enab1es 
it to be substituted for human effort in the creation of any good or 
service having human value; that technique is the procedure or method 
by which a tool is put into operation or employed to perform the 
productive services for which it was designed; and that technica1 skill 
is the human capability of applying technique to the use of tools in 
the creation of goods and services having human value. 
This chapter starts an el aboration of the suggested answer to the 
above question. The main ideas are that technologies and the tech-
niques which they mandate are continuous, dynamic, and progressive. By 
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continuous, it is meant tha,t technologies are based on scientific under-
standing, and current scientific understanding ;s cumulative and is 
founded squarely upon all past discoveries. By dynamic, it is meant 
that the innovation of new technologies is unstabilizing to society 
because it organizes means (including productive labor) and opens ways 
of distributing social products in ways differing from the ceremonially 
prescribed methods descending from the past. By progressive, it is 
meant that the integration and diffusion of new technologies is forward-
urging in terms of the ends-means continuum. The remainder of this chap-
ter expands the first two of these propositions more fully. 
TECHNOLOGICAL CONTINUITY 
This section takes up the first stated proposition above--that tech-
oology ;s continuous in terms of the ends-means continuum. The dynamic 
and progressive qualities of technology are examined in subsequent sec-
tions and chapters. Technological continuity relates to where new tech-
nology originates and how it ;s invented. while technological dynamism 
relates to change or how new technology is innovated. And the progressive 
nature of new technology has to do with the social integration and dif-
fusion of technology. 
Technology and Science 
To say that technology is continuous is simply to say that the dis-
coveries of new scientific insights upon which the invention of new tech-
nical means rests is cumulative. New scientific insights involve discover-
ing the existence of something which had been in existence before but had 
not been previously observed. Invention of new technical means involves 
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a deliberate change or adjustment in objects or practices so that a new 
kind emerges. Invention is always built on the discoveries that precede 
it. That is, invention of technical means is always based on scientific 
understanding where that understanding consists of systematized knowledge, 
and the latter results from the critical testing and verification of 
hypotheses which purport to link events causally. It is scientific 
understanding that is cumul ative. l 
It is argued by some that the linkage between technology and science 
is very tenuous. 2 According to this view, knowledge is the concern of 
pure science while use is the concern of technology. Moreover. the dis-
covery of new scientific principles is not an essential precondition to 
the invention of new technical means. Finally, it is said that early 
technical discoveries were made by practical men not by men of science. 
and that little practical use was made of so-called scientific knowledge 
until the mid-nineteenth century. It can be shown that none of these 
arguments obviates the nexus between technology and science. 
If knowledge is the concern of pure science and use is the concern 
of technology, it must follow that science has no concern with practical 
use and technology has no concern with knowledge. Such a view must rest 
on the notion that knowledge and use are exclusive terms. It might be 
demonstrated that knowledge may exist independently of its expected uses. 
However. past and present practical uses of knowledge is a sub-
stantial part of the body of scientific understanding. Therefore. science 
cannot and does not ignore practical uses because it employs existing 
understanding to beget additional knowledge, and the uses to which know-
ledge is put is one form of understanding which science uses in the propa-
gation of so-called new knowledge. 
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Moreover, knowledge is a necessary requisite to practical use or 
appl ication. Indeed, virtually all knowledge is ultimately used in some 
practical way. In that sense, knowledge anticipates or even mandates 
uses. Which is to say that practical uses grow out of knowledge. An 
important contention in the preceding chapter is that tools which embody 
technology are important sources of knowledge. Thus, technology is both 
founded on knowledge and is a significant part of the scientific body 
of knowledge. It follows that both science and technology are concerned 
with both knowledge and use or application. Science;s concerned with 
the discovery of knowledge while technology is directed toward the uses 
or applications of knowledge. Science involves the applications of 
knowledge to propagate new knowledge, while technology involves the 
employment of knowledge to new applications. 
It is argued that the discovery of new scientific principles is 
not a necessary precondition for the invention of new technical means, 
and that technology is therefore not clearly related to science. 
However, the contention in no way mitigates against the proposition that 
all technology is founded on scientific understanding. The latter is 
simply non seguitof to the former. New technological means need not be 
based on new knowledge. It can merely be a new application of already 
existing scientific understanding--as, indeed, much new technology is. 
Likewise it is argued that so-called practical men (and presumably 
not the men of science) made the important technical discoveries before 
the mid-nineteenth century. Here again, the connections between science 
and technology are supposedly blurred. The argument is apparently based 
on the unduly restrictive definition of science as only that knowledge 
which is discovered and systematized through formal research employing 
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the so-called scientific method. If one accepts that definition, then 
only those persons who conduct research may be classified as men of 
science. All others must be placed in other classes. 
On the other hand, if one defines science as systematized knowledge, 
however it comes to be accepted, then the foregoing classification is 
invalid and the argument is defeated. For example, some systematized 
knowledge was critically tested and verified by ordinary practice. And 
yet. such knowledge is accepted by the scientific community without 
dispute. Is it then less scientific than systematized knowledge that 
was originally tested and verified by research in a laboratory? 
There is no reason why practical men cannot be scientists, or that 
scientists cannot be practical men. Indeed, the history of science 
largely ascribes a high degree of practicality to early scientists. And 
it would seem that modern research scholars achieve greater successes 
because they also possess practical skills and knowledge of a practical 
sort. Research ski 11 5 and knowl edge of sci enti fi c methods are genuinely 
practical whether or not one is carrying on scientific research. 
Finally, it is argued that little practical use was made of so-called 
scientific knowledge until the middle of the last century, and that there 
is therefore no clear connection between science and technology. The 
argument is based upon the same restrictive definition of science--that 
only knowledge discovered and systematized through formal research is 
scientific knowledge. However, if scientific knowledge includes all 
systematized knowledge, then this argument is also defeated. 
Moreover, the enormous acceleration in technical progress since 
the last century, when scientific understanding became the clear and 
evident basis of practical applications, further 
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vindicates the notion that science and technology are inextricably and 
positively related. Thus the nexus between science and technology remains 
distinct. That is, all technical means are based on scientific under-
standing. And scientific understanding is continuous and cumulative. It 
follows that technology is likewise continuous and cumulative. 
Cumulative Synthesis 
An example of the cumulative nature of scientific understanding is 
the history of electrical discovery and the invention of tools based on 
pri ncipl es of el ectricity. Sal i ent features of that history were exposed 
in the preceding chapter. However, it is useful to draw some of the events 
out in summary to underscore the continuous nature of technology. 
It is recalled that Dr. William Gilbert discovered the existence 
of electricity in 1600 A.D. While it remained a scientific curiosity for 
more than 200 years, much was added to the understanding of electricity 
by other men. It was not until 1823 that William Sturgeon invented the 
electromagnet. The invention of this 1 ittle device opened way for the 
creation of a multitude of tools for control of other implements and for 
communication. Indeed, all modern communication and control devices use 
electromagnets in some way. 
Eight years later, in 1831, Michael Farraday discovered the prin-
ciple of electromagnetic induction upon which electric motors and electric-
power generators are based. The subsequent invention, innovation, and 
diffusion of electrical generators and motors has made possible the 
invention of all kinds of mechanical tools, the development of which 
would have been impossible without electromagnetic induction. 
Thomas Edi son invented the incandescent 81 ectri c-l i ght bul b in 1879. 
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While tinkering with his invention he stumbled on the electrical phenom-
enon which led to the discovery of the vacuum tube. Lee DeForest invent-
ed the triode, a variation of the vacuum tube, in 1906. The DeForest 
vacuum tube led to invention of the radio by Marconi. Subsequent devel-
opment of the vacuum tube led to the invention of television and digital 
computers, both of which have become widely used only since World War II. 
The di scoveries which 1 ed to greater sci enti fi c knowl edge about 
electricity and its properties were continuous at least from the time of 
Dr. !;illiam Gilbert. Each new discovery was built upon the previous 
expans; cns of knowledge. Thus, causal rel ationshi ps whi ch were 
di scovered in the past became means to future di seover; es. Moreover, 
the knowledge was cumulative insofar as each new generation of discovery 
made a net addition to the pool of scientific knowledge. Finally, the 
expansions of knowledge were geometrical ;n that. like a free electron 
in a critical atomic mass, each new discovery led to more than one 
additional invention or application. 
All of which says little about the psychological process of inven-
tion. There are many theories of invention. One extreme holds that 
some persons are uniquely endowed with superior intellectual powers and 
talents which enable them to excel in creative inSights. An opposite 
extreme posits that invention is a coalescing of events which arranges 
matters so that the invention is inevitable and the inventor was simply 
fortunate enough to fall into the coal escent situation at a crucial 
time. Invention is a very complex matter and it is likely that no 
single, Simple explanation will fit every inventive situation. 
Nevertheless, persons who have studied the inventive process 
theorize that it occurs in four distinct steps. The first step is the 
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perception of a problem--an unfilled want. The second step involves 
assembly of the data or elements needed to solve the problem. This must, 
of course, inciude an individual with the skills needed to manipulate 
the other elements toward solution. The third step is an act of creative 
insight in which a novel solution to the problem is conceived. The last 
step is one of critical revision in which the solution is elaborated and 
embellished. The solution to one problem leads to new sets of problems 
so that the process is repeated in what is called a Il cumulative synthesis U 
until a "strategic invention" ;s developed. 3 
An example of this process, especially novelty in the act of insight, 
is evident in the words of James Watt. Watt had been studying the New-
comen steam engine for about two years. 
I had gone to take a walk on a fine Sabbath afternoon. I had 
entered the Green and passed the old washing house. I was thinking 
of the engine at the time. I had gone as far as the Ord' shouse 
when the idea came into my mind that as steam is an elastic body 
it would rush into a vacuum, and if a connection were made between 
the cylinder and an exhausting vessel it would rush into it and 
might there be condensed without cooling the cylinder. I then saw 
that I must get rid of the condensed steam and injection water if 
I used a jet, as in the Newcomen engine. Two ways of doing this 
occurred to me: First. the water might be run off by a descend-
ing pipe, if an offlet could be got at a depth of 35 or 36 feet, 
and any air might be extracted by a small pump. The second was 
to make the pump large enough to extract both water and air ... 
I had not walked farther than the Golf house when the whole thing 
was arranged in my mind. 4 
Of course, much work remained before Watt could construct a working 
model of his novel concept. However, the example illustrates how Watt's 
creative insight was based on elements previously discovered by others--
the engine invented by Newcomen, the idea that steam ;s an elastic body, 
use of a pump which was the product of novel inSights by others, etc. 
Moreover, Watt's invention produced a practical, working steam engine, 
but it was only one step in a process of cumulative synthesis which opened 
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the way to others who subsequently improved the efficiency of the steam 
engine by their own inventive insights. 
Technological Cross Fertilization 
One additional significance is to be noted. Watt had somehow to 
gain access to those sundry bits of information. This was no simple feat, 
since nearly instantaneous communication and enormous banks of information 
and data did not exist in his day. On the contrary, information which now 
may be transmitted and received half way around the world in less than a 
second to~k several months to travel the same distance under the very best 
of conditions in Watt's day. Moreover, crucial information was rarely" 
to be found by simply finding the right book in the nearest library. Where 
then did the inventors, like Watt, of Western Europe gain the information 
that sparked their ingenuities? 
It was a nearly unique conspiration of circumstances which led to 
the inventions, innovations, and diffusions of technological implements 
in Western Europe resulting in the renaissance, the reformation, and ultim-
ately in industrialization and urbanization of the Western World. Tech-
nological advance emerged in the !Iest from two essential conditions. The 
first was technological cross-ferti1 ization which introduced diverse 
technical devices into Europe from other places at crucial times. The 
second condition was a social c1 imate conducive to innovation. This 
latter condition is the subject of a subsequent section of this chapter. 
It is the former condition which is appropriate to the matter at hand. 
Technological cross fertilization involves the diffusion of component 
techno1ogies--somehow bringing together diverse technical devices in the 
same place and time so that the immediacies and proximities of the devices 
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provoke the curious, stimulate their ingenuities, and lead them toward 
creative insights as to novel technical combinations of the devices. 
This is accompl ished in modern times by the publ ication of research 
results which has the effect of cormnunicating new scientific discoveries 
so they can be critically examined and used by other scholars. However, 
as noted above, these arrangements did not exist until relatively recent 
times. How then did it occur in medieval and renaissance Europe?5 
Technological cross fertilization occurred in Western Europe as a 
consequence of at least three significant, interconnected series of 
diffusive events. The first was the repeated invasions from the east, 
north, and south endured off and on for at least 2,000 years by the 
peoples of Western Europe. The second was the aggressive responses of 
the Europeans themselves to threats to their holy places by the Moslem 
Turks. The third was the resumption of East-West trade during the fif-
teenth century A. D. 
The repeated invasions of Western and Central Europe by the Huns, 
Turks, and Mongols from the East, the Carthaginians, Romans, and Arabs 
from the South, and the Vikings from the North brought European tribes 
forcefully into contact with wi dely-di vergent cultures. Whil e the 
Europeans feared and resisted the barbarian invaders, they were brought 
face to face with both technological and ceremonial aspects of the foreign 
cultures. They doubtlessly had cause to carefully compare the instru-
mentalism of the strange technologies with that of their own, and some-
times the tools of the invaders were found to be superior to their own. 
Occupation of the Holy Land (Palestine) by the Moslem Turks in the 
e1 eventh century gave ri se to the viol ent responses of Chri stendom known 
as the Crusades. Christianized Europeans responded eight times during 
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the 300 years between the tenth and fourteenth centuries to calls by their 
religious leaders to liberate the Holy Lands from the infidels. More 
than anything else, the Crusades mark the end of the Dark Ages and the 
beginning of the Renaissance in Europe. This time the invading Europeans 
found themselves immersed in the oriental cultures of the Mtddle East, 
and they acquired tastes for Eastern products and Oriental art which 
could not be satisfied in their homelands. 
The thirst for Oriental culture heightened by the Crusades led to 
resumption and expansion of trade between Europe and the Far Eastern 
empires. While the COrTD11erce was in fine fabrics, spices, and objects of 
Oriental art, trading brought other aspects of cultures together. Again, 
the Europeans were able to measure the powers of their own technologies 
against that of their trading partners. And once again, the Europeans 
discovered aspects of Oriental technologies complementary or superior to 
their own. 6 
The many centuries of invasions by foreigners, the three centuries 
of the Crusades, and the resumption and expansion of trade between Europe 
and the Far East in the centuries following the Crusades brought together 
in Western Europe the conditions needed to launch the mechanical power 
phase of the industrial revolution. The technological cross fertil ization 
which took place, particularly between the eighth and twelfth centuries 
A.D. resulted ;n the diffusion ;n Europe of many implements and ideas 
from other areas of the world. The Europeans learned of numerals from 
the Arabs and zero from the Hindus. They borrowed foot stirrups, the 
-breast harness for horses, paper, moveable type, gun powder, the magnetic 
compass, and windmills from China. From the Vikings they learned the 
skill of tacking into the wind with their sail ing ships and of rudders 
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to steer the shi ps. 
It was immersion in a cross-fertilized technical environment which 
sparked the ingenuity of inventive men like Watt. And it was their 
ingenuities operating in such an environment that led to creative insights 
and novel solutions to the scientific and technical problems of their 
times. It was the whole process of cumulative synthesis that produced the 
inventions upon which technological progress was and is founded. Finally, 
the process of cumulative synthesis demonstrates the cumulative character 
of science. Since technology is based on scientific understanding, tech-
nology is continuous. 
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 
This section of the chapter examines the dynamic character of tech-
nology. Dynamism is simply the propensity toward motion in anything. 
It is the opposite of static which is simply the propensity toward rest 
in anything. To call a body static is to regard it as motionless or 
changeless. When one refers to the dynamic quality of technology, he is 
essentially regarding the power of technology to induce ~hange. 
Tools and Change 
It is recalled once more from the preceding chapter that technology 
is that qual ity of a tool which enables the tool to be substituted for 
human effort in the creation of goods and services having human value. 
Likewise, it was argued in the same chapter that tools are forward-look-
ing in the temporal and homomensura senses. That is, the use of tools is 
part of a process of change. 
Tools are ends-to-be-reached before they are produced. They exist 
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only in human contemplation, and they will not come into existence until 
there is a deliberate human choice coupled with actions to allocate means 
to their production. Thus, the creation of tools is forward-regarding in 
terms of on-going life processes. After tools are created, they are the 
present effects of the past causes that created them, and they are part 
of the present means to ends which lie in the future. Finally, theyare 
deliberately brought into use to change existing states of affairs. That 
is, they are always employed in the present to attain some future end-to-
be-reached. Thus the employment of tools is likewise forward-looking in 
terms of on-going life processes. Tools are therefore implements of 
change, and their powers of change depend on the technologies resident in 
them. 
It is worthwhile to observe that changes will occur in people and 
their environments whether or not they possess or use tools. One will 
starve to death if he does not consume food whether or not he produces 
the food through tool use. Climates change annually and geological 
changes occur usually over relatively long spans of time whether or not 
people use tools. Individuals grow older day by day whether or not they 
use tools. Iron rusts, copper corrodes, and wood decays whether or not 
people use tools. All of which is to say that in the very long run there 
are no truly static situations. Rather. there are only relative states 
of dynamism, and the dynamism of so-called nature is heavily weighted on 
the side of what man can only view as decline and decay. To repudiate 
tools and technology will therefore not stop change. It will only reduce 
man's ability to influence change in his own interests. 
Mankind. like all living creatures. seeks to enhance his own welfare 
by controlling the direction and magnitude of change. His capacity to 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
252 
influence' change is obviously related to the quantity and quality of the 
tools,he uses and the intensities with which he uses them. From this, 
one can conceive of at least three separate scenarios of change. The 
first has to do with the intensity with which society uses the existing 
stock of tools. The second is the rate at which net additions are made 
to the existing stock of tools, assuming no qualitative changes. The 
third is the rate at which the technical qual ity of tools is changed. 
Technical quality relates, of course, to the ability of a tool to substi-
tute for human effort in production processes. Thus, the third scenario 
concentrates on technol ogica 1 change. 
One can also think in terms of a fourth scenario of change, a com-
posite of the three separate scenarios; the rates at which both the 
quantity and quality of tools are increased, and the intensity of use of 
existing tools. This is more realistic because all three scenarios are 
playing more or less simultaneously most of the time in most societies. 
However, it is useful to separate the scenarios for purposes of study. 
The focus of this section is on the third scenario, the one dealing 
with technological change. It is acknowledged that the preceding two 
scenarios--intensity of tool use and net increases to the stocK of tools--
will reflect social changes. The principal changes with scenarios one 
and two are economic and pol itical adjustments within existing institu-
tional arrangements. That is, they are very unl ;kely to trigger forces 
with the power and direction to affect any significant institutional 
changes. On the other hand, the third scenario reveals the root causes 
of social revolutions. That is, technical change is most likely to 
trigger forces with the power and direction to affect significant insti-
tutional changes. It is. therefore. technological change which has the 
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greatest dynami sm. 
Focusing then on the third scenario, it is argued that the innova-
tion of new techno10gy--to improve the technical qualities of tools so 
tools substitute for more units of labor in production--is socially unsta-
bilizing because it organizes means (divides labor) and opens ways of 
distributing social products differing from the ceremonially-prescribed 
methods descending from the past. It therefore opens opportunities to 
change prior existing social statuses and ceremonial systems of rank, and 
it affords new avenues of social mobility. The roots of social revolu-
tion are therefore grounded in the innovation of new techno10gies--tech-
no10gies that increase productivity in terms of output per man-hour. 
Revolutions occur when technological innovation changes interinsti-
tutional relationships such that one or more institutions cease to be 
wholly complementary within the institutional system. That is, there is 
a lack of integration and correspondence between interinstitutional cere-
monies. Some institutional values and the ceremonies built on them 
become dysfunctional. The ensuing social instability reflects attempts 
by the institutional system to adjust itself in the face of the technical 
change. Social stability is resumed when the new technology is fully 
integrated and institutions have adjusted their ceremonial systems to 
account for the technical changes. Integration relates to the progress-
ive qual ity of technology. Technological integration and diffusion are 
introduced in the next chapter and described in the remaining chapters 
of this work. 
Technology and Cities 
The foregoing is an abstract and syllogistic argument based on 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
254 
several definitional presuppositions which were developed in earl ier 
chapters. Little more need be said at this juncture in explanation of 
the propositions. However, they require embellishment with concrete 
examples in the context of institutional economic theory. An example 
which illustrates the dynamism of new technology in accord with the 
theory is drawn from the history or urbanization ln the Western World. 
It is necessary to pause for a moment to consider why cities come 
into existence at all. An answer is found in central-place theory and 
in the theories of location and agglomerative economies. The first has 
to do with special izations based on the internal economies of large-scale 
production, and the latter has to do with external economies of location 
and scale. 8 
Central-place theory argues that specializations occur because of 
internal economies of large-scale production, and it is 1 imited by the 
cost of transporting the resulting products to customers. If, for pur-
poses of illustration, one assumes a featureless plain (a so-called von 
Thunen plain) on which transportation is as efficient in one direction 
as in another, and resources are distributed evenly, then there need be 
no inter-family special ization. g Society might consist of many lndepen-
dent and self-sufficient families evenly distributed over the plain. 
According to the foregoing assumptions, each family would grow lts 
own grain, mill its own flour, and bake its own bread. Likewise, it 
would weave its own cloth and fashion its clothing. In addition to pro-
vi ding its own material needs, it would render needed services. The 
family would supply whatever medical care its members required, and it 
would govern itself, educate its young, and provide religious services 
for the spiritual needs of its members. The quality of goods and services 
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would be extremely primitive and the quantity meager, consisting of only 
that which the family could produce for itself. While there might be 
intrafamily specializations, there would be no interfamily specializations, 
and no trade or commerce between families. In short, society would con-
sist of few institutions--perhaps only the family, marriage, and spoken 
language. One can easily see why the family would 100m enormously impor-
tant in human affairs under such primitive circumstances. 
The question is, are there any forces that might operate toward 
interfamily special ;zat;ons? The answer ;s that there might be if fam-
ilies lived close enough to one another that goods and services could be 
economically transported between them with the prevai 1 ing transportation 
technology. That is, the division of labor (specialization) is limited 
by the extent of the market. As should soon be evident, the extent of 
the market is likewise limited by the state of technological development. 
But this moves ahead of the matter at hand. It is enough now to deal with 
specialization in terms of the extent of the market--given a state of 
technological development. 
For example, suppose that one family on the plain acquired a par-
ticular aptitude for milling flour. Members of the family accordingly 
developed great skill in milling techniques. That is, they became 
especially adept at employing the milling tools. They perhaps accom-
plished this by discovering that the mill stones and other milling equip-
ment employed by them and by their neighboring farmers possessed greater 
productive capacity than was generally achieved in small-scale operations. 
That was because the average farmer could not achieve an optimum rate of 
output for the tools if he milled only for his own family. Thus, economies 
in the form of lower man-hour costs could be achieved per pound of flour 
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milled by increasing the rate of output. Increases in the rate of out-
put necessarily meant changing the milling technique by organizing pro-
duction around the milling process. That is, the human skills of the 
efficient miller are organized by the milling tools he uses. 
Suppose further that the family decides to offer to mill the flour 
of several neighboring famil ies if the farming famil ies will supply the 
miller family with grain. Under what conditions is the miller family 
enterprise likely to be successful? Clearly, the exchange must prove to 
be benefi~ial to all parties if the enterprise is to succeed. Therefore, 
the neighboring farmers will purchase the miller services only if the 
man hours gained in not mill ing their own flour are equal to or exceed 
the man hours expended to cultivate, harvest, thresh, and transport the 
grain given the miller family in payment for its service. Likewise, 
the miller family will find it worthwhile to mill its'neighbors' flour so 
long as the man hours taken in milling the flour are equal to or less than 
the man hours it would have to expend to cultivate, harvest, and thresh 
the grain it receives in payment for the milling services. 
The miller family would succeed in selling its services under the 
foregoing circumstances so long as the cost it saved by milling in large 
quantities exceeded the cost to transport the grain to the mill and the 
flour back to the neighboring farmers. To illustrate this, suppose that 
the average farm family can produce one bushel of grain (on the average) 
with five man hours of labor. Suppose further that the average farm 
family can mill 33.3 pounds of flour at home from approximately one 
bushel of grain in one and two-thirds man hours of labor. Thus, the 
opportunity cost (the grain production that must be given up) to mill 
33.3 pounds of flour is one-third bushel of grain, and the opportunity 
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cost for the average farmer to produce one bushel of grain is 100 pounds 
of flour. The average farmer family will be willing to pay up to one-
third bushel of grain for milling 33.3 pounds of flour. 
Assuming that the prospective miller family is also an average farm 
family regarding grain production, it can produce one bushel of grain 
with the average expenditure of five man-hours. However, it finds that 
it can mill 33.3 pounds of flour in only one hour by milling in large 
quantities. The opportunity cost (the amount of grain production that 
must be given up) for the miller family to mill 33.3 pounds of flour is 
therefore only one-fifth bushel of grain. That is, the family will be 
willing to mill 33.3 pounds of its neighbors' flour so long as it receives 
no less than one-fifth bushel of grain in payment. Thus, the prospec-
tive miller family has a comparative advantage in the milling of flour 
because its opportunity cost to mill is less than that of its average 
farming neighbor. On the other hand, it has a comparative disadvantage 
in the production of grain because it must forego the milling of 167 
pounds of flour to produce one bushel of grain, as compared with only 100 
pounds for its average farming neighbor. 
Since the miller family has a comparative advantage in milling flour, 
and its farming neighbors have comparative advantages in producing grain, 
inter-family specialization is possible as long as the spread between 
their reciprocal offer prices is sufficient to cover the costs to trans-
port the grain to the mill and to return the flour to the neighboring 
farmers. It is recalled that the farming families are willing to pay not 
more than one-third bushel ·of grain to have 33.3 pounds of flour milled. 
And the miller family is willing to mill 33.3 pounds of its neighbors' 
flour for not less than one-fifth of a bushel of grain. Thus, the spread 
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Assuming that the most efficient means of transporting cargo is a 
two-wheeled ox cart, and that the cart can effectively carry 500 pounds 
of cargo at three miles per hour, who will transport the grain and flour? 
The farmers? Or the miller? And why? It can be shown that the farm 
families will transport their grains to the mill and return the milled 
flour to their farms. This 1s because the farmer's opportunity cost to 
transport, goods 1s less than that of the miller if the latter has succeeded 
in specializing in milling flour. It is true that the opportunity costs 
in terms of the bushels of grain foregone to transport goods under the 
above assumptions is the same for the farmers and the miller (liS bushel 
to carry 500 pounds three miles in one hour). However, their opportunity 
costs in terms of pounds of flour are different. The farmer must forego 
only twenty pounds of flour to transport goods subject to the preceding 
constraints. The miller's opportunity cost is 33.3 pounds of flour 
(approximately equal to one bushel of unmilled grain). Thus, the farmer 
will transport both the grain and the flour. 
What, then, is the extent of the miller family's market? It is nec-
essary to calculate the maximum allowable transport cost, and then apply 
that to the farmer's opportunity cost for transporting his grain and 
flour to and from the mill. It will be found that the maximum allowable 
transportation under the foregoing assumptions is the spread between the 
reciprocal offer prices (2/15 bushels of grain per 33.3 pounds of flour) 
mu1tip1 ied by the cart capacity (SaO pounds of flour). This places the 
maximum transportation cost the farmers are willing to bear at two bushels 
of grain. The same results obtain if one calculates the total transport 
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cost using the spread between offer prices stated in pounds of flour. 
However, it is desirable to keep the cost and price stated in terms of 
bushels of grain since that is the medium in which the farmer will pay 
the miller. 
The total allowable travel distance is then the maximum transporta-
tion cost (two bushels of grain) divided by the farmer's opportunity cost 
for transportation (1/5 bushel of grain per three miles in one hour). 
The maximum allowable travel distance is therefore thirty miles. If it 
is assumed that four trips (two in and two back) are required to complete 
the transaction, then the miller's effective market radius is 7-1/2 miles 
(30 miles divided by four trips). That is, farming families living within 
7-1/2 miles of the miller's farm will find it beneficial to use the 
miller's services, if the miller family charges no more than one-fifth 
bushel of grain to mill 33.3 pounds of flour, or 3/5 bushel for 100 pounds 
of flour. Clearly, those families living closer than 7-1/2 miles from 
the miller place will receive a bargain because of their lower transpor~ 
tation cost. And families living more distant than 7-1/2 miles will 
choose to mill their own flour. 
One can see that the miller family might devote so much time to the 
mill ing of flour that it could no longer farm its land efficiently. It 
would perhaps trade some of its land for the mill stores and other mill· 
ing equipment no longer used by neighboring families. Moreover. as the 
miller family became more and more specialized in milling flour, it would 
gain in skill at milling while diminishing in the skills of farming. And, 
as the millers concentrated more and more on their tools, they might 
invent technical improvements in them so as to further increase their pro-
ductivities. Likew;se, the neighboring families could efficiently farm 
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the additional lands they acquired from the miller family by simply 
reallocating the man hours released from mill ing flour to the cultivation 
of crops. 
The preceding analysis demonstrates how conditions might coalesce 
to cause interfamily specialization. In the example, the miller place 
became a central place; a point to which the surrounding farmers brought 
their grains for milling into flour. This came into being because of 
the specialization precipitated by the technology resident in tools that 
led to internal economies of large-scale production, and because the 
market was great enough to permit expansion to a scale of output that 
could achieve those economies. But more important, the extent of the 
market was constrained by the cost of transportation, and this latter 
cost was a function of the technology resident in the tool of transport--
the ox and two-wheeled cart. 
Milling flour in this example became an export base industry--an 
industry that produced a surpl us that could only be sold outside the 
region in which it was produced. The miller family milled a surplus by 
producing at a rate of output sufficient to achieve maximum efficiency 
from its tools. And the surplus was exported in exchange for grain which 
neighboring families could likewise produce in modest surplus. The grain 
surplus was possible because the neighboring families could more fully 
specialize in cultivation by reallocating some of their productive labors 
from milling to farming, and exchanging parts of their surpluses for 
flour milled by the miller family. Thus, the surpluses behind export-
base activities are found primarily in internal economies of large-scale 
product; on. 
On the other hand, the extent of the market for the miller's surplus 
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was detennined by the density of population and the cost of transporta-
tion. The cost of transportation was a function of location and the 
technology resident in the tools of transportation. Both of these 
economies were external to the miller family. That is, they were external 
economies of location and scale. They were therefore local base phenomena--
economies related to the attributes of locale. The significance of both 
local-base and export-base activities will be expanded below and in the 
next chapter. 
If one central place for milling flour can emerge because of internal 
economies of large-scale production and the consequent interfamily special-
ization, then it will likely occur in other areas by diffusion. Observ-
ing the benefits of specialization, other families might also choose to 
specialize in milling flour. In so doing, they would seek to avoid com-
petition by locating sufficiently distant from the original miller family 
and any others who might be emulating it so that their market areas were 
exclusive. That is, they would attempt to create a geOgraphic monopoly. 
However, as more and more families entered milling, all market areas would 
be taken and competition would emerge. Eventually, the entire plain would 
be covered by central miller places so that no farming family was more 
distant from a miller place than 7.5 miles. Thus, the circles of adjoin-
ing market areas would overlap slightly because some farm families would 
be more distant from a miller place than 7.5 miles if they did not overlap. 
Therefore, the shape of each miller place would be hexagonal--according 
to the von Thunen assumptions. And the maximum distance between central 
miller places would be only thirteen miles (2 X 7.5 X sine 60 degrees) 
rather than double the radius (or fifteen miles). 
The forces that brought forth central miller places will operate in 
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time to produce other forms of interfamily special izations. For example, 
another family might have a particular aptitude for baking bread, and 
its members may have developed great skill in employing the tools of 
baking. If the family found that it could reduce its average man-hour 
cost per loaf of bread by increasing the number of loaves it baked at one 
time, it likewise found that it had a comparative advantage in baking. 
If it also found that there were enough neighbors willing to exchange 
grain for the bread it baked, the family could choose to specialize in 
baking. 
Like the miller family, the family that chose to specialize in 
baking created a central place--a place where neighboring families could 
exchange grain for bread, allowing those neighboring families to reallo-
cate their productive labor from baking to those other productions in 
which they were relatively more efficient. However, the baker family need 
not necessarily be located at the same pl ace as the mi 11 er family. Li ke-
wise, the baker family will have a different market area--probably much 
smaller than that of a miller family. While it might be feasible to 
make only two round trips per year to the miller, the purchase of fresh 
bread will obviously require more trips to the baker. Moreover, the oppor-
tunity cost to travel any distance simply to purchase four or five loaves 
of bread is very great, and thus the distance one was willing to travel 
to buy bread would be commensurately short. 
And again, like the diffusion of milling, a successful specializa-
tion in baking is likely to migrate to other areas of the plain until the 
entire plain is covered by a network of small markets, each one surround-
ing a central baker place. In time, one might also find networks of 
central places for wagoner families. weaver families, tailor families, 
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shoemaker families, cartwright families, seller families, and many more. 
All will have come into existence as specia11sts 1n pursuit of increas-
ing returns to scale. That is, they will have taken advantage of the 
internal economies of large-scale production. And the magnitudes of 
those economies were determined by the technologi~s resident in the tools 
of their trades. Likewise, the extents of their market areas were con-
strained by the technical qualities of their tools of transport. 
However, a central place established around a single economic insti-
tution like a flour mill or a bakery does not make a city. It is true 
that cities might rise simply because of the coincidences of many net-
works of central places spread randomly over a featureless plain. That 
is, some central places would assume greater importance than others because 
the random distribution of networks of miller central places, baker central 
places, weaver central places, and other central places would coincide 
at some points. Thus, more than one specialization could be found at the 
points of coincidence. A hierarchy of central places would eventually 
emerge in which the first order comprised those central places at which 
a single specialization was located--say a bakery. Second-order central 
places would be those at which two or three specializations were found--
a baker, a miller, and a weaver. The highest-order central place would 
be that one on the plain at which the greatest number of specializations 
was located. 
While central-place theory produces a consistent and relevant 
explanation of urbanization built upon internal economies of scale, it 
is grossly over-simplified. One can visualize something like the fore-
going example occurring near the center of a large, homogeneous mass of 
flat, arable land. But even under those conditions, there are other 
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forces operating to produce urbanization. The example can be brought 
closer to real ity where those other forces can be observed by relaxing 
its simplifying assumptions. To do so, however, introduces complexities 
that go beyond the level of analysis desired here. Nevertheless, it is 
useful to relax the most gross assumptions of the model so that 
economics of location and agglomeration can be illustrated. 
When one departs from the von Thunen assumption, he contemplates 
a geography on which each site possesses unique spatial and locational 
qualities. The land possesses peculiar topographic features like 
forests, rivers, alluvial valleys, hills, coastal reaches, and regions 
with particular mineral deposits. That is, the land endowment is 
heterogeneous, absolutely finite, and perfectly immobile so that no one 
site is a perfect substitute for any other site. Communities in such 
a world tend to form at those places that confer on their users 
particular advantages of location or access. Such advantages stem from 
external economies--cost advantages of location that lie outside the 
control of individual institutions. The external economies are 
attributes of local base activities. 
External economies may apply to transportation cost or to produc-
tion cost. Transportation-cost orientation arises when the transporta-
tion costs are high in relation to production costs, and production-
cost orientation prevails when transportation costs are low in relation 
to production costs. 10 It can be shown that institutions which are 
transportation-cost oriented will settle on locations that minimize 
transportation costs. This will be at either the market locations for 
their products, or at the resource locations. To locate some place 
between their markets and their resources will involve higher 
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transportation costs because they must bear two sets of terminal costs--
one for resources and one for finished products. One set of terminal 
costs can be avoided by locating at either the market or the resource end. 
In general, transportation costs will be lower at the resource end 
for those institutions which produce goods that lose perishabil ity, 
weight, or volume in production. For example, the smelting of ore 
results in the loss of both weight and volume. Likewise, food proces-
sing results in loss of perishabil ity. Those industries tend to locate 
in their, resource areas. On the other hand, transportation costs will be 
lower at the market end for those institutions that produce goods that 
gain fragility, perishability, weight, or volume in production. For 
example, baked goods gain perishability, and automobiles gain volume in 
production. Those industries therefore tend to locate near their markets. 
Conversely, some institutions are production-cost oriented. ll 
That is, their products possess low bulk-to-value ratios so that trans-
portation costs are low in relation to production costs. Such institu-
tions tend to settle on locations that minimize production-related 
costs. Thus industries that use labor-intensive processes tend to 
locate in areas where the wages are relatively low for the skills they 
employ. Likewise, industries that use power-intensive processes tend 
to locate where electrical power is relatively less expensive. Finally, 
those firms that require specialized auxiliary services or regular face-
to-face contacts with suppliers or clients tend to locate where those 
services and contacts can be readily obtained at least cost. 
The point is that special izations rising to internal economies of 
large-scale production produce economic institutions. Those specialized 
institutions locate themselves so as to take advantage of external 
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economies of location where the costs of transportation or production or 
both can be minimized. Once established, such locations become central 
places where human interactions take place according to the character of 
the institutions located there. And major cities rise at those places 
where external economies confer abundant cost advantages. 
In addition to external economies of location, cities also possess 
external economies of large urban scale. Such scale economies arise 
from agglomeration--a balling up of many interdependent institutions at 
some central place. 12 External economies of urban scale stem from the 
progressive specialization of institutions. For example, it is not 
profitable to invest in expensive equipment to make a single component 
on a small scale, and production of such a component may be very labor-
intensive on a small scale. But as the industry expands, a new firm may 
come into exi stence to manufacture the component on a 1 arge scale and 
supply it to other firms in the industry. And, of course, those other 
firms will cease to make the component on a small scale. 
The functions delegated by one industry to auxiliary and comple-
mentary industries must usually be performed in close proximity. This 
is a potent factor in the geographic concentration of industries. And 
the geographi c concentration of industri es all ows an effi cient specia 1-
ization of the local base firms that create the external economies for 
the industries they serve. Moreover, the external economies involve 
true reductions in the real costs of social output. They are not just 
zero-sum savings--savings by one firm at the expense of another firm. 
Therefore urban aggl omerati on is a soci ally-redeemabl e phenomenon. 13 
Agglomeration may be understood in terms of the example describing 
interna 1 economi es of 1 arge-scal e production and the special i zati on of 
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millers and bakers. One may consider whether there are any factors that 
might cause a baker family to locate at or near the site of a miller 
family. Clearly, the baker family will find economies external to itself 
operating to cause it to locate near a miller family. It will find some 
commerce already centered on the miller place, and the miller can supply 
the flour needed in baking without charging a transportation fee. 
In time, perhaps, a wagoner family wi 11 locate near the mill er 
place; then a weaver, a tailor, a shoemaker, a cartwright, and a seller. 
Before long a community of famil ies and other institutions grows large 
enough to organize itself and to provide public services like a school, 
hospital, and constabulary. It is when this kind of ball ing-up occurs 
at some central place that a city is formed. The process is called 
agglomeration, and the organizing principle is external economies of 
urban scale. 
The foregoing is an explanation of why cities come into existence. 
The explanation was found in central-place theory and in the economic 
theories of location and urban agglomeration. The first had to do with 
interinstitutional specializations rising to the internal economies of 
large-scale production, and the latter had to do with the external 
economies of location and urban scale. Both internal and external 
economies relate to productivity in terms of output per man hour, and 
productivity is a function of the technical qualities of tools. Thus, 
cities are fundamentally creatures of technology--agglomerations of 
institutions that have come into existence through interhuman special-
izations developed in pursuit of increasing returns to scale. With this 
background, one can more clearly understand the forces compelling 
urbanization in the Western world. 
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Technology and Urbanization 
Time and space do not permit any more than a bri ef summary of the 
urbanization features salient to the theory at hand. Moreover, the pro-
cessua1 details of innovation are left to subsequent parts of this chap-
ter. This section introduces the antecedent technological causes of the 
urbanization which occurred in Western Europe, particularly, following 
the medieval period. This was a time of rapid urbanization followed by 
shifts in pol itica1 and economic power from Mediterranean regions to 
northern ~urope. 
In the way of prefatory background, the first cities were believed 
to have been founded in Mesopotamia during the fourth millennium B.C. 
They evolved from quasi-urban communities of less complex social organiza-
tion. And quasi-urban communities evolved from neolithic folk societies 
on the order of those described in preceding chapters. The typical fo1 k 
society is small, illiterate and self-sufficient with a biological div-
ision of labor based on the most primitive neo1 ithic technologies. The 
members are exc1 usive1y engaged in collecting food in an unremitting 
struggle for existence. Norms are highly prescriptive and there are 
virtually no alternative lifestyles open to members. 14 
Quasi-urban communities arose from pre1iterate folk societies with 
the agricultural surpluses produced by the domestication of animals and 
the merging of animal husbandry with crop cultivation. The oldest known 
quasi-urban community is prehistoric Jericho at the conf1 ux of the Jordan 
River and the Dead Sea. Jericho is believed to have been founded some-
time in the seventh millennium B. C. The conditions necessary for develop-
ment of such pre1iterate communities were a technology capable of produc-
ing a surplus of agricultural products, a suitable ecological base, and 
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a social organization extending beyond the family institution. 
Technological advance must be great enough to allow the production 
of a food surplus beyond that needed to sustain the farmers between 
harvests. The agricultural surplus must be great enough to free some 
members from the primary employments of food cultivation and gathering 
so that they may specialize in skills needed to augment the community 
in secondary empl oyments--securi ty, transportation, and admi ni strati on. 
As noted above, the technological advance that presaged evolution of 
quasi-urban communities was domestication of animals and the subsequent 
employment of animals at draught. These technical improvements led to 
the internal economies of scale that facilitated the specialization and 
division of labor. 
A suitable ecological base is one in which there ;s an adequate 
water supply, and the soil and c1 imate are capable of producing 
sufficient agricultural goods with the prevailing technology to support 
the population of the community. This accounts in part for the 
selection of places like Jericho in the Jordan River Valley and Jarmo 
in the Mesopotamian riverine system as the first sites for quasi-urban 
communities in the West. It also suggests why cities did not emerge in 
the northern-most and southern-most reaches of the temperate zones until 
much later. Weather in those zones was less hospitable and the 
technology needed to sustain an agricultural surplus in those soils and 
climates did not exist until much later. 
The social organization of a quasi-urban community must be suffi-
ciently advanced to provide an institution of government vdth enough 
power and abil ity to direct the activities of others. Likewise, there 
must be economi c i nstituti ons of suffi ciently integrated occupati ons and 
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specialized labor skills to provide security for the community and to 
manage the agricultural surpluses. The crops require planting, cultivat-
ing, and harvesting. Harvested products must be transported from the 
fields to storage. They must be secured from marauders, and they must 
be rationed out to members of the community at appropriate times. 
The chi ef di fferences between quasi-urban comrnuniti es 1 i ke Jericho 
and Jarmo and urban Ur and other feudal cities of the Tigris-Euphrates 
riverine system are technologies, the complexity of social organization, 
and literacy. It is no coincidence that the first feudal cities were 
founded pari passu with the invention and innovation of copper tools. 
The technological advances that first produced feudal urbanization was 
meta 11 urgy--copper mining, smel ting, and smithing. The use of copper 
produced more productive tools and improved means of transportation. 
These in turn led to larger agricultural surpluses and increased 
specialization and agglomeration--the movement of more persons from 
primary to secondary employments. 
Likewise social organization in feudal cities had to be much more 
complex. In addition to the security and management of agricultural SUI"'-
pluses provided in quasi-urban centers the new urban areas added manufac-
turing and commercial institutions. The mining of copper generally took 
place some distance from cities, and ore of semi-processed copper had to 
be transported back to the city. Some part of the urban popul ati on had 
to be organized as craftsmen and artisans in well-integrated processes 
for copper smelting and smithing to produce the tools and implements 
made of the new metal. Finally, the economy had to be far enough ad-
vanced to carryon commerce in resources, manufactured goods, and food. 15 
Commerce, of course, gave rise to record keeping and thus to 
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developments in mathematics and written language. Indeed, most anthro-
pologists distinguish the city from the quasi-urban community on the 
basis of literacy. According to this idea, a written language is clear 
evidence of a well-advanced and complex social organization. The folk 
community had no written language, and the feudal city did. However, 
one should not miss the point that the social organization is a complex 
of institutions which have been shaped in part by technology--that qual-
ity of a tool that enables it to be substituted for human labor in pro-
duction processes. 16 
The feudal cities of Mesopotamia at the end of the fourth millennium 
B.C. contained populations estimated between 5,000 and 20,000 persons. 
By the beginning of the second millennium, the inner city of Ur was 
believed to domicile upwards to 34,000 persons. Such cities that somehow 
survived into the 19th century ranged in population from 5,000 to 100,000 
inhabitants. 17 
The spatial and institutional arrangements of feudal cities are 
remarkab1y similar. The center of the city is the seat of governmental 
and rel igious activities, and it generally contains the residences of the 
elite. Lower classes are scattered in descending social order toward the 
city boundaries. The members of an occupational skill 1 ive and work in 
a particular area of the city. The family unit is patriarchal, and it is 
the principal socializing institution in the city. One is born into a 
family in a particular social stratum, and he must usually live out his 
life according to the norms of his class. Only the elite are literate 
because only the elite are educated. And the educational system is 
oriented to transmission of the city's traditions and ceremonial values. 
For the vast majority communication is by word of mouth, and news is 
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disseminated by heralds and crierS. 
Economic institutions in the feudal city are not well developed as 
compared with an industrial city. Production is based exclusively on 
human power and the power of other animals. The division of labor cen-
ters on product, not process. The principal production institution is 
therefore the guild, and the guild functions primarily to set prices and 
limit competition in its line of commerce. Typically, there is little 
standardization of weights, measures, and currencies. Credit and thrift 
institutions are very meager if they exist at all. Each feudal city with 
its agricultural environs is a self-sufficient entity and there is a min-
imum of commerce and other friendly intercourse between feudal cities. 
The ruling authorities of the feudal city are based on absolutes 
and tradition. The pol itical and rel igious institutions are rigidly 
hierarchical, and decision-making knows no rules beyond the ceremonial 
status and power of the person in authority. Religion is very prescrip-
tive, and it is a powerful instrument for preserving order and maintain-
ing social stabil ity in the feudal city. In a word, the feudal city 
lIemphasizes ceremonial rigidity and particularism."lS 
By contrast with the feudal city, the modern industrial city 
flourishes because of class fluidity and universalism. Status is based 
more on achievement than birth, and occupational positions are filled 
according to universalistic principles rather than particularistic. The 
family unit is loosely organized and members are relatively free to depart 
its influences with few restrictions. Many institutions are involved in 
socialization processes. A particularly important socializing institu-
tion is the public-school system. Universal mass education is a necessity 
in the industrial city. And only an industrial society is economically 
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The economy of an industrial city thrives on mass-production methods 
powered by mechanical engines and electric motors. Indeed, the widespread 
use of mechanical power to replace animal power is the chief technical 
distinction between industrial and feudal cities. The distinction is 
crucial because it is the foundation upon which other distinctions are 
based. Production is carried on by large-scale enterprises in the indus-
trial city. and labor ;s specialized along process lines rather than by 
product 1 ines. There is strict standardization of weights. measures, 
and currencies. The institution of banking is well developed and credit 
is usually available. Industrial cities are interdependent and they are 
connected by well-used transportation routes. communi cation systems, and 
commerce and banking ties. 
While the social organization is complex, the industrial city usually 
has a weak power structure as compared with the feudal city. Formal rules 
rather than ceremonial appeals to personal authorities are more used in 
bureaucratic decision making. Governing authority is based mainly on cere-
monial consent of the governed and appeals to scientific expe,rts. Indeed, 
the scientific tradition is a particular ceremonial mark which distin 4 
guishes the industrial city from the feudal city. Finally, religion is 
usually more permissive than prescriptive in an industrial city.19 
The foregoing relates to the spatial and institutional character-
istics of the societies described. These characteristics are the static 
elements in society. They are cross-sectional 1 ike a photograph snapped 
at some particular time. They show what apparently existed at the time. 
but they reveal nothing about how the objects in the photo came to be 
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what they were when the picture was taken. The question is, what were 
the dynamic elements that caused changes over time? 
The essential differences in the states of development from a folk 
society to an industrial city are the productivities of each in terms of 
product outputs per unit of labor input. Thus they are differences in 
states of technological development, or the technical qual ities of tools 
used by each. The agent for change in each case was new technology. It 
was the innovation, integration, and diffusion of draft animals for cul-
tivation and transportation that moved society from the fol k stage to the 
prel iterate, quasi-urban community. It was the innovation, integration, 
and diffusion of metal tools that moved society from the quasi-urban 
community to the feudal city stage. And it was the innovation, integra-
tion, and diffusion of mechanical power and electrical-control devices 
that moved society from the feudal city to the industrial-city stage. 
TUI~ning now to European urbanization, Europe was populated by small 
tribes organized as folk societies until well into the first millennium 
B.C. Cities did not appear on the continent of Europe until nearly 3,000 
years after the founding of the first cities of I~esopotamia. The first 
European cities were built by Achaeans, Dorians, and other indo-European 
tribes who invaded from the north into the Aegean area and by the Etrus-
cans in Italy. The former were masters of iron, and their triumphs over 
the original inhabitants of the Aegean lands were the triumphs of iron, 
for the original inhabitants had not yet acquired skill with the new metal. 
The new Greeks found the unyielding terrains of the Balkan Peninsula 
and the Peloponnesus unsuited, with the technologies prevail ing at the 
time. to the production of suffi cient agri cul tura 1 surpl uses to support 
cities. They therefore learned seafaring from their Minoan and Phoenician 
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predecessors, and they produced their surpluses by fishing and by trading 
and warring with other Mediterranean peoples. The Greeks also learned 
city bui 1 ding from thei r southern Mediterranean nei ghbors, and Cor; nth, 
Sparta, Athens, and other Greek cities were established by the eighth 
century B. C. 
At the same time, the Etruscans were building Pisa, Siena, and other 
cities on the Apennine Peninsula. As alreadY noted in Chapter IV, Rome 
was founded in the seventh century B. C. at the frontier between Etrusca 
and Latium. Rome ascended to dominance over Etrusca by 500 B.C. and over 
Greece, Persia, and Carthage by the end of the Punic Wars. She pushed 
her borders to the outward 1 imits of the then civil ized world by the end 
of the first century B.C. Indeed, wherever one found Rome, he found at 
least a veneer of civilization also. Many of the major cities of Europe 
were establ ished by Rome or because of Rome. They incl ude such cities 
as Paris, London, Brussels. Cologne. Seville, Bordeaux, Vienna. and 
Bel grade. 
The collapse of Roman power and the recession of her authority from 
Central and Western Europe in the fifth century A.D. brought chaos and 
decl ine in European commerce and trade with the East. It also brought 
the internal strife and the barbarian invasions from the east, north, and 
south which merited comment earl ier in this chapter. The result was an 
arrestation and retrogression in European city development. Except for 
those cities under the influence of Byzantine and Moslem administrations, 
the cities of Europe declined in population and power. 
After nearly five centuries of ecl ipse. the cities of Europe com-
menced a vigorous resurgence. Starting in the tenth century A. D., the 
center of economic and political power shifted gradually northward from 
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the Mediterranean to west central Europe. One manifestation of the shift 
was a rapid increase in both population and urbanization. The old EurD-
pean urban centers revived and the era is distinguished by the pro1 ifera-
ticn of new urban communities in northern Europe. 20 
The question is, why did urbanization resurge in Europe when it 
did? And how did Western European nations come to possess the powers 
that accrued to them in the middle of the second millennium A.D.? Some 
writers attribute the revolution to developments in Christian religious 
thought. Others bel ieve that it occurred because of charismati c pol itica 1 
and mil itary leadership on the parts of some monarchs which enabled them 
to win diplomatic and military capitulations from lesser adversaries so 
that kingdoms were expanded and empires formed. Still others believe it 
was the early seeds of capital ism with its rel iance on markets and the 
expansion of commerce and banking. 
In a sense it was all of these phenomena--and in another sense it 
was none of them. All of these happenings did, indeed. occur at crucial 
times. But they were the surface conditions of causes that lay much 
deeper. The roots of the revolution lay buried in the soil of techno1ogi-
cal change. Moreover, the technological changes occurred between the 
middle and end of the medieval period preceding the emergence of Europe 
out of the Dark Ages and into the Renaissance. 
The technical changes which lay behind the vigorous resurgence of 
European cities took place first in agriculture and warfare, and then in 
transportation. The changes involved the innovation of a heavy plow to 
replace the ancient scratch plow, innovation of a triennial system of 
crop rotation, and development and use of the heavy horse first in warfare 
then in agriculture and transportation. The combined effects of these 
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innovations was a substantial increase in agricultural productivity, ' 
increased efficiency in overland transportation, increases in populations, 
and rural to urban migrations. 
The next chapter deals with the integration and diffusion of the 
heavy plow, the triennial system of crop rotation, and the heavy horse, 
and with the demographic changes and social progress precipitated by 
innovation of those technical improvements. However. the matter at hand 
is: why did innovation of these devices first take place in Europe at 
that time? Most of the technical means were known earl ier by other soci-
eties in other parts of the world. Why did those other cultures fail to 
innovate and exploit the technical devices that initiated revolution and 
social progress in Europe? What was the unique combination of circum-
stances that caused Europeans to pick up on some technologies that were 
discovered but not effectively innovated by other cultures? 
TECHNOLOGY AND CEREMONIALISM 
The reasons the heavy plow, triennial field rotation, and the heavy 
horse were first innovated in European agriculture was because of the 
invention spurred by the technical diffusion and technological cross-fer-
tilization that was taking place there and because ceremonialism had a 
very tenuous hold on the peoples of Europe at the time. The technolo-
gical cross-fertilization taking place there was described earlier in 
this chapter as an element in invention. The reasons ceremonial ism was 
weak in Europe during that period will be described later in this section. 
First it is necessary to set the ceremonial conditions of pre-renaissance 
Europe aside to examine the elements of institutional economic theory 
that impinge upon the innovation of new technologies and its relationship 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
278 
to ceremonialism. 
The existence of technological cross-fertilization is necessary for 
invention and thus for innovation, but it is not a sufficient condition 
for the innovation of new technologies. It is possible for new scientific 
discoveries and technical inventions to occur without innovation, inte-
gratian, and diffusion following. A weak ceremonial system is also 
required. It;s the simultaneous occurrence of technological cross-fertil-
ization--to fac;l itate invention--and weak ceremonial practices that 
leads to the innovation and integration of new technologies. 
Weak ceremonial practices are necessary to the innovation of new 
technologies because of the disaccord between technology and ceremonialism. 
Ceremonialism is tradition-bound and change-resistant while technology is 
dynamic and change-producing. The remainder of this section examines the 
nature and conditions of the innovation of new technologies and the rela-
tionship of technical innovation to ceremonial ism and institutional change. 21 
Innovation of New Technology 
New technologies are initiated through a process of innovation. 
Innovation ;s simply the production of changes through the introduction 
of novelties. The novelties are, of course, the new technologies, while 
the changes are the cul tura 1 consequences of the novel ti es. Innovati on 
;s different from discovery and invention. Invention is a deliberate 
change or adjustment in objects so that a new kind emerges, while discovery 
is the perceiving of something which had been in existence before but had 
not previously been observed. Invention is a condition of innovation as 
discovery is a condition of invention. It is possible to have discovery 
without invention, and invention without innovation. It is not possible 
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to have innovation without invention, or invention without discovery.22 
There are no social effects from discovery and invention alone. 
The social consequences of invention do not commence until innovation 
takes place and the novelties of invention are introduced. To be sure, 
invention ;s a necessary ingredient of innovation. But nothing will 
happen, whatever is invented, until innovation takes place. Moreover, 
both discovery and invention in the modern age are largely products of 
institutional research carried on with the expectation of innovation. 
Thus, i~noyatiQn is the centerpiece of technical progress and institu-
tional change. 
As invention is the product of the inventor's genius, so innova-
tion is the work of the innovator. The inventor of a technical improve-
ment is rarely its innovator because the motives and tinkering skins of 
the inventor are not the same as the entrepreneurial skills of the 
innovator. It is the rare person who possesses genius for both invention 
and entrepreneurship. For example, DeForest, mentioned earlier as 
inventor of the triode, went broke several times trying to put his inven-
tion to commerci a 1 use. Yet others successfully innovated DeForest I s 
important inventions. The same fate has befallen many inventors. Many 
have tried to be innovators. Few have succeeded. Ironically, the pages 
of history are covered with the names of inventors, but one finds few 
names of innovators. Given the central and crucial nature of innovation. 
it would appear that altogether too little attention has been given to 
the study of innovation and innovators. 
Nevertheless, the innovator is the key to innovation. the center-
piece of technical advance and institutional change. His role is that 
of entrepreneur. As such, he is forward-looking in terms of the ends-
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means continuum. He seeks to organize present means in the least costly 
and most efficient way to achieve future ends-to-be-reached. And since 
the future cannot be known with certainty, there is risk that the out-
comes of present choices will not be as expected. Thus, the function of 
the entrepreneur is to bear the risks of failure--not to fail, but to 
make calculated present decisions, the future outcomes of which are 
inherently uncertain. And the future outcomes are more uncertain, 
albeit potentially more beneficial, if promising technical novelties 
are introduced among the means. 
The entrepreneurial function is discharged by an elite class in 
whatever society it is performed. This is a natural consequence of the 
authoritative nature of allocation. The entrepreneur has been 
empowered, by whatever means, to make social choices as to the alloca-
tion of scarce resources to the attainment of future ends. On the other 
hand, entrepreneurship has not been the exclusive province of a 
particular elite. It might sometimes be born by a ruler or a governing 
body. It might be served by business persons in a market system. Or it 
might sometimes result from a coalition of these and other elite groups. 
For example, almost the only innovators in electronic data processing 
have been private corporations 1 ike International Business Machines, 
National Cash Register, National Semi-Conductor, etc. On the other 
hand, the only innovator in the original development of nuclear energy 
was the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers, followed by the Atomic Energy 
Commission, both agencies of the U. S. Federal Government. 
Whatever person or group carries out entrepreneurship, the entre-
preneur' 5 method is to maximize the net benefits of whatever future ends 
are sought and hopefully attained. He achieves this by economizing in 
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the allocation of present means. That is, he selects and organizes 
present means in the least-costly fashion consistent with the future 
ends selected to be achieved. Thus, he is able to improve his alloca-
tion if he increases the ends attainable with a given set of scarce 
means, or if he can secure the usual benefits of future ends at less-
costly employment of present means. Either way, he may be said to have 
increased net benefits. The drive to maximize net future benefits 
therefore leads the entrepreneur to innovate where innovation is likely 
to result in economizing in the allocation of scarce means. 
The innovation of new technologies is considered successful and 
socially redeemable if it produces a sustaining increase in net benefits. 
That is, an innovation is a worthy one if it increases human welfare, 
and human wel fare is increased any time some persons can be made better 
off without making anyone worse off. Thus human welfare will be 
increased, ceteris paribus, any time the output of goods and services 
having human value is increased per man-hour of input. An innovation is 
worthless if it fails for any reason to produce the foregoing outcome at 
some time in the ends-means continuum. Successful innovations lead to 
diffusion--the spread and integration of the new technologies. and the 
adjustment of the institutional system to the new technical conditions. 
The entrepreneur or entrepreneurial group is rewarded for success-
ful innovations and penalized for failure. Indeed. it is the substantial 
rewards open to the successful entrepreneur that gives him incentive to 
innovate. The entrepreneurial reward for a successful innovation is a 
share in the increase in the net benefits which are created by the inno-
vation. This is known as private profits if the entrepreneur ;s a pri-
vate person operating in a market system If the entrepreneur is a ruleror 
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a rul ing body, the private benefits may be greater security in office 
for the ruler or political party stemming from increased approbation of 
their subjects or political constituents--and, of course, a share of 
the increase in net benefits accrueing to the office of ruler. 
The innovation may fail for some reason to produce the expected 
increase in net social benefits. Indeed an unsuccessful innovation 
might result in the diminution of net social benefits under some circum-
stances. The penalty the entrepreneur must bear for a worthless innova-
tion depends, of course, on the nature and magnitude of the costs 
involved. If the innovation involves the introduction of an invention 
through a market process and fails for some reason to increase profits as 
planned--to increase sales revenues or decrease production costs or bot~­
then the maximum penalty could be business failure for the entrepreneur 
firm as that firm absorbs some of any net loss in benefits. If the 
unsuccessful innovation were carried out by a ruler or governing body, 
then the maximUl" private penalty could be a fall from political power 
along with loss of the benefits available to persons in political office 
The point is that new technologies are introduced by a process of 
innovation. Innovation is performed by an entrepreneurial elite that 
makes decisions about the selection of future ends-to-be-reached and the 
allocation of present means to attainment of selected future ends. The 
outcomes of entrepreneurial decisions made in the present therefore re-
pose in the future, and since the future cannot be known with certainty, 
there is risk that the outcomes will not fulfill the expectations with 
which the decisions were made. The risks of failure are therefore borne 
by the entrepreneur who is incentivated to bear the risks by the pros-
pect of rewards for success. He is likewise encouraged to be prudent and 
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plan carefully by the possible penalties for failure. The entrepreneurial 
role is crucial to innovation, and innovation is crucial to technical 
progrc:;:s. 
Ceremonialism and Innovation 
The foregoing explanation of innovation was deceptively simple. It 
sought to explain innovation in the singular dimension of entrepreneur-
ship. Certainly, the entrepreneur is immensely important, but the insti-
tutional environment is equally important. Indeed, the institutional 
dimension makes the innovation and integration of new technologies among 
the most complex of all forms of social interaction. The institutional 
system exposes the entrepreneur to ceremonial risk, and ceremonial risk 
is one of the greatest deterrents to the entrepreneur and innovation. 
Ceremonial risk is simply the risk that the institutional system 
will defeat the innovation no matter how instrumental the technology 
promises to be. Ceremonial risk arises from the inherent tensions 
between technology and ceremonial ism. That is technology is forward-
urging in terms of the ends-means continuum, while ceremonialism is 
backward-cl ingi ng. Technology is dynamic and change-producing, and cere-
monialism is static and change-retardant. The innovation of new tech-
nologies is particularly dynamic because it opens ways of organizing 
means (including productive labor) and of distributing social products 
in ways differing from the ceremonially-prescribed methods descending 
from the past. New technologies therefore open opportunities to change 
prior existing social statuses and ceremonial systems of rank. affording 
new avenues to social mobil ity. 
This character of technology brings it into conflict with tradition-
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bound and backward-cl i ngi ng ceremonial i sm both as to the choices between 
alternative and competing future ends-;n-v;ew, and the alternative ways 
of organizing means to the attainment of the chosen ends. Ceremonialism 
prescribes that only those ends be selected that are in harmony with and 
reinforce the institutional values which descend from the past. like-
wise, ceremonialism prescribes that traditional means be employed and 
that they be organized in traditional ways. Ceremonialism brooks no 
deviation from antecedent procedures. A rigid and strong institutional 
structure buttressed by entrenched ceremonia 1 i sm operates to preserve 
social stability and perpetuate established cultural traits by opposing 
anything that threatens institutional changes. It achieves this ;n part 
by truncating technical progress--by proscribing the innovatio.n of new 
technologies. 
How much of new technology is actually innovated therefore depends 
upon the strength of ceremonial ism--the strength of institutional values 
and institutional resistance to change. Insofar as new technologies are 
innovated, confl icting aspects of institutional value systems--ceremonial-
ism--become redundant, wither, and are forgotten or become quaint cultural 
vestiges of the past. However, the institutional system does not yield 
easily no matter how weak it might be. Thus institutions submit to tech-
nica 1 progress and change only after anomy and soci a 1 upheaval. 23 Thi s 
part of the paper regards the ceremonial restraints on innovation and the 
ceremonial conditions necessary to innovation. This latter point resumes 
consideration of the ceremonial state of affairs that permitted the inno-
vation of the heavy plow, triennial field rotation, and the heavy horse 
in the agriculture of Western Europe. 
It is recalled from Chapter V that ceremonialism is the institutional 
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instrument for maintaining social stability by preserving and transmitting 
the cultural values that descend from the past. And Chapter V illustra-
ted how traditional values are preserved and transmitted by institutions 
through the powers of ceremony. Ceremony structures society into status 
systems based on ancient customs. It social izes members into accepting 
and playing traditional roles within the institutional structure. And it 
exercises social control by prescribing the correct modes of ceremonial 
exchange for the periodic validation of status. As noted above, the 
effect of a strong ceremonial system is a stable institutional environ-
ment in which the status quo is rigidly maintained and there is neither 
desire for nor expectation of change. The state of affairs is static, 
immobile, unchanging. The pract; cal effect is to perpetuate the anc; ent 
customs eternally into the future. 
One who is a member of such an environment has invested much of 
his past in an expected future stability that is founded on the preserva-
tion of the traditional values. -He finds security--confidence, satisfac-
tion, and tranquil ity--in the only SOCiety he knows or wishes to know, 
and his security is consta~tly reinforced by the tribal customs and tra-
ditional ceremonies of his father and his people. They give him status 
and they keep him emotionally and intellectually occupied with his social 
roles. They involve him in ceremonial interaction with the other members 
of his SOCiety who are likewise involved. One finds peace of mind and 
tranquility in the certainty that life has always been the way he under-
stands it and that it will always be so, generation upon generation. The 
gods have ordained it and there is nothing he can do to change matters 
even if he shaul d want to. 
Indeed, one who is imbued with such institutional certainty and 
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ceremonial security views any deviation from traditional ways with a mix-
ture of fear, frustration, and anger--fear, because it disrupts his sense 
of security with unfamiliar and thus uncertain elements, and frustration 
and anger because the deviation is not in accord with the customs that 
are the sources of his security and that he has learned to respect and 
love. Therefore, he will eagerly join the other members of his society 
as they respond to the cries of the high shamans to rise against the 
abominations that violate their taboos and threaten their tribal tran-
quility. Manand hi~ society will obey the commands of ceremonialism to 
defeat technical innovations and to preserve and perpetuate tribal customs. 
It is the grip of ceremonialism that holds a society in a state of tech-
nological retardation and social arrest. It is a well-developed and 
stable institutional system sustained by a powerful ceremonialism that 
precludes the innovation of new technologies. 
It was precisely the ceremonial fixations of the institutionally 
advanced Oriental societies that prevented those societies from effec-
tively innovating the heavy horse and its trappings in agriculture and 
transportation. It was the preoccupation with solidly established tradi-
tional ideal s reinforced by ancient and powerful ceremonies that arrested 
technical progress in Oriental cultures and continues to do so in modern 
times. A similar institutional rigidity derived from He·llenistic bel iefs 
and Roman institutions held the peasant farmers of the Apennine Peninsula 
in a similar ceremonial transfixion regarding effective innovation of the 
heavy plow. 
On the other hand, it was a very feeble ceremonial ism that permitted 
the heavy plow, the heavy horse, and triennial field rotation to be inno-
vated in Europe. The question is: Why were the peoples of Europe 
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relatively less encumbered by ceremony? Why were custom and tradition so 
irresolute at the time? The answer is found in the unsettled conditions 
commencing before the rise of Rome and continuing for at least three 
thousand years in Western Europe. 24 
The people of Europe have endured more than three millennia of 
strife. The area was a melting pot of human types unprecedented in his-
torical times. The Europeans have suffered almost continual political 
and mil itary turmoil either from within or without since before the rise 
of Rome. Comprised of many small and scattered barbarian tribes, the 
Europeans knew no common languages or culture. Between periods of inter-
tribal warfare, the people have endured conquest by outsiders. The 
Carthaginians maintained enclaves in the Iberian peninsula until the 
defeat of Hannibal at the hand of Proconsul Correlius Scipio in the 
Battle of Zama. 
The European tribes fell increasingly under control of the Romans 
after the Punic Wars, finally succumbing to Caesar's Legions in the Gallic 
Wars of the first century B.C. The Pax Romana witnessed a consolidation 
of Roman hegemony over the European tribes. Roman control continued 
until the decl ine and eventual withdrawal of Roman power from Europe 
during the fifth century. The period was anything but peaceful as Roman 
power was used in Europe to quell disputes between her subject tribes, to 
extend her influence to peripheral lands, to expel invaders from the East 
and North, and to put down revolts against her administration. 
After the collapse of Rome, the fragmented European tribes lay prey 
to first the Huns who rode out of the East in the fourth and fifth cen-
turies to plunder and rape most of Europe as far west as Drli;ans. They 
drove the Dstrogoths toward the Danube, the Visigoths into Thrace and 
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Illyria, the Vandals through Gaul and into Spain, the Burgundians into 
Savoy, and the Saxons and Angles into Britain. The advance of the Huns 
finally collapsed in 453 A.D. with the death of their leader, Attila. 
However, Europe was terrorized again by descendants of the Huns in 
subsequent centuries interspersed with invasions by other barbarians 
from the north and the south. The Bulgars invaded from the East in the 
sixth and seventh centuries, the moslem Arabs--Moors or Saracens--from 
the South in the first half of the eighth century, the Magyars or 
Hungarians from the East in the latter half of the eighth century, the 
Vikings--Norwegians, Swedes, and Danes--from the North in the ninth and 
tenth centuries, the Turks from the East in the eleventh century, the 
Mongols from the East in the thirteenth, and the Turks--Ottoman and 
Tamerlane--again in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. 
While the Huns and subsequent invaders rushed in to occupy the 
social vacuum created by the collapse of Rome, a dispute amongst 
insiders waged over who should succeed and restore the ceremonial glory 
of Rome. The fi rst contenders were the emperors of the Eastern emp; re 
at Byzantium during the sixth and seventh centuries. The Franks, under 
authority of the Bishop of Rome, claimed power during the eighth and 
ninth centuries. And the Germans--Teutons and Alamanni--asserted their 
claims to succession during the tenth and eleventh centuries. 
Interspersed all the whil e between wars of conquest and ci vi 1 stri fe 
were famines and pestilences that delivered even more misery and death 
upon European tribes. Food shortages frequently followed the disrup-
tions of war and revolution causing starvation and malnutrition. And the 
latter conduced toward pestilence. Indeed~ plague was a constant menace. 
Verus' troops brought plague from the East to Rome in 166-167, and 
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Emperor Claudius II died of the plague barely one hundred years later. 
Attila's army was afflicted with the plague in 452. The bubonic plague 
moved from Egypt to Asia Minor, to Constantinople, and to other parts of 
Southern Europe in 541-543, and sporadic outbreaks of the disease con-
tinued in Europe and along the European periphery during the medieval 
centuries. The Black Death reduced European population by half between 
1346 and 1350. It struck again in Portugal in 1436, and in London in 
1664-1665. 25 
It was as though Western Europe were the cryptic personification 
of the Apocalyptic Revelations of Saint John the Divine. 26 Western 
Europe was a frontier over which the four horsemen rode rough-shod for 
many centuries. War, civil strife, famine, and pestilence trampled 
whatever traditions and ceremonies might rise to stifle the triumph of 
technical progress. These were cataclysmic events of cosmic proportions 
to the peoples of Western Europe. Some might believe that the times were 
ruled by the Prince of Evil and his Demonic spirits bringing down dam-
nation and destruction on the sinful, purging mankind, and preparing the 
righteous for triumph of the Prince of Peace. Whatever it was, it smashed 
institutional shackles nearly as rapidly as they were forged in pre-
Renaissance Europe. 
How could a sixth century Visigothic scion find tranquility in an 
existence threatened by Bulgars descending on him and his people from the 
East, or have confidence in perpetuating a cultural past in which the 
hovels of his recent ancestors were pillaged and razed by the Huns, their 
kin raped and slaughtered by the armies of Attila, and their survivors 
driven into a hostile Thrace or I1lyria--inhospitable lands where their 
descendants eked out less than satisfactory subsistences only to be 
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dE!!cimated each year by famine, or pestilence, or civil strife, or by all 
of these calamities together. Opportunities to establish family shrines 
on the burial grounds of their ancestors were cut short each generation 
or so by one or another apocalyptic calamity. Indeed, the ancestors 
were interred all over Europe, if they were buried at all. Stable pro-
perty and other institutional relationships simply could not rise for 
very long. 
The point is that Visigothic descendant, or the Ostrogothid descen-
dant, or the descendant of the Burgundians or of any other indigenous 
Western European tribe either knew few ancient traditions instrumentally 
worthy of descendancy, or experienced disillusionment in most values 
descended from the past. His recollections of the past were filled with 
fear, frustration. and anger. Moreover, he was unlikely to assimilate 
the declining ceremonial traditions of the Romans--an oppressor empire 
that he neither understood nor trusted. Perhaps the term most descrip-
tive of his temperament is accute anomie--an ideology divided within 
itself leaving a sense of rootless disorganization, a feeling of point-
lessness, or that no certain bounds exist, a lack of strong national 
identity, and no pervasive notion of ethical constraint. 27 If he had 
knowledge of the ancient traditions of his tribe, he had no confidence in 
their powers to render a future tranquility with certainty. 
The only escape open to him were into insanity, or suicide, or 
some kind of mass movement. Escape into the former was perhaps retreat 
into the fantasy of a completely fabricated past devoid of causal linkages 
to the intolerably anomic present. Suicide was escape into an unbearable 
present that possessed no salutary linkages to either the past or the 
future. Escape into a mass movement could have been an hysterical drive 
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into a euphoric future contrived of ends as ends-in-themselves, or of 
ends toward which there were apparently no adequate means in the present. 
Societies predominantly populated by persons of the former dispositions 
were more 1 ikely to perish completely. 
However, a society substantially populated by persons of the latter 
disposition possessed somewhat greater prospects for survival. And it 
was likely to place much more stress on the irrunediate concerns of sur-
vival--but more important, survival by any means that promised ascendancy 
of -a future which was hardly certain of ascendancy. Such a society is 
unlikely to guide itself by the ceremonialism of a patently bankrupt 
modicum of tradition. Conditions simply would not permit it the luxury 
of preoccupation with its past. And those members who spent their time 
in idle fantasies about the "good old daysll perished as surely as the 
contrived objects of their fantasies. Rather, such a society was most 
likely to accept any means that were demonstrably instrumental to its on-
going future ends. That is, its preoccupation was predominantly toward 
the future, and only incidentaJly, if.at all, with the past. 28 
In short, the peoples of medieval Europe inherited the sciences and 
technologies of the Roman empire and the Oriental world without the cere-
manial burdens of the latter's institutions. Moreover, there were few 
opportunities and perhaps fewer incentives for the Europeans of the times 
to establ ish their own stable and enduring institutions resplendent with 
ceremonies founded on ancient customs. Europe was a frontier on which 
whatever institutions existed were social expediencies with few, if any, 
commonly understood 1 inkages with antiquity. European ceremonial systems 
were accordingly weak with a very tenuous hold on the peoPle. 29 
Innovation of the heavy plow, triennial field rotation, and the 
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heavy horse in agriculture therefore took place first in Europe because 
of the spur to invention caused by technological cross-fertil ;zation, and 
because ceremonial i sm possessed 1 ittle···power at the time to prevent the 
innovation of newly-invented tools. Both of these conditions prevailed 
in medieval Europe mostly because of the tumultuous conditions that 
prevailed there during and after the decline of Roman power. The latter 
condition. weak ceremonialism, resulted from centuries of warfare, civil 
strife, famine, and pestilence. 
A caveat is necessary at this point. The preceding illustration 
is based on the theory that innovation of new technologies requires a 
weak ceremonial system, and that the means by which a ceremonial system 
becomes weak is manifest hUman misery delivered by warfare, civil strife, 
famine, and pestilence. This may have been so in the quasi-urban com-
munities of antiquity and in the feudal cities of the pre-industrial ages. 
It may even be true today of those places in the world where industrialism 
is not the dominant mode of social organization and the industrial city 
is not the habitat of the vast majority of the people. 
However, it is not entirely so in the lands where industrialism is 
well establ ished and the people and their institutions have adopted 
industrial life styles. Indeed, a delicately balanced institutional 
system is a condition necessary for industrialism to flourish. Thus, a 
viable industrial system is founded on an institutional base that has 
essentially internal ized innovation and technical change. To be sure, 
ceremonial restraints are ever present--even in an efficiently function-
ing industrial city. However, the tenuity of ceremonialism is made 
del iberately pennissive so that it may operate to transmit culture, 
structure society, socialize people, and control them to the purpose of 
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achievin9 social stability without unduly impeding the innovation and 
integration of new technologies. But this discourse moves ahead of the 
points to be made at this time. The institutional characteristics of 
industrial societies are analyzed in subsequent chapters. 
This chapter has commenced an answer to the question: What are the 
underlying causes of institutional instability, change and discontinuity, 
and what are the consequences for the city? The answer given here is that 
the innovation of new technologies tends to be unstabilizing to institu-
tional enyironments, and that institutions along with their underlying 
val ue bel iefs and ceremonial systems change as they react toward the new 
technologies. Accordingly the institutional compositions of cities change 
with changes in technology. 
The chapter initiates an elaboration of the above theme, the main 
ideas of which are that technologies and their associated techniques are 
continuous and dynamic. Technology is continuous because the invention 
of new technical means is based on scientific understanding. and the 
latter is cumulative and is founded on all past discoveries. Technology 
is dynamic because the innovation of new technologies introduces ways of 
organizing means and distributing social products which differ from the 
ceremonial methods descending from the past. The innovation of new tech-
nologies therefore induces very long-run changes in the institutional 
system that functions to stabil ize society. 
The continuous quality of technology was developed in terms of 
invention. Invention is explained as a process of I' cumu lative synthesis U 
in which a problem is perceived, the solution elements are assembled, an 
act of creative insight conceives a novel solution from the assembled 
elements, and critical revision elaborates and embellishes the solution. 
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The solution to one problem leads to new sets of problems and the process 
is repeated until a strategic invention is developed. A crucial component 
of the synthesis process is the assembling of data and elements to solve 
the perceived problem. This is partly accomplished by technological 
cross-fertil ization--bringing together diverse technical devices in the 
same place and time, stimulating the ingenuities of inventors, and lead-
ing them toward creative insights as to new technical combinations of the 
devices. Technological cross-fertilization is therefore a crucial element 
in invent; on. 
However, invention is only one step in technologically induced 
social change. There are no social effects of discovery and invention 
until innovation takes place--until the new technical devices are intro-
duced. Technical innovation is the function of entrepreneurs who make 
choices as to the allocation of present means to the attainment of future 
ends-to-be-reached. If successful, the entrepreneur's choices resul t in 
an economical allocation of means--that is, the greatest total benefits 
are achieved from the attained ends at the least costly employment of 
scarce means. The use of new technical devices may improve efficiency 
of the entrepreneur's allocation if it helps secure the selected ends at 
less-costly employment of means or if it secures greater benefits from 
the attained ends with the same means cost as before. 
But the outcomes of entrepreneurial choices made in the present 1 ie 
in the future, and since the future is uncertain, there is risk that the 
allocation of means chosen in the present will not produce the selected 
future ends. The risks of failure are borne by the entrepreneur who is 
incentivated to bear the risks by the prospect of rewards for success. 
The entrepreneur I s rewards are a private share of the net benefits secured 
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by the attained ends. The entrepreneur is, of course, admonished to 
plan prudently by the possible private losses for failure. The entre-
preneur is the key person in the innovation process, and innovation ;s 
a key feature in technical change. 
One of the risks borne by the entrepreneur is that his technical 
innovation will be defeated by ceremonialism. This is because the dynamic 
character of technology brings it into conflict with the static character 
of ceremonialism. New technoiogies are change-inducing and forward-urging 
in terms of the ends-means continuum, while ceremonialism is change-
resisting and backward-clinging. How much of new technology is actually 
innovated therefore depends on the ceremonial powers of institutions to 
resist changes. The conclusion follows that a weak ceremonial system is 
a necessary condition to the innovation of new technologies. 
This latter point, weak ceremonial ism, was developed in terms of the 
chaotic institutional conditions leading to the innovation of the heavy 
plow, triennial field rotation, and the heavy horse in medieval European 
agriculture. Innovation of those technical means revital ized urbaniza-
tion in medieval and Renaissance Europe. and it helped set the institu-
tional stage for the Industrial Revolution which rose with and followed 
on the Protestant Refonnation. Some of the social effects of those 
innovations are described in the next chapter where the integration and 
diffusion phases of technical change are described. 
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CHAPTER V II I 
TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS 
This is the last of the chapters dealing with the technology ele-
ment of institutional economics. The first, Chapter VI, defined technology 
as that quality of a tool that enables it to be substituted for human 
effort in the creation of goods and services having human value. It 
defined the human component as technical skill in applying technique to 
employment of the tools embodying technology. And it defined technique 
as the procedure by which humans employ a tool in the production of goods 
and services having human value. 
The preceding chapter, Chapter VI!, argued that technology is con-
tinuous because it is based on scientific knowledge, and such knowledge 
;s cumulative and geometrical. That is, the invention of ne"., technology 
is based on past scientific discoveries and their technical applications. 
Moreover, the invention of new technology usually opens avenues to a 
number of possible on-going inventions. Therefore, invention of new 
technical means depends on technological cross-fertil ization--the assembly 
of diverse tools and technical knowledge at the same place and time, pro-
voking the curious and stimulating their inventive propensities. 
The chapter also argued that new technologies are dynamic because 
their innovation opens opportunities for organizing means and distributing 
social products in ways differing from the ceremonially mandated methods 
descending from the past. That is, new technology is forward-urging and 
change-producing in terms of the ends-means continuum. This brings 
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technology into conflict with ceremonialism because ceremonialism is 
change-resistant. That is, ceremonialism is backward-leaning in terms 
of the ends-means continuum, requiring that only traditional ends be 
sought and that traditional means be employed according to customs des-
cended from the past. Thus change-producing new technologies are locked 
in a struggle with change-resisting ceremonialism as to the selection of 
future ends-to-be-reached and the employment and organization of means to 
the ends selected. 
How. much of new technology is actually innovated therefore depends 
on the power of ceremonialism. It follows that a necessary condition to 
the innovation of new technology is a weak ceremonial system. These ideas 
were developed around the history of early urbanization in the West, and 
around the surge in .urbanization that took place in Ilestern Europe 
during the medieval era. The cause behind the unprecedented urbanization 
of this latter period was alleged to be the innovation of the heavy plow, 
triennial field rotation, and the heavy horse in agriculture. And the 
reasons these innovations took place in medieval Europe was the technolo-
gical cross-fertil ization that was taking place there as well as the 
feeble condition of European ceremonialism at the time. 
This chapter argues that new technology is progressive. That is, 
successfully innovated new technology results in technological integration 
and diffusion, and these latter outcomes increase human welfare. Tech-
nology facilitates this by economizing in the employment of scarce means. 
That is, it reduces the amount of human effort required to secure desir-
able sets of future ends. In other words, it decreases the man hours of 
labor input per unit of output of goods and services having human val ue. 
It therefore makes possible a more humane society by providing means 
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The first part of this chapter illustrates the foregoing by describ-
ing more thoroughly the innovation and diffusion of the heavy plow, 
triennial crop rotation, and the heavy horse in medieval Europe. It will 
be argued that these events increased the internal economies of large-
scale production in agriculture, increasing agricultural surpluses and 
liberating large numbers of peasants from primary employments so that 
they could specialize in secondary, or urban, employments. The second 
part of the chapter illustrates increases in external economies of urban 
scale initiated by the agricultural surplus and the further integration 
of the horse as a draft animal in ordinary commerce. 
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE - TECHNOLOGY AND INTERNAL ECONOMIES 
It was argued in the preceding chapter that social revol utions 
occur when innovations of new technologies first increase internal 
economies of large-scale production and then increase the external econ-
omies of location or scale. Such changes alter interinstitutional arrange-
ments so that some institutions are not entirely compl imentary within the 
system of institutions. Aspects of ceremonialism founded on certain 
institutional values become hindrances in light of the new technologies. 
The resulting social tensions reflect efforts of the institutional system 
to realign itself in accord with the new technologies. 
Social stability is resumed when diffusion and integration of a 
new technology is complete. Complete integration occurs when the tech-
nological innovation is fully incatinated across the institutional system, 
and all institutions are once again complimentary within that system. 
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This does not happen until ceremonies and ceremonial statuses have been 
changed to account for the new technology. Complete integration and dif-
fusion of major technological innovations often take centuries and some-
times millennia to occur. 
Technological diffusion is essentially an inter-culture phenomenon. 
That is, technological diffusion is the spread of technology from one 
culture, area, or group to another by borrowing or migration. The borrow-
ing of technology involves acculturation or assimilation. Acculturation 
is a process by which culture is transmitted through continuous first-hand 
contacts between groups with different cultures--one often having a more 
advanced civilization. Assimilation is a process whereby two or more 
heterogeneous groups occupying a common territory achieve a substantial 
cultural homogeneity that ultimately results in a national unity. The 
migration of technology involves convergence in which distinctive culture 
traits from different areas become similar or merge completely.2 
On the other hand, technological integration is the variety of 
social processes whereby the confl icts between newly innovated technolo-
gies and ceremonial ism are ame1 iorated, and the institutional system is 
brought into social harmony with the new technologies. Both innovation 
and integration are essentially intraculture phenomena. That is, they 
take place within a culture, ~ between cultures. 3 The remaining content 
chapters deal with the social mechanics of technological integration in 
an industrial society. 
The result of diffusion and integration is a new social stabil ity 
in which institutional powers have been redistributed in consonance with 
the new technological realities. Some institutions will have gained power, 
and some will have lost power. New institutions will have emerged, and 
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some will have disappeared. According to institutional economic theory, 
it is social revolution precipitated by technological change that accounts 
for institutional discontinuities. This part of the chapter regards the 
institutional changes resulting from diffusion and integration of agri-
cultural technologies in medieval Europe. 
Kings, clerics, craftsmen, costermongers, and camelots were a tiny 
fraction of the population in medieval Europe. They were supported by 
the vast multitude of peasant farmers comprising the rest of humanity. 
Thus, anything that affected peasant agricultural producti vi ty--weather , 
soil, or tools--must also affect civilization--population, health, wealth, 
and stealth. Two parallel developments brought together the technolo-
gical means by which the Europeans ascended to dominance in the post-
medieval Western World. The first was innovation and diffusion of the 
heavy plow to cultivate the hard soils of European uplands. The second 
was introduction of the heavy horse and its accouterment--first in warfare, 
then in agriculture and commercial transportation. Both developments are 
traced to events commencing in the first century, A.D., and they merged 
after the eighth century. Finally, those technical improvements were 
augmented by a shift from two-field to three-field crop rotation. The 
initial effect of these events was an increase in internal economies of 
large-scale production in agriculture, and thus an increase in agricul-
tural output per man hour of labor input. 
The Heavy Plow4 
Although the age is by no means certain, the first plow is bel ieved 
to have come into use sometime before 6,000 B. C., no doubt as an adapta-
tion of a digging stick. It is thought to have consisted of a triangular 
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or conical shape for digging the soil and handles for pulling or pushing 
the plow. Eventually an ox was used to provide the motive power for the 
plow. Modern adaptations of this prehistoric scratch plow remain in use 
in some p1 aces even today. 
The scratch plow does not turn the soil. Rather, it agitates the 
soil in its trace, leaving a strip of undisturbed earth between its furrows. 
Cross-plowing is done to further pulverize the soil. Thus, fields tend 
to be as wide as they are long where the scratch plow is used. Moreover, 
the scrat~h plow is only suitable for cultivating the light, dry, alluvial 
soils of river deltas. It is useless against heavy upland soils. This 
restricted early agriculture to the river areas where soils were suitable 
to the primitive scratch plow. 
The soils of Northern Europe are mostly of the latter type--moist, 
heavy, and up1and--and they are much more resistant than the light, dry, 
soils of Mediterranean and adjacent river deltas. Even when drawn by two 
oxen, the scratch plow could not handle the richer upland soils. If 
Europe were to prosper, some way had to be found to efficiently cultivate 
its upland soils. That way came in part with innovation of the heavy plow. 
The heavy plow possesses four technical features which distinguish 
it from the primitive scratch plow. The heavy plow has a coulter which 
cuts the soil vertically. The coulter Is attached at right angle to a 
flat share that cuts the earth horizontally below the sad. A mould board 
is attached to the plow and serves to lay the sad over in a furrow 
against the previously plowed edge. Finally, the entire plow is equipped 
with a set of wheels arranged to carry the non-cutting dead load of the 
plow. 
Lineage of the complete heavy plow is not fully known. Some 
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components of the heavy plow were known to be used with scratch plow 
shares. Coulters and wheels are bel ieved to have been in use in the Poe 
Valley as early as the first century. Likewise, the Goths were known to 
use coulters in the fourth century. However, the first appearance of the 
complete heavy plow was in the hands of the Slavs in the latter half of 
the sixth century. Credit for innovation of the heavy plow therefore 
appears to belong to the Slavs of Central Europe. The new plow was 
diffused westward, probably by migration, so that it was in use among 
the German tribes in the seventh century, among the French tribes in the 
eighth, and among the British tribes in the tenth. 
Integration of the heavy plow involved revolutionary changes in 
medieval European institutions. The chan§es stemmed from the increased 
agricultural productivity and from the techniques required to efficiently 
employ the plow. The heavy plow had several advantages over the scratch 
plow. It turned the soil with such force that it could be effectively 
used to bring the hard soils of European uplands into agricultural produc-
tion. This, of course, greatly multiplied the amount of arable land in 
Europe. Moreover, there was no need for cross plowing because the heavy 
plow pulverized the entire surface of a field with a single plowing. The 
time saved allowed a peasant to cultivate nearly twice as much land in 
the same amount of plowing. It was a case of substituting a tool, the 
heavy plow, for labor in agricultural production. 
Finally, the elimination of cross plowing made it more economical 
to plow land in long strips. Thus, fields tended to be long and narrow, 
rather than square as with scratch plowing. This latter effect was very 
important to soil conservation on sloping uplands. The long narrow fields 
were usually plowed in a clockwise direction with the furrow turned to 
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the right. As the years passed the fields tended to become terrace-like, 
each parallel field containing a low center ridge with a slight swail 
adjoining adjacent fields on either side with like characteristics. The 
fields therefore trapped and held water while preventing destructive 
erosion. Crops could usually be harvested from the depression between 
fields in drought years, and from the ridge in years with heavy 
precipitation. And, of course, crops were harvested from both ridges 
and depressions during normal climate years. 
Long open fields also changed the pattern of pasturage for cattle. 
As long as the population was sparsely settled over the land, animals 
could be grazed in permanent pastures located on tillable lands. But as 
population increased and the heavy plow made such lands tillable, less 
land was available for pasturage on a permanent basis. As long as each 
farmer cultivated his own small plot. his fallow could not be economically 
used for grazing. However. strip plowing and open fields permitted crops 
to be cooperatively sown in several large fields during any particular 
season. leaving a large community fallow free for grazing cattle. This 
had the added advantage of allowing the manure to drop on the next 
season's crop land rather than on open meadows. 
Innovation of the heavy plow also brought revolutionary social 
changes in Northern and Western Europe. Sometime during or just before 
the seventh century, there was an unprecedented upsurge in population and 
emigration from the Rhineland and contiguous areas. This correlates 
with an increase in open fields, and it is believed that use of the heavy 
plow accounts for both phenomena. According to this theory, the heavy 
plow increased agricultural productivity supplying the surpluses to sup-
port greater fecundity in peasant families and all at once liberating 
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significant numbers of peasants from farming. 
At the same time the heavy plow was restricted to use in areas hav-
ing a relatively dense settlement. A single family could not usually 
afford to acquire and use it. This was because land was allotted to 
peasants from a very early time on the basis of that which was needed to 
support a family and render. tribute to king and deity. The family lands 
were therefore not large enough to efficiently employ the much more pro-
ductive heavy plow. Moreover, the new plow was costly to acquire. The 
suspension and wheels were much more complex than the simple frame of the 
primitive scratch plow, and they were therefore comensurately more expen-
sive. LikeWise, the working parts which were greater in number and size, 
had to be of metal, and all metals were scarce and costly in sixth and 
seventh century Europe. 
The heavy plow was also more costly to operate, both because it was 
heavier and because it was used in heavier and more resistant soil. The 
new plow could not be drawn by a single yoke of oxen. Indeed, it usually 
required four yoke--;n other words, eight oxen. It was rare for a peasant 
family to own more than a single yoke, and it was necessary for them to 
pool their plow teams to effectively use the heavy plow. 
As already noted, it was more efficient to cultivate long, narrow 
fields with the new plow. Thus, whenever the heavy plow was placed into 
use in Western Europe, the village lands were usually reorganized from 
squarish, fenced fields into large open fields which were plowed in long, 
narrow strips. The only reasonable way to allocate land was, therefore, 
to distribute the strips to the peasants who owned the plow and the indi-
vidual yokes of oxen comprising a cooperative plow team. On that basis, 
one peasant family might cultivate many small dispersed strips of land. 
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Thus, land commenced to be allocated to peasants on the basis of 
their contributions to their cooperative plow teams. This had immense 
importance because the criteria of efficient land distribution ceased to 
be the amount needed to sustain one family. With the right technologies, 
a peasant family could clearly produce a substantial and enduring surplus. 
Therefore, the basis of land distribution became the amount that could be 
effectively tilled by the tool of tillage--the plow and the plow team. 
Cooperative agriculture posed problems of control and coordination. 
Clearly, such dispersed narrow plots of land could not be cultivated at 
the whim of the peasant to whom they were allocated. They had to be 
plowed in concert with the adjoining strips that were owned by other 
members of the plow team if all were to be efficiently cultivated. 
Inevitably disputes arose. As a consequence. strong peasant tribunals 
emerged in hamlets to adjudicate disputes and to make decisions on land 
management for the community. These conditions were one of the bases 
of a manorial system. And such economies were found only in Northern 
Europe where the heavy plow was used to cultivate open fields. 
Oiffusion and integration of the heavy plow in medieval Europe 
increased internal economies of large-seal e agri cul tura 1 product; on, all 
at once multiplying the potential for growth in agricultural output, 
creating a substantial agricultural surplus, and 1 iberating large numbers 
of peasants from farming so they could gravitate to secondary and urban 
employments. In order to secure the significant increase in social 
benefits, society was reorganized to efficiently employ the heavy plow. 
This involved realigning real property boundaries, reallocating peasant 
lands from a basis of family subsistence to a basis of tool productivity, 
shifting farming from an individual family enterprise to a cooperative 
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manage the community arable. 
Triennial Field Rotations 
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An innovation in the eighth century augmented the gains reaped from 
use of the heavy plow. A system of three-field-crop rotations replaced 
the two-field system which descended from antiquity. The triennial rota-
tion was initiated in Frank lands between the Seine and Rhine Rivers with 
rise of the Carolingian Empire. It was quickly integrated in that region, 
but diffusion to other regions of Europe was very slol<, perhaps reflecting 
ceremonial rigidities in land tenures. England abandoned biennial rota-
tion in favor of triennial in the twelfth century following the Norman 
conquest, while the Slavs in Poland and southern Sweden waited until the 
thirteenth century fallowing the Mongol sweep across Eastern Europe. 
The rotation system allowed land to lay fallow biennially under the 
two-field system and triennially under the three-field system. The fallow 
period was to rest the soil and allow it time to replenish nutrients 
through capillary action, and by plowing under the indigenous cover. The 
parcels were reversed the next year so that the previously fallowed par-
cel was cultivated, and the previously cultivated parcel was fallowed. 
The two-field system was used universally. if not uniformly, throughout 
Europe. The principal variation involved planting seasons. Main crops 
were planted in the southern part of the north temperate and sub-tropi-
cal zones in autumn and were harvested in late spring or early summer. 
On the other hand, main crops were originally planted in the early spring 
and harvested in the late summer or early autumn throughout the northern 
part of the north temperate zone and in the northern sub-arctic zone. 
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Three field-crop rotation recognizes that there are indeed two sea-
sons for planting and harvesting and that significant gains in productivity 
can be realized by organizing agrarian work around the fact. The three-
field system divided the croplands into three equal parcels. One was 
planted in the fall with winter-growing grains for harvest late the follow-
ing spring. The second field was planted in early spring with summer-grow-
ing crops for fall harvest. The third field was left fallow. The fields 
were rotated each year so that each would have been once in winter crops, 
once in spring crops, and once in fallow during any three-year period. 
A comparison of the two methods of crop rotation illustrates the 
gains in the triennial system over the biennial. If the total annual 
plow capacity of a manor is 900 acres, then it is easy to see that a 
single plowing of the fallow will allow the manor to farm 900 acres 
under either rotation system. However, 450 acres must be kept fallow 
under the two-field system leaving 450 acres for crops. On the other 
hand, only 300 acres are kept fallow under the three-field system leaving 
600 acres for crops. Thus the gain of the triennial method in product 
units per unit of plow input is 33 percent over the biennial system. 
The gain is even more dramatic if the fallow is plowed twice dur-
ing the year. Of course, double plowing the fallow reduces the total 
acres of land tillable by a given plow team. However, this poses no 
problem as long as the increase in productivity from double plowing is 
at least equal to the output foregone by reducing the acreage plowed. 
Indeed, overall efficiency is thereby gained in land use because the out-
put per acre is increased while the units of product produced per unit of 
plow input remains at least the same. At any rate, the three-field 
rotation gain is even greater with a double plowing of the fallow. 
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For example, assuming the same plow team constraint as before, 900 
acres per year, it is seen that 600 acres of that capacity must be allo-
cated to double plow 300 acres of fallow under a biennial rotation. 
This leaves only 300 acres of capacity for plowing cropland, and the 
total acres farmed by the manor is 600. On the other hand, only 450 
acres of plow capacity is allocated to double plow 225 acres of fallow 
under the triennial rotation. This leaves 450 acres of plow capacity 
for the manor arable. The manor can therefore keep 150 more acres in 
crop for an increase ·of 50 percent with the same plow input. Part of 
that increase is derived from the additional land cultivated by the sav-
ing in plow-team capacity. That ;S~ the manor can farm 675 acres 
(450 + 225) with triennial rotation, and only 600 acres with biennial 
rotation. 
The three-field rotation system had other advantages over and above 
the obvious gains in productivity. It increased labor efficiency by dis-
tributing peasants I work more uniformly across the year. By enabling 
crop diversification, the technique reduced the propensity toward famine. 
And finally, the system resulted in a substantial increase in the pro-
duction of crops that were particularly important to subsequent events. 
One was the use of legumes in the spring planting, and the other was the 
cultivation of oats also as a spring crop. 
Commencing in the ei ghth century, 1 egumes--l intel s, peas. broad 
beans, and chickpeas--were sown in the spring planting because they 
replaced the nitrogen taken from the soil by the previous year1s crops 
of wheat and rye. They were essential to success of the triennial rota-
tion of crops because of the greater intensity of soil use with that 
system. An important by-product of that procedure was the infusion of 
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protein-rich vegetables into the human diet, and this had a positive 
effect on both the level of population and the health and vigor of the 
people. These factors weighed heavily in the outcome of subsequent events. 
Further consequences stem from the spring crops of the triennial 
field rotation. Qats, which came to Europe as a weed from Asia Minor in 
prehistoric times, was a major spring crop. Oats happen to be the prime 
diet for horses, and Europeans found precisely the correct food among 
their agricultural surp"uses for the proper care and feeding of horses--
a fact of considerable future importance to the Franks. 
In summation to this point, it is clear that innovation and inte-
gration of the heavy plow increased agricultural productivity because it 
embodied greater technology than its predecessor, the primitive scratch 
plow. That is, the heavy plow had a greater capacity to substitute for 
labor in agricultural production. Likewise the change from biennial to 
triennial crop rotation augmented the greater efficiency of the heavy 
plow so that the two events worked toward a long-run excess of labor in 
farming. They did this by releasing peasants from agricultural employ-
ments while increasing the food surpluses by which populations could 
expand. At the same time, the new plow enabled theretofore untillable 
lands to be brought under cultivation, substantially increasing the long-
run potential for the production of a continuing agricultural surplus. 
Finally, the exigencies of the technology mandated a radical reordering 
of land tenure and the reorganization of peasant employment from individual 
to cooperative farming techniques. 
This discourse on the heavy plow must be interrupted for a time in 
order to pick up the other technological means by which the Europeans 
ascended to dominance in the post-medieval Western World. The other means 
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was by introduction of the heavy horse. Like the innovation of the heavy 
plow, introduction and diffusion of the heavy horse is traced to events 
which conunenced in the first century A.D. And the two means merge after 
the ei ghth century. 
The Heavy Horse6 
The horse has seven epochs. It apparently originated on the Steppes 
of central Asia where it foraged the wilds for native grasses. Its sec-
ond epoch is as game for the Indo-European savages who hunted the Steppes 
before the dawn of history. Early domestication of the horse for meat, 
milk, and hides by the same Indo-Europeans marks its third epoch. The 
fourth finds the horse drawing a travois loaded with cargo or drawing a 
chariot in warfare. The fifth equestrian epoch sees the animal bearing 
a rider with broad sword or spear. The sixth sees the horse replacing 
oxen drawing a plow and other forms of heavy drayage. Finally the horse 
becomes a totally ceremonial appendage in the modern industrial world 
where its technical and productive qual ities are completely surpassed by 
mechani ca 1 forms of power. 
The domestic horse was exclusively a creature of warfare in the 
Western World until the early ninth century. It served three successive 
military masters--the charioteer, the rider without stirrups, and the 
rider equipped with stirrups. Horse-mounted warriors were used by the 
PerSians, the Greeks, and the Romans, and of course, by the barbarians 
that periodically swept across Europe during the thousand years follow-
ing the decl ine of Rome. 
However, combat from the back of a moving horse was a precarious 
enterprise in antiquity. The warrior sat bare "back gripping the horse 
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with his knees. At most he had only a blanket or cushion between himself 
and his horse. He had no pommel or cantle to give front and back support, 
and no stirrups for lateral support. This severely limited the warrior's 
ability to wield a sword or thrust a spear or lance from horseback. More-
over, the horse of antiquity was too small to bear an armored warrior or 
to be armored itself. Thus cavalry was never a decisive arm in those 
times. 
The heavy horse, ancestor to both the medieval warhorse and the 
draft horse, was introduced to the Western World in the first century. 
The pedigree of the heavy horse is not clearly known. It is clear, how-
ever, the heavy horse opened the way to use of heavier accouterment. 
The rigid-frame saddle soon made an appearance, and both the horse and 
its rider could be armored for combat. 
The saddle with pommel and cantle but without stirrups appeared 
also in the first century A.D. The saddle burst upon the Roman Empire 
under barbarian warriors charging out of the east. Hhile the porrnnel and 
cantle improved efficiency of warfare from horseback, the p1 ight of the 
cavalryman remained precarious without stirrups. And seven more centuries 
elapsed before the stirrup appeared in Europe. 
The stirrup is first found in India during the second century B. C. 
supporting only the big toe of an unshod rider. Of course, the toe stir-
rup is unsuitable Tor the shod rider of colder climates, and the first 
attempt to support the whole foot appears as a hook stirrup in Pakistan 
and Afghanistan during the latter part of the first century or the early 
part of the second. The hook stirrup had a penchant for snagging and 
dragging a fallen rider. It gave way to the ordinary foot stirrup in 
China by the fifth century. The foot stirrup found its way to Persia by 
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the end of the seventh century. Finally, it was innovated in Europe by 
Charles Martel, de facto King of the Franks, in sweeping military reforms 
during the first half of the eighth century. 
Significance of the foot stirrup to subsequent institutional changes 
in Europe cannot be overemphasized. The foot stirrup was the keystone to 
a radical reordering of Frank arms and warfare, and the logistics of mili-
tary reorganization mandated revolutionary changes in society itself. At 
the same time the importance of the horse in warfare led to the breeding 
and prol iferation of more powerful horses, and it eventually opened the 
way to widespread use of the horse in agriculture and transportation. 
Finally, the Franks ascended to dominate European pol itical affairs for 
nearly three centuries. The new horse-based technologies were force-
fully diffused throughout Europe during those centuries. 
To understand how and why the foot stirrup was so important to 
European civil ;zation, one must understand its function. While the 
saddle gave front and back support, it was the stirrup that gave lateral 
support to the rider. The stirrup therefore fixed the rider to his mount 
and the combination made for a fighting unit of unprecedented might. The 
blow was no longer delivered by force of the warrior's arm alone. He 
could now grip his lance between his body and his upper arm, and guiding 
it with his hand, he could land the blow on an adversary with the combined 
force of himself and his galloping mount. Thus, the power of the human 
body was replaced by that of the horse, and the arrangement made possible 
a new method of warfare--mounted shock combat. 
The advent of mounted shock combat reversed the order of battl e and 
within a generation the mounted warrior ceased to simply support infantry. 
Cavalry replaced infantry as the principal Frankish arm, and infantry, 
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the traditional queen of battle, became a supporting arm to cavalry. The 
mil itary import of these events was immediate, but the social conse-
quences were revolutionary and pervasive. 
The ceremonial aspects of society had to be reorganized to support 
mounted warfare. The Frankish army consisted of infantry levies of free-
men until the middle of the eighth century. The process derived from 
the Germanic tradition that every freeman was a soldier. It was a rela-
tively inexpensive way for the monarch to maintain an army. The military 
potential ities of the foot stirrup changed all of that, and virtually 
every European institution was ultimately affected. 
The new method of warfare was costly. To be effective, a knight 
needed several mounts. In addition to remounts for horses killed in 
battle, the knight's squire must be mounted. Additionally, the knight 
must be armed and he and his mounts must be armored. In all, the cost 
to equip one knight was about twenty oxen, the plough teams of ten or 
more peasant famil ies. The cost to maintain a knight was equally expen-
sive. Each horse had to be maintained in top condition, and horses con-
sume large amounts of grain whether or not they see combat. Here then, 
is the importance to the Frankish kingdom of a spring planting of oats 
under the triennial crop-rotation plan. 
The monetary and taxing systems of medieval Europe were primitive, 
and ther~ was no way a monarch could rely on taxation to support a retinue 
of knights. The most important income-producing wealth at the time was 
arable land, and land endowments became the method by which mounted 
warriors could be maintained in suitable number. Charles Martel seized 
ecclesiastical properties in 732--approximately the time triennial crop 
rotation was innovated in those lands. He gave possession of the land 
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(benefice) to an expanded group of cavaliers with the condition that 
they serve him (servile tenure) in mounted combat. Failure to discharge 
the tenure involved forfeiture of the fief. The result of these arrange-
ments was a wide extension of the feudal institution of vassalage. 
Thus, European feudalism was a military organization of society to 
support cavalry. It stressed the breeding and rearing of horses and the 
training and support of men capable of carrying on the new method of war-
fare. For this reason, Pippin changed the Saxon tribute from cattle to 
horses in 758. One can imagine the impact of this requirement on the 
breeding of cattle and horses. The ceremonial aspects of the agricultural 
system to support cavalry, manorial ism, descended from the Roman pro-
prietary system described in a prior chapter. It needed only to be 
adapted from pagan to Christian ceremonies and to be wed with the cere-
monial system of land tenure and agricultural techniques that were emerg-
ing with innovation of the heavy plow. 
The knight's personal ity and hi s environment were shaped by hi s 
mode of fighting, and his mode of fighting stemmed from innovation and 
diffusion of the foot stirrup. The two distinguishing ceremonial qual-
ities of the caval ier were loyalty to his 1 iege and mil itary prowess 
based on the new methods of mounted shock combat. And these two qual-
ities were the corner-stones of medieval chi va 1 ry. 
The new warriors had to be skilled professionals. They had to be 
in superb physical condition and they underwent long periods of mil itary 
training. There was simply no time for homey vocations 1 ike farming and 
crafts. And here is one si gnif; canee of an agri cul tura 1 surpl us--support 
of a full-time, professional military elite. The institution of knight-
hood produced a proud and cohesive military caste that ceremonially 
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vented its competitiveness and sharpened its prowess in the lethal but 
pragmatic wargame--the jousting tournament--a series of encounters be-
tween mounted knights in which opponents charged and attempted to unseat 
one another with lances. Military service therefore became a matter of 
ceremonial class, and freedom became a matter of property tenure suf-
ficient to support a mounted warrior. Like the patriarchal estates of 
antiquity, feudal tenures soon became hereditary, conditioned always on 
one's ability to fulfill knight's service. 
Wherever the Frankish kingdom extended its realm, it introduced its 
methods of warfare and its feudal institutions. Mounted shock combat 
became the practice of the Lombards in Italy by the end of the eighth 
century--Byzantium by the tenth. And Will iam the Conqueror introduced 
the technique to the Anglo Saxons at Hastings in 1066. The crusades 
brought mounted shock combat forcefully to attention of the Moslems, and 
the Syrians and Egyptians were staging jousting tournaments by the thir-
teenth century. 
Finally, the feudal warrior intentionally created by the Franks to 
serve their military needs became the ruling class on collapse of the 
Carol ingian Empire. Of course, this perfectly preserved the savage 
tradition that the elite men of invidious leisure shall eschew the debas-
ing occupations involved with the creation and maintenance of material 
welfare, and shall occupy themselves with only the ceremonial barbarian 
vocations--pol itics, rel igion, warfare~ and maleficent games. Quite the 
oppOSite of the vulgar occupations, the feudal warrior's vocation stressed 
invidious leisure and the ceremonial destruction of goods. 
But another consequence of feudal warfare commands attention. That 
is, of course, the breeding up and widespread diffusion of horses suitable 
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Europe in affairs of the renaissance world by further advancing 
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agricultural productivity, increasing food surpluses, and freeing labor 
from agricultural employment. However, the event had to await two 
other deve10pments--a suitable harness and a nailed horseshoe.? 
The Slavs reckoned a unit of p10w1and in the twelfth century as 
that which could be cultivated by two oxen or one horse. While a 
properly harnessed and shod draft horse produces approximately the same 
pull as an ox, the horse moves more rapidly so that it actually 
accomplishes one and one-half times the foot pounds per second of work 
done by the ox. And the horse has more stayi ng power than the ox so 
that the farmer can work several hours longer each day. In all, the 
work advantage of the horse is approximately twice that of an ox. 
Horses were harnessed 1 i ke oxen in anti quity--whi ch is understand-
able since the draft animal of prehistory was the ox, and it would seem 
that the yoke harness which worked very well with oxen had simply to be 
adapted to the horse. However, the yoke did not work well with the 
horse. The horse could be harnessed to the yoke only with long straps 
attached to the ends of the yoke and passed around the creature's neck 
and under its belly. The straps pressed on the windpipe and jugular 
ve; n when the horse attempted to pull. Moreover, the yoke rested on the 
horsels shoulders, a point of traction that is much to high for a horse. 
The key feature of a modern harness is a padded collar that rests 
on the withers of the horse so as not to constrict blood and airflow. 
Traces or shafts attach the collar to the load so that the traction point 
is near the chest of the horse. This allows the beast to place its entire 
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weight into pull ing. It has been demonstrated that a horse rigged with 
a modern collar harness can pull as much as five times the load it can 
pull with the ancient yoke harness. Clearly, horses could not be used 
in place of oxen for heavy drayage until the collar harness came into use. 
Early attempts by the Romans to overcome the defects of the yoke 
harness produced unsatisfactory variations of breast straps and collars. 
Likewise, China is known to have had the breast harness in the sixth cen-
tury. At any rate, the evidence points to a satisfactory collar harness 
in Germany by the latter half of the eighth century. However, diffusion 
of the collar harness and use of the heavy horse with the heavy plow did 
not take place in Europe until the late tenth or early eleventh century. 
It is probable that the horse was not harnessed to the heavy plow 
even though the collar harness had been known for two or more centuries 
because horse hooves are not very durable in moist climates like those 
of Northern Europe. After all, a draft horse is no better than his 
hooves when it comes to the long pull. While the horse hoof is durable 
in dry c1 imates, it becomes soft and is easily damaged with moisture. 
Oxen appear to be better equipped than horses in this regard because 
their hooves stand up better. The nailed, iron horseshoe remedied the 
problem of hoof durability for horses. However, nailed horseshoes do not 
appear in Europe until the latter half of the tenth century. The first 
archeo1ogica11y-confirmed evidence of a nailed horseshoe was found in the 
grave of a Siberian nomad in the Yenisei region dating from the ninth 
century. Evidence indicates that they were known in Byzantium soon after, 
and in Europe soon after that. However, widespread use of the nailed 
horseshoe does not occur until the eleventh century. 
It was finally in the e1 eventh century that the properly-shod draft 
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horse was efficiently harnessed to the heavy plow in Europe. The plow 
had been in expanding use for nearly five centuries, and the collar har-
ness had been in existence for more than two hundred years. The com-
bined effects of the innovation, diffusion, and integration of the 
heavy plow, the three field rotatiol\ and the heavy horse in agriculture 
were astounding increases in internal economies of large-scale agricul-
tural production, resulting in equally astounding increases in agricul-
tural productivity and surpluses in agricultural products, the emancipa-
tion of significant numbers of peasants from farming, and a radical 
reordering of institutional arrangements. 
Those effects were caused by qualitative improvements in tools. 
That is, they stemmed from technological advances that permitted the 
improved tools to better substitute for labor in the production of goods 
and services having human value. Those results became the means to on-
going ends. Indeed, they served to bring ends into view that had there-
tofore been beyond human reach. It became possible to organize means in 
different ways than the traditional methods descended from the past. Thus, 
the forward-urging new technologies were in conflict with change-resis-
tant ceremonialism. That is, some inter-institutional arrangements were 
not entirely compl imentary within the institutional system, and aspects 
of ceremonialism based on those institutional values became hindrances 
in light of the new technologies. This led to social conflicts as the 
institutional system first struggled to resist, then to realign itself in 
accord with the new technologies. 
Social stability did not resume until diffusion and integration of 
the new technology was complete. That did not happen until the technol-
ogical innovations were fully harmonized with the institutional system, 
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and all institutions were once again compl imentary within that system. 
That happened when ceremonies and ceremonial statuses were changed to 
account for the new technologies. While the innovation and diffusion 
of the heavy plow and the heavy horse in Hedieval Europe took almost a 
thousand years, the social adjustments needed to fully integrate those 
technical arrangements took another four hundred years, give or take a 
century or two. 
URBANIZATION - TECHNOLOGY AND EXTERNAL ECONOMIES 
The preceding part of this chapter described how the innovation and 
diffusion of the heavy plow, triennial field rotation, and the heavy 
horse increased the returns to scale in agricultural production in med-
ieval Europe. It resulted in the creation of a substantial and enduring 
agricultural surplus, the liberation of large numbers of peasants from 
farming, and the precipitation of revolutionary institutional changes. 
The changes described in the foregoing part of this chapter related to 
institutions in a rural setting. Of course, the revolution did not end 
with the changes in agricultural production. Indeed, the revolution in 
agriculture had profound effects on all aspects of medieval and post-
medieval 1 ife. 
In addition to first increasing the internal economies of large-
scale production. the diffusion and integration of the heavy plow, 
triennial crop rotation. and the heavy horse also affected the external 
economies of location and urban scale. The distribution and size of 
urban settl ements. rural to urban migrati ons. and urban growth and form 
were ultimately affected. This part of the chapter describes the progres-
sive qualities of technological innovation and diffusion by illustrating 
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the secondary and urban consequences of integrating the heavy plow and 
the heavy horse in medieval Europe. 
Distribution of Urban Settlements 
Substitution of the horse for the ox in farming led to the same 
substitution in other uses. The horse replaced the ox as draft animal 
in overland transportation resulting in reductions in transportation 
costs and commuting times, and therefore in changes in market areas and 
the distribution of settlements. That is, use of the horse at draw 
increased the external economies of certain urban locations and led to 
profound alterations in the hierarchy of central urban places. The 
changes obtained because of the greater speed of the horse over the ox. 
The horse coul d haul goods and passengers greater di stances per hour of 
drayage than the ox. r~oreover, the horse could endure longer periods at 
the draw, and it was a more efficient converter of forage to work than 
was the ox. 
Use of the horse at draw mandated other techni ca 1 improvements. 
The common drayage vehicle of Roman times was an ox-drawn, two-wheeled 
cart. By the twelfth century, the two-wheel ed cart had given way to 
expanding use of four-wheel ed wagons capabl e of haul i ng very heavy loads. 
~1oreover. wagons were improved to take advantage of the greater eff;-
ciency of the properly shod and harnessed horse. Among the improvements 
were turning front axl es, 5 iog1 etrees, and brakes. 8 
The benefit of these technical improvements was a substantial reduc-
tion in the cost of overland transportation. It is estimated that the 
cost of transporting grain overland in Roman times doubled its price each 
100 miles. On the other hand, water transport was so inexpensive that 
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grains shipped to the city of Rome from North Africa undersold grains 
grown by Romans only a few miles from the city. By contrast, the cost 
of overland transportation of grains in the thirteenth century is estim-
ated to have doubled its price each 300 miles, a reduction to only 33 
. percent of the former cost. 
The sizes of marketing areas and the distribution of settlements 
were greatly affected by the reductions in overland transportation costs. 
The relevant principle is found in the relationship between the radius 
and the area of a circle. If the radius is doubled, the area of that 
circle is quadrupled. If the radius is tripled, the area is increased 
nine times. In other words, the area multipl ier is the square of the 
radius mul tipl ier. 
Applying the foregoing principle and assuming a transportation cost 
reduction of two-thirds, one can see that, ceteris paribus, goods can 
now be transported three times as far at no additional cost. That is, 
the radius multiplier is three. Thus, the area served by a market 
village has expanded by a multiple of nine; in other words, by the square 
of the radius multiplier. For example, if the distance from the central 
business district of a market area were three miles, its market area is 
approximately 28 square miles ( A =1Tr2). If the cost of transportation 
to and from that market town is somehow reduced by two-thirds, then the 
effective radius of its market area may be increased by as much as three 
times, or to approximately nine miles. This implies an expansion of 
that townls market area from 28 square miles to approximately 254 square 
miles, or by a multiple of nine. 
The same effect can be demonstrated using a market theory of land 
allocation. 9 For purposes of explanation, it is assumed that the value 
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of land is determined by its productivity, and that the central market 
price per acre of harvested product is the same at any given time for 
all producers. The profit per acre to producers is therefore the central 
market price per acre of harvested product less all costs per acre to 
produce the product and deliver it to the market. The costs are the land 
rent per acre, the transportation cost per acre, and other costs per 
acre. Other per-acre costs include the cost of seed, fertilizer, etc., 
and they are approximately the same for all producers. On the other hand, 
transportation costs are directly related to the distance the land 1 ies 
from the central market place. The farther the land is from the central 
place, the greater the transportation cost. 
If farmer-producers bid against one another for use of the land in 
accordance with the foregoing assumptions, it will be found that the 
emerging bid-rent function is inversely proportionate to the transporta-
tion-cost function. For example, if the product price at the central 
market place for all producers is $200.00 per acre of output, the per-acre 
costs other than rent and transportation are $25.00, and the profit norm-
ally expected and required to keep farmers cultivating the product is 
$75.00 per acre, there remains $100 per acre to cover rent and the cost 
of transportation. Finally, if annual transportation costs are $33.00 
per acre per mile from the central place. then the effective radius of 
the central market place is approximately three miles ($100/acre divided 
by $33 per acre per mile), and its area is approximately 28 square miles. 
It is easy to see that farmer-producers will bid higher rents for 
parcels of land closer to the central market place because the transpor-
tation cost associated with those parcels are lower. That is. rent is a 
premium paid for access to the central places, and the closer the land 
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to the center, the higher the rent. For example, if the distance from 
the central market place is one mile, the annual transportation cost per 
acre of product is $33.00. Under these conditions, the producer would be 
will ing to bi d up to $67.00 rent per acre. On the other hand, the trans-
portation cost on a parcel two miles from the central marketplace is 
$67.00 per acre, and the farmer-producer would be willing to bid only 
$33.00 rent per acre. And, of course, the producer would not bid on 
lands more distant than three miles from the central marketplace. 
It is also easy to see that a general reduction in transportation 
costs will increase the radius of the market arable. For example, if the 
transportation cost on the last mentioned parcel of land dropped from 
$100.00 per acre of output to $33.00 (implying an annual transportation 
cost of $11.00 per acre per mile from the central market place) it would 
become economically feasible to farm the land, and producers would be 
wi 11 i ng to bi d up to $67.00 rent per acre. But more than that, the lower 
transportation costs make it feasible to bring land lying even more dis-
tant from the central market into cultivation, thus increasing the radius 
of the market arable from three miles to nine, and its area from 28 
square miles to 254 square miles. 
~~hi1e this simple explanation demonstrates the point, it ignores 
other economic variables. For example, a reduction in transportation 
costs would first increase profits and attract more farmers into cultiva-
ting the product. This would increase the number of bidders for the 
arable lands and force rents up. The increased rents would make the more 
distant and perhaps less suitable lands more attractive alternatives to 
the land alreadY under cultivation. Finally, the additional supply of 
product harvested from the newly cultivated lands would force product 
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prices downward and restore lower profits. The net result would be a new 
long-run market equilibrium with normal profits, lower product prices, a 
larger central market area with rents on farm lands lower than before 
near the central place and higher than before at the periphery. 
Other factors are likely to mitigate against expansions on the 
order suggested above. Topographic features 1; ke mountains, 1 akes, and 
rivers! will affect the direction and extent of expansion. Similarly, 
property and political boundaries may place limits on expansions of 
market areas. Nevertheless, the pOint is made that the innovation and 
diffusion of new technologies (heavy horse, breast harness, horse shoes, 
improved wagons, etc.) reduced the cost of Dverl and transportati on. And 
the lower transportation costs effected profound changes in urban 
arrangements in medieval and post-medieval Europe. The size and 
di stri bution of settl ements, rural to urban mi gration. urban growth. 
and many other social arrangements were ultimately affected. 
The number and distribution of settlements (the hierarchy of 
centra 1 pl aces) were effected because as transportati on costs decl ined 
and potential village arables enlarged. the market and commuting areas 
of adjoining hamlets and villages expanded to overlapping. Each 
community was affected differently depending on its position in the 
emerging networks of central places. Assume, for example, that a very 
long-run stability based on the ox-drawn, two-wheeled cart as the 
primary transport vehicle located hamlets an average three and one-half 
miles apart. That is. each settlement consisted of ten or twelve 
peasant cottages serving an area of a little more than eleven square 
miles with an outside radius of two miles. 
Now assume that the last fifty years witnesses a general change to 
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horse-drawn wagons and a resulting reduction in transportation costs of 
two-thirds. What is 1 ikely to happen? According to the foregoing theory, 
one community in nine will eventually expand and the remaining eight will 
decline so that the resulting very-long-run distribution locates first 
order settlements an average ten and a half miles apart. That is, each 
of the expanding villages serves an area of approximately 100 square 
miles with an outside radius of six miles. And if the surviving villages 
absorbed the families of the defunct hamlets, the village populations 
would expand by one hundred or more families. Something on that order 
seems to have occurred in Europe between the tenth and fourteenth centuries. 
The point is that substitution of the horse for the ox in overland 
transportation had transilient effects on the distribution and sizes of 
European urban settlements. The horse technology reduced transportation 
costs, changed the external economies of urban locations, and led to the 
growth of some first-order settlements and the demise of others. More-
over, growth of some settl ements accompanied increases in the speci a 1 iza· 
tion of urban employments and in proliferation of the urban institutions 
staffed by the new specialists. 
Rural to Urban MigrationlO 
Two of the foregoing occurrences brought about other changes that 
profoundly affected city development in Europe. The first was the increase 
in internal economies of large-scale production in agriculture caused by 
innovation and diffusion of the heavy plow and the heavy horse. The sec-
ond was alterations in the distribution and sizes of settlements caused 
by the reduction in transportation cost attributed to substitution of 
the heavy horse for the ox in overland transportation. Together. the 
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two phenomena resulted in increases in' the external economies of large 
urban scale and thus increases in urban agglomeration. 
An itinerant merchant made his appearance across Europe in the 
eighth and ninth centuries. His 1 ineage is not certain, but he and most 
of his retinue were probably former serfs or sons of serfs whose bondage 
could not be proven. The itinerant merchant as well as all of the traders 
involved in medieval and post-medieval European commerce were responding 
to the emerging economic productivities of Western Europe. However, their 
responses were themselves instrumental toward several important on-going 
changes. The first was the economic resurgence of European towns and the 
founding of new towns as medieval trading centers. The second was the 
gradual monetization of feudal obl igations. 
The itinerant merchant was the final link in a chain of commerce 
that commenced at Constantinople, Alexandria, and other Eastern Mediter-
ranean ports, and made a tortous journey through the great maritime 
cities of Venice, P;sa, and Genoa to the fair at Champagne and to the 
sma11er trading centers emerging in the European river valleys--Hamburg 
on the Elbe, Cologne on the Rhine, Paris on the Seine, London on the 
Thames. From those centers, the itinerant merchant peddled the silks, 
spices, precious metals, drugs, and finely-worked jewelry from the Orient 
to the nobil ity that occupied the castles and manors of Europe. The 
moneys he acquired in this way were used to purchase furs, honey, fish, 
wine, salt, timber, iron, and woolens which were returned over the same 
routes to be exchanged for more Oriental goods. 
Wherever a merchant stopped, he encamped his retinue on a site pro-
tected by a church, or a castle. In time, a permanent trading place grew 
outside the walls of those edifices. Such places soon became the nuclei 
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of small trading towns or bourgs, as they were called in France. The free 
men--burgesses or bourgeois--who inhabited the new burgs remained outside 
the manorial system, and there were no precedents founded on tradition to 
regulate their relationships with the fuedal nobility. Thus they formed 
the market institutions and developed the ceremonial arrangements that 
would eventually displace the fuedal order. For the first time the 
cities were not the outposts of central governments, as they had been in 
previous civilizations. Rather, they succeeded in maintaining their inde-
pendence ?utside the main structure of social power. 
The second change toward which the itinerant merchant was instru-
mental was the monetization of feudal obligations. Trade with itinerant 
merchants gave rise to demands for money as media of exchange. Indeed, 
much of the money was ultimately supplied through the buying transactions 
of the merchants themselves. However, the use of money d; d not end wi th 
the merchants. Gradually, over the centuries between 900 and 1400. most 
economic transactions were placed on a money basis. As a result, feudal 
servitude gave way to the payment of tallage (or taxes) by the vassal in 
exchange for the fief. Likewise, rents were paid in money for use of the 
lord1s lands. Finally, the lord commenced to reward serfs with money 
wages for work performed on the lord's demesne. The resulting monetary 
reci procities--wages for 1 abor, rent for 1 and, interest for money, and 
profit for entrepreneurship--pealed the death knell for the institutions 
of feudal society, and they were harbingers of a coming system of market 
institutions. 
The increase in agricultural productivity described in the early 
parts of this chapter drove agriculture prices down in relation to the 
prices of other goods. In international trade parlance, the corrunodity 
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terms of trade turned adverse to the primary producers. By the thirteenth 
century, the landed aristocracy found itself pinched between low rev-
enues and high prices. Many of the nobles sought relief by enclosing 
and farming the COJ1111Cr. lands, and denying use of those lands as pastures 
for the peasants to graze their stock. Moreover, the fecundity of 
peasant families and the practice of dividing and distributing a peasant's 
arable strips among his sons· was making it increasingly difficult for 
peasants to support themselves, and they were gradually pressed off the 
land. Entire hamlets were wiped out in England where tenants were some-
times simply thrown off the land. The dispossessed tenants became a land-
less labor force compelled to work for wages wherever work might be found. 
These events coincided to produce the food and fiber and the labor 
resources needed to support an expansion in urban employments. Peasants, 
finding no gainful opportunities for agricultural vocations. migrated to 
villages where they became the cadres from which the increasing demands 
for urban services were supplied, and they eventually specialized in the 
secondary employments that abound in urban settlements. They became 
millers, bakers, wagoners, cartwrights. weavers, tailors, shoemakers, 
sell ers, music; ans, smiths. carpenters, masons, butchers, teachers. 
clerics, constables, and the host of other specialists that populate the 
institutions that agglomerate at urban places. 
Not only dispossessed tenants, but peasants who continued to farm 
found urban 1 iving preferable as well. Historical geographers investiga-
ting demographic changes in Germany found that peasants were abandoning 
their settlements but not their fields starting in the eleventh century 
and continuing with greater frequency into the thirteenth century. The 
peasants were moving to nearby cities and villages and commuting to their 
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fields each day during planting and harvesting seasons. Clearly, the 
improved transportati on technology was the enabl i ng factor. As long as 
peasants must rely on the slow and plodding oxen as their means of trans-
portation, they must 1 ive close to their fields. However, use of the 
much faster horse allowed the peasants to commute greater distances in 
the same amount of time as before. 
Thus, the shift from oxen to equestrian-based transportation led to 
the urbanization of German peasants. The advantages to the peasants were 
many-fold. Life in a rural hamlet of ten or twelve peasant families was 
drab, indeed. On the other hand, life in a large village of a hundred or 
more families gave one access to a large church. perhaps a church school, 
a tavern, better security against marauders, merchants with a greater 
variety of goods and services. more frequent and accurate news of national 
and international events, and other urban amenities. ll 
It ;s hard to imagine a more revolutionary change in the family 
institution than occurred with urbanization. A rural family was much 
more isolated, independent, and self-sufficient than an urban family. 
This meant that the family produced most of its own food and clothing. 
Governance, education, and worship were directed by the elders of the 
family. Chi'ld delivery, health care, and burial of the dead were all 
internal functions of the rural family. The isolation of a rural family 
in medieval times caused its members to be almost entirely dependent upon 
the family for their living needs. And the responsibilities of the 
family elders in such isolation endowed the elders with great paternal 
authority. 
On the other hand, the same family removed to an urban setting 
finds paternal authorities traumatical1y eroded. The family is no longer 
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isolated, self-sufficient, or independent. It now lives in close prox-
imity with many di fferent fami 1 i es. The goods and servi ces provi ded for 
itself by the rural family are provided by other specialized institutions 
external to the urban family, and the family must pay for the goods and 
services from money wages earned in employments outside the family. Food 
and clothing are suppl ied through retail merchants in the town, and gover-
nance is carried on by a municipal administration. Education is provided 
by schools, and worship is done in a church. Child delivery may still 
take plac~ in the home, but it is most likely assisted by a midwife who 
has no blood relationship with the family. Health care is provided by 
hospitals, medical doctors, and nurses, and burial of the dead is done 
in a churchyard or other community burial plot. 
The point is that the potency of the fami ly as an institution is 
greatly diminished in an urban setting, vis a rural setting, because of 
the plethora of other specialized institutions which exist in urban areas. 
Those institutions simply take over many of the functions that were per-
formed by the family in isolation. The members of an urban family learn 
to rely on institutions outside the family, and they are therefore no 
longer solely dependent on the family for most of their 1 iving needs. 
The paradox is that urban family interdependence leads to intrafamily 
independence, and to diminution of rural family cohesion and erosion of 
rural paternal authority. Urbanization of European peasants was indeed 
revolutionary. 
Here again, the external economies of large urban scale and the 
urban agglomeration it produced in medieval Europe is traced to innova-
tion and diffusion of the heavy plow and the heavy horse in agriculture 
and to subsequent use of the horse in commercial draught. Those 
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technical improvements led to an agricultural surplus, and, at the same 
time 1 iberated many peasants from agricul tura 1 vocations. The former 
peasant farmers migrated to urban settings where they specialized in sec-
ondary employments and staffed the myriad of institutions that agglomera-
ted there in response to the economic stimulus created by the increased 
agricultural productiviti es. 
Urban Growth 
While the cultural integration of the heavy plow and the heavy 
horse impacted initially on the internal economies of large-scale produc-
tion in agriculture, the secondary and on-going effects had to do with 
the external economies of location and urban scale, and thus with the 
sizes and distribution of urban settlements, the rural to urban migrations, 
and urban growth. The sizes and distribution of urban settlements, and 
the rural to urban migrations were described above. This section elab-
orates the phenomenon of urban growth in medieval Europe as an on-going 
consequence of the new technologies in agriculture. 
The fact of urban growth in medieval Europe was, of course, 
implicit in both of the preceding sections. The villages that survived 
the redistribution of settlements occasioned by the decrease in overland 
transportation costs grew by simply absorbing both the populations and 
the commerces of the defunct hamlets. Likewise, rural to urban migra-
tions further swelled urban populations. Indeed, the populations of 
medieval urban centers did not grow from within, but expanded because of 
migrations. However, there had to be more to urban growth than simply 
population increases. There had to be some kind of economic basis to 
expand urban employments so that the new urban dwellers could be 
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accommodated, 
The explanation of urban growth in medieval Europe is found in the 
interregional trade and exchange relations in which the itinerant 
merchant described above was a key figure, A section of the preceding 
chapter dealt with comparative advantage, interfamily specialization, 
and trade in the context of central-place theory. Precisely the same 
principles apply to interregional and international trade, Just as 
persons possess differential aptitudes and tool-using skills, so regions 
possess 9ifferent resource or factor endowments. That is, the quantity, 
or quality, or both quantity and quality of land, labor', capital, and 
entrepreneurship are different from region to region. 
Even if this were not so with labor, capital, and 
entrepreneurshi p--whi ch are mobil e in varying degrees and coul d 
theoretically be distributed uniformly over the lando-variations in the 
productivity of land resources alone would differentiate regions from 
one another. This is because land is heterogeneous, absolutely finite. 
and absolutely immobile. And insofar as labor, capital, and entre-
preneurship are allocated at least in part according to land produc-
tivities, it is unlikely that they will be uniformly distributed across 
regions--or, for that matter, uniformly within a particular region. 
Each region would, therefore, possess particular advantages and 
di sadvantages o.s compared to other regions. and each woul d eventually 
specialize in the production of those goods and services in which it had 
a comparative advantage. ~loreover, it would trade parts of its special-
ized outputs with other regions for the goods and services foregone in 
speci a 1 izi ng its own productions. Greater eff; c; ency and wel fare are 
presumably achieved, as international trade theory attempts to 
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demonstrate, by international and interregional specializations based on 
the principle of comparative advantage. And once the residents of a 
region seek to improve their efficiency through specialization, they 
forego self-sufficiency and economic independence. They become one 
segment of an inter-dependent web of specialized economic regions, each 
one of which is dependent on all others. 
And so it was in medieval Europe and between Europe and the 
cultures of the Eastern Mediterranean. The itinerant merchants became 
the burgesses of Europe, and they continued to mark up and sell Oriental 
silks, spices, drugs, jewelry. and precious metals and stones to the 
nobility. Moreover, they continued to buy food stuffs, fabrics, and 
building materials from the manors, and they sold those goods to the 
oriental cultures at handsome profits. In short, the burgs enjoyed very 
favorable balances of payments while the Eastern cultures were suffering 
a net outflow of exchange, and the European nobility were slowly becom-
ing impoverished. It was the net injection of exchange payments that 
created the economic base for urban expansion in medieval Europe. 
The key to understanding why and how interregional trade and 
exchange resulted in urban growth is to understand the principle of the 
export-base mul ti pl ier in economic-base theory.12 Accardi ng to economi c-
base theory, productive activities in a city and its hinterlands may be 
divided into export-base (basic) and local-base (non-basic) industries. 
Export-base industries produce primarily for export to other cities and 
regions while local-base industries produce only goods and services that 
are consumed locally. Local-base industries are therefore those produc-
tive activities that generate the external economies of urban scale 
which cause agglomeration. On the other hand, it ;s the export-base 
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industries of a city that generate the revenues from outside the region 
that cause economic growth of a city, including growth of the local-
base industries within its boundaries and hinterlands. 
The export-base multiplier is the ratio of the change in total 
regional employment to the change in export-base employment. In other 
words, it states the change induced in total employment by the addition 
of one employee to an export-base industry. The export-base multiplier 
may also be understood solely in terms of regional incomes. The levels 
of regional incomes and regional employments are directly related, and 
it matters 1 ittle which statistic is emphasized. However. it is desired 
to explain here how rurai-to-urban migrations resulted in part from the 
rapid and SUbstantial increases in urban employment opportunities over 
much of medieval Europe. Thus, the export-base multiplier will be des-
cribed here emphasizing the employment effects. 
The multiplier relates export base to urban growth as follows: 
For some reason an economic demand is initiated from outside a region for 
products produced in the reg; on. Thi 5 gi ves ri se to a demand ; n the 
region for the resources needed to produce the products to be exported. 
This, of course, includes an increase in the demand for units of labor 
to carry out the production. The increased demand for labor will be met 
either from unemployed persons in the region or by the migration of labor 
into the region, or both. The added employee will. of course, receive 
wages from his employer, .,nd the employer will pay the wages from the 
revenues he receives from selling the product outside the region. The 
wages paid the new employee, as well as payments made to other factors 
involved in the production, are injections of buying power into the region. 
The new workers wi 11 use their wages to pay 1 i vi ng expenses, perhaps 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
338 
including the purchase of some items imported from outside the region. 
The payments for imported goods are ultimately made to vendors outside 
the region, and the moneys so paid are therefore leaked from the region's 
income stream. The new workers may also save part of their wages, and 
insofar as their savings do not go directly to merchants inside the 
region, they too are leaked from the income stream. However, their pay-
ments to defray 1 iving expenses remain in the region's income stream 
because they are made to landlords, vendors, and tradesmen within the 
region, i~creasing the demand for the goods and services supplied by the 
local-base businesses and employees. 
Each person receiving payments from the new employees will 1 ikewise 
spend part and save part. This process will continue through many spend-
ing-saving revolutions until funds equal to the entire original injec-
tion have leaked away to savings or to payments for goods imported from 
outside the region. After all spending and saving initiated by the 
original injection have ended, it will be found that the full value of 
additional regional income generated is several times the value of new 
export revenue. Likewise, it will be found that the new regional income 
is supporting local-base employees that are several times the number of 
employees added by export-base industries to meet the new external demands 
for thei r goods. 
The key element here is what economists call the marginal propen-
sity for local consumers to consume locally-produced goods and services. 
The greater that propensity is, the greater is the export-base multiplier. 
In other words, leakages to savings and to payments for imported goods 
weaken the power of the multipl ier. There are, of course, other reasons 
why communities might wish to have high propensities to save and to import. 
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However, those reasons are beyond the matter at hand, and it is sufficient 
for this analysis to recognize that the latter propensities dampen the 
expansive effects of new export revenues. Export-base multip1 iers are 
found to range from slightly less than three to slightly less than seven 
in modern times, with the higher multipliers associated with the larger 
cities. Larger cities have higher export-base multip1 iers because their 
citizens have higher propensities to consume local goods. This is 
apparently because larger cities have well-developed local bases that are 
capable a! producing much of what the residents of such cities consume. 
An example of the expansive powers of a vigorous export base is 
found in Flanders. The usual populations of towns in medieval Flanders--
Northeastern France., Belgium, and Southern Holland--was from 2,000 to 
6,000 persons. However, the populations of Ypres, Bruges, and Ghent 
each swelled to more than 35,000 persons. These latter cities gained 
their prominences from specializing in weaving and exporting fine woolen 
textiles. Incidently, much of the raw wool was imported from England 
where the nobility had created "sheepwa1ks" by enclosing and depriving 
the peasants' use of manorial common lands. Some notion of the rapid 
growth in export revenues is evi dent in Ypres where the number of 1 ead 
seal s attached to the fabrics produced by its weavers increased from 
10,500 in 1306 to 92,500 in 1313. Likewise, loanable funds became so 
abundant in Lubeck, the Hanseatic League city to the north of Flanders. 
that the rate of interest dropped from 10 to 5% in the preceding twenty 
or so years, reflecting a substantial injection of payments made for 
exported goods. 13 
It is perhaps not wise to over general ize on such data. However, 
economic-base theory suggests a causal relationship between the surge in 
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the export of woolen fabrics and the growth in the populations of Ypres 
and the other major textile-producing cities of Flanders. If one 
assumes that those cities would have grown to something 1 ike the average 
of other towns in Flanders, their growths would have arrested at popula-
tions of only 4,000. However, their populations grew to nearly ten 
times that number. And it was growth of the employment opportunities 
in such exporting cit';es as Ypres, Ghent, and Bruges that attracted 
medieval peasants into migration from rural to urban areas. 
Of course medieval urban growth was much less a blessing than has 
been suggested here. The warfare, famine, and pestilence that 
periodically swept across medieval Europe was cited above, and rural-
to urban-migration resulted in concentrated populations that were 
particularly vulnerable to those maladies. Indeed, by the time of the 
Black Death in 134B, migrations had clearly resulted in the over-
expansion of urban centers, and the ensuing retrenchment lasted nearly 
300 years. Nevertheless, the urbanization that took place between the 
tenth and thirteenth centuries in Europe set the stage for the 
Industrial Revolution that commenced in the nineteenth century.14 
The argument here runs as follows: Urban agglomeration and growth 
in medieval Europe was possible because of exchange payments generated by 
interregional trade. Interregional trade was possi ble because of regional 
specializations rising to take advantage of internal economies of large-
scale production. Regional specializations were possible because of 
technical improvements that lowered the costs of transportation and 
widened the markets for specialized products, and because of the agri-
cultural surpluses that allowed some peasants to abandon agricultural 
employments and specialize in the urban employments on which the trade 
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flourished. And the surpluses were possible because the heavy plow and 
the heavy horse were innovated in Medieval European agriculture. Thus, 
the causal ity is traced once again to the increased productivity attri-
buted to important technical improvements--improvements that allowed 
tools to more effectively substitute for human labor 1n the production of 
goods and services having human value. 
TECHNOLOGY AND PROGRESS 
The .previous chapter described the dynamic qual ities of technology. 
The innovation of new technology is dynamic because it induces change by 
permitting means to be organized in ways differing from the traditional 
methods descended from the past. That is, it enabl es soci ety to secure 
future ends with the expenditure of fewer present means, and it sometimes 
brings desirable future ends within human reach that were previously 
beyond known means. Thi s ultimately reduces the amount of human effort 
required to secure future ends. In other words, it decreases the man 
hours of labor input per unit of output of goods and services having 
human value. It accomplishes this by enabling the tools embodying the 
new technology to substitute for more units of human labor in production 
processes. 
It has been argued in this chapter that technology is also progres-
sive. Technology is progressive because it is forward-urging in terms of 
the ends-means continuum. By forward-urging, it is meant that technology 
is oriented toward future human ends--but more than that, future ends 
that improve upon human welfare. Such improvement is possible because 
of the dynamic quality of technology described above. The great strides 
in human progress were those sequences of events that produced substantial 
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improvements in human conditions, whether the improvements were seen as 
reductions in human travail, declines in famine and disease, or increases 
in human longevity. Whatever the gains, the events that produced them 
were sol idly based on antecedent technological advances. The point is 
that human progress is ultimately keyed to technical progress, and it 
is in this sense that technology is progressive. 
However, the progressive qual ities of technology are not real ized 
until newly innovated technologies are diffused and integrated. It is 
not enoug~ to simply innovate new technologies. Society itself must be 
restructured to exploit the new technologies if their full benefits are 
to be realized. It is the integration process that brings forth the 
institutional changes involved with social structure. It often takes 
centuries to achieve full integration of pervasive technologies; to adapt 
human skills, to embellish the technical devices, to perfect the techniques 
required to effectively employ the tools embodying the new technologies, 
and to alter distributional arrangements so that everyone enjoys his full 
share of the benefits created in the process. 
This chapter has been an attempt to illustrate the progressive 
character of technological diffusion and integration by describing some 
of the institutional changes resulting from development of the heavy plow 
and the heavy horse in medieval European agriculture. Those technologies 
produced internal economies of large-scale production that improved agri-
cultural production, all at once creating a substantial surplus of food 
and fiber, and 1 iberating many peasants from farming and forcing them to 
migrate to urban centers where they eventually specialized in secondary 
employments. The new plow and horse technologies therefore created the 
environing conditions for urban agglomeration as well. Of course, there 
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were other technical improvements in the medieval period that similarly 
facilitated craft specializations. Such improvements have only been 
impl ied in the preceding descriptions, and while it is not intended to 
slight the latter it has been enough to trace out the progressive con-
sequences of the heavy plow and the heavy horse. 
The point is that the plow and horse technologies that were new to 
medieval Europe altered interinstitutional relationships so that some 
institutions were not completely complimentary in the institutional 
system. Certain ceremonial practices based on particular institutional 
values became obstacles before the new technologies. Social tensions 
resulted as the institutional system at first opposed and then adjusted 
itself to the new technologies. The details of the adjustment process 
were not expl icitly described--indeed, archeology and history do not 
deliver those details up from the medieval period with any degree of 
clarity. Those processual details could only be inferred from the cir-
cumstances. However, the apparent effects, the resul ting i nstituti ana 1 
changes, could be described with some degree of certainty. 
At any rate, the social instability preCipitated by innovation and 
exacerbated by integration of the heavy plow and the heavy horse abated 
only when diffusion and integration of the new technologies were complete. 
Integration was not complete until the technologies were accommodated by 
the institutional system, and al1 institutions were once again in harmony. 
That did not happen until ce'(emonies and ceremonial statuses were altered 
to account for the new technologies. 
Complete integration resulted in a new social stability in which 
institutional powers were redistributed in congruity with the new tech-
nologies. Some institutions acquired greater power while others suffered 
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diminished power. Some old institutions disappeared and some new insti-
tutions came into being. It was social revolution initiated and carried 
through by technological change that produced institutional discontin-
uities in the medieval period--as well as in all other periods. And it 
was the post-revolution stability in which the full benefits of the 
integrated technologies were realized. But it was the future genera-
tions that based their own progressions on the medieval technologies 
that achieved the full measure of benefits. It is the nature of 
technical progress that one generation's technical accompl i shments are 
all at once founded on those of previous generations and become the 
foundation for technical progress by future generations. As technology 
is continuous, technical progress is also continuous. 
This concludes description of the technology component of insti-
tutional economic theory as it is interpreted by this author. Chap-
ter VI defined technology as that qual ity of a tool that enables it to 
be substituted for human effort in the creation of goods and services 
having human value. Moreover, it distinguished technology from tech-
nique and hUman skill. Chapter VII described technological continuity 
and related it to scientific discovery and invention. Likewise, 
Chapter VII described technological dynamism--the power to initiate 
change--and related it to the process of innovation. And the present 
chapter described the progressive qualities of technology and related 
them to processes of social diffusion and integration. 
This and the preceding two chapters have described technology and 
its relationship to the ends-means continuum--the continuum of on-going 
life processes. Likewise, the next preceding two chapters, Chapters IV 
and V, described ceremonialism and its relationship to the continuum, 
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and the continuum itself was described in Chapter III. The question 
remaining unanswered in all of this is how the tensions between forward-
urging technology and backward-clinging ceremonialism are resolved. 
The remaining two content chapters deal with that question. 
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URBAN VALUATIONS 
Considerable verbiage has been invested to this point in 
distinguishing the technological aspect of human culture from the 
ceremonial aspect, and in showing how each aspect relates to the 
continuum of on-going life processes, the end-means continuum. To 
repeat once again, ceremonialism is backward-reaching while technology 
is forward-urging in relation to the continuum. Thus, the ceremonial 
and technological aspects of culture are pitted against one another 
regarding the selection of future ends-to-be-reached and the means to 
be employed to secure the selected ends. 
Parts of the preceding two chapters have dealt with the conflict 
between ceremonialism and technology in the context of urbanization in 
Western Civilization. Attention was focused on the powers of new 
technologies to bring about institutional changes in the face of 
ceremonial practices that were systematically weakened by social 
calamities. It was possible to infer the social choices from the 
consequent circumstances--in other words, to reconstruct the probable 
causes from the observable effects. However, practically nothing was 
said about the political and economic processes for resolving the 
tensions between ceremonial ism and technology into institutional 
change and social progress. 
And yet it cannot be doubted that the revolutionary changes 
emerged in the wake of del iberate human choices made after reflections 
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on the costs and probable benefits of the alternatives open to choice. 
Unfortunately. little is found in the literature to inform the present 
of precisely what costs and benefits were perceived by monarchs or 
peasants in arriving at chosen courses of action. Attempting to impute 
from observable circumstances the particular valuations they made in 
arriving at decisions would involve the most sheer speculations. 
Therefore there will be no attempt here to embell ish the events 
described in the preceding chapter with speculations on how medieval 
decision-makers perceived their alternatives, or how much weight they 
assigned to the particular benefits and costs they might have 
cons i dered. 
However, much social change has occurred between the medieval 
and modern eras. The technological progress and institutional changes 
secured in the Dark Ages formed the base from which the Industrial 
Revolution was launched. And the Industrial Revolution, ',oIhich is a 
stage of the technical revolution that has been underway from the 
beginning of man, is still in progress. Much has obviously happened 
between then and now, not least of which is enormous gains in human 
welfare carried forth by the revolutionary powers of technological 
change. 
Much of the western world has become industrialized during the 
intervening period. Many of the feudal cities of Roman Gaul have 
become the industrial cities of Europe. The use of draft animals to 
power agricultural equipment and commercial transport vehicles has 
given way to the use of mechanical power devices. Mechanical power 
equipment and electronic-control devices have replaced men in manu-
facturing~ moving society from reliance on scarce and costly hand-
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crafted products to an abundance of relatively low-priced goods and 
services which are mass produced in industrial processes. 
Moreover, technical changes occur much more rapidly in the 
present age than at any other time in the history of man. This is 
partly because of preceding technological developments that have 
decreased the costs of communication and therefore the costs of 
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knowledge. One effect has been to spur invention by heightening 
technological cross-fertilization. Another effect has been to further 
weaken the powers of ceremonialism to resist technological innovation 
by raising expectations of change and reducing the fears of technical 
progress and institutional changes in the minds of persons who will 
bear the costs as well as enjoy the benefits of change. And yet 
another effect has been to shorten the time required to achieve the 
cultural diffusion and integration of new technologies. All of these 
changes are themselves the effects of technological developments--the 
most important of which is innovation and integration of electronic 
communi cat; on equ; pment. 1 
The foregoing effects also result from another feature of 
industrial societies that distinguish them from feudal societies. The 
feature is that technical change is at le~st partly institutional ized 
in industrial societies. By this, it is meant that members of such 
societies expect some technological development in the form of 
technical changes that produce net positive social benefits or a 
surplus of benefits over costs in the long run. Thus, ceremonial 
practices in industrial societies are directed more toward control-
ling technical change than toward stopping it all together. This means 
neither that ceremonialism ;s absent under industrialism nor that the 
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inherent tensions between ceremonialism and technology no longer exist. 
Rather, it simply means that ceremonialism is deliberately weakened 
vis-a-vis the powers of technology in an industrial system. 
Since industrial society ls a present reality, much more is 
known about its techniques of social choice, and it therefore serves 
as a better object for the study of socla1 choice than medieval 
society. This chapter and the next examine the cultural mechanisms 
for making social choices in an industrial society--choices that 
resolve the tensions between ceremonial ism and technology into 
technical change and social progress. This chapter considers the 
institutionalized criterion of valuation in selecting ends and 
organizing means, drawing primarily from orthodox economic theory--
particularly from welfare economics and the economics of public choice. 
The next chapter examines the processes of social choice in an 
industrial society, drawing from elements of pluralist political 
theory and from institutional economic theory. 
The principal idea in the present chapter is that attitudes 
toward value in an industrial society are as multifarious and disparate 
as society is pluralistic, and there is no simple or direct method to 
structure and wei gh val ues in choosi ng between competing future ends 
and between alternative methods for employing present means toward 
whatever ends are selected. The first part of the chapter looks 
briefly at values and welfare in the context of choosing. The remain-
ing parts examine aspects of benefit-cost analysis in terms of the 
values described in the first part. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
VALUES AND WELFARE 
Values 
The concept of value is simple to understand, but its applica-
tions lead to inordinate complexities. Value is that quality of a 
thing or state-of-affairs that distinguishes it as more or less 
desirable. So-called subjectivists in the philosophy of axiology 
argue that anything about which anyone has concern possesses value. 2 
On the other hand, so-called metaphysical objectivists claim that 
things are desiY'ed because they have value. 3 Finally, logical 
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objectivists believe there can be no logical or ontological theory of 
value, only a theory of valuation. 4 It matters little which idea one 
subscribes to because each one allows valuations across an enormous 
range, and it admits a myriad of competing values and conflicting 
interests--particularly in the pluralist societies that characterize 
industrial nations. 
Society is an environment of great contrasts. It is a source of 
humane compassion and a refuse heap for human dereliction. It is a11-
at-once a source of ecstatic pleasures and excruciating pains, of 
great creativity and terrible waste. of resounding hope and crushing 
despair, of glorious successes and dismal failures, of grand and 
auspicious wealth and abject poverty, of abiding love and vicious hate. 
In short, it is many diverse things to many diverse people. 
Likewise, industrial society is composed of disparate creatures--
fat, thin, tall, and short--male and female--young and old--black, 
white, and almost every variation between--rich and poor--educated 
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and not-so educated--a society of creatures common in their humaneness 
or lack of it. All have aspirations, hopes, fears, and despairs. Each 
loves and hates and experiences varieties of pleasure and pain. Each 
is an individual effect of prior causes (deliberate or accidental), 
and he is a means (l ike it or not) to future ends--though hardly the 
only means. How he is organized toward the future depends not only on 
the causes that brought him and his environment into being, but also 
on the choices made by the pluralistic, institutional society of which 
he is a part as well as the decisions he himself made on those choices 
1 eft open to him. 
Both individual and collective choices involve the selection of 
future ends-to-be-reached, and the employment of means toward the 
attainment of those future ends. Such choices are necessarily 
structured by the values people hold. And those values are partly 
functions of the ceremonial causes and effects which transmit culture, 
social ize persons to their institutional roles, control social 
interactions, and thereby maintain social stability. In short, the 
attitudes of people about values and the valuing of competing future 
ends and alternative ways to employ means are mostly the products of 
the institutional system described in Chapters II. IV, and V above. 
Reca 11 i ng from Chapter I I : 
An institution is an organized social group that has evolved 
from and is united with some particular system of cultural 
values. and it serves through processes of social control to 
stabilize social interaction by preserving and perpetuating 
those values in the society of which the institution is a part. 
Industrial society is essentially an urban one, and since an 
urban area ;s Simply one at which many highly special ized institutions 
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have agglomerated, it follows that industrial society is a value-
charged environment. It is an environment that is charged with tech-
nical values, pecuniary values, ethical values, and aesthetic values--
a matrix of values as various and complex as the institutions that 
agglomerate in urban areas, and as the people who populate the 
institutions and espouse their ceremonial values. 
There may be little argument with such technical values as water 
freezes at sea level when the temperature drops below zero degrees 
centigrade. And there may be substantial agreement as to pecuniary 
or economic valuations ordered out in market places as prices, wages, 
rents, profits, etc. However, such pecuniary valuations may be 
challenged as unjust on ethical, moral, or social grounds. Likewise, 
ethical or social considerations might be challenged on aesthetic or 
intrinsic grounds. And aesthetic valuations might be condemned on 
moral or ethical grounds. Industrial society, therefore, abounds with 
clashes between values, each one vying for preeminence in weighting 
choices for and against particular sets of competing future ends and 
al ternative ways of organizing means. 
The point ;s that peoples ' attitudes about values and valuing in 
an industrial society are as multifarious and disparate as society ;s 
pluralistic, and some method must be found to resolve conflicting 
interests in a selection of social ends and allocation of means that 
maximizes social welfare. The method commonly used is some variation 
of benefit-cost analysis. Before taking up benefit-cost analysis, 
however, the question of welfare criteria must be examined in the 
context of choosing from competing ends and from alternative techniques 
for employing means. 
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Social Welfare 
Welfare is simply a state of being or doing well, and it applies 
in this case to conditions of human health, prosperity, and happiness. 
Thus social welfare has to do with the health, prosperity, and 
happiness of society as a whole. Economists are preoccupied with a so-
called social-welfare function. The social-welfare function is a gross 
abstraction, the derivation of which is found in orthodox micro-
economic theory. Time and space do not allow for a rigorous explica-
tion of the underlying microeconomic theory. However, a brief summary 
of the major premises of the applicable welfare economic theory is 
necessary and possible. It is necessary because the theories 
implicitly pervade the thinking of most modern policy-makers. 
The entire framework of welfare economics rests on several 
simplifying aS5umptions--some explicit and some implicit. The follow-
ing list of assumptions and deductions therefrom is not exhaustive. 5 
1. People achieve satisfaction (or utility, or happiness) in 
the consumption of goods and services. (Note that "services H admits 
to happiness in human experiences which are not narrowly construed as 
material or pecuniary). Persons will therefore attempt to maximize 
their satisfactions while attempting to minimize the costs (or 
disutil ity) to them of securing those satisfactions. 
2. The human animal is hedonistic so that, in the long run, 
his wants are insatiable. Thus, human wants are potentially infinite. 
3. On the other hand, most of the resource-means from which 
human wants are satisfied are finite in nature. and they are therefore 
scarce. Thus, it is important to allocate scarce resource means in 
such a way that the greatest possible hUman satisfactions are attained. 
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allocation of resources is attained. 6 A Pareto-optimal allocation 
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exists when resources have been allocated in such a way that it is not 
possible to increase anyone's satisfaction (or improve his welfare) 
without detracting from some other person's satisfaction (or welfare). 
A Pareto-optimal allocation cannot be improved in terms of efficiency 
criteria. However, such an allocation may be improved in terms of 
equity criteria if goods and services are redistributed in such a way 
that the gaining persons value their gains more than the losing 
persons value their losses. 7 
5. The economic system functions to allocate scarce resources to 
competing human wants. A market economy carries out its allocative 
function by an exchange system based on the price interaction of the 
supply of and the demand for goods and services. (The term Tlprice ll is 
generally conceived in a pecuniary or monetary connotation when used 
in connection with an economic system. However, its use is not 
restricted to pecuniary appl ications. The price anyone pays for some-
thing is really those other things he gives up or "trades off ll to 
secure the good or service he acquires). 
6. Allocative efficiency in the way of Pareto criteria can 
only be achieved in a perfectly competitive market economy. The 
conditions necessary for a perfectly competitive economy are: Products 
must be homogeneous. All market agents must be price takers--not price 
searchers. This is usually thought to exist when there are many 
sellers and many buyers such that the actions of anyone seller or any 
one buyer will not affect the market price. Moreover, there must be 
perfect market knowledge on the part of every market agent. Finally, 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
356 
there must be perfect factor mobil ity 50 that resources may move into 
or out of the production of any good or service according to market 
conditions. This also means that there can be no barriers to entry 
of any firm into any industry. 
7. A perfectly competitive market system distributes income on 
the basis of the supply of and demand for the resource receiving the 
income. The demand for a productive resource is the marginal revenue 
product of the resource. The marginal revenue product of a resource 
is the net addition to the manufacturer I 5 total revenue occasioned by 
the addition of one more unit of the productive resource. A wage 
that is simultaneously equal to the marginal revenue product (demand) 
and the average cost (supply) of a productive resource is an efficient 
and equitable wage. Thus, an efficient distribution of income is an 
equitable distribution in such a system. Which is to say that if 
income is to be redistributed according to some other concept of 
equity, such redistribution is extra-market. 
8. Human satisfactions can be maximized subject to available 
resources if perfectly competitive conditions prevail and if the entire 
system is in a state of general equi1ibrium--that is, if there are no 
economic incentives for changes anywhere in the system. 8 
9. Production is said to be in a Pareto-maximum general 
equilibrium when the marginal rate of technical substitution between 
every set of inputs is the same for all producers using the inputs. 
The marginal rate of technica1 substitution is simply the amount by 
which one productive input must be reduced per unit of increase in 
another productive input such that a constant rate of productive output 
is maintained. 
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10. A production possibility frontier (or transformation curve) 
reflecting the number of units by which the production of one good 
must be decreased in order to expand the production of other goods, is 
derived from the foregoing. The production possibil ity curve shows 
the maximum attainable output of one commodity for every possible level 
of output of other commodities. given the finite resource pool. 
11. A Pareto-maximum general equil ibrium of exchange occurs 
within the constraint of the production possibility frontier where the 
marginal rate of substitution between every set of goods is the same 
for all parties consuming the goods. The marginal rate of substitution 
is simply the number of units of one good that one consumer must 
sacrifice per unit gain of other goods so that a constant level of 
satisfaction is maintained. The marginal rate of substitution for 
exchange partners must equal the marginal rate of transformation on 
the production pass i bil ity frontier. There is one unique exchange 
equil ibrium for every pOint on the production possibil ity frontier. 
12. A utility-possibility frontier reflecting the maximum level 
of satisfaction attainable by one exchange partner for every level of 
satisfaction of other exchange partners is constructed from the above 
exchange sol utions. The outward-most reach of a family of util ity-
possibility frontiers is called the grand utility possibility frontier. 
13. A socia1-we1fare function is assumed to exist. The social-
welfare function is presumably an aggregation of the individual 
preference functions of all members of society. and it therefore 
possesses the properties of an individual preference function (or 
indifference map). An indifference map is a graphic representation 
of a family of indifference curves. An indifference curve is a locus 
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combination of which renders the same level of satisfaction. 
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14. Maximum social welfare is achieved where a social 
indifference curve (a component of the social welfare function) is 
tangent to the grand utility possibllity frontier. The point of 
tangency is called the point of "constrained bliss" because it is the 
one and only Pareto-optimal organization of production and exchange 
that maximizes human satisfaction throughout society subject to the 
availability of resources. 
The foregoing is a bare-bones outline of the principal tenets of 
welfare economics. As the reader can see, the theories involve a high 
degree of abstraction. However, all theories are abstractional made 
from reality for purposes of explaining past causes and effects. Such 
abstractions are theories that can be used to predict future outcomes 
of present actions, and to prescribe present actions to effect desired 
future outcomes. The marks of good theory are therefore i nterna 1 
consistency, emp.irical validity, and relevancy, or predictive accuracy. 
It can be shown that welfare economics fares very well in tests 
of internal consistency. By internal consistency· it is meant that a 
theory is free of contradictions whereby one or more components of the 
theory are incongruent with the major premises of the theory. Welfare 
economics and the microeconomic theories upon which it is based are 
virtual paragons of internal consistency, and no significant defects 
may be cited from that quarter to sully the theories. What then of the 
other tests of good theory? Can welfare economics stand the tests of 
empirical validity and predictive accuracy? It is found that the 
principal defects with welfare economics stem from a lack of empirical 
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suspect--no matter how consistent the theory mi ght be internally. 
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Welfare economics suffers from a dearth of empirical verification. 
The two major defects of welfare economics are the requirement that 
markets be perfectly competitive, and the assumption of a social-OJelfare 
function. Other related difficulties that plague the theory are the 
high-jevel of abstraction, the static approach to analYSiS, and the 
stress of pecuniary valuations. That which follows will deal with 
the relatively minor defects first and end with discussion of the two 
maj or defects. 
It has already been noted that a theory is an abstraction from 
real ity made for purposes of explaining and applying causal relation-
ships. Thus, an abstraction is a generalization that ;s assumed into 
existence to explain reality. A theory ;s defective if it is based an 
abstractions or assumed general izations that do not, in fact, explain 
real ity, or they describe some empirically verifiable but minute 
aspect of reality, and they are advanced as a total explanation of 
reality. No matter how attractive a theory might be intuitively. it 
is an intellectual exercise of 1 ittle practical value if it cannot be 
verified empirically. As will soon be clear, this is a problem with 
welfare economics. The level of abstraction so removes welfare 
economic theory from reality that the theory is of little practical 
value. 
A second and related defect of welfare economic theory is that 
it is a static form of analysis used to explain an essentially dynamic 
reality. The whole notion of equilibrium is that of a stable state--
a state of being in wrlich there are no operant forces for change. In 
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the so-called state of general equilibrium on which the concept of 
social welfare is partly based, the whole of society is theoretically. 
at rest. There are no economic incentives for change anywhere. The 
whole notion is manifestly false because the real world abounds with 
forces pressing for change. That is, the real world is inherently a 
dynamic environment. It is constantly, if sometimes slowly, in a state 
of change. No matter how attractive the general equil ibrium 
abstraction, it ;s defective because it attempts to relate the real 
world in purely static terms. 
A third defect of welfare economics is the implicit elevation of 
pecuniary valuations over other forms of valuation. It must be 
admitted, however, that welfare economics need not be couched solely 
in the pecuniary frame of reference. But, as a practical matter, the 
underlying economic theories are most instrumental in explaining human 
interactions in pecuniary tenns. This is no doubt because pecuniary 
valuations are far and away the easiest to recognize in market terms 
and to veri fy empiri cally. Pecuni ary val uati ons are therefore often 
used. however imperfectly. as proxies for technical, aesthetic, and 
ethical valuations. The point, however, is that not all values can be 
reduced to money prices. Pecuni ary val uati ons, no matter how practi cal 
or well substanti ated, are very poor surrogates for other forms of 
va 1 uation. And insofar as wel fare economics rel i es upon pecuni ary 
valuations. it offers a poor explanation of realities that abound in 
technical, aesthetic, ethical, and other values. This idea is 
elaborated much more fully under "external benefits and costs II below. 
A major defect of welfare economics is the deductive conclusion 
that a Pareto-efficient allo~ation can be achieved only in a perfectly 
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competitive economy. This is tantamount to declaring that a Pareto-
efficient allocation cannot be achieved simply because perfectly 
competitive markets are impossible of achievement in modern, industrial 
economies. And perfectly competitive markets cannot be achieved 
because the conditions necessary for existence of perfect competition 
do not ex; st. 
For example, products are simply not homogeneous. Near perfect 
homogeneity exists with fungible goods such as wheat. sugar. and crude 
oil. However, even fungible goods are differentiated by qualities and 
conditions. Moreover. very few goods are of the fungible sort. On 
the contrary, a mark of an industrial system ;s its mu1titude of markets 
comprising wide :xarieties of differentiated goods and services. The 
empirical conclusion is that the real world abounds with heterogeneous 
goods and services, and that product homogeneity is a somewhat rare 
exception. 
Likewise, many producers are price makers rather than price 
takers partly because it is possible for them to differentiate their 
products from otherwi se close substitutes. Thi sis accompl i shed by 
quality and style variations, brand naming, and advertising. Moreover, 
some markets are highly concentrated on the seller side so that one or 
a few producers control the quantity of goods flowing to their markets. 
To the extent that markets are concentrated or products are differ-
entiated, producers may restrict suppl ies and thereby raise prices in 
their markets. In like manner, consumers are often price searchers 
rather than price takers simply because product differentiation has 
produced variations in quality and style, and therefore in the prices 
of close product substitutes. The empirical point ;s that market 
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agents are generally not price takers in the real world. 
It is also impossible to meet the necessary condition of perfect 
market knowledge on the part of each market agent in the real world. 
As good as communication technology is, it is not yet capable of 
instantaneously and preci 5e1y recording, storing, reca 11 ing, and 
processing all transactions in all markets, and immediately 
transmitting the necessary market information to every agent who needs 
the information to make informed market choices. The empirical 
conclusion is that the real world is one of imperfect market knowledge. 
Finally, there is not perfect factor mobility in the real world. 
It is not always possible for resources to move into or out of the 
production of particular goods or services in response to market 
conditions. In the first place, land resources are absolutely finite 
and immobile, and while the use of any particular parcel of land might 
be changed, this can occur only in the economic long run. But the land 
itself cannot be relocated in response to market conditions. This. of 
course. appl i es with nearly equal force to structures and equi pment 
permanently installed on the land. 
Labor resources in the real world are only slightly more mobile. 
It is a major personal disruption to pick up and move a household from 
one region to another. and persons tend to ignore or resist market 
incentives to make interregional moves. Massive short-run interregional 
relocations of labor in response to market differentials are therefore 
rare. And international labor mobility is even less real because of 
the added cultural shocks involved. On the other hand, labor resources 
might be somewhat mobile within a local market where a job change does 
not involve a family or household relocation. However. there are labor 
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market rigidities even in local areas because units of labor are simply 
not homogeneous. Units of labor are differentiated by technical skills, 
and they are not perfect substitutes for one another. For the same 
reason, there are labor market barriers to entry in the form of labor 
union restrictions and state licensing requirements. Thus, unfilled 
shortages and persistent surpluses of particular skills do occur from 
time to time in labor markets because labor resources in the real world 
are not perfectly mobile. 
In similar fashion, business firms cannot usually enter or exit 
particular industries in response to market signals. An industrial 
system is composed of many highly specialized institutions. The 
institutions employ specialized tools and hUman labor with particular 
technical skills. They operate at particular locations, and they 
supply goods and render services to persons in those and related 
locations. Technical and locational constraints alone would 1 imit the 
mobil Hy of such institutions. But the high capital costs required to 
retool for most new markets may be an even more formidable barrier. 
Business firms are further limited by other barriers to entry. 
Economies of scale in many industries may preclude entry by firms with 
small-scale plants because they cannot produce at high enough rates of 
output to bring their average total costs of production down low enough 
in target markets to allow them to compete effectively with established 
forms of larger scales of plant. This is particularly true if the 
established firms practice exclusionary pricing techniques whereby 
they price their goods low enough to limit entry by potential entrant 
firms. but high enough to enjoy some monopolistic profits. Here again, 
factor mobility is imperfect because businesses are often barred from 
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though market conditions might otherwise signal needs for changes. 
Perhaps the most mobile of factors is capital, and it is also 
somewhat more responsive to market forces because of its greater 
mobil ity. But factor mobil ity is imperfect even in capital markets. 
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At least two elements restrict the mobility of capital. The first is 
the range of problems associated with international exchange. The risks 
and transfer costs involved with exchanging one national monetary unit 
for another tend to limit the mobil ity of capital over national 
boundar; es. Li kewi se, exchange controls, host government control of 
profit repatriation, and the problems of taxation of income by host as 
well as home governments tend to fUrther limit the international 
mobil ity of capital. 
The second element is government controls in the form of domestic 
monetary and fiscal policies that limit capital mobility within a 
national economy. Such government policies are pursued for purposes 
of allocating resources to the provision of public goods and services, 
redistributing income, and maintaining economic stability. The 
pol icies are discharged through the tax and expenditure processes of 
public budgets and through central management of the monetary stock. 
Monetary and fiscal policies as well as direct regulation of market 
activities by governments are inimical to so-called competitivg, 
private enterprise markets for the simple reason that they cause 
allocational and distributional effects that are different from purely 
market outcomes. This does not mean that the effects are necessarily 
better or worse--only that they are different and they involve 
limitations on the free mobility of capital. 
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competitive markets to exist simply do not prevail and cannot be 
brought into existence in an industrial system. Products are not 
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homogeneous and they are therefore not perfect substitutes for one 
another. Not all market agents are price takers. Some on the demand 
side are price searchers, while some suppliers are price makers. 
There cannot be perfect knowledge of market conditions by every agent 
operating in markets. Fina11y, not all resources are perfectly mobile, 
and they cannot always enter or exit industries in response to market 
forces. 
Since the necessary conditions cannot exist,' then perfectly 
competitive markets cannot exist. Since perfectly competitive markets 
cannot exist, it is impossible to determine whether or not a Pareto-
efficient allocation of resources existS. Of course, there is the 
question of whether most, but not all. of the necessary conditions 
will produce a better allocation than if none of the conditions exists. 
It has been persuasively argued by others that so-called second-best 
sol utions cannot be demonstrated to be better in any way than other 
nonoptimal solutions. 9 The conclusion ;s then that the requirement 
that a Pareto-efficient allocation can only be achieved and measured 
in a perfectly competitive market economy is a major defect in welfare 
economic theory because perfectly competitive market conditions are not 
empirically validated characteristics of society. And one is placed in 
the position of attempting to measure and adjust real welfare outcomes 
to an unreal and unattainable ideal. 
In defense of economists. it must be noted that any economist 
worth his salt does not bel ieve that the perfectly competitive market 
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model is a faithful representation of the real world. One may there-
fore wonder why economists are so preoccupied with the perfectly 
competitive model. The answer is that the model is one of two polar 
mode 1 s used as idea 1 states by whi ch ma rket performance in the real 
world may be measured. The opposite polar model is the so-called pure 
monopoly model in which there is a single supplier and many buyers and 
which also is not a faithful representation of the real world. That 
is, real world markets are simply imperfectly competitive in one degree 
or another on a continuum that extends from a perfectly competitive 
pole at one extremity to a pure monopoly pole at the other extremit:l. 
Regarding the arguments at hand, it ;s one thing to acknowledge ar. 
ideal state as such. It;s quite another to require the actual i;~at;on 
of an unattainable ideal state as a necessary condition to forming sound 
social policy--as welfare economics appears to do with the concepts of 
Pareto efficiency and perfectly competitive markets. 
Another major defect in welfare economic theory ;s the assumptiG:'l 
that a social-welfare function exists and might be disclosed in some 
way if only a method could be found to continuously reveal and aggregate 
the individual preference functions for every consumer in the economy. 
Presumably, a market system accomplishes this in some mysterious way. 
But, as a practical matter, there ;s no known way to accurately reveal 
a social-welfare function if one does exist. Indeed, one economist was 
awarded a Nobel Prize essentially for rigorously demonstrating that 
there are common preference patterns which, if held by the individual 
members of society, will give rise to an inconsistent pattern of social 
choice. r~oreover. no market technique, voting scheme, or system of 
representation will necessarily produce a rational social choice.'O 
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exist except in the grand assumptions and abstruse abstractions of 
welfare economists. 
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All of which is to say that welfare economic theory appears to 
fail the test of empirical validity. It fails because of at least two 
major defects--the requirement that markets be perfectly competitive in 
order to achieve and measure a Pareto-efficient allocative outcome, and 
the assumption of a social-welfare function. Other related and 
significant defects include the high level of abstraction, the static 
approach to analysis, and the stress on pecuniary valuations. Each of 
these defects and all of them together so remove welfare economic 
theory from real ity that the theory is hardly more than an intellectual 
exercise of 1 ittle practical use. And while the theory may possess 
superb internal consistency, its empirical defects cast serious doubt 
on its relevancy--or its probable accuracy in predicting future 
outcomes--and thus on its viability as an instrumentality for policy 
formulations. In other words, its weakness as a positive analysis 
casts doubt on its normative powers. 
Where does all of the foregoing leave the matter of social 
welfare? Clearly, it admonishes caution in the normative application 
of orthodox economic criteria to welfare problems. On the other hand, 
the theory is the refined product of some of the most learned and 
scholarly minds of the industrial era. It must therefore possess some 
compell ing and enduring qualities. And, notwithstanding its afore-
mentioned defects, it does indeed possess some redeeming attributes. 
Perhaps the most attractive component of the theory is the notion of a 
Pareto-efficient allocation of resources. And next to that are the 
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criteria for income redistribution, given a Pareto-efficient allocation. 
There are no doubt other elements of the theory that are good guides 
for policy. But it seems to this author that the former two components 
are ideal states that ought to be as nearly achieved in practice as 
the frailties of real ity permit. 
At the same time, there are no delusions about the practical 
difficulties surrounding the attainment of a Pareto-efficient allocation 
of resources and an equitable distribution of income within a Pareto 
framework. The paucity of realistic and operational theories under-
scores the problem--values are as multifarious and disparate as society 
is pluralistic, and there is no simple or direct way to measure and 
weigh competing values and conflicting interests in the selection of 
ends and the employment of means so that social welfare ;s maximized. 
The first aspect of the problem concerns the accurate definition and 
measurement of values in the form of benefits and costs so that they 
can be weighed in making choices from among alternative and competing 
social ends and as to the employment of resource means. The second 
part of the problem is to reach some consensus on choice or 
preferretiness criteri,a. And finally, the choices must be made and 
actualized in practice. Benefit-cost analysis is one technique that is 
emp 1 oyed to these ends. 
Benefit-Cost Anal ysi s 11 
Benefit-cost analysis is a structured technique for defining and 
measuring benefits and costs for purposes of evaluating alternative 
public investment projects. Indeed, the technique is used by private 
agencies in arriving at investment decisions. and informal variations 
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political decisions of many, if not most, private individuals. 
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Benefit-cost analysis is a logical extension of cost-effective-
ness analysis, operations research, systems engineering, systems 
analysi 5, and program-eval uati on-and-review-technique. Indeed, benefit-
cost analysis is a natural complement to the latter technique. However, 
it is more comprehensive than the former. Benefit-cost analysis is 
probably less akin to other types of analysis that are sometimes 
applied to policy problems, such as psychological analYSiS, 
bureaucratic analysis, and implementation analysis. 
The earliest documented efforts of the U. S. Federal Government 
to expl icitly employ benefit-cost approaches were made by the U. S. 
Army Corps of Engineers in the evaluation of river and harbors projects 
in the early years of the present century. The technique was expanded 
in the late 1940s by the Rand Corporation to decide which aircraft 
should be developed as the next generation strategic bomber for the 
U. S. Air Force. Benefit-cost analYSis was officially adopted by the 
U. S. Department of Defense in 1961 following publication of a book 
describing the technique and cQiluthored by Charles Hitch, then 
comptroller of the Department of Defense. The benefit-cost procedure 
was incorporated into a comprehensive federal budgeting technique 
called the planning-programming-budgeting system (PPBS). The PPBS 
approach was extended to all federal agencies in 1965 by President 
Lyndon Johnson, but the PPBS requirement was rescinded in 1971 by 
President Richard Nixon. However, benefit-cost analysis continues in 
wi de federa 1 use. 
The benefit-cost analysis procedure involves estimating and 
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values. Discounting is based. on the principle that future value 
possesses less present worth than it possesses at the time of future 
transaction. This is because the future is uncertain, and hence 
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people tend to favor current enjoyment of present values over possible 
future values, and they therefore tend to save only small amounts of 
their disposable incomes, if they choose to save at all. Thus, one 
dimension of interest is as compensation to induce people to save--
that is, to forego some current consumption in favor of possible future 
consumption. And, of course, the interest is paid by those persons who 
use the money saved by others--in other words, by the persons who 
forego possible future consumption in favor of current consumption. 
Using the interest principle, one can see that if he must make 
some future payment--he can deposit a sum in the present to draw 
interest until the payment must be made. For example, one can currently 
deposit $1000 at five percent annual interest to make a $2000 payment 
in fifteen years. That is, the future $2000 obligation has a present 
value of only $1000 if it is discounted at five percent per year. 
Likewise, if one is to receive $2000 in fifteen years, its present 
worth is only $1000 if it is discounted at five percent per year. 
At any rate. benefit-cost analysis uses the discounting technique 
to set a present value on both future benefits and future costs. 
benefit-cost ratio is then calculated for each alternative way of 
achieving a particular future end-in-view. That alternative rendering 
the highest benefit-cost ratio is selected as the method to be used 
in securing that particular end-in-view if the end ;s selected as an 
end-to-be-reached. An alternative sometimes used in place of benefit-
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cost ratios is net present values. The net present value of a project 
is simply the difference between the present value of benefits and the 
present value of costs. The project method selected under that 
procedure is the one rendering the highest net present value. 
Whichever technique is used, it is applied to every end-in-view, 
and all ends-in-view are arrayed in descending order according to their 
estimated benefit-cost ratios (or their net present values). Of course, 
those projects for which the best benefit-cost ratio is less than one, 
or the estimated net present value is negative (the present value of 
benefits is less than the present value of costs) are excluded from 
the 1 ist. Selection of ends-to-be-reached is then made from that 
prioritized list. The end possessing the highest estimated benefit-
cost ratio (or net present value) is the first to be initiated. It is 
followed by the project possessing the next highest benefit-cost ratio 
and so on down the list until the budget for such projects is exhausted. 
As one can see, benefit-cost analysis ;s instrumental both in selecting 
ends-to-be-reached and in choosing among alternative ways of employing 
means to the ends selected .. 
A simple example involving a private investment decision will 
illustrate the point. Assume that a person has somehow come into ten 
thousand dollars and is seeking to invest it in a way that will 
maximize his net present value in the investment. Assume fUrther that 
he has considered investing in real property, a U. S. Treasury bond, 
gold, commodity future, and common stocks. 
He first eliminates commodity futUres because he considers the 
risk of loss too high in relation to his ability to bear risk, and the 
duration of his investment would be too short to qualify any possible 
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gain as long-term for tax purposes. He then eliminates gold because he 
believes that its potential for long-term gain has already been 
discounted by the market. Finally, he eliminates any kind of bond 
because the expected return is not high enough, and he believes that 
he is capable of bearing a greater risk for a commensurately greater 
return. However, he notes that the coupon rate on the Treasury bond 
is eight percent, and that he can obtain that rate of return virtually 
free from risk of solvency loss. 
On the other hand, he reasons that population pressures and 
inflation will place continuing upward pressures on rents and real 
property prices, and he feels that common stocks are badly under-priced 
consjdering their book values and earnings potentials. Thus, his 
investment choice is between real estate and common stocks. 
He first estimated net present values of possible investments in 
severa 1 pi eces of real property. He di scovered that the hi ghest 
estimated net present value was obtainable with a three-year-old 
apartment quadriplex that was well situated for mul tiple-fami 1y 
dwellings. He determined the net present value by subtracting the 
present val ue of present and future costs from the present val ue of 
present and future revenues. 
He calculated the present value of revenues by using the following 
progression where PYA is the present value of revenues. A is the revenue 
received in a calendar year, r is the discount rate, i is the initial 
expression, and n is the number of discount periods--usually the 
productive duration of the investment in years. 
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n . A A A (2) PVA ~ ,L_A_'_-. = _1_ + __ 2__ + .. + __ n__ 
i = 1 (l + r)' 1 + r (1 + r)2 • (1 + r)n 
He reasoned that his revenues would include annual rents over the 
duration of his ownership plus the net scale price of the property when 
he decided to sell it. He chose to ignore the income-tax impl ications--
depreciation tax shelter during ownership, long-tem capital gains tax 
upon sale--of his possible investment. He assumed that his rents would 
inflate at approximately ten percent per year and that he would 
experience an average vacancy rate of ten percent. He assumed that the 
market value of the property would 1 ikewise inflate by ten percent per 
year. He decided to use an eight percent discount rate because he knew 
that he could receive that return on U.S. Treasury bonds with almost no 
risk of solvency loss. Finally, he considered holding the property for 
twenty years, the duration of the mortgage note required to secure it. 
Thus, the revenue during any given year except the year of sale 
would be the following in which Ro is the annual rent in the preceding 
year and Rl is the annual rent in the current year. 
(3) Al = Rl = Ro + .1 Ro - .1 (Ro + . 1 Ro) . 
And the revenue during the year of sale would be the following in which 
S is the sale price less transaction costs. 
(4) An = Rn + S. 
Substituting the latter two expressions into progression (2), renders 
the following: 
(5) PVA = Rl + Rl + .1Rl _ .1(Rl + .1Rl ) + ... 
l+Y' (1 + r)2 
+Rn-l + .1Rn-l - .1(Rn-l + .1Rn +S) 
(1 = r)n 
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Each apartment unit is presently leased for $325 rent per month, 
and the tenant pays all of his own utility charges. The property is 
offered at $115,000. However, the prospective investor believes that 
he can buY it for $100,000 because it is part of an estate liquidation 
and the heirs do not wish to keep the property. However, they are 
will ing to take back a purchase-money mortgage at 10 percent interest as 
part of the transaction. Substituting appropriate values into 
progression (5) produces the following estimated present value of 
revenues: 
(6) PV A = $404,779. 
He then calculated the present value of present and future costs 
by USin9 the following progression in which PVc is the present value of 
costs and C is the costs incurred during a particular calendar year. 
Ln C C1 C (7) PVc '= __ i __ = __ + __ 2 __ + 
i + 1 (1 + r) i 1 + r (1 + r)2 
+ _C_n __ • 
(1 + r)n 
He reasoned that his annual costs would include acquisition costs 
(Ca), management and maintenance costs (Cm), and property taxes (T). 
(8) Ci = Ca i + Cmi + T i 
His acquisition costs included his down payment in the first year 
($10,000), and the interest and payment on principal each year ($5195 in 
the first year, and $10,390 in each subsequent year). He assumed that 
his management and maintenance costs would average ten percent of his 
annual rents each year. 
(9) Cmi = • 1 Ri . 
Substituting expression (9) into expression (8) and the expanded 
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expression (8) into equation (7) produces the following progression: 
(10) PV = Cal + .lR1 + T1 + Ca2 + .lR2 + T2 Can + .1Rn + Tn 
c 1 + r (1 + r)2 + ... I (1 + r)n 
And substituting the appropriate values into progression (10) and 
solving for the present value of costs results in 
(11) PVc = $166,930. 
Finally, substituting results (6) and (11) into equation (1) 
renders the estimated net present value. 
(12) PV N + PVA - PVc = $404,779 - $166,930 = $237,849. 
The prospective investor followed a similar procedure in estimating 
the net present values of possible investments in a number of widely 
traded and promising common stocks. The highest estimated net present 
value he could find, taking inflation into account, was approximately 
$40,000. By comparison, the net present value of a twenty-year 
treasury bond with an eight percent interest rate discounted at eight 
percent is precisely zero if inflation is ignored. On the other hand, 
the net present value of such a bond is negative if there is consumer-
price inflation over the life of the bond. Naturally, the investor 
purchased the quadrip1ex. 
The foregoing example illustrated the use of benefit-cost analysis 
in making a private investment choice. The procedure seemed clear and 
unequivocal. One Simply estimates the present value of benefits 
(revenues in this case) and the present values of costs, and he 
subtracts the latter from the former in arriving at net present value. 
Choice is Simply a matter of comparing alternative results and selecting 
the result yielding the highest net present value. 
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employing a procedure similar to the technique illustrated in the 
example. Likewise, governments use variations of the same technique 
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to tentatively select and proffer alternatives to the public and its 
elected representatives. However, aspects of the benefit-cost procedure 
become controversial when 1t is employed in pub1 ic decision-making. 
Controversy centers around at least five questions: What elements are 
to be classified and inc1 uded as benefits and costs? What pecuniary 
values shall be assigned to the benefit and cost elements? What 
preferredness criteria shall be used? (Preferredness criteria include 
two elements--the social-discount rate, and the time over which benefits 
and costs will be discounted back to present values). What shall be 
maximized or minimized in attempting to improve social welfare? And, 
finally, who will control the process and decide the foregoing questions? 
The remainder of this chapter briefly examines each of these questions. 
INTERNAL BENEFITS AND COSTS 12 
Internal benefits and costs are those tangible values that are 
easily measured in pecuniary terms, and with which orthodox economists 
are most at home. They are the prices, revenues, costs, wages, rents, 
interest rates, and profits that occupy both the dreams and the waking 
hours of businessmen and that fill the pages of sophomore textbooks on 
economic principles. They are the elemental and divisible stuff of 
market systems and gross national products. And they are all of the 
other values that lie behind the money terms that represent them in 
market affairs. They are the aesthetic, subjective, persona1, private, 
visceral, individual, and intrinsic valuations that lurk behind and are 
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somehow manifested in market behaviors. 
Internal benefits and costs are perhaps the least controversial 
aspects of benefit-cost analysis because they are the easiest to 
measure with some degree of accuracy. When one makes a personal market 
choice, he actualizes it with a private transaction in which.he either 
buys or sells something and pays or receives a price in exchange. The 
good or service is divisible and the agent buys or sells only as much 
of it as he wishes at the price. He is said to reveal his preference 
for the good or service by the consummated transaction. Moreover, his 
preference is recorded in the market, and it will have some effect, no 
matter how slight, on demand and supply factors in the market. The 
meaning of this for benefit-cost analysis is that the supply of and 
demand for private or divisible goods and services can be estimated 
with considerable precision, and there is usually little controversy 
surrounding which internal benefits and costs should be included or 
what money values should be assigned to them. 
Most private market decisions explicitly employ only internal 
benefits and costs. The preceding example illustrating a private 
investment decision was one expl ;citly involving only internal benefits 
and costs. The example was developed to illustrate the procedure for 
using benefit·cost analysis in arriVing at an investment decision. 
The procedure is essentially the same with minor variations to adapt it 
to corporate and public purposes. Thus, the reader will be spared 
additional examples of the same kind to illustrate corporate and public 
applications of benefit-cost analysis. On the other hand, it is 
necessary to develop a corporate investment example to illustrate other 
aspects of benefit-cost analysiS that give rise to controversy. 
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Suppose, therefore, that a private, electric utility company 
serving an area of the Pacific Northwestern part of the United States 
has forecast its future electrical power generating requirements, and 
it has found that it must somehow provide more electrical power than 
it can presently generate and purchase if it is to meet the estimated 
future demands for its power. Suppose further that the company 
employed some variation of the benefit-cost analysis described above 
as a way to evaluate alternatives for solving its production problem, 
and that its investigations also revealed that additional hydroelectric 
development would not be profitable because all good hydroelectric 
sites in the area had already been exploited. The profitable options 
and their expected net future profits discounted back to present 
valUes were as follows: 
Option A: Construct one high-capacity nuclear-fueled, electrical-
power generating plant. Present value of revenues = $800,000,000. 
Present value of costs = $225,000,000. Net present value = $575,000,000. 
Option B: Construct one large-capacity generating plant based 
on fossil-fuel. Present value of revenues = $800,000,000. Present 
value of costs = $240,000,000. Net present value = $560,000,000. 
Option C: Expand generating capacity by constructing several 
plants: one central nuclear-powered plant, several dispersed fossil-
fuel fired plants (to minimize transmission costs), and develop 
renewable energy (wind, sea, or solar) plants where possible. Present 
value of revenues = $800,000,000. Present value of costs 
$370,000,000. Net present value = $430,000,000. 
Option D: Do nothing. Acquiesce in the construction of 
additional generating capacity by other utilities, and simply purchase 
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the needed electrical power from those other companies, mark the price 
up, and sa'l it to the company' 5 customers. Present value of revenues 
= $800,000,000. Present value of costs = $550,000,000. Net present 
value = $250,000,000. 
Option E: Construct a network of renewable energy-powered 
(solar, wind, and sea) generating plants at suitable sites. Present 
value of revenues = $800,000,000. Present value of costs = $680,000,000. 
Net present val ue = $120,000,000. 
Based on the net present values of the company· 5 estimated future 
profits, and assuming that the company profit maximizes, it will choose 
to construct a single, high-capacity, nuclear-fueled generating plant. 
The nuclear plant, Option A, produces $575,000,000, a higher net 
present value than any other option investigated. The question now 
becomes, can the company make its choi ce un; 1 atera 11y and proceed with 
its nuclear power project? The answer is that it is very unl ikely 
the company can do so. The reason is that the company has considered 
only internal benefits and costs in its estimates. and there are other 
so-called external benefits and costs to be considered before a 
decision can be made. Moreover, external constituencies must be 
invol ved in the process so that what may seem at first to be a 
straight-forward private economic matter all at once becomes a publ ic 
and pol itical matter. 
EXTERNAL BENEFITS AND COSTS 13 
What are the external benefits and costs that must be considered 
by the electric utility company? Or, at a higher level of generaliza-
tion, what are externalities, and how do they differ from internal 
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benefits and costs? Simply stated, an external ity is said to exist 
any time an economic gain or loss accrues to one or more recipient 
ag.ent as a consequence of an economic action taken by an initiating 
agent, and the gain or loss is not reflected in the price of the 
resulting economic good or service. Or, stated another way, an external 
benefit is said to exist when the marginal social cost of a good or 
service is less than the marginal social benefit, and an external cost 
is said to exist when the opposite occurs--the marginal social cost ;s 
greater than the marginal social benefit. 
Externalities may also be understood as so-called spill-over 
effects, or neighborhood effects. And external costs might appear in 
the form of external diseconomies, or negative externalities. Likewise, 
external benefits might be called by external economies or positive 
externalities. However they are termed they mean external benefits or 
external costs in the benefit-cost vernacular. 
Social benefits are simply the sum of internal (or private) 
benefits, and external (or public) benefits. And social costs are the 
sum of internal (or private) costs and external (or publ ic) costs. 
Social costs and benefits diverge at the margin bp.cause external 
benefits and costs are non-diVisible, and markets deal only in the 
divisible goods and services that comprise internal (or private) 
benefits and costs. Thus markets equate private benefits with private 
costs at some certain price. And if external costs drive social costs 
above private costs, the good or service involved will be produced and 
consumed at lower costs and higher quantities than would be so if the 
external cost It/ere included. Li kewise, if external benefits drive 
social benefits above private benefits, the good or service will be 
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under-produced at lower costs because the market will equate only the 
private benefits and costs involved. 
Externalities involve initiating agents and recipient agents. 
An agent that initiates an externality might be either a producer of 
goods and services or a consumer. In like manner, recipients of 
external ities might be either producers or consumers Dr both together. 
Three classes of externalities have been identified--public-good 
externalities, technical externalities, and ownership externalities. 
Pub 1 i c-Good Externa 1 it i es 
PUblic-good externalities result when the marginal cost of 
supplying additional units of a good or service is zero, or very nearly 
so. That is, the product is not divisible, and once it is created, no 
affected person can be excluded from enjoying the benefits. Likewise, 
adding an additional person to the affected population will not 
increase the cost of supplying the product. For example, an efficient 
police force in a community will result in effective crime prevention 
and law enforcement. Moreover. all residents share in the benefits 
once the community is free of crime, and no one can be excluded from 
those benefits. Even visitors and recent immigrants become recipients 
of crime prevention benefits, and their arrival in the community and 
their enjoyment of its crime-free environment will not usually add to 
the cost of supplying the benefits. 
However, goods and services involving substantial external 
benefits will usually be under produced because such goods and services 
are not divisible. This means that the good or service cannot be 
divided into consumer units, packaged, and sold to users on the basis 
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of the satisfactions they experience from the benefit. There is, 
therefore, no way to discover the true preferences of the recipient 
agents--the residents of a crime·free community in this case. This 
results in a so-called free--rider phenomenon in which a recipient will 
understate the value of the benefits he enjoys in order to avoid pay-
ing for their production. He will do this because he knows that he 
will receive the benefits once they have been created whether or not 
he pays for them. 
For these reasons, the allocation of resources to the production 
of public goods and services cannot be accomplished solely by market 
institutions. Indeed, it generally falls to governments to 
reallocate resources from the private sector to the public sector in 
supplying public goods. Such reallocation is accomplished through 
government fiscal processes involving tax revenues and public 
expenditure budgets. And insofar as governments are of the 
representative sort, issues surrounding taxes and expenditures are 
ultimately resolved in the electoral process. 
Technical Externalities 
The second class of externalities, technical externalities, 
result from technologies that cause evenly-increasing returns to the 
scale of the producing plant. That is, average total costs of 
production decl ine with each additional unit of output produced per 
unit of time, and the firm with the lowest cost per unit of output 
is ipso-facto, the institution with the largest scale of plant in the 
industry. The result is that the firm with the largest scale of plant 
can easily under.-price all other institutions in the industry because 
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their plants are not large enough to enjoy such low-cost operations. 
Only the producer with the largest plant can survive in competitive 
markets, and the outcome is a monopoly industry in which all of the 
consumers in the industry must buy from a single large seller. Once 
such a monopoly emerges, the monopolist can control the price of his 
product by restricting output to that rate per unit of time that 
produces the greatest profits. That is generally at a significantly 
lower rate of output and a higher price than would prevail under 
competitive conditions. 
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The externality in this case is the loss in social benefits 
occasioned by the monopoly solution, assuming that there are only 
technical externalities involved. A competitive solution would produce 
a price that would equate marginal social benefits to marginal social 
costs. This is so because there are no technical externalities 
involved with a perfectly competitive solution. and marginal social 
benefits are therefore the same as marginal private benefits and 
marginal social costs are also the same as marginal private costs. 
However, under monopoly conditions, marginal private benefits 
are less than marginal social benefits, the difference representing 
external benefits. The profit-maximizing monopolist will set his out-
put where marginal private (and social) costs equal marginal private 
benefits (or marginal revenue). This will usually be at a lower 
marginal cost than with a competitive solution, and it will be at a 
lower rate of output but at a higher market price. In microeconomic 
j!argon, the monopolist is said to be appropriating a larger portion of 
the consumer surplus to his profits than he would receive under 
competitive market conditions where there are no technical externalities. 
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loss in social welfare. The loss comprises that portion of consumer 
surplus that is denied consumers, but cannot be appropriated to the 
monopo 1 i st I 5 prof; ts. 
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Another feature that distinguishes firms that operate in 
industries containing substantial technical externalities is that they 
tend to be high fixed-cost enterprises--meaning that their fixed costs 
are very high in relation to their variable costs. Such institutions 
are thought to be natural monopolies because, as noted above, 
monopolies tend to emerge naturally as a result of the increasing 
returns to scale occasioned by the technical externalities in such 
industries. .fJ.. second reason such firms are considered natural 
monopolies ;s because they operate most efficiently as monopolies--
which is to say that resources are wasted if society attempts to impose 
competitive market conditions on the industries. 
An example of a natural monopoly ;s a utility industry. An 
e1 ectrica 1 util ity industry possesses techn; cal external ities, and its 
operating company or companies are high fixed-cost firms. Thus, the 
necessary conditions for efficiency-fostering competition in the 
electric utility industry do not exist. One can imagine, for example, 
how the landscape and skyline of the ordinary city would look with 
fifty or more duplicate sets of electrical power-distribution lines 
hanging from fifty or more sets of power poles, and connecting fifty 
or more transformers, switches, and meters at each structure buying 
electrical power. 
Moreover, each power company would ideally build generating 
capacity to carry the entire market just in case it could somehow 
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entice all of the customers away from its competitors. But more than 
that, each company would have to build capacity for expected future 
load--not just for the existing customers--because of the long lead 
time required to bring new generators on line. The point is that each 
competitor would have full capacity to carry the total present and 
projected load. Thus, the industry would have excess generating 
capacity that is some multiple greater than the number of institutions 
operating in the industry. 
Finally, cut-throat price competition would eventually eliminate 
all but a few of the largest, and thus the lowest cost, operating 
companies. And the surviving companies would find it economically 
more efficient to consolidate into a single operating company. A 
monopoly with gross excess capacity would therefore emerge, and the 
resources allocated to the generation and distribution systems of the 
defunct competitors waul d have been wasted because the systems waul d 
have to be dismantled and removed to make way for productive uses of 
the lands they occupied. 
el early. the market will not all ocate resources eff; ci ently where 
technical externalities pervade the industry. It is for these reasons 
that uti 1 i ty companies are ei ther operated by governments as publ i c 
enterprises, or by private corporations under strict government control. 
Controls of private uti 1 i ty corporati ons invol ve excl usi ve franchi ses 
and rate regulati on. The uti 1 ity is granted ali cense that permits it 
to serve a11 of the consumers in its market area free from competition 
with other institutions supplying the same utility services. In 
exchange, the company must forego the right to set its own prices in 
favor of public-rate regulation, and it must serve every customer in 
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its market area who is willing and able to pay the established rate. 
Government regulation of utility companies' attempts to avoid 
the economic waste inherent in utility industries under the ceremony 
of competition, and to bring social benefits into equilibrium with 
social costs. Thus, rates would ideally be set where marginal (social) 
cost equals average revenue (or marginal social benefit). However, 
because of technical externa1ities--the high fixed cost and the need to 
bui1 d capacity that exceeds average demand so as to accommodate peak 
loading and meet expected growth in demand--the socially desirable 
rate may cause a utility company to operate at a loss. This is because 
the marginal cost will probably be below the average total cost of the 
firm under such circumstances. Governments must therefore either 
subsidize the company from taxes of other revenues, or use a so-called 
IIfair-return" pricing technique. A fair-return rate is one that 
equilibrates average revenue (marginal social benefits) with average 
total cost. This permits the firm to "break even" without subsidy. 
The fair return approach is generally used because it is politically 
more palatable than subsidies from tax revenues. 
Ownership External ities 
The third class of externalities is called ownership externalities. 
Ownership external ities occur because certain resources are divorced 
from effective ownership, and their marginal private costs are 
essentially zero. They are therefore looked upon as free goods, and 
they tend to be employed so intensely in some cases that they are 
rendered less suitable for continued human use. In other words 
external costs drive social costs above private costs so that there is 
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For example. a producer who pollutes water by discharging his 
toxic wastes upstream imposes an external cost on downstream recipients 
whether they be consumers who draw drinking water from the stream. or 
other producers who require clean water in their production processes. 
The producer-initiator uses the stream as a means of disposing of his 
wastes because it is the least costly method open to him. and because 
the flowing water is owned by no one. or it is owned by the government--
which is to say that it is owned by everyone and anyone who chooses to 
use it. If enough people choose to dispose of their wastes in the 
stream, it may become so intensely used that it is rendered unfit for 
any other use. External costs result in lower internal or private 
costs to initiators. and therefore a greater than socially desirable 
production and consumption of the good or service for which the 
external cost was imposed. Moreover, they result in loss of profits 
for recipient producers and loss of util ity for recipient consumers. 
In any case, there is no market method by which the recipients of 
external costs can recover their losses from the initiators of the 
costs. 
A similar problem arises when an economic agent initiates 
external benefits. A private i.ntra-tlrban bus company that covers its 
internal costs of operation solely on the basis of revenues from trip 
fares may produce external benefi ts for 1 oca 1 merchants because the 
company provides transportation for some of the merchants customers who 
might otherwise be unable to commute for shopping. The bus company 
might also be partly responsible for a reduction in traffic congestion 
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and for some air PQJlution abatement in the corrununity insofar as 
residents are wooed away from their private automobiles to commute by 
bus. The external benefits initiated by the bus company increase the 
sales of recipient producers and reduce some dissatisfactions of 
recipient consumers and producers. But, here again, there is no market 
mechanism by which the initiating bus company can obtain payment from 
the recipients of the external benefits because ownership of the 
benefits are effectively divorced from the initiating institution. 
Here again, the welfare gains and losses attributable to owner-
ship externalities are not effectively handled by markets. When 
externai benefits raise social benefits above private benefits, the 
involved good or service is under-produced because the initiator is 
not paid for the benefits he produces. Governments attempt to correct 
this kind of misallocation by paying subsidies equal to the estimated 
pecuniary value of the external benefit to the initiator of the 
benefits. Such subsidies are sometimes raised from taxes levied 
against the recipients of the benefits. 
In similar fashion. a good or service is overproduced and over-
consumed when external costs raise social costs above private costs. 
This happens because the internal or private costs of production are 
lower than they would be if the initiator had to bear the full social 
costs of production. Governments attempt to correct this kind of 
misallocation by direct regulation or by taxing the initiator of the 
external cost. Direct regulation involves establishing and enforcing 
efficient standards based upon the technical character of the toxic 
wastes discharged and the capacity of the disposal medium to assimilate 
the wastes without significant degradation. Taxes may take the form 
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intended to internalize the external cost so that consumers of the 
resulting products pay a price that covers all of the social costs 
incurred in their production. 
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The foregoing three classes of externalities--public goods 
externalities, technical externalities, and ownership externalities--
possess several common attributes. Each involves either an economic 
gain or loss accrurng to one or more recipient agents as a result of 
an economic action taken by an initiating agent, and the gain or loss 
is not reflected in the price of the resulting economic good or service. 
In other words, an external benefit will drive social benefits above 
internal or private benefits, and insofar as the market will equil-
ibrate only private benefits and costs, the good or service resulting 
in the externality will be underproduced. In similar fashion an 
external cost which drives social costs above private costs will 
result in Dver-production and consumption of the resulting good or 
service because the external cost is not borne by the producer and 
reflected in the consumer price. 
Moreover, there is no simple or direct way of measuring the worth 
of externalities because they are indivisible, and there is no 
institutional ceremony for internalizing them. That is, they cannot 
be divided into user units and sold to individuals on the basis of the 
personal utilities or disutilities the externalities generate. There 
is therefore no simple or direct way of discovering the individual 
preferences of recipient agents. As a result. recipients of 
externalities tend to free-ride by understating their benefits and 
overstating their costs because they know that they cannot be excluded 
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from the external benefits or avo; d the external costs once they are 
created. L i kewi sa, there is no market method for remunerating 
initiators of external benefits or for collecting external costs from 
initiators and paying them to recipients. 
For these reasons, the ex; stence of extern a 1 iti es converts what 
might otherl'lise be relatively simple economic problems with more-or-
less direct market solutions into very complex social issues that can 
only be resolved, if at all, in political arenas. One might say that 
externalities are the combinations that open Pandora's box releasing 
the disparate and competing values that plague choices between ends-in-
view and between means to be employed in reaching selected ends. This 
is simply because almost anything can be claimed as an external cost 
by possible recipient agents, or claimed as external benefits by 
initiating agents. And since such claims are buttressed by one or 
more of the plethora of non-pecuniary values, it is often extremely 
difficult to empirically prove or disprove the actual existence of the 
claimed externality. And even if it can be shown to exist, it is often 
more difficult to place an accurate pecuniary value on it--all of which 
opens the way to participation by almost anyone in the decision process, 
and to political game playing by the groups participating in the 
process. 
Externalities and Benefit-Cost AnalYSiS14 
With that explanation of externalities, it is possible to return 
to the benefit-cost analysis of the alternative ways to increase the 
e1 ectrica 1 generati ng capacity for the util ity company introduced 
earlier. It is recalled that there were five options that the utility 
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company found to be profitable when it considered only internal or 
private benefits and costs. The first option, and the one found to be 
most profitable, was (A) to build a single nuclear-fueled, generating 
p1 ant with capacity to supply the expected growth in demand. The 
other options in descending order of profitability were: (B) to build 
one large conventional thermal plant powered by fossil fuels; (C) to 
build several small plants at dispersed locations and using nuclear 
fuel, fossil fuel. and solar. wind, or sea energy as appropriate to 
the site; (0) do nothing, letting other uti1 ities construct the 
additional generating plants; (E) build many solar, wind, and sea-
powered plants. 
The question was asked, can the company make its choice 
unilaterally and proceed with its nuclear power project? The answer 
was that it is very unlikely that the company could do so because it 
had not considered external benefits and costs in its evaluative 
analyses. The next question was, what are the external benefits and 
costs that must be considered before the company can proceed? Despite 
its present length, this tome will thankfully not be protracted to a 
length sufficient to fully explore that question. However, it is 
possible to trace out the general kinds of external ities that will 
most likely be involved. 
It appears unlikely that there will be any public goods 
externalities because the company is a private one. and its product. 
electrical power. is divisible into kilowatt~. and it can be sold in 
individual units on the basis of the satisfactions enjoyed by consumers. 
On the other hand, technical externalities are clearly involved, and 
it is very likely that ownership externalities will also be 
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significant. 
Technical externalities are a consideration because a private, 
electric utility corporation precisely fits the definition of a natural 
monopoly. It is a high-fixed cost institution, and it operates in an 
industry that enjoys (or suffers) increasing returns to plant scale. 
The company is therefore subject to government regulation of its 
operations and rates. If for no other reason, this condition alone 
would subject the company's expansion plans to public scrutiny, and 
much of that scrutiny would center on the provable external ities of 
whatever it planned to do. Anyhow, the technical externalities would 
likely be a factor in some degree on the benefits side of the analysis 
for each option considered. 
Likewise, some ownership externalities cannot be avoided for 
most, if not all, options. Probably the most obvious are the external 
costs of pollution resulting from gaseous and liquid waste emissions. 
This is undoubtedly the greatest with the first two options--a single 
nuclear plant, and a single conventional, thermal plant. However, air 
and water pollution would also be an external cost of the third option, 
although the pollution would not be so concentrated and thus not so 
great a problem as with the first two. On the other hand, air and water 
pollution would not be a problem under the last two options--do nothing, 
and develop solar, wind, and sea energy sources. 
The first two alternatives might also lead to increased traffic 
congestion and air pollution from auto exhaust emission in the 
community on which the plant is satellited. This might occur because 
of population added to the community by the addition of a new export-
base industry, and it could lead to greater public expenditures to 
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widen and maintain streets, as well as other actions to remedy the 
congestion and adjust to the degradation of its environment. This is 
not 1 ike1y to be a problem with any other option. 
Ecological disruption would undoubtedly occur with all options 
except 0, do nothin9. It is difficult to say where such disruptions 
would be the greatest, but one is intuitively attracted to the first 
two once agai n as the options bearing the greatest prospects for 
ecological damage. 
The risk of cataclysmic nuclear accident is, of course, an 
external cost of the first option. A malfunction that resulted in a 
reactor melt-down would no doubt dump radioactive water and gas into 
the air and streams, contaminating large areas surrounding the plant, 
and rendering them uninhabitable for a time. On the other hand, the 
nuclear alternative m'1ht lead to long-run improvements in a promising, 
inchoate technology, and in that case there may be external benefits 
involved. Those benefits might apply as well to the solar, wind, and 
sea options. 
The list of ownership externalities is limited only by the 
bounds of one's imagination. One could go on listing and rationalizing 
possible external benefits or costs to support whatever outcome he 
favored. But a comprehensive catalog of such external ities go beyond 
the purposes at hand--which is simply to show how external ities fit 
into a benefit-cost analysis, and how they provoke controversy and cast 
doubt on the outcomes of benefit-cost analysis if they are not carefully 
handled. 
For purposes of illustrating the latter point, suppose that the 
utility company prepares itself for the long and tedious hearings and 
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possible litigations by having its benefit-cost analysis expanded to 
include externalities. Believing that its own staff, while thoroughly 
competent, would lack credibility before public bodies, the management 
contracts with an outside consultant to complete the study. The 
economists and technicians of the consultant firm, working with the 
utility's planning staff to collect and analyze data and arrive at the 
results reflected in Table 1. The data in the external benefit and 
external cost columns naturally embody the conclusions of an 
environmental impact statement which is appended to the benefit-cost 
analysis, 
R
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TABLE I 
BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS OF ELECTRICAL GENERATION ALTERNATIVES 
(VALUES STATES IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS) 
Present Values Present Values 
OPTIONS of Benefits of Costs 
Private External Total Pri vate External Total 
A - Nuclear only 800 50 850 225 180 405 
B - Conventional Fossil 
Fuel Only 800 170 970 240 160 400 
C - Di spersed Small 
Plants Using Nuclear, 800 210 1010 370 55 425 Fossil-Fuel and Solar, 
Wi nd. and Sea 
o - Do Nothing 800 250 1050 550 60 610 
E - Solar, Wind, and 800 230 1030 680 30 710 Sea Energy on ly 
- -
~ -- ~ - --- ... -
--- - -
~- -
----
Present Values 
of Net Benefits 
Private Social 
575 445 
560 570 
430 585 
250 440 
120 320 
~----~-
W 
<0 
'" 
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Armed with the benefit-cost analysis, the environmental impact 
statement and other appended materials, the electric utility company 
initiates its permit application expressing its continued preference 
for the nuclear option and rationalizing it on the grounds that the 
figures are simply estimates and that the utility staff is confident 
that actual results will vindicate its choice. The entire process has 
passed with the application into the arena of public choice. How will 
it fare in the political realm? 
For purposes of examining that question, suppose that the 
population is evenly divided between five distinct points-of-view. 
And further assume that those five points-of-view are equally 
represented on the commission or other body that wi 11 act on the 
application. One hastens to admit that such a diverse body is unlikely 
to exist for long because the colleague nature of such institutional 
groups usually brings their members to some kind of consensus about 
the matters on which they del iberate and rule. Proceeding anyhow on 
the assumpti on, the poi nts-of-vi ew are those of pri vate bus inessmen, 
fiscal conservatives. economic idealists, fiscal liberals. and 
envi ronmenta 1 i sts. 
Aside from their titles, the attribute that most separates these 
views from one another is the implicit goal-orientation of each. This 
surfaces as that which each constituency believes ought to be maximized 
or minimized. One can see that the profit orientation of private 
businessmen leads them to favor maximizing net private benefits--which 
is the benefit-cost euphemism for private business profits. And, of 
course, option A in Table I maximizes net private benefits. 
The fiscal conservative is the person who religiously votes 
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votes against all money measures in elections. The goal-orientation of 
the fiscal conservative would therefore lead him to favor the least 
cost solution--option B in Table I if the person happens also to be 
concerned about environmental matters, or option A if his concern is 
only for private costs. These two views, that of the private 
businessman and the fiscal conservative are not far apart. They are 
both cut of the same conservative cloth, and they are often sewn into 
the same cloak surrounding issues. 
On the other hand, economic idealists are persons who tend to 
measure the real world by how far it deviates from their models. This 
view is usually found abundantly in the economics departments of 
liberal-arts colleges and business schools, and frequently in 
engineering schools and in the professional constituencies surrounding 
those schools. Inculcated with the importance of maximizing social 
welfare, economic idealists are most likely to favor maximizing net 
social benefits because their theories tell them that maximum net 
social benefits is the benefit-cost euphemism for maximum social 
welfare. This just happens to be option C in Table I, the eclectic 
solution. However, economic idealists are not wed to any particular 
solution on a priori grounds, and if it can be empirically demonstrated 
that some other option achieves a higher net social welfare, economic 
idealists would support that option. CoincidentalJi, the e-cMomic 
idealist's goal-orientation happens to be the most generally used 
choice criterion. 
Fiscal liberals are very nearly the polar opposites of fiscal 
conservatives. They religiously vote in favor of every money issue on 
an election ballot. They tend to feel that private profits are the 
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to sustain the poor by income supplements, and to reallocate resources 
from the private sector to the production of public goods nnd services. 
Given his goal-orientation, the fiscal liberal is most likely to favor 
option 0 in Table I because it produces the greatest total external 
benefits. and external benefits are the benefit-cost euphemism for 
public goods. 
Finally, the environmentalist possesses an enormous affinity for 
zoological and geological nature. He believes that the natural state 
is an ecologically balanced paradise and that the best of all possible 
worlds is a wilderness that has somehow escaped the fettering touch of 
man. He therefore implicitly opposes all civilized activities because 
they are not in accord with his vision of paradise and because they 
foul natural environments with human artificiality, upsetting the 
ecological balance and wreaking havoc across the land. Clearly, if the 
environmentalist must support one of the five options, it will be 
option E because it involves the lowest external cost, and external 
cost is a benefit-cost euphemism for environmental degradation. The 
environmentalist is often found in coalition with the fiscal liberal 
because he sees the profit motives of private business as an engine 
driving humanity to degrade the environment and because he feels that 
the most effective brake on that engine is governmental power. 
Assuming that deep in his heart each archetype has faith in the 
integrity of the consultants who prepared the environmental impact 
statement and polished the benefit-cost analysis, what inside 
strategies will each employ to achieve selection of that option that 
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best fits his goal-orientation? (For purposes of this paper, an 
inside strategy is one that does not involve explicit coalitions among 
the factions that make up the decision group). Since each knows that 
the choice criterion is to be maximum net social benefits, the 
strategies must somehow result in increasing the net social benefits 
of his preferred option, or reducing the net social benefits of 
alternative options. It may be possible to achieve this by contesting 
one or more of the following elements of the benefit-cost analysis: 
the items included either as external benefits or external costs, the 
pecuniary values aSSigned to the external benefits or external-cost 
items. the social discount rate. and the number af years aver which 
the present values of benefits and costs were discounted. The effects 
of changes in the first two elements will be considered in the next 
section below. The latter two elements are called the "preferredness 
criteria l' and the effects of changes in them will be considered in a 
subsequent part of the chapter. 
Alterations in Externalities 
One way each of the commi ssi oners can press the ascendancy of hi s 
preferred solution is to somehow raise the net present benefits of 
that solution in relation to the others. As noted above, one way this 
can be accomplished is to somehow bring about a reduction in the costs 
or an increase in the benefits of the solution he prefers, or to 
decrease the benefits and increase the costs of the alternatives that 
stand ahead of his. He can do these things by raising questions 
regarding either the inclusion or the exclusion of some particular 
benefit or cost item, or regarding the pecuniary value assigned to 
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any item. 
He will, of course, raise questions about any glaring 
deficiencies in the schedules of internal or private benefits and 
costs particularly if doing 50 will enhance his preference. However, 
he is unlikely to find the best picking among the private benefits and 
costs because they are the most easily quantified empirically, and 
they are therefore the least controversial and the least susceptible 
to challenge. On the other hand, the schedules of external benefits 
and costs are replete with controversy--controversy about which items 
should be included and about the pecuniary values to be assigned to 
the included items. Controversy reigns because there is no simple or 
direct way of establishing the existences of externalities or of 
accurately measuring their magnitudes if they are found to exist. In 
like manner, there is no fool-proof way of placing pecuniary values on 
whatever magnitudes one perceives for external ities. Thus, the best 
picking for the antagonist is among the external ities. 
On that basis, the private businessman may be expected to 
initially ignore options 0 and E in Table I because they pose no 
immediate threat to his preference. On the other hand, he may be 
expected to raise questions about possible exclusions and low valua-
tions of external cost items, and about the inclusions and high 
valuations of external benefits for alternatives Band C, the 
conventional and eclectic options, because they both produce higher 
net social benefits than his favored nuclear solution. If he fails 
to bring the present value of net social benefits for those options 
down below that of his solution, he will then attempt to raise the 
net social benefits of his preferred solution by posing questions 
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about its exclusions and low valuations of external benefit items, and 
inclusions and high valuations of external cost items. Of course, 
consistency requires that any changes in standards for either 
inclusions or valuations must be applied uniformly to all like 
situations under each alternative. Thus, an advocate must take care 
that a change he proffers in support of his preference does not also 
change other solutions adversely to his cause. 
For example, an argument the businessman might make is that the 
schedule of external costs of the conventional option do not include 
the contribution of that option to the depletion of a non-renewable 
resource--fossil fuels. This would also apply with less force to 
option C, the eclectic option. Likewise, he might argue that the 
inflation factor (an internal cost item) used in determining the 
operating costs for options Band C is too low in view of the 
{armeeable depletion of fossil fuels. If either of these arguments 
carry, the effect wi 11 be to increase the present va 1 ues of total 
social costs and thus reduce the present values of net social benefits 
for options Band C. If this does not give the edge to the 
businessman's preference, he will argue further that the external costs 
of his solution have been grossly inflated by the inclusion of an item 
for the risk of a cataclysmic nuclear accident, and another for thermal 
pollution of stream water. If these two items are not removed, he can 
insist that the pecuniary values assigned to them are much too great. 
Each commissioner will similarly support his preferred alternative 
Thus, the fiscal conservative will initially ignore options A, D, and 
E, and he will pose questions that tend toward decreases in the present 
value of net social benefits for option C, and that tend toward 
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increases in the net social benefits of his preferred solution. 
option B. In like manner, the fiscal liberal will ignore option E, 
oppose options A, B, and C, and support option D. And the 
environmentalist will ignore none of the options, support his 
preference, option E, and oppose the rest. Finally, the economic 
idealist will see his role as one of protecting the empirical integrity 
of the benefit-cost analysis because he does not care which option is 
finally implemented so long as it is the one truly possessing the 
hi ghest net soci a 1 benefits. 
The point is that the opportunity for manipulation of possible 
benefit-cost analysis outcomes is greatly expanded by the tenuous 
nature of externalities and the often questionable pecuniary values 
assigned to them. External ities are so malleable that the benefit-
cost analysis can frequently be made to come out any way the consensus 
of a decision body chooses. Indeed, the benefit-cost analysis becomes 
speculative at best, and implausible at worst when externalities loom 
so large. All of which underscores the problem: there is no easy or 
direct way of weighing disparate and competing values in the selection 
of ends-to-be-reached and in the employment of means such that social 
welfare is maximized subject to resource constraints. 
PREFERREDNESS CRITERIA 15 
Another element that enhances the mall eabil ity of benefit-cost 
analyses is preferredness criteria. Preferredness criteria is 
generally thought of in terms of social discount rates. However, it 
also includes the time preference, or the period of time over which 
benefits and costs are discounted back to present values. 
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Social Discount Rates 
A very important choice to be made in every benefit-cost analysis 
regards what social discount rate to use to discount the benefits and 
costs back to present values. The choice is important because of the 
relationship between the rate and the resulting present values. 
Recalling from a previous part of this chapter, the discounting 
equation for benefits is 
~ Ai 
PVg - L- (1 = 4)1 
i = 1 
The equation is the same for costs, substituting C for Band A. The 
social discount rate, r, is in the denominator of the term, and it 
follows that a high discount rate increases the denominator and 
therefore decreases the resulting present value of the benefit or 
cost. And the opposite is also true. The lower the social discount 
rate, the higher the resulting present value. Thus, present values 
are inversely related to social discount rates. 
The relationship between social discount rates and present 
values opens the way for further manipulation of benefit-cost results. 
Interinstitutional biases can be introduced when several institutions 
are competing for the same funds. If the funding authority is 
deciding which institutions shall receive money for its projects on 
the basis of net present values, the institution that can justify the 
lowest social discount rate will have an advantage, other things being 
equal. For example, if the electric utility company described above 
was not privately owned, but was an element of government, its 
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projects would compete with projects of other government agencies for 
priority and funding. And it could obtain an advantage for itself if 
it could justify a lower social discount rate than the rates used by 
competing agencies. 
The same problem occurs with intersectoral allocations as well. 
Social discount rates for federal projects in the United States have 
traditionally used some sort of average interest rate conjured up from 
market interest rates paid on U. S. Treasury bonds. Of course, the 
treasury rate represents an almost risk-free investment and it is 
therefore substantially lower than private interest rates in money 
markets. On the other hand, corporate interest rates reflect all of 
the risks borne by private business, and they are therefore higher. 
The present values on private projects are usually calculated using 
some kind of weighted average yield on private investments. The 
point is that government sector projects often appear more productive 
than private sector projects because the net present values on 
government projects are usually calculated using lower discount rates. 
This can and does lead public policy-makers to believe that money 
spent in the public sector produces greater welfare than money spent 
in the private sector. And, of course, this will affect the 
propensity of those pol icy-makers to propose hi gher taxes and hi gher 
public expenditure programs. 
Moreover, intrainstitutional biases may be introduced by a 
particulai" discount rate even if it appl ies uniformly throughout the 
institution using it. This is because a low rate favors long-term 
projects over short-term projects, and a high rate favors short-
term projects over long-term projects. This is simply because lower 
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discount rates give greater significance to distant future values than 
higher discount rates. In other words, one dollar discounted from 
thirty years in the future at four percent is worth thirty-one cents 
today. Oiscounted at 12 percent, it is worth only about three cents. 
For example, ignore initial construction costs and inflation, and 
assume that a project produces current net benefits of $1700 per year. 
These values discounted at four percent over ten years yield a net 
present value of $13,792. However, a project producing only $1000 
per year and discounted at the same rate over a thirty-year life 
yields a net present value of $17,295. Clearly, the longer-term 
project produces a higher net present value even though its annual 
net revenue is lower. On the other hand, a twelve percent discount 
rate reverses the order of preference--$9,607 for the ten-year project, 
and $8,508 for the 30-year project. The point is that the social 
discount rate is crucial to the outcome of the analysis. 
Similarly, low social discount rates favor high initial cost 
projects with low operation and maintenance costs, while high rates 
give the edge to projects with low initial costs and high costs of 
operation and maintenance. For example, using the preceding 
illustration, and assuming a useful 1 ife of 10 years and the same 
current values of benefits for both projects, the project producing 
$1700 in current net benefits per year is operating at lower 
operation and maintenance costs than the project that produces only 
$1000 per year. On that basis, the net present values of the first 
project are unchanged (S1700/yr. at 4%/year for 10 yrs.= $13,792, 
and at 12%/year = $9,607.) However, the net present values of the 
second project change because of the change in useful 1 ife from thirty 
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to ten years. (They become $lOOO/yr. at 4%/yr. for 10 yrs.= $8,113), 
and at 12%/yr.= $5,651.) 
If it is assumed that the initial construction costs occur only 
in the first year of each project, then the net present values of the 
projects will be reduced in each case by the discounted values of 
their initial costs. If the present values of initial costs of the 
projects are assumed to be $7,500 for the first, and $2,500 for the 
second, then the net present values resulting with a four-percent 
discount rate are $6,292 and $5,613 respectively. Clearly, the high 
initial cost project with low operation and maintenance costs is 
preferred over the other project at a four-percent discount rate. 
However, if the discount rate is 12 percent, the outcome is rev~rsed-­
$2,107 in net present values for the first project, and $3,151 for 
the second--and the low initial cost project with high operation and 
maintenance costs is preferred over the other project. Here again, 
the discount rate is crucial to the outcome. 
The foregoing suggests that there should perhaps be a single 
social discount rate to be applied to all projects in the entire 
national economy--public and private, long-term and short-term. A 
so-called net yield approach is often suggested in which some average 
of interest rates and rates of return on private investments is 
adjusted by removing inflation risks, solvency risks, liquidity risks, 
interest rate or term risks, and all other elements that elevate the 
rate above the pure cost of money, wratever that is. Under these 
arrangements, every project in every institution across the country is 
using precisely the same social discount rate, and that rate is the 
pure cost of using money. Such an arrangement, if it could be achieved, 
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would greatly simplify decisions made on the bases of interproject 
comparisons of benefit-cost analyses. 
A counter argument is that structures of market interest rates 
and returns on private investments are so varied and complex that any 
so-called average is almost useless. Moreover, when the resulting 
average rate is refined by removing the factors that elevate it above 
the pure money rate, it is like removing the salt, leavening. and 
spices from bread--one is left with a bland, and unpalatable product. 
That is, a pure money rate--if such a rate exists--is void of most 
ingredients that give interest and profit rates any significance. 
Idea lly, the rate used to di scount net benefits back to a present 
value on any given project would reflect at least the cost of the 
capital funds used to create and operate the project over its 
productive life. Thus, the rate should incorporate every risk and 
yield factor involved in the project and in like projects throughout 
the economy. According to this view, each project would use a social 
discount rate that was uniquely calculated using the risk and yield 
factors inherent in the project. 16 
One of many examples that might be cited to justify special 
discount rates is the term structure of interest rates--the 
distribution of rates according to the lengths of term for the 
securities represented. The yield curve in the term structure of 
interest rates usually (but not always) reflects short-term rates 
that are loltJer than intermediate-term rates. and intermediate-term 
rates that are lower than long-term rates. It is sometimes argued 
that these variations result from the unwillingness of lenders to give 
up control of their moneys for longer periods because of inflation 
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risks, and that the yield curve can be leveled out by simply removing 
inflation risk from the rates. However, this argument does not square 
with a so-called perversion of the yield curve during periods of high 
inflation. The short-term rates rise higher than long-term rates at 
such times--perhaps reflecting the expectations that long-term rates 
are too high and can only decline, and thus borrowers are unwilling to 
make long-term commitments at such high interest rates. However, the 
more usual shape of the yield curve suggests that social discount 
rates should increase with increases in the duration of the useful 
life of the project. 
The discount rate strategies that might be employed by antagon-
ists in the utility company example would depend upon features of 
the possible solutions that are not revealed in the data of Table I. 
However, it is apparent from the discussion in this section that an 
advocate in that example would argue to justify a lower social 
discount rate if his preferred option were either a longer term 
project than the competing alternatives, or if it were a high initial 
cost project with low operation and maintenance costs. On the other 
hand, he would argue in favor of a high social discount rate if his 
preferred option were either a short-term project or a low initial 
cost project with high operation and maintenance costs. All of which 
demonstrates that the relationship between social discount rates and 
net present values and the opportunities for manipulation of the 
former adds to the mall eabil ity of benefit-cost ana lysi s. 
Time Preferences 
Another important choice to be made in every benefit-cost analysis 
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is the duration over which benefits and costs shall be discounted back 
to present values. The choice is important because the choice can 
affect the resulttng net present values. A long duration with many 
years over which to discount benefits and costs will project higher 
net present values than a short duration--other things equal. 
Of course, the duration of a project should not be in dispute. 
It should simply be the productive life of the project. However, that 
period may be indeterminate at the outset of a project because of 
factors that do not enter into the physical condition of the capital 
goods in the project. For example, secondary and tertiary effects 
might endure much longer than the productive life of the primary 
physical features of the project. This is also true of externalities. 
The time over which an external benefit or cost endures may exceed 
the internal, physical life of the project. For example, nuclear 
contamination caused by a serious accident at a reactor site might 
render the site unusable for a number of hUman generations beyond the 
estimated productive life of the project. Finally, there is the 
possibility that new technologies may render the project obsolete 
before its estimated productive life is expended. Conversely, the 
project may remain productive long after its estimated productive 
1 ife has passed. 
The point is that the duration of the productive life of a 
project is not always so certain at the outset of the project. Thus 
there is some discretion in setting the number of years over which 
benefits and costs are to be discounted back to present va1ues. This 
then allows for further manipulations of possible benefit-cost analysis 
outcomes. And if one wished to gain priority for his preferred 
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project, he would argue to increase the duration of its productive 
life, and thereby inflate the project's net present values in 
relation to alternative projects of shorter duration but discounted 
at the same social discount rate. 
Some of the foregoing tactics for manipulating time 
preferences are e1 iminated if the choi ce criter; on is changed from 
net present values to benefit-cost ratios. Benefit-cost ratios were 
described earlier as an alternative technique to net present values 
for choosing a project methodology and for prioritizing a list of 
projects. The principal advantages of benefit-cost ratios over net 
present values are that they discriminate on a basis of net present 
values, but they screen out manipulations involving time 
preferences and overall project magnitudes. 
The inflation of net present values accomp1 ished by increasing 
the productive life of the project will not change the project 
priority if benefit-cost ratios are the criteria of choice. For 
example, assume that benefits and costs of a project are discounted 
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at four percent over ten years and that the present value of benefits 
is $13,800,000, and the present value of costs is $8,100,000. This 
produces a net present value of $5,700,000, and a benefit cost ratio 
of 1.7. Now assume that the productive 1 ife over I<hich the benefits 
and costs are di scounted is changed from ten to thi rty years. The 
present value of benefits is nOl< $29,400,000, and the present value of 
costs is $17,300,000. This dramatically increases the net present 
value from $5,700,000 to $12,100,000. But notice that the benefit-
cost rati a remains 1.7. Thus, the tact; c for improvi ng the pri ority of 
a project by increasing its productive life and thereby inflating its 
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net present value is overcome by using benefit-cost ratios for 
prioritizing projects. 
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Likewise, advantages of project size are eliminated by 
prioritizi ng project 1 i sts according to benefit-cost rati os. For 
example, assume two competing projects X and Yare analyzed using the 
same social rate of discount and the same productive life. And 
further assume that the present value of benefits for project X is 
$20,000,000, and its present value of costs is $18,000,000, yielding 
a net present value of $2,000,000. Now, assume that the present value 
of benefits for project Y is $6,000,000, and its present value of 
costs is $5,000,000, yielding a net present value of only $1,000,000. 
On a project 1 i st pri or; tized sol ely according to net present val ues, 
project X would be listed ahead of project Y because its net present 
value is higher by double that of project Y. This is so even though 
project Y produces'} higher rate of return than project X. However, 
if the list is prioritized by benefit-cost ratios, project Y is 
listed ahead of project X because the ratio for Y is 1.2 while the 
ratio for X is only 1.1. Thus, prioritizing project 1 ists according to 
benefit-cost ratios el iminates advantages (or disadvantages) of 
project size. 
However. pri orit; zi ng projects accord; n9 to benefit-cost ratios 
will not have any effect on benefit-cost analysis outcomes that 
involve manipulations of externalities or social-discount rates. The 
ranking of alternative project methodologies or the priority of a 
project can be increased on a project list by strategies to increase 
its net present value in relation to those of other projects. The 
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strategies of change described above involving manipulation of 
externalities and social-discount rates will also change benefit-cost 
ratios to enhance project priority. Once again, benefit-cost analysis 
is a pliant process because of the opportunities to maneuver outcomes 
by jockeying elements of the analysis. 
BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS AND WELFARE 
This chapter commenced with the question, how are the tensions 
between forward-urging technology and backward-clinging technology 
resolved into human progress, where progress is forward movement along 
the ends-means continuum--the continuum of on-going life processes. 
Future orientation and forward movement along the continuum also 
suggests the triumph of technology over aspects of ceremonialism, 
and the resulting improvements in social welfare. 
The linkage between ceremonialism and human values was 
acknowledged, and it was observed that values in an industrial society 
are as multifarious and disparate as society is pluralistic. The 
preceding question was then rephrased to: How are the diverse values 
in an industrial society structured and weighed in choosing between 
competing future ends and between alternative methods of employing 
present means toward the selected ends so that social welfare is 
maximized. After all, it is in the process of choosing between such 
alternatives that new technologies are or are not chosen to be 
innovated, diffused, and integrated. 
However, since the implicit summum bonum in all of this is 
maximum social welfare, it was necessary to explore that concept. 
Social welfare is simply the aggregate of individual welfare, and the 
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latter is the sum of one's satisfaction with life subject to technical 
and ceremonial constraints. The tenets of social welfare were 
examined from the perspective of welfare economics. While the theories 
of welfare economics are internally consistent, their predictive and 
prescriptive powers are suspect because they are empirically weak. 
That is, the theories are so abstract that there is little correspond-
ence with reality or it is sometimes difficult. if not impossible. to 
empirically establish the correspondence. As consistent as it is 
internally, much of welfare economics is simply implausible. 
Neverthel ess, the wel fare economi c concepts of Pareto-eff; ciency, 
and of equity within a Pareto-efficient system were found to be 
humanely attractive ideas. A Pareto-efficient system is one in which 
resources have been allocated such that the welfare of anyone person 
can be improved only at the cost of the welfare of others. Equity 
within a Pareto-efficient system is improved if income is redistributed 
such that the gaining persons value their gains more than the losing 
persons value their losses. These concepts were found to be so 
intuitively compelling that it was suggested that their conditions 
ought to be as nearly achieved as possible. 
However, operationalizing the Pareto criteria is another matter, 
given the implausibility of significant aspects of welfare economics. 
The problem is one of accurately measuring the confl icting and 
competing values, weighing them in some sort of choice mechanism, 
making decisions, and actualizing the decisions according to some 
criterion of choice. 
Benefit-cost analysis is a technique by which values measured in 
pecuni ary terms are organized and analyzed to facil itate human 
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decision-making. The technique moves decision-makers toward choices 
that, in theory, should at least enhance, if not maximize, social 
welfarf!: subject to resource constraints. 118enefits" is the b'enefit-
cost jargon for social welfare, while Ilcosts" is the term analogous to 
resource constraints. The benefit-cost analysis procedure by which 
only methods and projects that produce maximum net social benefits 
(or maximum excess of benefits over costs) or the highest benefit-
cost ratios will be implemented is the element that augurs toward 
maximum social welfare. As explained above, social welfare is enhanced 
in Pareto-efficiency terms any time someone can be made better off 
without making any other person worse off. This has a high 
probabi 1 ity of occurrence whenever an investment project--pri vate or 
public--truly produces a net positive present value, and that value 
is the highest in relation to relevant alternatives. 
The decision to innovate new technologies occurs out of the 
benefit-cost analysis process any time a new technology promises to 
increase social benefits relative to social costs, or to reduce social 
costs relative to social benefits. and the increase in net social 
benefits is great enough to overcome ceremonial resistances to the 
technical change. When these things coalesce, technology produces or 
widens the excess of social benefits over social costs, and social 
welfare "is thereby improved. Of course, the successful innovation of 
a new technology--an innovation that does indeed improve social 
welfare--is unlikely to happen unless all social benefits and costs 
are accurately assessed and included in the analysis, and all phantom 
benefits or costs are excluded from the analysis that led to the 
decision to innovate the new technology. 
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A good bit of this chapter has been devoted to describing how 
benefit-cost analyses can be manipulated to produce outcomes that are 
favored by one or another special-interest group. The production of 
favored outcomes can be achieved by manipulation of certain elements 
of the analysis--chiefly, externalities, social-discount rates, and 
time preferences. Manipulation of the latter two, social discount 
rates and time preferences, can be done, but it is not so facile in 
present institutional environments because they may be more effectively 
dealt with in the pecuniary frame-of-reference. However. this is not 
altogether the case with externalities. 
To be sure, many external effects are very real. There are 
external benefits initiated by both producing and consuming agents for 
which the market neither extracts payments from the recipients who 
enjoy the benefits, nor remunerates the initiators for the external 
benefits they produce. And there are external costs initiated again 
by both producing and consuming agents for which the market again 
neither extracts payments from the initiators, nor sees to payment of 
the recipients who bear the costs. Real external benefits and costs 
must somehow be verified, quantified, and included in benefit-cost 
analyses if social decisions are to lead to efficient allocations of 
resources and equitable distributions of incomes. 
There, however, is the rub. Externalities are ethereal. They 
are non-divisible, vaporous, and illusory. They are like smoke in a 
bar, and no person who stays in the room can avoid breathing it if he 
is to breathe at all. Or they are 1 ike the fragrance of a bouquet in 
a parlor, and no person who remains in the parlor can be excluded from 
the pleasant redolence as a way of inducing him to contribute to the 
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cost of the bouquet. In many cases, there is no simple or direct way 
of either verifying the existence of externalities, or of assessing 
their pecuniary values when they are found to exist. Most techniques 
for eva1 uating external effects therefore come down to intuitive 
opinions on the part of the analyst, and this injects subjective and 
sometimes unsubstantiated judgments into what may otherwise be a more-
or-less objective analysis. 
It is the problem of verifying and quantifying externalities that 
opens opportunities to maneuver the benefit and cost elements of 
benefit-cost analysis to favor the outcomes preferred by the interest-
groups with the greatest influence in the process. Preferred outcomes 
can be assured by the maneuvering of phantom benefits or costs into 
the analyses, and it is the spiritual essence of externalities that 
increases the 1 i ke1 i hood that such maneuveri ng wi 11 be successful. 
There is a gargantuan preoccupation with external costs under the 
institutional environment that prevails in the United States in this 
1 ast quarter of the twenti eth century. The preoccupation has ri sen 
like a spectre from the past concomitant with the rise of new tech-
nologies that promise greater and greater social wel fare and at the 
same time threaten revel ut;onary inst; tutiona 1 changes. The questi on 
relevant to the continuum of on-going life processes is. to what 
extent are phantom ceremonial values cloaked as external costs and 
maneuvered into benefit-cost analyses simply to prevent the 
innovations of new technologies? There is little doubt that such 
manipulations take place. But because of the ethereal quality of 
externalities, it appears doubtful that it can be prevented. 
Benefit-cost analysis possesses important advantages despite the 
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weaknesses described above. To the degree that manipulation of its 
various elements can be controlled, benefit-cost analysis appears to 
be the most promising technique now available to evaluate alterna-
tives--both as to ends to be achieved and ways to allocate resources 
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to achieve the selected ends. It tends to move issues to the top of 
the table. It arrays costs along side benefits for analysis, and it 
forces the examination of spending in terms of goals. It therefore 
holds forth the prospect for greater efficiency in the allocation of 
resources and in the distribution of incomes, and thus for improvements 
in social welfare. 
However, the weaknesses inherent in benefit-cost analysis 
admonish additional research to discover better empirical ways of 
verifying the existence of true external ities and of quantifying them 
when they have been established. They also admonish constant 
vigilance on the parts of all affected groups to detect and prevent 
the improper manipulation of benefit-cost analysis elements to 
artificially favor the outcomes preferred by one of another special 
interest group.17 
It has been the purpose of this chapter to examine the modern 
economic processes by which the tensions between technology and 
ceremonialism are resolved into human progress. The process involves 
choosing goals and ways of employing resources to achieve the goals. 
Choices are made by weighing benefits and costs and by choosing the 
a 1 ternati ves that produce the greatest net of benefits over costs, or 
the goals that render the greatest increase in social welfare. But 
because of opportunities for manipulation of elements in the process, 
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the outcomes that promise the greatest social welfare may not be 
selected. The problem remains--there is no simple or direct method 
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to structure and weigh values in a pluralistic, industrial society for 
choosing between competing future ends and alternative ways to employ 
resources such that social welfare is maximized. 
This chapter did not consider the political and other social 
processes by which decisions are made. For example, it left the 
question open as to how the power to control or influence the 
decision processes is distributed in a pluralist society. This and 
other related paints are considered in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER X 
URBAN PLURALISM 
The preceding chapter sought to explain how institutional values 
are measured in dealing with the tensions between technology and 
ceremonialism--tensions that frequently lead to decisions to innovate 
new technologies, and ultimately to the institutional changes 
precipitated by the new technologies. This chapter takes up the 
processes by which societies reconcile the social tensions that 
result in institutional changes. In other words, it addresses the 
question~ how do institutions change in modern. industrial democracies? 
The tentative answer, and the central idea in this chapter, is 
that institutions eventually adjust to the new technologies by 
diffusing and integrating them across the institutional system through 
a process called "collective action n by economists. and lIinterest-
group politics!! by political scientists. This does not mean that 
collective action and interest-group politics are simply different 
names for the same phenomenon. However, it acknowledges a substantial 
and complementary overlap regarding the economic and political 
relationship between technological innovations and institutional 
changes. 
It will help to briefly review appropriate parts of preceding 
chapters as a way of setting the stage for this chapter. It is 
recalled that ceremonialism arises from the cultural past, and it 
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embodies traditional ways of knowing and doing. Thus, it is the 
technique by which institutions discharge their social functions of 
maintaining social stability. Ceremonialism accomplishes this by 
transmi tting culture, structuring society, social izing members of 
society. and controlling social interaction. Ceremonialism seeks in 
these ways to preserve the cultural values out of which the 
422 
instituti cns have grown. Ceremon; a 1 ism is therefore stat; c and 
oriented toward the past in terms of the ends-means continuum. Hence, 
ceremonialism prescribes selection of only those future ends that are 
congruent with traditional values, and the employment of means in 
ways that do not deviate from traditional techniques. For these 
reasons, ceremonialism opposes selection of any future end or any 
technique for employment of means that is not established ;n tradition. 
On the other hand, technology is that qual ity of a tool that 
enables it to be substituted for human labor in the creation of goods 
and services having human value. Insofar as the production of goods 
and servi ces presumes future human uses, technology is future-ori ented, 
continuous, dynamic, and progressive. The innovation of new 
technology opens ways of organizing means to future ends in different 
ways than the traditional, and it may also bring future ends into 
human reach that were previously beyond known means. The dynamic 
qual ity and forward-urging of technology bring it into confl ict with 
backward-cl inging ceremoni a 1 ism as to the selecti on of ends-to-be-
reached, and as to the employment of means to the selected ends. 
How much of new technology is actually innovated depends on the powers 
of ceremonial ism to resist change and on the tenacity of the 
institutional values upon which the ceremonial ism is founded. 
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Modern innovations of new technologies arise out of decision 
techniques in industrial societies. Such techniques presume to 
evaluate alternatives by defining, quantifying, and weighing social 
benefits and costs. And they usually involve selection of the 
alternatives that yield the highest net present values (or excess of 
the present value of social benefits over the present value of social 
costs). The decision to innovate a new technology is reached when 
the analysis reveals that use of the new technology will so increase 
net present values (by increasing present values of benefits, or 
decreasing present values of costs, or both) that ceremonial 
resistance to the ensuing change is overcome. 
The actual innovation of a new technology is destabilizing to 
institutional environments because it opens opportunities for social 
mobility in which traditional social statuses and ceremonial systems 
of rank may be changed. It is this institutional feedback from 
technological change that precipitates social revolutions. Such 
revolutions occur when the innovation of new technology changes 
interinstitutional arrangements so that one or more institutions are 
no longer fully complimentary to the institutional system. Certain 
ceremoni es founded on the incongruous institutional arrangements 
become dysfunctional within the system. The resulting social 
instability reflects institutional responses to the technical change--
first to oppose, and then to adjust itself to the change. 
Social stability resumes when the new technology is fully 
integrated into the institutional system, and ceremonial arrangements 
have been altered to accommodate the technical change. Some 
institutions may have gained, and some may have lost social power. 
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New institutions may have come into existence, and some established 
institutions may have disappeared. It is this process of diffusion 
and integration of technology that produces institutional change and 
is the subject of this chapter. The process involves what economists 
call collective action, and aspects of collective action involve what 
political scientists call interest-group politics. 
COLLECTIVE ACTION 
Institutional economic theory possesses two main branches. The 
first has to do with institutional instability and discontinuity, and 
the second with institutional adjustments to change. That is, the 
first branch deals with the disequilibrating social elements that 
lead to revolution, and the second branch deals with the equilibrating 
social elements that lead to adjustment and stability. The seminal 
works in the first branch were produced by Thorstein Veblen and 
Clarence E. Ayres, and Chapters III through VIII above are an 
attempted summary restatement and embellishment of the applicable 
portions of their works. 
The seminal works in the second branch, the one dealing with 
institutional adjustments and stabi1 ity, were produced by John R. 
Commons. The first part of this chapter is an attempted summary and 
restatement of applicable portions of Commons' institutional economic 
theory. The reader is placed on notice that many of the terms 
developed in Chapters III through VIII according to the Veblen and 
Ayres lexicon are called by different names in the Commons vernacular. 
As in the translation from one language to another. there is not 
perfect 1 iteration between words in the two branches. However. there 
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are terms in each branch that have approximately synonYmous counter-
terms in the other branch. Appropriate interpretations will· be made 
in the applicable parts of the following text. 
It was Commons' view that institutions adjust in the face of 
technological change and social stability is restored through 
collective action. Indeed, his clearest and most complete, and yet 
concise, statements of theory are found in a monograph he titled 
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The Economics of Collective Action. Collective action deals with 
conflicts of interests between institutions, and the ceremonial modes 
of behavior by which the conflicts are resolved. And it purports to 
explain how the ceremonial norms are changed in the resolution process. 
Conflicts of Interests 1 
Conflicts of interests arise between going concerns because of 
the volitional or purposive nature of mankind and because of the 
material scarcities induced by the institution of property. The 
purposive nature of humans gives rise to the uses of goods and 
services while the institution of property limits the availability of 
the same. In other words, it is the disparity between the demand for 
and the supply of goods and services that causes conflicts of 
interests between goi ng concerns. 
Purposiveness, the central feature of volitional psychology, 
represents the behavioral qualities that inhere in humans and enable 
them to think and act in the longitudinal dimension of the ends-means 
continuum, the continuum of on-going life processes that was 
described in Chapter III above. They are descriptive of the traits 
that allow humans to visual ize their wants and conceptual ize them 
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in terms of distant future goals, and to plan and develop complex 
organizations of means to reach those goals. The goals are, of course, 
finished goods and services of both the producer and consumer kinds. 
The organization of means involves marshalling both the human and the 
nonhuman resource components. The former leads to the creation of one 
or more going concerns and a consequent demand for human labors. The 
latter leads to demands for material and other nonhuman resources. 
And the outcome of volitional motives is to secure the expected 
stream of future incomes as present values. 
Commons uses the term "going COI'leernll to mean approximately what 
Veblen and Ayres calls lIinstitution. 1I The former is a legal term used 
in courts of law that are trying civil litigations involving economic 
matters. In that context, a going concern ;s a lawful, solvent, whole, 
and viable economic unit. Thus a Commons' IIgoing concern II is an 
lIinstitution li in the Veblen-Ayres vernacular, but the latter appears 
to have a somewhat broader meaning than the former. Nevertheless, 
going concern will be used interchangeably with institution in this 
chapter. 
As noted, going concerns came into being because of human 
purposiveness. Possible future ends are brought into view, and when 
one is selected as an end-to-be-reached, a going concern is employed 
or organized to secure it. A going concern is an institutional 
organization composed of II complimentary factors II which, when 
organized correctly, enable the going concern to accomplish the goal 
or goals for which it was created. People are transitory in going 
concerns, but going concerns pers; st generation upon generation in 
one institutional form or another. It is the going concern that 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
discharges human purposiveness according to volitional psychology. 
Going concerns use material things, and the uses of material 
things are regularized by the institution of property. Private 
property rights are nothing more than the interests of owners that 
the state will enforce against non-owners. 2 It is recalled from a 
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previous chapter that property was fused with sovereignty during the 
European feudal era, and it was gradually separated with the 
monetization of feudal obl igations. The separation of sovereignty and 
property institutions came to be founded on the natural rights doctrine 
of John Locke. The doctrine justified certain common liberties on 
the ground that one gained a property right independent of the 
sovereign when he created a good by mixing ois personal labors with 
naturels materials. This followed because one must certainly have a 
right to the fruits of his own labors. 
The property rights severed from the institution of sovereignty 
included the private ownership and use of corporeal properties. 
Corporeal properties are tangible things such as land (or realty) and 
physical commodities (or personalty) other than land and features 
attached to the land. The expectation that the sovereign would 
enforce the ownerls quiet enjoyment of his private properties against 
trespass by non-owners gave rise to the Engl ish Common Law. 
specifically: 
As distinguished from law created by the enactment of 
1 egi s 1 a tures, the common 1 aw compri ses the body of those 
principles and rules of action, relating to the government 
and security of persons and property, which derive their 
authority from usages and customs of immemorial antiquity, 
or from the judgements and decrees of the courts 
recognizing, affirming, and enforcing such usages and customs; 
and, in this sense, particularly the ancient unwritten law 
of Engl and. 3 
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Incorporeal private property came into being when the courts 
commenced to enforce so-called obligations of contracts. This consists 
of a debtor's duty to pay his just debt to a creditor. The creditor's 
right to receive future payment is a property right conveyed by 
contract. The contract is an intangible private property because it 
came into being only in connection with some other property matter, 
and the right conveyed is an incorporeal property because it involves 
no tangible, material thing. However, the contract and its rights 
can be exchanged for other property ri ghts, ri ghts to both corporeal 
and incorporeal properties as well as to both tangible and intangible 
properties. Such private rights are preserved against public medd1 ing 
by the "obligations of contracts" clause of the U. S. Constitution. 
The constitutional meaning of property was enlarged by courts and 
legislatures in the United States during the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century to include other forms of intangible properties. 
These properties consisted of business goodwill, patents, trademarks, 
copyrights, franchises, etc. They were effectually laws proscribing 
unfair competition, and they created duties of avoidance and 
forbearance in others. They give the owners of intangible properties 
the economic power to withhold from others, until an agreeable price 
is negotiated, certain rights the non-owners might use and may need. 
The modern property distinctions result in proprietary scarcity 
as distinguished from biological and psychological scarcity. 
Biological scarcity relates to the Malthusian notion of scarce 
resources because of poor natural endowments, and psychological 
scarcity arises from the so-called hedonistic nature of man described 
by utilitarians like Bentham. The former contemplates resource 
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availability in terms of the past, and the latter in terms of the 
present. Both are based on a ceremonial concept of corporeal and 
tangible properties. The concept of tangible property is the holding 
of corporeal things for onels own use and enjoyment, and it fosters 
a sense of individualism and economic independence. 
Proprietary scarcity, on the other hand, relates to 
institutional present and contemplated future uses of resources to 
secure on-going future ends. It is therefore based on a ceremonial 
concept of incorporeal and intangible properties--ceremonial rights 
that give persons and institutions status in the form of present 
claims on future incomes. Such rights are ceremonially conveyed by 
contracts. and they give the owners the power to ceremonially withhold 
from others present and future uses of properti es the non-owners need 
until the owners and non-owners can ceremonially negotiate working 
rules, the prices, and other terms of future exchange. Thus, 
proprietary scarcity is enforced by a set of ceremonial arrangements 
involving a concept of intangible properties. Finally, proprietary 
scarcity ultimately fosters interdependence of interests as opposed 
to the independence of interest embodied in a concept of tangible 
property. 
However. proprietary scarcity leads to conflicts of interests 
between going concerns. One institution has legal title and physical 
possession of the property or the document or other evidence of the 
property, while another lacks legal title and possession but needs 
present or probable future use of the property to achieve the 
institutions I planned future ends. The resolution of such conflicts 
is the subject matter of collective action, as Commons believed, 
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"in control, liberation, and expansion of individual action,II4 
Ceremoni a 1 Norms 
Conflicts of interests are resolved by transactions that are 
structured by working rules and, at the same time, are concerned with 
creating and changing the working rules. IIWorking rules" is the 
Corranons term for that aspect of ceremonialism that has so far been 
called traditional ways of knowing and doing. Working rules are the 
ceremonial modes of behavior that are expected of persons occupying 
institutional positions. They are the ceremonial role patterns that 
descend from the cultural past and inform the present of customari ly 
acceptable forms of human interaction. They are the taboos that cement 
institutions together internally and that bind them to one another 
externally. They are all the laws of the nation as well as the 
conditions of every private contract or other agreement hammered out 
by bargaining. And they are the managerial decisions and rules 
promulgated by every executive officer across the land. 
In short. they are ceremonial ism. the instrumentality of the 
institutional system for maintaining social stability. Working rules 
will be used interchangeably with ceremonial ways of knowing and doing 
(taboos) and with ceremonial modes of behavior. 
Working rules are the institutional guidelines for transactions. 
and the "transaction" is a Commons term approximately meaning 
"ceremonial exchange" in the language of Veblen and Ayres. Transac-
tions are the ceremoni a 1 methods for acknowl edgi ng rank and va 1 idating 
status. They are therefore the varieties of ceremonial interactions 
that bind persons together with flurries of activities within the 
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institutional system, and they thereby maintain the system and preserve 
social stability. The word transaction will be used interchangeably 
with ceremonial exchange in this chapter. Taking place according to 
working rules, transactions dissolve conflicts of interests into 
interdependencies of interests by providing legal forums for the 
exchange of property ri ghts. 
The exchange of property ri ghts between gO;"9 concerns ; s, of 
course, economic activity. Any economic activity takes place in three 
stages--a negotiation stage. a transaction stage, and an administration 
stage. The negotiation stage ends with agreement on the values to be 
exchanged. It is approximately the offer and the acceptance in 
contract parlance. The transaction stage lays down the working rules 
that culminate in a binding contract which will govern the exchange. 
And the administration stage discharges the exchange according to the 
conditions or working rules laid down in the transaction stage. This 
includes the lawful alienations and acquisitions of ownerships, the 
physical transfers of the rights exchanged, and the future payments 
if any. The transaction stage is the crucial stage because it is the 
apex of economic exchange where the working rules are established that 
will govern the activity during its future existence. 
All transactions are collective action in practice. There are 
three kinds of transactions--bargaining transactions. rationing 
transactions, and manageri a 1 transacti ons. Bargaini n9 transactions 
are the most recent to rise out of custom in the western world. The 
going concerns in a bargaining transaction are private institutions 
that are legal equals. They employ persuasion and sometimes coercion 
as inducements in the negotiation stage to buy and sell commodities or 
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other property rights. The working rules of the transaction stage 
produce collateral debts--a debt of performance by the seller and a 
debt of payment by the buyer. The debts are discharged in the 
administration stage as the seller alienates the property right sold 
to the buyer and acquires payment of consideration by the buyer, and 
the buyer al ienates the consideration to the seller and acquires the 
property right purchased from the seller. 
Bargaining transactions are collective actions because at the 
outset each bargaining transaction has not two, but at least five 
potential parties. There are at least two competitors on each side 
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of the transaction--two potential buyers offering the two best 
opportunities for the seller, and two potential sellers offering the 
two best opportunities for the buyer. The buying and selling parties 
will, of course, be narrowed to the actual buyer and seller by the end 
of the negotiation stage. Finally, there is at least one judge who 
stands ready to hear any disputes and to issue decrees in the name of 
the state to an actual seller or buyer. The judge represents the 
sovereign power of the state enforcing custom and law. It;s this 
arrangement that makes bargaining transactions juridicial in character. 
Rationing transactions are the oldest in point of time, and 
they are the commands of a governing body allocating property rights 
among the governed. They take place between legal superiors and legal 
subordinates, whether or not there is perfect agreement on the parts 
of subordinates. The negotiation stage involves command as an 
inducement to obedience, and the working rules of the transaction 
stage have to do with budgetary commitments that affect the future 
distributions of wea1th, assets, and incomes. The budgets are 
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revenues and the disbursement of funds. 
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Obvious examples of rationing transactions are the taxation and 
expenditure programs of governments. Dictatorships are the more 
primitive and autocratic superiors in rationing transactions. However, 
taxes are no less onerous to the citizen of a democracy in which the 
tax laws are enacted by legislatures composed of elected 
representatives. The citizen is nevertheless compelled by law and the 
possible sanctions of the state against his person and properties to 
pay his taxes. Moreover, the state will use the tax revenues to pay 
for whatever public programs emerge from the legislative consensus 
whether or not all taxpayers agree with that consensus. Other less 
obvious examples of rationing transactions are the allocations of 
rights made by boards of directors to the operating officers of 
private institutions like business corporations, labor unions, and 
churches. As one can see, the central stage of such activity, the 
rationing transaction, is legislative in character. 
Finally, managerial transactions arise out of bargaining 
transactions or rationing transactions, or both. The working rules 
emerging from bargaining and rationing transactions may contain areas 
of discretion. Those areas of discretion are filled by managerial 
transactions during the administration stage of the bargaining or 
rationing transaction out of which the discretion emerged. Managerial 
transactions are executive in nature. and they take place between 
legal superiors (the managers) and legal subordinates (the persons 
managed). Thus. the negotiation stage involves command as an inducement 
to obedience. The commitments and rules of future actions resulting 
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Discharge of the commitment takes place in the administration stage 
by the actual combining of inputs to produce the outputs. 
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For example, the general manager of an enterprise may be 
empowered by the rationing transactions of the board of directors to 
manage the company' 5 resources in the production of commodities for 
sale through retail merchants to consumers. The working rules will 
no doubt give the manager substantial discretionary authority to 
discharge the production commitment in the administration stage. The 
discretionary authorities will be exercised through additional 
transactions of the bargaining and managerial sort. 
In pursuit of his responsibilities, the manager may hire an 
employee. The hiring invol ves a bargaining transaction because it 
takes place voluntarily between legal equals. And, in cases of 
employment, the commitment to render future labor services is 
consensual under the working rules (custom and law) that govern such 
commitments in the western world. The commitment may therefore be 
terminated at will by the employee and under collective bargaining 
provisions by the employer. However, once the employment commitment 
is made, and as long as it remains in force, the status relationship 
between the employer and employee is one of master and servant. And, 
as long as that relationship obtains, the servant is obliged to obey 
the cOTTUllands of the master in their productive enterprise. Thus, the 
transactions that thereafter ensue between them are managerial 
transactions which are corollary to the bargaining transaction that 
initiated the master-servant relationship. 
The three forms of transactions--bargaining, rationing, and 
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managerial--resolve confl icts of interests between going concerns by 
providing ceremonially-sanctioned methods for exchanging property 
rights. The exchange of property rights is necessary to permit going 
concerns access to the scarce resources needed for the institutions to 
achieve their future ends-to-be-reached. The transactions are 
governed externally by working rules (custom and law), and they are 
concerned with the creation of the internal working rules to govern the 
on-going features of the exchanges with which they deal. It is 
therefore transactions that maintain the institutional system by 
binding persons together with collective activities within the system--
activities that reinforce human interactions by ceremonially 
acknowledging ranks and validating statuses. 
Changing Ceremonial Norms6 
The key to understanding institutional changes is in 
understanding how ceremonial ism changes--how changes are brought in 
the ceremonial totems and taboos, in the ceremonial systems of status 
and rank, and in the methods of ceremonial exchange that val idate 
institutional statuses. In short, it is changes in the panoply of 
the ceremoni a 1 canons of taste and the ceremoni a 1 modes of behavi or 
that perpetuate institutions and the cultural values on which they 
are founded. It is changes in the very forces that operate against 
change. 
And the key to understanding how ceremonial ism changes is to 
understand the nature of transactions and their relationships to 
customs and laws. The simplest statement of those relationships is: 
transactions are structured by customs and the law, while laws are 
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slowly changed to conform to underlying customs, and customs evolve out 
of the routine practices of transactions. In other words, customs are 
little more than routinized working rules, and they therefore rise out 
of working rules that have become routinized by transactions. And the 
laws are slowly changed to bring them into accord with certain 
evolving customs. Changes in the law involve interest-group politics 
and they are the subject of the next part of this chapter. 
This section deals with the causal relationships between 
transactions, working rules, and customs that lead to changes in 
ceremonial norms. A summary of those relationships follows: 
(1) Assuming a very long-run social stability based on a mature 
technology--one which has been fully diffused and integrated--going 
concerns are found to be operating with complimentary factors which 
include firmly established working rules, and the transactions between 
going concerns are completely routine. 
(2) The discovery of a pervasive new technology will open 
opportunities to increase benefits (increases in quantity or quality 
or both of goods or services or both) proportionately more than the 
increases in corresponding casts. 
(3) However, innovation of the new technology will be difficult 
and may be impossible under some of the established working rules. 
While those working rules were complimentary factors in the established 
environment, they become 1 imi ting factors with the new technology. 
(4) Human purposiveness I'/ill cause some going concerns to 
attempt to innovate the new technology and to realize the profits or 
other social gains from doing so. They will therefore search for ways 
to bring the 1 imiting factors under control and to convert them to 
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complimentary factors in terms of the new technology. The efforts will 
take the form of strategic transactions which have the functions of 
changing the working rules in terms of the new technology. Strategic 
transactions are simply bargaining, rationing, and managerial 
transactions that introduce neoteric working rules. 
(5) If the strategic transactions are successful, they will 
produce revised working rules that prove themselves instrumental toward 
innovation and integration of the new technology, and the revisions 
will be routinized by repetitive transactions if the innovation is 
fruitful. 
(6) Finally, the limiting factors will have been converted to 
complimentary factors when the revised working rules have been fully 
routinized, and fully routinized working rules are, after all, 
customary ways of doing things. 
An example that illustrates the foregoing process is the 
innovation of the motor vehicle and some of the very long-run changes 
in urban affairs that are attributable to the diffusion and 
integration of automotive technology. It must be admitted at the 
outset that only a few of the more obvious effects can be described 
here because the effects are so pervasive that there is hardly an 
aspect of human existence that has not been significantly touched by 
that technology. Likewise, it is not possible to describe even a 
small fraction of the immense profusion of transactions that were 
somehow involved with the innovation, diffusion, and integration of 
automotive technology. The transactions must surely number in the 
billions, and perhaps in the trillions. With this ;n mind, it is 
only possible to savor the essence of what occurred. 
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The self-propelled vehicle is a creature of the twentieth century. 
To be sure. automat hIe technology is continuous with other 
technologies. and its genesis extends back in time before the 
twentieth century, But the innovation, diffusion, and integration of 
automotive technology are very recent phenomena. Working rules 
centering on transportation arrangements were based on horse and rail 
technologies at the turn of the present century. The innovation and 
diffusion of horse technology was described in Chapter VIII above. 
The di stri but; on of settlements, the patterns of interurban and 
interregional trade and exchange, and the differential rates of urban 
development and growth described in Chapter VIII were changed again 
in the nineteenth century by the innovation, diffusion, and inte-
gration of railroad technology. The use of horse-drawn, rail 
transport reaches well back before 1800, particularly in mining 
operations and in intra-urban transportation. However, inter-urban 
transportation remained unaffected by railroad technology until the 
innovation of steam locomotion. 7 
The first inter-urban railroad, the Stockton and Dar1 ington 
Railway, opened passenger and freight service in England in 1825. 
The Baltimore and Ohio commenced rail service in the United States in 
1828 using horse-drawn cars. The 8 and a converted to locomotives in 
1830 using the litom thumb,1i a locomotive built by Peter Cooper. The 
superiority of railroads in the cross-country transportation of 
freight and passengers was demonstrated during the U. S. Civil War, 
and that war gave impetus to railroad construction in the United States. 
Acts of the U. S. Congress in 1862 and 1864 provided pub1 ic lands for 
construction of a transcontinental railroad. The Union Pacific 
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Railroad was built eastward from California. The two met at 
Promontory, Utah on May 10, 1869. 
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Railroad construction proved to be a boon to the westward 
expansion of the United States, and construction proceeded throughout 
much of the remaining nineteenth century until the entire country was 
served in one way or another by railroads. The U. S. Interstate 
Commerce COrTUTlission was created in 1887 to regulate the expanding 
private railroads. By the end of the century routine working rules 
based on inter-urban rail technology and intra-urban horse technology 
were well established, and the routine working rules were 
substanti ally integrated wi th soc; a1 customs and traditional bel i efs. 
Likewise. physical arrangements had been changed to accommodate 
the railroad technology. After all, railroad construction included 
more than simply laying track between two cities. It also involved 
the construct; on of terminal facil it; es for fre; ght and passengers. 
Thus, cities like New York, Chicago, New Orleans, and San Francisco, 
that were major ports for water-borne cargo and passengers, had to be 
partially rebuilt to link rail terminal facilities to water terminal 
facilities so that ,o'rgoes could be transshipped without double and 
triple handling. Other cities like Omaha, Kansas City, Indianapolis, 
Oklahoma City, and Denver that were developing during the era of 
railroad construction were expanded around a rail terminal. 
This feature of railroads, the central terminal for inter-city 
transportation, and the relatively high cost of horse-drawn intra-city 
transport caused cities to be monocentric with high population 
densities at and adjacent to the central core. All commerce and 
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industry took place at a central business district, and people resided 
in or inmediately next to the central business district. Everything 
tended to center on the railroad terminal in order to minimize the 
cost of transportation. land rents, wages, and net income were 
accordingly higher in the core area, and they decl ined with distance 
from the core area. On the other hand, transportation costs and thus 
the prices of goods increased with distance from the core area. There 
were no suburbs as they are known in the latter quarter of the 
twenti eth century. 8 
This was the situation, then, at the outset of the automobile 
era. Cit1es were generally monocentric and centered on inter-city 
railroad terminals. The intra-city transportation of cargo was by 
horse-drawn vehicles, and the intra-city transportation of passengers 
was by the same means and by electric-powered trolleys. Working rules 
based on horse and rail technologies were routinized and were 
reconciled with traditional beliefs and social customs. In other 
words, the ceremoni a 1 norms had been changed suffi ci ently to 
accommodate the technologies, and the technologies were integrated 
with the institutional system so that all affected institutions were 
congruent with the system. 
However, the first fity years of the twentieth century witnessed 
first a peak in railroad prosperity and then a decline in the 
significance of the railroads. There were many factors contributing 
to the changes, but the chief factor was innovation of the self-
propelled vehicle. The first record of a self-propelled vehicle 
dates back to 1769 when Nicholas Joseph Cugnot demonstrated a steam-
powered three-wheeled carriage in Paris. Cugnot's invention was 
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However, a similar vehicle built in 1801 by Richard Trevithick 
in England gave rise to the production and use of both steam- and 
electric-powered vehicles in England during the nineteenth century. 
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Even so, the self-propelled vehicles did not come into full use there 
until their worth was demonstrated in the United States during the 
first quarter of the present century. This was because the British did 
not find it possible to change the existing working rules to allow the 
full diffusion and integration of self-propelled vehicles with the 
existing institutional system. For example. such vehicles were 
limited to a four mile-per-hour speed, and they were subject to 
discriminatory bridge and road tolls. Likewise, a so-called Red Flag 
Act was passed in England requiring that each self-propelled vehicle 
be preceded by a man on foot carrying a red flag by day and a red 
lantern by night to warn approaching teamsters and carriage-masters so 
they might control their horses as the vehicles passed. The 
requirement remained in force from 1836 to 1896. 
Ceremonial powers and institutional resistance to change were 
simply too great in England to permit the full integration of self-
propell ed veh; c1 es there. The Sri ti sh experi ence demonstrated that 
innovation of the new automotive technology was difficult, and full 
integration was impossible under some of the established working rules. 
While those working rules were complimentary factors in the 
established environment, they were limiting factors with the new 
technology. The same ceremonial situation prevailed with more or 
less intensity elsewhere in the world. 
In the meantime, it was becoming clear to other enterprising 
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people that the self-propelled vehicle held great potential for 
sUbstantial improvements in overland transportation. Under the 
correct circumstances, such vehicles could provide personal portal-to-
portal passage commencing at any moment of the owner's choosing, and 
they could do so with unprecedented privacy, speed, comfort, and 
hauling capacity. Moreover. the costs of maintenance and operation 
could be far less than the same costs using teams of horses for motive 
power. There were no extensive preparations required before the trip, 
as with horses, and there were no special livery requirements at the 
end of the trip. All-in-all, the potential gains in human welfare 
seemed impressive to those persons with the vision to look ahead. 
Karl Benz and Gottlieb Daimler were two such vis'ionaries. Benz 
introduced a three-wheeled carriage powered by an internal combustion 
engine in Germany in 1885. In the same year, Daimler produced an 
internal combustion engine that was better suited to self-propelled 
vehicles, and the Daimler Company brought out the "panhard car" in 
France by 1894. So-called "horse1ess carriages II were introduced on 
the other side of the Atlantic during the 1890s in various power and 
size configurations by Charles and J. Frank Duryea, Ramsom 01ds, Henry 
Ford, Elwood Haynes, Al exander Winton. and others. 
It was the work of entrepreneurs like Benz. Daimler. Dlds, Ford, 
Winton, and others that led to the creation of going concerns for the 
purpose of innovating the new automotive technology and realizing the 
private profits and other social gains for doing so. Their strategies 
involved searching for ways to bring the limiting factors under 
control and to convert them to complimentary factory ;n terms of the 
new techno1 09Y. Thei r methods took the form of strategic transacti ons 
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integration of the new technology. The strategic transactions were 
rationing, bargaining, and managerial transactions that introduced 
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novel working rules. The novel working rules might apply to creation 
and organization of the going concern, purchases of inputs, production 
arrangements, or marketing the final product. 
Perhaps the most successful and best-known i nnavatar in the 
automotive field in that era was Henry Ford. It is therefore possible 
to draw from Ford biographical materials to illustrate the employment 
of strategic transactions that changed working rules, and to illustrate 
the routinization of working rules into customary ways of knowing and 
doing. Ford was born on a farm near Dearborn, Michigan in 1863. He 
was employed by the Edison Company as a machinist and engineer from 
1890 to 1899. Working in his spare time, he completed his first 
automobile in 1892. 10 
Resigning from the Edison Company in 1899, Ford and others formed 
the Detroit Automobile Company. However. eventual disagreement with 
his associates caused Ford to withdraw, and in 1903 he formed the Ford 
Motor Company in associ ation wi th James Couzens. the Dodge brothers. 
and others. Ford had bought out hi s associ ates by 1907, and the Ford 
Motor Company has since remained under control of the Ford family. 
Each of these actions involved strategic bargaining transactions in 
the creation of a going concern for the purpose of producing and 
selling automobiles. The first attempt proved fruitless, but the 
second set of transactions culminated in the Ford Motor Company, 
perhaps the most successful pioneering automobile producer in the 
world. 
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Success of the Ford Motor Company is attributable to many things. 
However, three novel and revolutionary arrangements stand out because 
they eventually became the models for other successful manufacturers. 
The first was to adapt the conveyor belt principle to the mass 
production of automobiles. The second was to gain control over the 
supply of inputs. And, finally, Ford established control over the 
distribution and sale of his automobiles. 
Undoubtedly the most revol uti onary of Ford's novel arrangements 
was adaptat·ion of the conveyor-belt principle to the mass production 
of automobiles. This was accomplished by strategic rationing 
transactions that committed the Ford Motor Company to the assembly-
line principle. and allocated internal resources to company managers 
to carry out production according to that principle. On-going 
strategic bargaining and managerial transactions further shaped the 
working rules to actualize the novel concept. StrategiC bargaining 
transactions involved hiring units of labor and buying other resources, 
and strategic managerial transactions involved integrating the labor 
and other resources into the assembly-l ine process. The result was a 
manufacturing process that substantially reduced the unit cost of 
automobiles by taking advantage of increasing returns to large-scale 
production. And the Ford assembly-l ine process became a model of 
production efficiency that was ultimately copied and adapted to the 
manufacture of nearly every product in modern industrial systems. 
'The other two novelties initiated by the Ford Motor Company, 
gaining control over input supplies and over distribution and sale 
of the final products, resulted in much the same way. Strategic 
rationing transactions committed the company and allocated its 
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resources to those ends, and company agents secured the ends, largely 
through strategic bargaining transactions with other going concerns. 
Because of the advantages Ford Motor Company real ized from those 
arrangements, it soon became the largest and most profitable 
automobile producer in the world. Ford introduced the Mode1-T in 1908. 
The Mode1-T was an inexpensive, mass-produced, standard car that sold 
15,000,000 before it was discontinued in 192B. The initial success of 
the Mode1-T enabled Ford to expand in the 19205 with branches in 
England and other countries. 
The mass-production techn; que and the vert; ca 1 conso1; dations 
that gave Ford Motor Company control of its automobile distribution 
and sales as well as many of its input supplies became prototypes for 
other successful automobile producers and other manufacturers. Thus, 
Fordls strategic transactions successfully adapted the traditional 
working rules, converting them from limiting factors to complimentary 
factors in terms of automobile manufacturing, distribution, and sales. 
And continuous repetition of the transactions by Ford and the other 
going concerns that copied Ford routinized the novel working rules so 
that they became customary ways of knowing and doing. 
This section has described how changes in ceremonial norms are 
brought about through collective action to adapt the institutional 
system to technological changes. This involves changes in ceremonial 
tastes and in the ceremonial modes of behavior that perpetuate 
institutions and the customs and traditional beliefs around which 
institutions are formed. The changes derive from the nature of 
transactions and their relationships to custom and law. Transactions 
are guided by customs and the law, while laws slowly change to conform 
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to customs, and customs evolve out of the routine practices of 
transactions. That is, customs are simply working rules that have 
been routinized by transactions, and customs change as working rules 
are changed and routinized by transactions. 
INTEREST-GROUP POLITICS 
The previous section described how ceremonial norms are changed 
by collective action through the medium of transactions between going 
concerns. Transactions are governed by customs and the law. while 
customs evolve out of the routine practices of transactions, and laws 
slowly change to conform to evolving customs. The section described 
how transactions change and rout; n; ze working rul es, and routine 
working rules are customary ways of knowing and doing. And. since 
ceremonial norms are also customary ways, they change as novel working 
rules are routinized by transactions. Since laws are little more than 
codification of certain customary beliefs, they are slowly changed 
with changes in the underlying customs. However, the section did not 
elaborate on this latter point, noting that changes in the laws involve 
interest-group politics. This part of the chapter deals with interest-
group politics and changes in the laws. 
The main idea in this part is that laws are founded on customs, 
and they are enacted and changed in a pluralist democracy by interest-
group interaction in which persons are free to form, join, quit, and 
dissolve interest groups, and interest groups are free to form, jOin. 
quit, and dissolve coalitions in support of or opposition to the 
enactment of new laws and changes in old laws. Consensus can be 
reached and human wel fare enhanced ; n thi s way through interest-group 
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interaction alone. Moreover, a public-interest equilibrium results and 
can be maintained solely by the interaction of opposing interest groups 
and interest-group coalitions. The first section examines the 
relationship between law and sovereignty, and the second section 
describes how interest-group interactions bring about changes in the law. 
Law and Soverei gnty 
Laws are based on customary ways of knowing and doing. They are 
codifications of the traditional bel iefs that descend from the 
ancient past. They are all of the rules of ceremonial conduct of a 
nation-state in which the rules are enforced by a sovereign authority 
with powers to impose punishments for violations of the rules. There 
is. therefore, no systematic development of law until the appearance 
of a sovereign state with centralized police authority. The state 
rises in response to what appears to be a universal tendency for the 
institutions of a society to produce a legal order to preserve and 
enforce their ceremonial mandates. Thus, governments come into 
existence with social activities which threaten certain taboos that 
are held sacred by the more powerful institutions in a society. 
Any social activity involves at least two groups, one composed 
of those persons who are directly involved in the activity, and others 
composed of those persons who are indirectly affected for good or bad 
by the activity. Those groups which are indirectly affected and who 
perceive their interests involved in the activity will organize to 
preserve their customs and to protect their interests. The resulting 
organized interest is a public, and insofar as the public commissions 
agents to operate in its behalf to control the activity, the 
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institution of government comes into being. ll 
The power to control is coercive power--the power tc compel 
people to do things they would not otherwise do, and to desist from 
doing things they would otherwise do. And since the ultimate in 
coercion is physical violence, sovereign government is, at base, 
institutionalized violence--that is, violence that enjoys the sanction 
of law. This is so whether the form of government is monarchic or 
democratic, albeit that the coercive powers may be more restrained by 
custom and law in the latter than in the former. 
The earliest governments were monarchical in which all sovereign 
powers--legislative, executive, and judicial--were vested in a single 
ruler who was supreme in ceremonial power, rank, and author~ty. The 
earliest surviving legal codes were nothing more than collections of 
ancient beliefs regarding ceremonial behavior that were assembled by 
such monarchs in discharge of their legislative powers. Much of what 
is now known of the governments and traditions of antiquity survives 
in the form of legal codes--the Code of Hammurabi (Babylonia), the 
Laws of Manu (India), the Mosaic Code (Palestine), and the Law of the 
Twelve Tables (Rome). Indeed, Roman law developed from the latter of 
these~ and was summarized in the Corpus Juris Civilis at the time of 
Justinian. While the Roman law was eclipsed for a time by Germanic 
Codes after the decl ine of Rome, it was later revived and became the 
basis of most Continental European 1aws. 12 
However, development of the law in England followed a different 
course. Revolt of the barons against King John led to sealing the 
Magna Charta at Runnymede in 1215. The document was sealed under duress, 
and the king repudiated it as soon as he was free from baronial 
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coercion. Nevertheless, certain aspeCts of British law trace their 
origins to the Magna Charta. Among these are the right to trial by 
jury and the guarantee of habeas corpus which are traced to the clause 
against the oppression of subjects. Likewise, some have traced the 
House of Lords, and thus the British parliamentary system, to the 
Magna Charta provisions that secure certain feudal rights, privileges, 
dues of the barons against encroachment by the king. This and other 
matters led the king to convene a Curia Regis, or Great Council, to 
consider judicial matters of the realm that affected baronial 
prerogatives. The chief effect of Magna Charta was to limit the 
sovereign powers of the monarch. 13 
Royal courts were created in partial response to the Magna Charta 
limitations on royal prerogatives, but also on the medieval theory that 
the laws administered by the King's Courts (King's Bench, Exchequer, 
and Court of Common PI eas) represent the common customs of the realm 
as opposed to the customs of local jurisdictions that were applied in 
baronial courts. The King's Courts served to undermine the local 
administrative powers of the landed aristocracy as against the 
sovereign powers of the monarch in England by providing recourse to 
1 itigants that was less partial than the often capricious judgments 
handed down in the local courts under baronial control. 
Common recourse to the King's Courts gave rise to the Common Law 
that is now a basis of law in most English-speaking countries and 
other countries that were colonized by the British. 14 The Common Law 
gave supremacy to the customs or judicial precedents over the 
administrative edicts of local aristocracies. This led to the doctrine 
of Llsupremacy of the lawll under which not even the sovereign is above 
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the law. It also led to the presumption of innocence under which a 
defendant is presumed to be innocent until his guilt is proven beyond 
a reasonable doubt. This, of course, placed the burden of proof on 
the plaintiff in civil litigations and upon the state in criminal 
trials. Finally, it led to common trials by jury in which matters of 
guilt and innocence must be decided on the evidences by panels of 
peers rather than by the aristocracy or by officers of the sovereign. 
The result of all of this was to separate and distinguish judicial 
powers from other forms of sovere; gn power. 
Representative government emerged in England concomitant with 
but ostensibly separate from rise of the Common Law. It was a long, 
slow process that corrmenced in the thirteenth century with the Curia 
Regis, the kernel from which the House of Lords evolved. The House 
of Commons also originated in the thirteenth century with the 
convocation of knights and burgesses to report the consent of counties 
and towns to taxes imposed by the kind. However, the legislative 
powers of Parliament were not fully secure until the Glorious 
Revolution of 1688 which saw James II deposed and William III subject 
to great 1 imitations on the powers of the crown. Moreover. it was not 
until the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that the House 
of Commons secured its ascendancy in British government. Likewise, it 
has only been·in recent times that the lower social classes have 
secured the franchise and have enjoyed full representation in the House 
of Commons. 15 
Because of the long history and continuity of its laws, the 
British Constitution is unwritten and flexible. The fundamental laws 
and principles of government that make up the British Constitution 
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implicitly include the whole body of common and statutory laws of the 
realm as well as the practices and traditional workings of government. 
It can therefore be changed simply by acts of parliament, by judicial 
construction, or even by changes in customs. 16 
On the other hand, many nations made sharp pol itical and economic 
departures from the past in revolutions over the last two or more 
centuries. They have therefore had little in the way of indigenous 
legal customs on which to rely in constituting their new governments. 
Thus, they have used written constitutions to initiate governments 
and to specify the fundamental laws and principles of government by 
which they will be governed. For this purpose they have drawn largely 
from pol itical phi 1 osophy or from 1 ega 1 precedents successfully 
applied by other nations, or from some combination of these two. 
The Constitution of the United States is of this latter form--
specific, written. and having superior sanction to the ordinary laws 
of the land. It is rigid insofar as it is subject to specifically 
prescri bed processes of amendment wh; ch make it di fficul t to change 
by amendment. It consists of a preamble, seven articles, and presently, 
23 amendments. It is based on the natural-rights doctrine formulated 
by John Locke, and eloquently restated in the Declaration of Inde-
pendence. The delegated powers were constructed largely from so much 
of the Commentaries on the Law of England by Sir William Blackstone as 
deal with the sovereign powers of nation states. 17 
The U. S. Constitution serves to delegate powers from the several 
states to the federal government. This is because powers of 
sovereignty reposed originally and solely in the states, and the states 
acquired their powers from the colonial charters granted by royal 
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states relinquished some of their sovereign powers to the new republic. 
However, those powers not specifically delegated elsewhere in the 
Constitution were reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment. As 
will soon be clear, these provisions no longer have much meaning 
because statutes and judicial constructions have preempted the powers 
of the various states and have opened them to invasions by federal 
authori ti es. 
Article One delegates the legislative powers to a Congress 
composed of a House of Representatives with representation apportioned 
by population, and a Senate with representation apportioned by states. 
Each representative must stand for election biannually, and each 
senator every six years. Article Two delegates certain executive 
powers to an office of President. That office is filled by election 
every four years. Article Three delegates judicial powers to a 
Supreme Court composed of justices who are appointed for 1 ife by the 
President, and their appointments are confirmed by the Senate. The 
remaining articles deal respectively with relations of the states, 
amendments to the Constitution, supremacy of the federal Constitution, 
and the conditions under which the Constitution was to be ratified. 
The separation of powers into three branches is thought to create 
a system of checks and balances that will so diffuse sovereign powers 
as to preclude the concentration and usurpation of power by anyone 
branch. for example, the legislative powers of the Congress are 
limited in three ways. first, both houses must pass each bill before 
it can be sent to the President for signature. Second, any bill passed 
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by both houses may be vetoed by the President before it becomes law. 
However, a presidential veto may be overturned by a two-thirds majority 
in both houses. Finally, the constitutional ity of any statute may be 
tested in the courts by any person who wishes to bring legal suit to 
that end, and if the statute is found to be unconstitutional, it will 
be set aside by the courts. 
The executive powers of the President are likewise limited in 
three ways. First, he can generally take no actions without the 
statutory authority of Congress. Second, in those few areas in which 
he is empowered to initiate action his actions are subject to 
ratification by the Senate. And third, the constitutionality of any 
presidential action may be tested in the courts by any person who 
wishes to bring legal suit to that end, and if the action is found 
to be unconstitutional, it will be set aside by the courts. Finally, 
the Supreme Court and all of the lesser federal courts are limited to 
hearing only those cases that are properly brought before them through 
judicial process. The courts cannot initiate legislative and 
executive actions, nor can they undertake review of such actions upon 
their own initiatives. 
The U. S. Constitution also places other limits on the sovereign 
powers of the federal and state governments. These limitations are 
contained chiefly in the first nine amendments, the so-called I1B111 of 
Rights, II and the fourteenth amendment, the equal protection of the 
laws amendment. The essence of these amendments is to secure 
individual civil liberties from invasion by sovereign powers. 
The U. S. Constitution with its various amendments is a very 
brief but vastly important statement of the fundamental laws and 
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of government for the United States. Beneath the constitutional veil 
lurks an enormous body of statutory, administrative, and case law. 
Statutory law embodies all of the enactments of 'he Congress and the 
legislatures of the various states that have been signed into law by 
the President and the state governors. Administrative law embodies 
all of the rules promulgated by all of the regulatory agencies created 
by the federal and state governments. And case law embodies all of 
the judgments rendered by all of the courts in the land. 
Despite the difficulties in making formal amendments, the federal 
Constitution has been elaborately embellished to extend and increase 
the sovereign powers of the federal government into what was formerly 
the constitutionally sanctified domain of the states and the realm of 
individual freedoms. This has been accomplished by statute and 
judicial construction relying chiefly on the interstate commerce and 
implied-powers clauses of Section 8, Article one of the Constitution. 
The interstate commerce clause delegates to the federal government the 
exclusive power to regulate international and interstate commerce. 
The implied-powers clause gives Congress the power to enact whatever 
laws are necessary to execute the other powers expressly delegated to 
it. la 
Until the 1 ate 1930s, Congress exerei sed its powers under the 
interstate commerce clause exclusively with the regulation of 
transportation that crossed state boundaries. The agency for 
regulation. the Interstate Commerce Commission, was created by statute 
in 1887 to regulate the private railroads that were ascending at that 
time to dominate the economy. Case law generally affirmed a strict, 
literal interpretation of the interstate commerce clause that limited 
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However, the depreSSion that plunged the country into economic 
chaos during most of the 1930s spawned a rash of recovery legislation 
during the pre-World War II administrations of President Franklin 
Roosevelt. The resulting statutes constituted a massive expansion in 
the federal regulation of private business whether or not the business 
activities physically crossed state boundaries. Hardly any aspect of 
American economic life remained free from federal regulation. This 
likewise constituted a massive invasion of the states' domains and a 
federal preemption of their sovereign powers. 
The courts, relying on the precedents of strict and literal 
interpretations of the commerce clause. responded by declaring crucial 
recovery statutes unconstitutional. However, the Supreme Court slowly 
came to a more liberal interpretation, one that simply confirmed a 
social trend already established in practice. In 1937, the Court 
handed down a landmark judgment that effectively removed any 
constitutional bar to the expansion of federal control of private 
social activities, economic or otherwise. The case was the National 
Labor Relations Board Y..2. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corporation, and it 
was the constitutional test of the National Labor Relations Act. In 
order to uphold the statute, the Supreme Court had to so . broaden its 
interpretation of the interstate commerce clause that virtually any 
activity that can be shown to affect the general welfare may now be 
construed as in interstate corrrrnerce for purposes of exercising federal 
soverei gn powers. 
The Jones and Laughl in case 1 aid to rest any serious question of 
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states' rights, and it opened the way to the unbridled proliferation of 
federal regulatory agencies. The federal structure is literally 
plastered with acronyms representing the institutions that have since 
been created by congressional statute to regulate nearly every aspect 
of human existence in the United States. The problems of regulation 
and regu1 atory standards had become so acute by the end of Wor1 d 
War II that Congress found it necessary to enact the Federal 
Administrative Procedures Act in 1946. The Act simply standardized 
and codified the customary procedures that had evo1 ved out of the 
rationing, bargaining, and managerial transactions involving 
regulatory practice and that had proven to be ceremonially viable in 
the i nst i tuti ona 1 system. 
There are no expressly stated constitutional provisions for the 
creation of federal regulatory agencies. Hence, they have been created 
under the implied powers clause, and they are generally considered to 
be parts of the executive branch of government. Their governing boards 
and chief administrators are therefore appointed by the President and 
their appointments are confirmed by the Senate. Even so, most such 
agencies function with a high degree of autonomy under the statutes 
that created them. This is because they are presumed to be staffed 
with persons possessing a high level of technical expertise in the 
areas of their regulatory powers. And they fUnction to provide expert 
control over social matters in which neither the Congress nor the 
courts possess technical competence. 
For these reasons, the statutes under whi ch regul atory agencies 
are established generally delegate legislative, executive, and judicial 
powers to be exercised in the technical realm in which the agencies 
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are to operate. Thus, such agencies make the rules by which they will 
regulate, and under which the regulated going concerns will operate. 
Moreover, the agencies enforce the rules, adjudicate in the 
prosecution of going concerns that are suspected of being in violation 
of the rules, and impose sanctions on those institutions found guilty 
of rule infractions. All of these matters are subject to review 
through appropriate appeals to the federal courts. However, the court 
system will not hear an appeal until all administrative remedies have 
been exhausted. Likewise, it will not exercise original jurisdiction, 
hear new evidence, or place itself in the positions of agency hearings 
officers in exercising judgments on evidence. 
The emerging system of federal regulation of heretofore private 
activities has been criticized on several grounds. An important 
criticism argues that Congress has abdicated its legislative 
authorities and has wrongly delegated its legislative powers to 
autonomous agencies that are directed by officials who are apPointed 
and who are not accountable back to the electorate. On the other hand, 
the agencies are accountable to Congress. They are subject to audit 
by the General Accounting Office, and they are dependent on Congress 
for funding of their operations. Congress may eliminate an agency or 
change its operations either by statute or by fiscal controls. And 
since Congress is accountable to the electorate, it is argued that 
regul atory agenci es are 1 i kewise accountable through Congress. 
Another important criticism argues that endowment of a single 
agency with legislative, executive. and judicial powers blurs the 
tradition of separation of powers that is supposed to characterize the 
federal government. On the other hand, it is argued that so long as 
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Congress retains the legislative power to change or eliminate an 
agency, and so long as going concerns that are subject to agency rules 
have appellate recourse to the federal court system, the integrity of 
the checks and balances principle is preserved. The point is that 
there does not now appear to be any further constitutional or common-
law ground for turning back the ever-deepening waves of federal 
regulation of private social activities in the United States. It has 
become a solid fact of American life and nothing short of cataclysmic 
revolution is likely to change it--if, indeed, even that can change it. 
The whole body of administrative law, and a substantial body of 
case law has grown out of the regulatory process both at the federal 
level and at the state level. These laws along with the bodies of 
statutory and cnnstitutional laws that make up the American legal 
system represent the institutional responses to the technological 
.changes that have thrust humanity into the twentieth century. They 
are codifications of traditional bel iefs that descend from the past. 
They are based on customary ways of knowing and doing, and they raise 
ceremonialism and institutional rigidities to their zenith by giving 
them the force of law--the power of rules that can and will be enforced 
by the institutionalized violence of sovereign government if necessary. 
Interest Groups and the Law 
The first part of this chapter described how institutions are 
adapted to technological changes through collective action. According 
to this idea, the customs and traditions, the ceremonial norms. around 
which institutions are formed, are changed by transactions between 
going concerns in which the transactions change and routinize working 
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rules regarding the new technologies. And since customary ways of 
knowing and doing are simply routine working rules. the customs change 
with routinization of new working rules. 
This part of the chapter considers how the laws are slowly 
changed in accord with certain evolving customs. The inunediately 
preceding section described the relationships between law and 
sDvereignty--that laws raise ceremonialism to its greatest tenacity 
by placing it within the enforcement powers of sovereignty. Thus. 
customs that are given the force of law are more difficult to change 
than those that do not possess that force. And to change working 
rules that are specified in law sometimes requires first changing or 
relaxing the appl icable laws. Laws are enacted and changed in a 
pluralist democracy by interest-group interaction in which persons 
are free to form, join, quit, and dissolve interest-groups, and 
interest-groups are free to form, join, quit, and dissolve coalitions 
in support of and in opposition to the enactment of new laws and 
changes in 01 d 1 aws. 
A pluralist democracy is founded on the principle of process 
democracy, II •• • that institutional arrangement for arriving at 
political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide 
by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote.,,19 While 
the lIprocess ll in process democracy is related in terms of inputs and 
outputs, the struggle for the people l s vote ;s group process in which 
the struggle is carried on inside and between groups--institutional 
groups 1 i ke 1 abor unions. trade associ ations. business corporati ons. 
universities, political parties, units of government, churches, etc .. 
and factions and splinter or subgroups of institutional groups. 
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Chapter II above described the attributes and functions of institutions 
generally in terms of the social sciences, and Chapters IV and V 
expanded on the description in terms of institutional economic theory. 
The contents of those chapters generally apply to the interest-group 
politics of pluralist theory. It is, therefore. only necessary to 
summarily relate key aspects of the former to the latter. 
It was explained in Chapter V how all of society is a network or 
structure of interlocking and interrelated institutions. The social 
values commonly cherished by individuals are a product of socializa-
tion carried on by institutions, and they are real ized through 
memberships in institutions and institutionally-related groups. 
Individuals commonly occupy positions in several institutions~-some 
voluntary and some involuntary. Involuntary memberships result from 
chance of birth and the like over which the individual has no control. 
However, the point is that individuals are simultaneously members of 
several potential interest groups (surrounding institutional values 
that are so universally held that they are not actively pol iticised), 
and one or more organized interest groups. 
An organized interest group is a politicized interest group--
one which actively seeks to influence political decisions to affect 
particular outcomes regarding the selection of ends-to-be-reached and 
the employment of means toward the selected ends. Again, from 
Chapter V, it is recalled that such institutional groups are structured 
by ceremony, and persons occupy positions within the structure that 
equip them with ceremonial roles to play. The rank, status. and power 
to wield influence both within and without the organization is a 
function of both one's position in the organization, and the position 
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of the organization in relation to other institutions 1n the system. 
Which position one acquires in an organization is the produc~ of 
a number of ceremonial factors that depend on the nature of the 
institution involved. However, the matter generally comes down to how 
meticulous one is in adhering to the ceremonial taboos and in employ-
ing the ceremonial totems of the group, and of the positions one seeks 
within the group. In the final analysis, it is how well the image one 
projects compares with the ceremonial expectations specified in the 
institutional norms. In the terms of elite theorists, it is the range 
of skills and resources one possesses--knowledge of organization, 
ability to manipulate word symbols, and professional competence. It 
is one's connections--schools, church, social clubs, other institu-
tional connections--or lack of connections that determine onels access 
to pOSitions of institutional power, rank, and prestige. 21 
All organizations are controlled under their ceremonial norms by 
the few persons who occupy the highest positions in the organization, 
the positions that bestow the highest rank and status on their 
incumbents. Those persons speak for the organization, and they wield 
whatever external influence and power the organization enjoys. That 
is, all organizations are under the titular directions of ceremonial 
elites. The range of discretionary powers enjoyed by an elite is a 
function of the ceremonial constraints of the organization it directs. 
As noted in Chapter IV above, this is chiefly a matter of the 
traditional values and customary ways of knowing and doing that 
descended from the past. 
The obvious individual inequalities under these arrangements may 
appear to be inherently undemocratic in terms of the classical liberal 
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concept of democracy. However, democracy is preserved, according to a 
pluralist concept of democracy, so long as the inequalities are 
dispersed and not cumulative. That is, so long as the persons who 
occupy positions of influence in one organization do not enjoy the 
same advantages in all organizations, and so long as such positions 
are not all occupied by persons from the same ethnic or social strata. 
Dispersed and noncumulative inequalities are evidences of social 
mobility in a society by which it is possible for almost anyone who 
seriously seeks a position of influence to attain it. This is most 
1 ikely to result in societies in which organizational memberships are 
predominantly voluntary, and pluralist societies are generally of 
that sort. 22 
Organized interest groups will attempt to influence political 
decisions regarding the outcomes of social activities. The usual 
approach is to seek the enactment of laws that will increase the 
proportionate, incremental share of the benefits more than the increase 
in the proportionate, incremental share of the relevant costs--or, 
conversely, laws that will decrease the proportionate, incremental 
share of benefits less than the decline in the proportionate, 
incremental share of costs--that accrue to its constituents in any 
authoritative distribution of benefits and costs. And since the law 
is concerned with the distribution rather than the creation of benefits 
and costs, the success of one interest-group will be at the expense of 
other interest groups, both potential and organized. 23 
Assume, for example, the successful innovation of a new 
technology for which new working rules are being routinized by 
transactions to integrate the technology into the institutional system. 
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Assuming further that there are no private counter-measures open to 
the indirectly-involved institutions, they may either acquiesce in the 
activities and silently suffer the adverse effects, or they can press 
for laws that protect their interests. If they seek relief through 
the enactment of new laws or the changing of old laws, they may seek 
either prohibition of the new technology or proscription of the new 
working rules, or public compensation for their losses. Failing the 
prohibition, they would seek proscription. And failing proscription, 
they would seek compensation. 
Access to changes in the law is through the agents of sovereignty.-
the interest groups that make up the executive, legislative, and 
judicial branches of government, and whose interests are the laws 
themselves and the preservations and expansions of their own power 
bases. The executive interest groups are addressed by counsel to 
seek changes in administrative laws. The legislative interest groups 
are plied by lobbying to obtain desired statutory changes. And, 
failing both of these, the judicial interest groups may be petitioned 
for judgments that affect changes through case law. 24 
Of course, any effort to initiate changes in the law will 
precipitate counter actions by interest groups that will be adversely 
affected by the proposed legal change. Moreover, each opposing 
faction will enlist support from other interest groups that can be 
convinced that their interests are likewise affected or that can be 
induced into a coalition by other means. The point is that there will 
be at least three factions surrounding any proposed change in the law--
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The most likely outcome of these ceremonial processes of legal 
change is one that either departs as 1 itt1e as possible from antecedent 
customs and laws or that produces more votes than it loses for the 
interest groups in the vote-conscious coalition. Judiciaries are more 
inclined to the former, and legislatures to the latter. Either way, 
no change is likely to occur until the aggregate size of the 
constituencies behind the interest groups favoring the change is 
greater than the aggregate size of the constituencies behind the 
interest groups clearly oPPosing the change. And that division will 
depend on how each group perceives and evaluates its alternatives in 
terms of its proportionate benefits and costs. 25 Finally, how each 
group evaluates its alternatives will depend on the ceremonial values 
that are weighted into the applicable benefits and costs. 
An example that illustrates many of the foregoing points is 
urban renewal in the United States. To understand the institutional 
explanation of that program, one must pick up the thread in the 
preceding part of this chapter that described the transactions dealing 
with innovation of the automobile. It is recalled that integration of 
railroad technology had left urban form essentially monocentric around 
a central rail road terminal. Commerce and industry took place in a 
central business district in order to minimize transportation costs. 
People tended to live in and immediately adjacent to the central 
business district for the same reasons, and the central core therefore 
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had high population densities. Land rents, wages, and net income were 
higher in the core and decl ined with distance from the core, and 
transportation costs and the costs of goods increased with the 
distance from the core. 
It is also recalled that innovation of the automobile succeeded 
because of the expectation that, under the right conditions, it could 
provide personal portal-te-portal passage for its owner commencing at 
any time of the day or night, and it could do so with unprecedented 
speed, comfort, privacy, and hauling capacity. Finally, it could 
provide these services at less operating and maintenance cost than a 
stable of horses. The expectations that fostered innovation of the 
automobile were largely realized by the end of World War II, and the 
coro11ary improvements in the automotive technology since that time 
have simply extended and consolidated the social gains attributable 
to the automobil e. 
It was these two social phenomena that led to the urban 
redevelopment program in the United States--the monocentric urban 
form centered on a railroad terminal, and the passenger automobile 
with its cargo counterpart, the truck. As the horse changed the 
distribution and composition of settlements from the time of the ox, 
and the railroad changed them again in the nineteenth century. so the 
automobile and the truck changed them in the twentieth. 
Railroads continued to dominate intercity transportation of 
passengers and freight until the end of World War II. However, intra-
city transport of freight was shifted from the horse-drawn wagon to 
the motor truck commencing after World War I. Likewise, both engine-
and motor-driven trolley systems were expanded so that these two 
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in some American cities as early as 1920. Of course, this did not 
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particularly affect central business districts that continued to be 
dominated by intercity railroad terminals. However, it did affect the 
core residential arrangements, and upward pressures on residential 
rents were arrested as popul ati on growth was 1 argely absorbed by the 
first suburbs. 26 
A trend toward moving passengers between cities by automobile, 
bus, and aircraft was clearly evident at the end of World War II, and 
the drop in rail passenger traffic was so great that many railroads 
simply ceased to carry passengers. The personal private automobile 
was more convenient, and the bus less expensive for short intercity 
trips. And the aircraft was no more expensive than the train, but it 
was much faster on long intercity trips. At the same time, the 
intercity transportation of certain kinds of goods was shifted from 
railroads to motor trucks and aircraft. The trucks could eliminate 
transshipment costs by moving goods directly from a seller in one city 
to a buyer in another--something the railroads could not generally do. 
And air freight is much faster than rail freight even though it is 
also more expensive. Finally, private automobiles were putting intra-
urban trolleys out of business as people increasingly drove their 
family cars to and from work and shopping. 
The effects of these changes were many. The changes accel era ted 
the move of upper- and middle-income residents to suburbs followed by 
the commercial businesses that served them and by the large-scale 
enterprises that were liberated from central rail terminals and high 
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rents by the shift to intercity truck transportation. The metropolitan 
area was becoming polycentric with a large central city surrounded by 
many smaller suburban centers. Indeed, cities like Los Angeles, 
California that experienced their most expansive growth after the 
initial integration of automotive technology have developed without 
one large central city, and they consist mainly of many small centers 
connected by highway corridors and patchworks of residential housing. 
However, the suburban dispersal of housing and business reduced the 
economic functions of older metropol itan core areas to producing 
highly specialized regional services and providing agglomerative 
economies for certain kinds of high-risk enterprises. 27 
The dec1 ine in demands for core-area sites were fe1 t in lower 
rents for both residential and commercial properties in those areas 
while rents and incomes were increasing in the suburban rings that 
were developing around central cities. And since the suburban rings 
were beyond the central-city boundaries, the corresponding loss in 
core real-property values meant a shrinkage in property-tax bases, 
and thus an increase in tax rates or a reduction in urban-tax revenues 
to finance urban services. In many cases it meant both. 
The continued diffusion and integration of automobile technology 
was also producing a further revolution in agriculture. The 
mechanization of farming was increasing the returns to large-scale 
agricultural production at the same time that agricultural lands in 
war-torn European countri es were bei ng restored to producti on. The 
result was a decline in foreign demands for American agricultural 
goods while rises in American agricultural productivity were increasing 
the supplies of those goods. Thus, farm incomes were held down during 
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a period in which other incomes were rising. Families were finding it 
increasingly difficult to subsist on small acreages, and they were 
more and more incl ined to abandon farming in favor of urban 
employments. 
The natural refuge for the recently unemployed rural-to-urban 
ill1Tligrants was the now low-rent housing left in the core areas of 
central cities by upper- and middle-income families. The cultural 
shocks of life-style changes and the lack of skills and urban employ-
ment opportunities made adjustments for the new wave of irrnlligrants 
difficult. Moreover, many of the irrunigrants were southern negroes, 
and their plights were further complicated by the racial prejudices 
that confronted them in their new environments. Many found it 
difficult, if not impossible, to subsist in their new homes, and their 
landlords found it impossible to collect rents high enough to cover 
all taxes and maintenance costs. The result was a rapid depreciation 
in the quality of affected neighborhoods, and an enonnous increase in 
the demand for urban services at precisely the time when urban 
property-tax revenues to finance such services were shrinking with 
declining real-property values. 28 
The myriad of transactions that integrated the automotive 
technology and secured the social gains from that technology changed 
inter-institutional arrangements so that many institutions experienced 
substantial gains in net present values. But some institutions found 
it impossible to adapt, and those institutions suffered reductions in 
net present values. It was clearly too late to prevent innovation of 
the automobile or to proscribe the working rules that had already been 
routinized surrounding that technology by the end of World War II. 
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The only relief open to the adversely affected going concerns was 
publ ic compensations to eradicate or arnel iorate the adverse effects. 
Affected going concerns, therefor~ organized interest groups and 
the interest groups formed coalitions to press for laws that would 
compensate them at the expense of others for the losses they suffered. 
And other persons and institutions that saw their interest adversely 
affected by the proposed redistributi ons 1 i kewise formed interest 
groups and coalitions to protect their interest. The list of going 
concerns and interest groups is mLlch too long to examine here. 
However, over the years, it has included such luminaries as the 
National Urban League, the Federal National t40rtgage Association, the 
National Association of Home Builders, the AFL-CIO, the Bureau of the 
Census, the Federal Reserve Board, the National Association of Real 
Estate Boards, the U. S. Conference of Mayors, and the Ford Founda-
ticn. The list also includes an imposing number of private companies--
predominantly banking and insurance corporations. 29 
Likewise, the details of their opposrng views as well as the 
impressive list of resulting statutes, regulations, and legal decisions 
go beyond the scope of this treatise. However, the result was a 
plethora of laws that created more federal and state agencies and 
authoritative redistribution programs for the agencies to manage. 
Among the agencies created to date to deal with the automobile effect 
were the cabinet-l evel, federal executi ve departments of Health, 
Education and Welfare (HEW), and Housing and Urban Development (HUD), 
and all of the existing and new federal administrative agencies that 
fell within their statutory areas of concern were organized under them 
for program coordination and funding. Of course, the redistribution 
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One such program, Urban Redevelopment, was initiated as Title 
to the Housing Act of 1949. The name was a euphemism for slum 
clearance, and the latter a euphemism to some people for eliminating 
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what they considered to be undesirable residents. The naive saw the 
program as a way to restore the older and decaying central cities to 
their former and rightful eminence. The practical-minded found the 
program to be a way of acquiring or preserving income at public 
expense. Still others found that the program imposed substantial costs 
on them by disrupting their life-styles and forcing them to move from 
the low-cost housing in familiar neighborhoods populated by friends to 
housing they could not afford in unfamiliar surroundings populated by 
strangers. Moreover, the initial program foroseeably reduced the 
standing stock of urban housing for those low-income famil ies that 
could least afford to arrange other accommodations. 31 
The name was later changed to Urban Renewal, and the program 
became the umbrella for a number of subsequent laws of a similar sort. 
Despite the detractions implied by the above remarks, the 
accompl ishments of the program are as impressive as they were costly. 
The program did assist the cities that completed urban-renewal projects 
to make many needed physical adjustments to the automobile effect 
described above. Likewise, the skylines of many cities are now 
adorned with stately public structures where once stood only 
dilapidated older houses. Finally, some high- and middle-income 
families have found the renewed urban core an attractive place to make 
their homes, and they have moved back to the city from the suburbs. 
Even so, the modern, industrial city is not and perhaps never can be 
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what it was before the automobile. 
The conclusion of this section concludes the chapter. The 
chapter has attempted to describe how institutions adapt to 
technological change through collective action. The principle of 
adaptation is found in the relationships between transactions, customs, 
and law. Transactions are structured by custom and law, while customs 
evolve out of the routine practices of transactions, and laws are 
slowly changed to bring them into accord with the evolving customs. 
Transactions between going concerns change and routinize working 
rules. and since customs are simply routine working rules, they 
change with the routinizing transactions. 
Since laws are little more than codified customs, they are 
changed to bring them into accord with the evolving customs. This 
last section has attempted to illustrate how laws are changed in a 
pluralist democracy by interest-group interaction in which persons 
are free to form, join, quit, and dissolve interest groups, and 
interest groups are free to form, join, quit, and dissolve coalitions 
in support of or opposition to the enactment of any new law or change 
in any old law. Consensus can be reached and human welfare enhanced 
through interest-group interaction, and a public-interest equilibrium 
can be maintained solely by the interaction of opposing-interest 
groups and interest-group coal itions. 
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CHAPTER XI 
CONCLUSION 
This work commenced with the contention that progress toward a 
more complete theory of urban affairs might be made by integrating 
institutional economic theory and elements of the more orthodox econ-
omic theory with aspects of pluralist theory from political science and 
relating the resulting whole in an urban context. This is the last and 
concluding chapter in the work that attempted that synthesis. The 
chapter briefly summarizes key elements of the intervening chapters, and 
it suggests possible on-going implications that might be deduced from the 
work. 
SUMMARY OF MAJOR POINTS 
The synthesis commenced with an exploration of selected social 
sciences literature to establish a definition of the word "institution Jl 
that would serve throughout the remainder of the work. The definition 
finally settled out of Chapter II was that: 
An institution is an organized social group which has evolved 
from and is united with some particular system of cultural values, 
and it serves through processes of social control to stabilize 
social interaction by preserving and perpetuating those values 
in the society of which the institution is a part. 
Equipped with the foregoing definition, the work examined institu-
tions in light of selected elements from institutional economic theory, 
orthodox economic theory, and pluralist political theory. Following is 
a brief summary of the major points made ;n the preceding chapters. 
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Institutional Economics 
There are two main branches of institutional economic theory. 
The first branch deals with the forces in society that tend toward 
instability and revolution. The second branch deals with the forces 
that tend toward adjustment and stability. The former is the product 
of Thorstein Veblen and Clarence Ayres, and the latter is that of John 
R. Commons. The former branch has been described as institutional 
economics in this treatise. The second ;s properly the same, but it 
has been called the economics of collective action, and it was described 
along with interest group-politics in the chapter on pluralism. 
Institutional economics views economic phenomena as products of 
institutional systems in which markets will exist subject always to 
i nstituti ona1 constra i nts. It concentrates on the inst; tutional mil i eu 
in which markets exist, and the feed-back effects of market activities 
on institutional arrangements--the ways in which society1s uses and 
changes in uses of material devices structure and restructure society 
itself. These effects occur only in the very long run, and institu-
tional economic time periods are therefore anthropological time periods. 
periods of sufficient duration to study the institutional changes that 
result from economic and quasi-economic activities. 
The very long run is a longitudinal dimension in time. according 
to John Dewey and Clarence Ayres, called an ends-means continuum--a con-
tinuum of on-going life processes. The present is a constantly changing 
instant of time which divides the past from the future. Everything that 
exists in the present is the effect of causes from the past, and those 
same effects are the means to ends that 1 i e in the future along the 
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the continuum. 
Lying in the future along the continuum, possible future ends 
exist only in human contemplation, and they will not become actual 
states of being unless man chooses to bring them into being and 
actuates choices by organizing and employing means to attain his chosen 
ends. Ends-in-view are alternative and competing, and the selection of 
one set of ends may preclude the possible achievement of competing ends 
because means are either too scarce to permit the attainment of all 
sets, or the alternative sets of ends may be incongruous. 
Ends are not ends-;n-themselves. Once they are secured, ends 
become means to on-going ends that lie even farther in the future along 
the continuum. Ends have value because people, through institutions, 
set them out as desired, while the value of means is partly deternined 
by their instrumentalism in securing desired future ends. The questions 
raised by this concept of an ends-means continuum are: Why and how are 
particul ar ends-to-be-reached chosen from among a 1 ternati ve and 
competing ends-in-view? And what determines how means are chosen and 
organized toward achievement of the ends selected? 
According to Thorstein Veblen and Clarence Ayres, the practice of 
ceremonialism supplies part of the answer. Ceremonialism is the instru-
ment of the institutional system for discharging its social control 
functions, and it is the subject of Chapters IV and V. Ceremonialism 
transmits culture and achieves the social control required to maintain 
social stability by conferring and validating status upon members of 
society. 
Ceremonialism is founded on the beliefs of tradition that inform 
the present from the past. Ceremonial values are transmitted by the 
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legends and myths that pervade the 1 iterature and drama of a culture 
and that describe the mystical powers of ancestors and the tribal 
triumphs of the past. Such ITIYths transmit the totems and taboos of 
the culture. They promote cultural status systems and social order by 
teaching persons the correct ethical and aesthetical values to hold. 
Ceremonial ism social izes members of society by teaching and rei n-
forcing them from birth until death with the ancient systems of social 
status and rank. They come to understand and accept their positions 
and the roles they must play in society. They accept the mystical 
potency of each social rank, and they come to recognize and respect the 
distinctions of rank that distinguish themselves from others both 
above and below them in the institutional hierarchies of society. 
Ceremonial ism also teaches people how to acknowledge ranks and 
va 1; date statuses through ceremon; a1 exchange, ceremon; a1 gi ft-giving 
and ceremonial destruction of goods. And it teaches them of the serious 
consequences of failure to know and abide by the ceremonially-sanctioned 
modes of behavior. Lastly, the cultural ways of knowing and dOing, the 
taboos and the mana of rank and status are reconstructed and reinforced 
by mystical ceremonies--awe-inspiring religious liturgies, graphic arts. 
literature, and dramas that extol the tribal values of culture. All of 
this ceremonial activity augurs social stabil ity by involving persons 
in webs of institutionally-sanctioned social interaction. It is a 
result of socialization and social control accomplished by institutions 
that are attempting to preserve and perpetuate traditional value systems. 
Ceremonialism is therefore backward-clinging in terms of the ends-
means continuum. It rational izes present euphorias in terms of the 
powers of mystical past causes, and it brooks no departures from 
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customary techniques. It measures the desirability of possible future 
ends in terms of the values that descended from the past, and it 
prescribes antecedent techniques as the best methods for employment of 
means toward attainment of future ends. The ceremonial dimension of 
society attempts to extend the past forever into the future. 
On the other hand, institutions are not always successful in 
perpetuating cultural values and preserving social stability. Indeed, 
new institutions rise, some institutions decline, and some disappear 
altogether. Why does this happen in the face of the powerful cere-
monial hold on the past? According to Thorstein Veblen and Clarence 
Ayres, the answer is found in the social consequences of new technol-
ogies. Chapter VI above distinguished technology from human skill and 
technique. Technology is that quality of a tool that enables it to be 
substituted for human effort in the creation of goods and services 
having human value. Human skill is the propensity and ability to apply 
technique to the use of tools, and techniques are the methods by which 
hUmans employ tools in production. Technique is therefore the pro-
cedure by which ends are converted to means as an on-gOing process. 
Technology is continuous, dynamic, and progressive. The continu-
ous and dynamic qualities of technology were described in Chapter VII. 
Technology is continuous because the invention of new technologies ;s 
based on scientific knowledge, and such knowledge results from 
empirical verification and critical testing of hypotheses that purport 
to link events causally. Scientific knowledge is continuous because it 
is based on scientific discoveries, and such discoveries are cumulative 
in the sense that they are founded on the reservoir of scientific 
knowledge that has been built up from prior discoveries. Insofar as 
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the invention of new technologies 'is founded on scientific understand-
ing, technology is likewise continuous. 
The innovation of new technology is dynamic because it opens 
opportunities to allocate resources (employ means) in ways that are dif-
ferent from the ceremonially prescribed methods that descended from the 
cultural past. It may also change the ends selected to be attained 
because it brings ends into view that were previously beyond available 
means. The innovation of new technology will therefore also open oppor-
tunities to change traditional social statuses and ceremonial systems of 
rank~ affording new avenues of social mobility toward higher relative 
statuses for some persons and lower relative statuses for others. 
The progressive character of technology was described in Chapter 
VIII. Insofar as new technology succeeds in substituting tool s for 
human effort in the production of goods and services having human value 
it will produce a social dividend in the way of a greater surplus of 
social benefits over social costs. And since those benefits afe distrib-
uted to enhance human welfare, the new technology wi11 contribute to human 
progress. The distribution of the social dividend is a function of the 
institutional system in society, and the progressive quality of new tech-
nology is realized by the diffusion and integration of the technology 
throughout that system. In the integration process the institutional 
system is changed to bri ng it· into accord wi th the new technology. 
The dynamic and progressive features of new technology make it for-
ward-urging in terms of the ends-means continuum, that of on-going life 
processes. However, these features bring technology into tension with 
tradition-bound ceremonialism, and the resulting environment is filled 
with confl icts between those persons whose ranks and statuses are 
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threatened, and those persons who stand to gain in position and status 
by the innovation, diffusion, and integration of the new technology. 
To what extent new technologies are actually innovated and inte-
grated depends upon the strength of ceremonial ism in relation to the 
forward pull of the potential net social benefits expected from the new 
technology. In other words, it depends on the relative strength of 
institutional values and ceremonial resistances to changes. To the 
extent that new technologies are innovated, diffused, and integrated 
with the institutional system, some of the ceremonial norms and modes 
of behavior will become redundant and fade. causing some institutions 
to decline in influence, power, and importance. The question raised by 
the relationship between technology and ceremonialism is: How does 
society reconcile the tensions between new technologies and 
ceremon i ali sm into soci a 1 change and human progress? 
Valuations 
The answer to the foregoing question is found in methods for valu-
ing social benefits and social costs, and in techniques for making social 
choices. Valuation methods are found in orthodox economic theory, and 
social-choice techniques are the concerns of political pluralist theory 
and of that branch of institutional economics called the economics of 
collective action. Chapter IX is concerned with the former and Chapter 
X with the latter. This section of the summary covers Chapter IX. 
The first step in reconciling the tensions between tradition-bound 
ceremonialism and forward-leaning new technologies is to accurately 
measure the benefits and costs of alternative courses of action. However. 
the values perceived by individuals and institutions are as multifarious 
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and disparate as society is pluralistic, and there are therefore a 
myriad of competing and conflicting values. Moreover, there is no 
simple or direct way to structure and weigh competing values in select-
ing ends-to-be-reached, and to organize and employ means to whatever 
ends are selected such that social welfare is enhanced. 
Indeed, it is not always clear what social welfare is or how it 
should be measured. Nevertheless. orthodox economists argue that 
welfare can somehow be maximized if resources (means) can be allocated 
optimally. Vilfredo Pareto describes an efficient allocation as one in 
which means have been allocated such that it is impossible to improve 
anyone's welfare without adversely affecting the welfare of others . 
. J. R. Hicks and Nicholas Ka1dor maintain that. even though a Pareto-
optimal allocation of means exists, social welfare can be improved if 
social product is redistributed in such a way that gaining persons 
value their gains more than losing persons value their losses. 
The "possibil ity theorem" of Kenneth Arrow holds that there are 
some conditions of choice under which neither market nor political 
arrangements will define a social-welfare function by which Paretcrmaxi-
mum welfare can be measured or achieved. Notwithstanding Arrow1s con-
vincing arguments, the Pareto criterion remains a very compelling ideal 
to be as nearly achieved as possible. But, again, any movement toward 
that idea needs to be founded on empirically accurate valuations--valua-
tions that weigh costs and benefits, where benefits are human satisfac-
tions attained by achieving the most desirable sets of future ends, and 
costs are the alternative ends foregone to secure the benefits. 
Both benefits and costs may possess internal attributes and 
external attributes. Internal attributes involve divisible (private, 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
482 
personal, visceral, aesthetic) values, while external attributes 
involve nondivisib1e (public, ethical, collective, institutional) 
values. Economists argue that goods and services that possess only 
internal (divisible and private) attributes may be provided through the 
pricing mechanisms of private markets. 
Some economists have argued with conviction that goods and ser-
vices possessing substantial externalities cannot be efficiently pro-
vided through private markets. This is because such goods and services 
are not divisible, and no one can be excluded from enjoying the benefits 
once they have been produced. Since they cannot be divided, such goods 
cannot be packaged and sold in consumer units. Persons therefore tend 
to nfree ride" with such goods by understating their benefits and over-
stating their costs because they know that, once the goods have been 
created, they cannot be denied the benefits. Goods possessing substan-
tial externalities are collective or public goods, and they must be 
provided by other institutional arrangements than private markets. 
The alternative to private markets is, of course, the variety of 
governments in which pub1 ic goods are said to be provided through the 
electoral process. Whatever the institutional process, the technique 
that is gaining currency is benefit-cost analysis--a technique in which 
annual benefits and costs are estimated and net social benefits are 
discounted back to a net present value. Several issues surrounding the 
technique raise questions about its viability as a means of valuing 
alternatives. The issues involve the following problems: 
--Which external benefits and costs will be included? 
--What pecuniary values are to be assigned to external benefits 
and costs? 
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--What social discount rate will be used to discount future 
benefits and costs back to present values? 
--Over what useful life will the benefits and costs be discounted? 
--What is to be maximized or minimized in the outcome? 
--Which institutional values will dominate the process? 
The benefit-cost analysis of social alternatives can lead to many 
different outcomes depending on how the foregoing questions are 
answered. And since each one can be answered a number of ways, benefit-
cost analyses can be manipulated to yield outcomes favored by one or 
another special-interest group. The problem in terms of the ends-means 
continuum is that the innovation of an otherwise justified new technol-
ogy may be defeated through such manipulations by the forces of ceremon-
ialism. Despite these obvious limitations, benefit-cost analysis may be 
the best available method for valuing social alternatives. 
Which underscores the problem--values as perceived by individuals 
and institutions are as multifarious and disparate as society is plural-
istic, and there is no Simple or direct way to structure and weigh com-
peting values regarding ends and means. The question remains: How does 
society reconcile tensions between ceremonial ism and technology in sel-
ection of ends-to-be-reached and in employing means to the ends selected? 
Pl ural ism 
The answer to the foregoi ng questi on ; s found in the economi cs of 
co11ective action and in pluralist theory, particularly theories of 
interest-group politics. These bodies of theory and their relevance to 
urban affairs were described in Chapter X above. Together, the two sets 
of theory help explain how institutions adjust to the disequilibrating 
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influences of new technologies through changes in customs and laws. 
According to the theory of collective action advanced by John R. 
Commons, confl icts of interests occur between going concerns (or insti-
tutions) over the present and future uses of scarce resources. Resource 
scarcity is caused by intangible property rights--claims on streams of 
future incomes arising from the expected future employment of material 
things. The conflicts of interests are resolved by transactions (or 
ceremonial exchanges) that bring about exchanges of property rights 
between institutions. Transactions are limited by working rules (or 
ceremonial norms cloaked as traditions) in the form of custom and law, 
and each transaction is concerned with settling the particular working 
rules governing its own exchange. Customs evolve out of working rules 
that are changed and routinized by transactions. 
There are three kinds of transactions--bargaining, rationing, and 
managerial. Bargaining transactions take place between going concerns 
with approximately equal bargaining powers. Bargaining transactions 
are voluntary arrangements and they tend to be juridical in nature. On 
the other hand, rationing transactions take place between legal 
superiors and legal subordinates. Rationing transactions are therefore 
involuntary arrangements, and they tend to be legislative in character. 
Finally, managerial transactions are likewise involuntary, and they 
concern the organized uses of properties and other rights established 
out of prior bargaining or rationing transactions. Managerial trans-
actions tend to be executive in nature. 
All transactions involve at least three elements--conflicts of 
interests caused by proprietary scarcity, interdependence of interests 
arising from the need for exchange, and order stemming from the need for 
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working rul es to fac; 1 itate exchange. Transactions funct; on to convert 
conflicts of interests to interdependencies of interests. Transactions 
also create and change working rules where necessary to meet the needs 
of exchange. 
The relevance of collective action to institutional changes, and 
thus to thE resolution of tensions between ceremonialism and technology, 
is found in the relationship between transactions. working rules, 
customs, and laws. Transactions are structured by the working rules 
in customs and laws; working rules are changed by transactions to fit 
the needs of exchange, while customs evolve from new working rules that 
are routinized by transactions, and laws are slowly changed in 
accordance with the evolving customs. 
Laws are customs that have been set apart by placing the coercive 
powers of the state behind their enforcement. Law does not come into 
being, therefore, until there is a sovereign state with centralized 
police authority. And such an authority rises in response to what is 
apparently a universal propensity for institutions to produce a legal 
order to enforce their ceremonial norms. Governments are therefore the 
institutional agencies for making, enforcing, and adjudicating laws. 
Making and changing laws are legislative functions, while enforcing laws 
is an executive function, and adjudicating violations and disputes under 
the law ;s a judicial function. Customs that have been given the force 
of law, are of course, more difficult to change than other customs. 
The way laws are made and changed to conform with evolving 
customs in a pluralist democracy is explained by theories of interest-
group politics. The main idea is that laws are made and changed 
through interest-group interaction in which persons are free to create, 
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join, quit, and dissolve interest groups, and interest groups are free 
to form, join, quit, and dissolve coalitions in support of or opposi-
tion to the enactment of any new law or the change of any old law. 
According to this idea, consensus can be reached and political 
stabil ity maintained through the interaction of opposing interest 
groups while laws are in a perpetual state of adjustment. 
This ends the summary of the key points that were expanded and 
illustrated in the preceding chapters. The summary has shown how the 
component theories--from institutional economics and political 
pluralism--were integrated in the main work. However, several addi-
tional points must be stressed. The first is to underscore the places 
where the component theories converge and overlap, and the possible 
normative relevance of that. The second is to point out the places 
where the theories appear to have import for urban affairs, and to 
consider the possible normative relevances in each case. 
INSTITUTlONf.L eCONOMICS AND PLURALISM 
One aspect of the contention in the first chapter of this work 
was that institutional economic theory, and selected elements of 
orthodox economic theory might be brought into productive synthesis 
with political pluralist theories. This part of the concluding chapter 
pOints to the places in the main text where it seems to this author 
that the component theories converge and overlap, and to the possible 
normative relevance of the results. 
There were many places throughout the main text at which the 
component theories overlapped. However, ignoring the introductory and 
concluding chapters, the chapters in which institutional and other 
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economic theories were significantly in union with political theories 
were Chapters II, IV, V, IX, and X. The institutional essence of 
those chapters was predominantly ceremonial ism, vis technology. 
Chapters II, IV, and V related institutions to groups, and group 
activities to ceremonial activities. Chapter II defined institutions 
in part as human groups organized around particular sets of cultural 
values, and it sought to expand the definition by exploring the origins 
of institutions, social functions of institutions. the structure of 
institutions, and the nature of institutional influence and power. 
While Chapter II was a wide-ranging examination of the social-sciences 
literature on institutions, much of the literature was consistent with 
institutional economic theories, and the latter theories were consis-
tent with some ideas espoused by political theorists like David Truman 
at one extreme, and C. Wright Mills at the other. 
Chapters IV and V explored ceremonialism and the social functions 
of institutions, noting that ceremonialism is the social mechanism by 
which institutions discharge their functions--in particular, to 
stabilize society by transmitting culture, organizing society, social-
izing members of sOciety, and exercising social control. These aspects 
of institutional economic theory from the works of Thorstein Veblen and 
Cl arence Ayres have good correspondence with pol iti cal theori sts 1 i ke 
Harold Lasswell and David Truman, to name only two. 
Chapter IX brought together the disti 11 ed works of many orthodox 
economists, and several other social scientists to examine the matter of 
human welfare, and of valuing social alternatives for improving on 
welfare. While the material in that chapter was not explicitly from 
institutional economics, the tone of the economic content was 
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institutional in character. Moreover, the institutional tone of the 
chapter was consistent with the interest-group theories of David Truman 
and Ea r 1 La tham. 
Finally, Chapter X combined the economics of collective action, a 
branch of institutional economic theory from the works of John Commons, 
with theories of interest groups from the works of political scientists 
like David Truman, Earl Latham, and Robert Dahl to explain how institu-
tions adjust to technological change. Commons described how the customs 
around which institutions are organized are changed through what he 
called collective action. The works of Truman, Latham, and Dahl comple-
mented that of Commons by offering an explanation of how laws are changed 
through interest-group interaction to conform with evolving customs. 
Of course, the fit between institutional economic theory and con-
temporary political theories is not perfect. For that matter, neither 
is the correspondence perfect between the two main branches of institu-
tional economic theory. However. there are many points on which one or 
another aspect of institutional theory para 11e1 s, overl aps, or campl e-
ments contemporary political theory. The opposite is also true, and 
drawing from political theory, it has been possible to augment and 
expand the body of institutional economic theory. 
One might conjure up a great many possible implications from 
these conclusions. However, it seems that the principal relevance of 
this part of the tome lies in the essentially provincial nature of the 
social sciences in a real world that is inherently diverse, varied, and 
heterogeneous. The understanding of social phenomena is rarely achieved 
by attempting to explain it within the limits of a single discipline. 
If it is to be understood at all through the application of social 
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theories, the theories must at least be eclectic--drawn from as many 
sources and discipl ines as necessary to render a consistent explanation 
that has empirical validity and is relevant to real-world problems. 
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS AND URBAN AFFAIRS 
Another contention at the beginning of this work was that progress 
toward a more complete theory of urban affairs might be possible by 
relating the synthesis in terms of urban affairs. The examples used 
to illustrate the component institutional and political theories were 
therefore directly related to cities, or they had a reasonably clear 
relationship to urban affairs. That is, they were either non-urban 
consequences of causes that were c1 early urban, or they were urban 
consequences of causes that were non-urban. 
Of course, it was not possible to include every urban matter that 
might be meaningfully related to the synthesis. Thus, the urban phen-
omena used were selected on two bases. The first was according to how 
well the material could be adapted to the component theories, and the 
second was according to a time 1 ine that extended roughly from 
antiquity to the present. The theme that seemed to be most amenable to 
these bases was urbanization. Aspects of both technology and ceremon-
ialism were accordingly illustrated by selected urbanization topics. 
Technology and Urbanization 
Chapters III, VI, VII, VIII, and X contain technology-related 
examples from the history and related theories of urbanization. The 
underlying notion in those chapters was that modern industrial cities 
represent the highest achievements of civilization and that they are 
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the products of technological developments. Those developments 
commenced before recorded history and they continue to this very moment. 
As long as man progresses along the continuum of on-going life 
processes, technological development will provide the means of progress 
and increased urbanization and the embellishment of urban life will be 
one of its products. 
The means-ends continuum, the continuum of on-going 1 ife 
processes, was illustrated in Chapter III by discussion of the Roman 
establishment of the City of London, England. The main idea in 
Chapter III was that a city is the effect of causes that 1 ie in the 
past, and it is a collection of means to ends that lie in the future. 
It is the product of human deliberations and choices, and usually 
deliberations and choices that extend backward for many centuries in 
time. 
Chapter VI employs a discussion of technological developments in 
agriculture as a way of deriving a definition for the word IItechnology." 
The urban relevance of agricultural development is that urbanization is, 
in the first instance, a product of improvements in agricultural produc-
tivity, and agricultural productivity is a function of technological 
developments in agriculture. The concluding part of Chapter VI 
describes how anatomical parts of man have been replaced in production 
processes by tools embodying successively more complex and instrumental 
technologies. These developments both improved agricultural produc-
tivities and enhanced human existence in modern industrial cities. 
The economic principle of comparative advantage was used in Chap-
ter VII to explain central-place theory, and central-place theory to 
explain the effects of internal economies of large-scale production in 
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bringing about urbanization. Technology is a central feature in this 
chain of causes because it is improvements in technology that bring 
about increases in internal economies of large-scale production. And 
insofar as economies of scale bring about increased special ;zations, 
there are increased pressures for urbanization for it is in cities that 
special ;zation, the division of labor, reaches its highest level. 
The invention and innovation of new technologies and effects of 
those innovations on urbanization was also described in Chapter VII. 
It was argued that the underlying factor in the change from prehis-
toric folk society to the pre-urban folk community was the change from 
the use of humans for motive power in agriculture to the use of oxen as 
draft animals. The technological change that moved society from the 
prehi stori c and pre-urban fol k community to the truly urban feudal city 
was the di scovery of metallurgy, the subsequent improvements in too 1 5, 
and the consequential increases in productiv;ties. Fina1ly. urban 
society moved to the era of the industrial city with the substitution 
of mechani ca 1 power technol og; es for animals in productive processes. 
The progressive qualities of technology were illustrated using 
central-place theory again in Chapters VII and VIII to show how increas-
ing degrees of specialization leads to agglomeration of institutions at 
central places in response to increasing external economies of large 
urban scale. Likewise, changing technologies that lowered costs of 
transportation were shown in Chapter VIII to effect changes in the 
distribution of urban settlements within hierarchies of central places. 
History of the diffusions and integration of the heavy plow and the 
heavy horse in agriculture and the horse in overland transportation in 
Medieval Europe lent empirical weight to the theories in Chapter VIII. 
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Export-base theory was used in Chapter VIII to illustrate the on-
going effects of technological integration on urban growth in Medieval 
and Renaissance Europe. Increasing first the internal economies of 
large-scale production, and then the external economies of urban scale, 
the diffusion of technology promoted productive surpluses that were 
used as exports in interregional trade and exchange. The net revenues 
realized from the trade were used to expand local urban bases and were 
thus responsible for urban growth. 
Finally, how collective action and interest-group politics bring 
institutional norms into accord with changing technologies was 
described in Chapter X. One aspect of that adjustment was illustrated 
by the changes in urban form precipitated by changes in transportation 
technologies. That part of the chapter explained how the railroads 
produced monocentric cities in the nineteenth century, and how the 
later diffusion and integration of automotive technology produced 
suburban;zation, polycentric cities, and a plague of urban problems 
that are a part of the on-going institutional adjustment process. 
Urbanization as a theme to describe the dynamic and progressive 
effects of technology according to institutional economic theory seems 
to be a useful approach. It appears to add both color and dimension to 
institutional economics, political theory, and explanations of urban 
affairs. And insofar as advances in social theory are incremental at 
best and are based upon insights drawn from antecedent theories, it may 
be said that the work at hand has advanced urbanology toward a more 
complete theoretical base--albeit ever so slightly. 
The normative implications of this aspect of the work appear to 
center on the very long-run relationship between technological 
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development, urbanization, and the quality of urban life. The signifi-
cance of this relationship is often and unfortunately lost in a laby-
rinth of what can only be called short-sighted ceremonial concerns that 
appear as traditional values, the preservation of which is most likely 
to retard technological development, inhibit urban development, and 
impair the quality of urban life. In the very long run, improvements 
in the qual ity of urban 1 ife are keyed to urban development, and urban 
development is keyed to technological development. And since human 
progress points toward continued urbanization, progress is likewise 
tied to technological development--just as it has always been. 
Urbanization and Ceremonial ism 
Urban-related examples were employed to illustrate the ceremonial 
aspects of institutional economics in Chapters II, IV, V, IX, and X. 
The central urban-related idea is that institutions agglomerate at 
urban places to take advantage of the external economies of large urban 
scale. Thus urban areas are simply domiciles for institutions, and 
they provide the physical forums for ceremonial interaction. Any 
reference to institutions or ceremonialism. the instrument for 
discharging institutional functions, is therefore related to urban 
affairs. An important related idea is that ceremonial ism is tradition-
bound and backward-clinging in terms of the ends-means continuum. 
Chapter II was given over to exploring the ontological meaning 
of the word 'Iinstitution" in order to devise a definition that would 
serve throughout the work that followed. Chapters IV and V expanded 
on the institutional functions gleaned from the review of literature in 
Chapter II. A product of those expansions was to show how institutions 
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evolved as social mechanisms to reduce human uncertainties and to 
stabilize human interactions. The legendary establishment of the city 
of Rome, Italy, by Romulus was described in Chapter IV to show how the 
institutional system of antiquity finally adjusted to the modest 
urbanization that was occurring in those times. 
Finally, Chapters IX and X are devoted to explanations of how 
institutions adjust to technological changes in modern pluralist demo-
cracies--societies that are both industrialized and urbanized. It was 
demonstrated in Chapter IX how ceremonial influences might defeat the 
innovation or the integration of new technologies by manipulating 
benefi t-cost ana lyses to favor outcomes that were preferred by 
reactionary institutional groups that were bent on preserving their 
traditional values. 
Chapter X described how the institutional system adjusts itself 
through collective action and interest-group politics. Collective 
action brings about changes in customs by transactions (ceremonial 
exchanges) between going concerns (institutions) in which working rules 
(ceremonial norms) are adapted to new and different circumstances. 
The routinization of such adapted working rules produces changes in 
customs. The chapter also demonstrated how 1 aws are changed to bri ng 
them slowly into agreement with evolving customs. Customs that have 
been given the force of law are much more difficult to change than 
other customary ways; the process of change in a pluralist democracy 
is through interest-group pol itics. 
Once again, urbanization as a theme around which to unify the 
synthesis and describe the ceremonial dimension of institutional 
economics has been a useful approach. The theme has highl ighted the 
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ceremonial aspect of urban existence by first demonstrating the 
agglomerative linkage between cities and institutions and thus the 
domicil iary role of the former for the latter, and second by expanding 
on the functional influences of ceremonialism toward the maintenance 
of social order in all places that institutions exist. This is, of 
course, predominantly in urban settings where the external economies 
of large urban scale have attracted an agglomeration of institutions. 
The normative implications that might be drawn from the relation-
ship between urban affairs and ceremonial ism appear to center on the 
tradition-orientation of ceremonialism. The first concern is with the 
maTIeabi1 ity of benefit-cost analysis by which it may be possible for 
reactionary institutions to defeat the innovation, diffusion, and inte-
gration of new technologies that would otherwise advance human welfare 
in terms of the continuum of on-going 1 ife processes. It can only be 
hoped that persons will become wary of such strategies as they become 
better informed on the essential character of ceremonialism and its role 
of preserving traditional values by opposing innovations that threaten 
the mythical foundations on which those values are based. 
The second concern is with what appears to be the modern tendency 
to declare more and more human interaction as subject to law and thus 
to the coercive enforcement powers of governments. Over and against 
the need for stability is an equally important need for flexibility, 
and expansion of the rule of law, vis the reign of customs aiorie, is 
to forfeit the latter for the former. Laws are much more rigid and 
more difficult to change than customs that do not have the force of 
law. The more a society gives its customs the force of law, the more 
inflexible that society becomes. And the more inflexible a society, 
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technologies in expanded human welfare. 
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 
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Another purpose in the foregoing work was to make a contribution 
of sorts to institutional economics--although that purpose was not 
expressed in so many words. The question raistd in this part of the 
concluding chapter is whether that implicit purpose has been fulfilled. 
Finally, this part will compare the institutional works of a selected 
group of contemporary economists with the interpretations made here of 
the seminal works in institutional economic theory. 
Economic Theory 
Viewed exclusively from the economic perspective, description of 
the two foregoing relationships may be considered a contribution to 
institutional economic theory. That is, the parallel augmenting and 
complementary relationships between aspects of pluralist political 
theory and institutional economic theory may be said to enhance both 
bodies of theory, and thus to be a contribution to the latter as well 
as the former. Likewise, describing urbanization and urban development 
in terms of institutional economic theory is a contribution to the 
latter as well as to a better understanding of the former. 
It appears to this writer that the work at hand makes several 
other contributions to the field of institutional economics as well--
albeit they are minuscule ones. The main contributions are: Designation 
of a fourth economic time period, the livery long-run. II Expanded 
redefinition of the words lIinstitution." and Ittechnology." Giving 
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discovery, invention, innovation, integration, and diffusion as they 
relate to science and technology, and reorganization, and embel1ish-
ment of institutional economic theory as it is interpreted from the 
semi na 1 works by thi s author. 
Chapter I above designates the relevant institutional economic 
time period of analysis as the livery long run," and defines it as a 
497 
period of sufficient duration to study the institutional changes that 
result from economic and quasi-economic activities. To be sure, other 
economists have acknowledged the anthropological and evolutionary 
nature of institutional economic theory. but none have distinguished 
its time period of analysis from other economic time periods. 6 The 
institutional time period differs from the three time periods of 
orthodox economic theory in that the latter are concerned primarily 
with elasticities of resource supply, given a state of institutional 
arrangements. As the name implies, and the definition confirms, the 
institutional time period is much longer than the longest orthodox 
economic time period. Indeed, the essential distinction of institu-
tional economic theory is this time period dimension and the evolu-
tionary perspective it connotes. 
Chapter II sought an operational definition of the word 
lIinstitution.1I Previous definitions were generally found deficient 
because they were not sufficiently inclusive. Selected topics of 
social sciences literature were surveyed, and the definition quoted in 
the beginning of the summary at the head of this chapter was adopted. 
The definition describes the institutional components (human group and 
cultural values), the social function of institutions (to preserve 
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social stability), and the institutional methodology (by perpetuating 
cultural values). Chapters IV and V further elaborated an the adapted 
definition in terms of the ceremonial nature of institutional functions 
and methods.1 Thus this work has produced a definition of the ward 
"institution" that is mare complete and more suited to the purposes of 
institutional economic theory. 
Considerable verbiage has been produced by others about technology. 
However, this writer could find no adequate definition in all the 
literature dealing with the word. Mast previous definitions are 
deficient because they either confuse technology with technical skill--
which is a nonmaterial, human quality--or with all culture without 
distinction. Chapter VI attempts to sort out these issues and to 
derive an operational definition of the ward. The resulting definition 
is: Technology is that quality of a tool that enables it to be 
substituted for human effort in the creation of goads and services 
having human value. Moreover, the chapter distinguished technology 
from technique and technical skill. Technique is the method by which 
tools (embodying technology) are employed by humans. And technical 
skill is the ability of persons to apply technique to the employment of 
tools. This work has therefore produced definitions of the word 
"technology" and of related terms that are more clearly delineated than 
previous definitions and that appear to be better suited to the 
purposes of institutional economic theory. 
8uilding on the definition of technology from Chapter VI, 
Chapters VII and VIII offered a mare exacting explanation of the 
institutional relationships between scientific discoveries and the 
invention, innovation, integration, and diffusion of new technologies. 
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Scientific discoveries and the invention of new technologies relate to 
technological continuity while the innovation of new technologies 
relates to the dynamic qualities of the latter--to the powers of 
technology to induce social change. The integration and diffusion of 
new technologies relate to improvements in human welfare, and the 
latter to social progress. B 
Finally, this work has produced a new interpretation of the 
seminal works in institutional economic theory and has reorganized and 
embellished the theory with historical examples. It was noted in the 
beginning chapter that institutional economic theory is in a state of 
disarray with unreconciled inconsistencies between its main branches. 
It is therefore not clear how institutional economists can claim a 
coherent body of theory, or justify it as a discreet field within the 
economics discipline. Indeed. it is not at all clear how institutional 
economics fits within the discipline of economics. 9 Thus more orthodox 
economists tend to treat the field with disdain and to escape 
completely into the fairyland of mathematical economic models. 
The preceding chapters have attempted to demonstrate that there 
is a coherent body of institutional economic theory, and that the 
field serves a number of important functions within the economics 
discipline. Institutional economics adds a dimension and a perspective 
all its own by which economics may be more closely related to and more 
nearly integrated with other social science disciplines, and it 
functions to criticise, augment, and complement other fields within 
the economics discipl ine. 
While no exhaustive effort was made to reconcile the 
inconsistencies in institutional economic theory, the theory was 
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organized and rationalized along particular lines so that the major 
premises of this work might be developed. As noted in Chapter I, the 
criteria used to achieve consistency between the fragments of 
institutional economic theory were to use those parts that are in 
essential agreement, to use those parts that this author believes are 
most va 1 i d where there is confl i ct and where the materi ali s needed to 
systematize the theory, and to ignore remaining parts that do not 
appear to be particularly applicable. 
There are points on which the seminal institutional writers are 
clearly in agreement. They all shared an evolutionary outlook--what 
this writer characterizes as a very long-run perspective. Tiley all 
were concerned with the .. position and nature of institutions in 
society. And they were all critical of orthodox economic theory for 
its static method of analysis. Notwithstanding these points of 
agreement, certain inconsistencies persist to plague the field. 
By now, the reader knows very well that the theory is organized 
in this work around the idea of an ends-means continuum and the choices 
surrounding the selection of future ends and the employment of means 
toward achievement of the ends selected. 10 Likewise, the reader knows 
about the past-cl i ngi ng of tradition-bound ceremoni ali sm and of the 
fonv-ard-urging of new technology. These ideas were described in 
Chapters III through VIII, and they were taken from The Theory of 
Economic Progress by Clarence Ayres. 
Ayres combi ned the concept of ceremoni ali sm from The Theory of 
The Leisure Class by Thorstein Veblen with the progressive technologies 
from The Theory of Business Enterprise and other works also by Veblen 
to describe the ceremonial-technology dichotomy. Further, he related 
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the dichotoll\Y to a continuum of on-going life processes, a concept that 
he drew from Theory of Valuation by John Dewey. However, the original 
AYres rendition of these ideas did not follow the form described here. 
Indeed, his work was so difficult for some scholars to understand that 
he had to clarify it in a protracted foreward to his second edition. ll 
Even there, his organization does not seem to this writer to be a good 
one. The reorganization given in this work to these aspects of the 
theory has hopefully given it better clarity and coherence. 
The Veblen-AYres branch of institutional economics sees 
institutions and their ceremonial practices as villains in the play of 
human progress. Institutions serve to stabilize social interaction, 
and this means placing restraints on individual actions that contravene 
institutional norms. It means preclusion of technological innovation, 
proscription of change, and inhibition of human progress where the 
former are instrumental toward progress. The Veblen-Ayres branch sees 
progress as the triumph of its hero technology over the villain 
institutions. It explains institutional discontinuities in terms of 
technological continuities. In short, the Veblen-Ayres branch of 
institutional economics concentrates on the unstabi1izing forces that 
cause social revolutions. It gives practically no explanation to how 
stability is maintained while social change is under way. 
On the other hand, the John R. Commons branch views institutions 
as the heroes in the piece. After all, institutions are "collective 
action in control, liberation, and expansion of individual action. 1I 
The Commons view proceeds on the premise that at least some level of 
certainty and stabil ity in human interaction is necessary in any 
civilized society. It is, of course, institutions that maintain social 
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stability before, during, and after social changes. Moreover, the 
Commons branch attempts to explain institutional changes in terms of 
collective action, and it succeeds thereby to shed light on the area 
of economic interaction left murky from the Veblen-Ayres point of 
view--the social processes whereby the tensions between ceremonialism 
and technology are resolved into human progress. 
The inconsistencies related above stem, in this writer's opinion, 
from differences in pOints-of-view. The Veblen-Ayres view concentrates 
on the technology and the social forces that tend toward change, and 
thus toward social instability. Conversely, the Commons view 
concentrates on the forces of soci ety that tend toward stabi 1 ity--on 
what Veblen and Ayres call ceremonialism, and Commons thinks of as 
working rules and transactions. At any rate, the interpretation in 
this work sees the two views as complementary, and it has been 
expedient to develop this idea in Chapter X above as a partial 
reconciliation of the two branches of institutional economics. 12 
The apparent inconsistencies between the Veblen-Ayres branch and 
the Commons branch of institutional economics are complicated by 
problems of vocabulary. This difficulty is further compl icated by 
modern writers who tend to coin their own terms for phenomena on which 
there is not wide-spread semantical agreement. At any rate, an under-
standing of the synonymity of terms is useful in seeing that Veblen, 
Ayres, and Commons were, indeed, comprehending and writing of the same 
things. Chapter X above attempts to clarify this by translating 
certain terms from Commons to the verbiage of Veblen. For example, 
the Commons I1 go ing concern" is approximately synonymous with the Veblen 
l1institution.1l Likewise, Commons I Ilworking rules, custom, and lawll are 
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approximately synonymous with Veblen's "ceremonialism," and the former's 
"transactions" may be viewed as the latterls "ceremonial exchanges. II 
This part of the chapter attempts to justify the claim that 
substantive contributions to the field of institutional economics have 
been made in this monograph. The supposed contributions are: 
Demonstrating a parallel, augmenting and complementary relationship 
between political pluralist theory and institutional economic theory. 
Showing the relevance of institutional economic theory to urbanization 
and urban development. Designating the "very long-run" as the 
institutional economic time-period of analysis. Redefining the words 
"institution,lI "technology," and related tenns. And reorganizing and 
expanding institutional economic theory as it has been interpreted 
from the seminal works by this writer. 
Contemporary Institutional Economists 
Until now, this writer has adhered closely to the seminal writers 
in institutional economics. Indeed, even this was very selective, and 
only the writings of Thorstein Veblen, John Dewey, C. E. Ayres, and 
John R. Commons were seriously consulted. This was done to assure that 
the original works were interpreted with fidelity. Curiously, none of 
the seminal writers were economists in the orthodox sense. Veblen, 
Dewey, and Ayres were educated in the discipline of philosophy, and 
Commons failed in his efforts to complete a doctorate in economics. This 
might account for what no doubt appears to other economists as the for-
mer writers' contrariwise approach to economic orthodoxy. And it might 
also account in part for the apparent lack of interest shown in the 
field by most traditionally-trained economists. Nevertheless, each 
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man made one or more substantial and significant contributions to :the 
field that is known today as institutional economics., and it is on 
their works that the field is founded. 
Are there any contemporary scholars in the field today? If so, 
who are they? How shall they be distinguished from other economists? 
What is the nature of their work? And how do their writings relate to 
this work? There are, of course, contemporary scholars of institutional 
economics that are distinguishable from other economists, although some 
contemporary institutionalists might resist their inclusion in that 
classification. Moreover, many contemporary institutional economists 
are d1stingu1shed in other fields of economics as well. Interestingly, 
contemporary institutional economists are some of the most widely 
read in the economics discipline today. 
The attributes of institutional works that distinguish them from 
tlose of other economists include the characteristics described above as 
unique to the field of institutional economics. The essential 
attributes that are common to the works of all institutional economists 
are employment of the very long-run time-period of analysis along with 
the evolutionary perspective that the time-period involves, and the 
concentration on institutional arrangements. 
Other corollary attributes that may indicate an institutional 
linkage are tendencies to niggle and criticise economic orthodoxy on 
the bases of empirical and historical examples drawn from other 
disciplines and theoretical views, and preoccupations with economic 
development and growth. 
A good many economists who are much better known for their 
contributions to orthodox economics might incidentally be classified 
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as institutional economists on the foregoing bases,13 However, the 
contemporary scholars selected for inclusion here as institutionalists 
have, in the opinion of this writer, distinguished themselves by 
producing works that are substantial contributions in the field. The 
works of these men defy easy subclassification. Some survey the past 
and are descriptive. Some look to the future and are predictive. Some 
deal with normative values and are prescriptive. And some are all 
three. Some of their works deal with contemporary problems, and others 
with very long-run developmental problems. Some tend to stress 
technological aspects of socio-economic problems, and others stress the 
ceremon; a 1 . 
At any rate, the best-known contemporary institutional economist, 
in this writer1s opinion, is John Kenneth Galbraith. Galbraith has 
been a prolific commentator on the American and world economies since 
the early 1950s. Spiced with a smidgen of prescriptive exposition, 
his works have been primarily descriptive. Moreover, he tends to take 
the phenomenon of technical change as given, and he concentrates his 
analysis on the problems of ceremonial ism and institutional adjustment. 
His contributions to vocabulary include the concept of countervailing 
power, dependence effect, conventional wisdom, social balance, 
industrial state, technostructure. rev; sed sequence, educati ana 1 and 
scientific estate, planning system, and more. 
Galbraith's first work of institutional significance is American 
Capitalism, subtitled liThe Concept of Countervailing Power.1I The work 
applied the interest-group politics of Dewey. Truman, and others to 
economic interaction. holding that " ... private economic power is 
held in check by the countervailing power of those who are subject to 
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it." By which, Galbraith means that "In the typical modern market of 
few sellers, the ac~ive restraint is provided not by competition but 
from the other side of the market by strong buyers.,,15 Moreover, each 
side will attempt to enlist public opinion in its cause and to 
influence the enactment of laws that will enhance its bargaining power. 
Galbraith illustrates the operation of countervail ing power with 
examples drawn from the history of labor and farm legislation, among 
others. 
As well as coining a new term, "countervail ing power, II American 
Capitalism ;s a criticism of economic orthodoxy for concentrating on 
imaginary competitive markets while ignoring the very long-run insti-
tutiona1 changes that have rendered the orthodox paradigm ever less 
relevant. In this sense, the work is more in the tradition of John R. 
COlTUTlons. Indeed, one can almost imagine Commons ~ "collective action ll 
operating as Galbraith's II countervailing power. 1I 
Perhaps Galbraith's most influential work is The Affluent Society 
which, along with American Capital ism lays a foundation of theory on 
which most of his subsequent works are erected. Indeed, Affluent 
Society is the first volume in a trilogy, the remaining volumes of 
which are reviewed below. The book is also a social criticism that 
became a favorite conversation piece of the liberal dilettanti, and it 
topped the best-seller lists for six months or so. Moreover, the work 
has so far had a lasting effect on recent generations of pol icy makers 
and scholars. 
Approximately the first third of Affluent Society is, of course, 
an introduction, and it states the historical context in which the 
remainder of the work is developed. The center piece of the 
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introduction is lithe Concept of the Conventional Wisdom," ", .. the 
ideas which are esteemed at any time for their acceptability."lll 
Acceptability is tested by familiarity, and the wider the familiarity, 
the less changeable the ideas. It is, of course, the conventional 
wisdom that rules the lives of men and is therefore the basis of social 
policies. Galbraith traces the roots of the conventional wisdom from 
the fundamental ideas of modern Western Civilization--the notions of 
rational economic man, competitive markets, consumer sovereignty, the 
liberal state with limited powers, etc.--to the present flowering of 
high consumption in modern industrial life. That ties economic security 
to employment, employment to production, and production to consumer 
demand. 
The center third or so of Affluent Society is devoted to an 
attack on the institutional fruits of a conventional wisdom that is 
sadly out of touch with the economic realities of industrial times. 
The p;~ce de r~sistance of that section and perhaps the entire book ;s 
the "dependence effect," which Galbraith describes thus: 
As a society becomes increasingly affl uent, wants are 
increasingly created by the process by which they are 
satisfied. .. Increases in consumption, the counterpart of 
increases in production, act by suggestion or emulation to 
create wants. Or producers may proceed actively to create 
wants through advertising and salesmanship. Wants thus come 
to depend on output. In technical terms it can no longer be 
assumed that welfare is greater at an all round higher level 
of production than at a lower one ... the higher level of 
production has, merely, a higher level of want creation 
necessitating a higher level of want satisfaction ... this is 
not true of all goods, but that it is true of a substantial 
part is sufficient. It means that since the demand for this 
part would not exist, were it not contrived, its utility or 
urgency, ex contri vance is zero. 17 
The notion embodied in Galbraith1s dependence effect is, of 
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course, not affirmed in the conventional wisdom which believes the 
opposite, that production is called up by consumer demand. The 
di.sparity between the illusions that people hold (the conventional 
wisdom) and Galbraith's reality (dependence effect) is responsible for 
serious misallocations of resources and a variety of socioeconomic 
ills. It results ill a lack of "social balance," and social balance is 
defined by Galbraith as ". . . a sati sfactory J'el ationshi p between the 
supply of privately produced goods and services and those of the state, 
,,18 
The dependence effect results in social imbalance because 
lI advertising operates exclusively, and emulation mainly, on behalf of 
privately produced goods and services. Since management and emulative 
effects operate on behalf of private production, public services will 
have an inherent tendency to 1 ag behind." In ampl ifyi ng thi 5, Gal braith 
writes: 
The scientist or engineer or advertising man who devotes 
himself to developing a new carburetor, cleanser or depilatory 
for which the public recognizes no need and will feel none until 
an advertising campaign arouses it, is one of the valued members 
of our society. A politician or public servant who dreams up a 
new public service is a wastrel. Few public offenses are more 
reprehensible. 19 
The theory of social balance is the heart of the prescriptive 
portion of Affluent Society. Galbraith devotes the last third of his 
book to matters that should be changed to correct the misallocations, 
bring the economy into social balance, and remedy other social ills 
traceable to the dependence effect. Finally, the book ends with a 
prediction of the benefits that might be expected if his prescriptions 
are followed. 
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Affluent Society was a popular conversation piece on the academic 
circuit as well. The avant garde scholars delighted in its implied 
criticisms of conservatism. But, understandably, not all of Galbraith's 
colleagues agreed with him. Some attacked his dependence effect, 
arguing that there is much more to advertising than want creation, that 
advertising also conveys all sorts of information needed by consumers if 
they are to make intelligent economic choices. Others raised questions 
about the theory of social balance, arguing that many of the goods and 
services deSignated as so-called public goods by Galbraith might be 
provided more effi ci ently by private markets. Fina lly, others called 
Galbraith to task for what they saw in Affluent Society as a sellout 
to socialism. 20 
But what about the relationship of Affluent Society to the 
interpretation of institutional economics exposed in this work? 
Galbraith's contribution in The Affluent Society is in the very best 
tradition of institutional economics. One can see Veblen's influence, 
and perhaps that of Ayres, in the work. Indeed, conventional wisdom is 
Galbraith's term for ceremonial beliefs ~ Veblen, or for custom in 
the Commons vernacular. Likewise, the emulative quality of the 
dependence effect is straight out of Veblen's Leisure Class. Finally, 
the work is a scholarly social criticism of the first order. Neverthe-
less, there are some disquieting reservations of Galbraith's normative 
pronouncements that will be reserved for the end of this review of his 
works. 
At this writing, Galbraith has produced two more works that merit 
comments as institutional economics. Indeed, the two selections 
complete the trilogy that commenced with and evolved from The Affluent 
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Society. The New Industrial State is a carefully delineated 
description of the corporate system and the relationship of the cor-
poration to the state and the individual. While it is an overstatement 
to say that New Industrial State is simply a restatement of The 
Affluent Society, the reader has little trouble seeing the influence 
of the latter in the former even though Gal braith has taken some pains 
to attire phenomena in the former in different idiomatic regal ia. 
What Galbraith is describing has long since been described by 
others. However, at least two things distinguish this work. The first 
is that he has brought a considerable mass of scholarship together in a 
single volume to support his contentions. The second is that he has in 
some ways disclosed his own ideological preferences more openly and 
thus more clearly--with reasonable scholarly reservations. of course. 
The dominant feature of the industrial state is the industrial 
system comprisi'ng large producing organizations, planning, discipline, 
and economic growth as the principal measure of success. The large 
producing organizations are, of course, corporations. Galbraith 
descri bes how the lItechnostructure" has 1 argely repl aced traditi ana 1 
management in cantrall ing the modern corporation. The technostructure 
consists of "those who, as participants, contribute information to 
group dec; s; ons. II Gal bra; th descri bes this group as very 1 arge--
.. . it extends from the most senior officials of the 
corporation to where it meets, at the outer perimeter, the white 
and blue collar workers whose function is to conform more or 
less mechanically to instruction or routine. It embraces all 
who bring specialized knowledge or experience to group decision-
making. This, not the management, is the guiding intelligence--
the brain--of the enterprise. 21 
Everything in the industrial state is harnessed to the needs of 
the technostructure. Members of the technostructure "adapt the goals of 
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the corporation to their own; by extension, the corporation seeks to 
adapt social attitudes and goals to those of the members of the 
technostructure. II Thus the accepted sequence is revised. The accepted 
sequence is founded on the notion of consumer sQvereignty-_lIthe uni-
directional flow of instruction from consumer to market to producer .. ,II 
Galbraith explains the revised sequence: "Instead the producing 
firm reaches forward to control its market and on beyond to manage the 
market behavior and shape the social attitudes of those, ostensibly, 
that it serves. 1122 
The technostructure, through its management and control, have 
brought the state itself into 1 ine so that the state serves the former 
by "regulation of aggregate demand, maintenance of a large public. 
sector on which this regulation depends, unden-lriting of advanced 
technology and provision of an increasing volume of trained and 
educated manpower. 11 23 
The latter of these state functions in service to the techno-
structure--provision of an increasing volume of trained and educated 
manpower--is discharged by state and corporate support of higher 
education, what Galbraith calls the "educational and scientific estate. II 
The traditional antagonisms between the latter and the corporate world 
have all but vanished since ascendance of the technostructure, the 
members of which are products of the educational and scientific estat2. 
The estate has expanded enormously to meet the needs of the techno-
structure,and it is gaining in political influence at the same time 
that organized labor is declining in s:lch influence. 24 
Most of 1he New Industrial State is given over to description of 
the present economic condition of modern American society and of the 
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institutional changes that have brought it to that condition. However, 
in the last chapter Galbraith speculates on the probable future of the 
industrial system. His predictions suggest a convergence wherein any 
nation that achieves mature industrialization will, irrespective of 
its professed ideology, become an industrial state in service to its 
citizens. Thus, the state enterprises of the professed communist 
nations will be indistinguishable from the mature, modern corporations 
of the professed capitalist nations. And the states in both cases will 
be serving their industrial systems in the same ways.25 
What Galbraith calls the industrial system in New Industrial State 
he roughly translates to the Ilplanning system" in Economics and the 
Public Purpose. The planning is, of course, carried on by the techno-
structure which, by the way, survived the transition from the former 
volume to the latter without perceptible change. The planning enables 
the technostructure to rna i nta i n its control of the ent i re economy and 
thereby to assure an unending continuation and growth of its prestige, 
power, and income. 
However, Galbraith contrasts the planning system with the market 
system, the less than half of the economy that continues to serve the 
American consumer. This is essentia11y the noncorporate, proprietary 
part of the business world, and it is composed of many small 
enterprises that tender services, vis the supply of goods or things 
that are manufactured by the 1 arge corporati ons. The important 
differences are that members of the planning system are able to control 
their environments while members of the market system remain subject 
to their environments. These circumstances lead to exploitation of the 
market system by the planning system. Moreover, such economic ills as 
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the planning system little affected, or perhaps even better if than 
before. 26 
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Economics and the Public Purpose is Galbraith's major prescrip-
tive work. The last third of the volume is given over to an agenda of 
reform that seems remarkable in light of the institutional problems 
Galbraith has so assiduously sketched out. Some of the most conserva-
tive persons might consider his reforms radical while the most liberal 
constituency might feel they were on the conservative side. Indeed, 
as he is careful to point out, many of the reforms were well under way 
before the book was published in the early 1970s. 
Interestingly, Galbraith rejects the tired liberal palliatives of 
the past that attacked market power. He argues correctly, in the 
opinion of this writer, that: liThe central problem of the modern 
economy is unequal development. The least developed is where there is 
the least monopoly and market power; the greatest development is where 
there is the most." 27 
He therefore rejects anti-trust enforcement both because it has 
been ineffective and because it proceeds on the classical theory that 
monopoly power leads to inefficient allocations of resources. He 
rejects regulation in its present form because the state is essentially 
a captive of the planning system and regulation simply leaves the 
technostructure to regulate itself. Placing so-called public-interest 
members on corporate boards of directors is a toothless remedy because 
corporate boards are almost as powerless before the technostructure as 
the corporate stockholders. Finally, he rejects wholesale publ ic 
ownership of corporate business because the evidence fails in many cases 
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ownership--and, indeed, some evidence suggests the contrary in some 
kinds of enterprise. 28 
What Galbraith argues for is emancipation; emancipation of 
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belief, emancipation of women, emancipation of the state, and emancipa-
tion of the market system. The agenda call s first for emancipation of 
belief by jettisoning the worn-out baggage of the conventional wisdo~ 
and its classical economic contents. It means leaving hold of the 
accepted sequence and grasping the revised sequence in all of its 
ramifications. Only with those new understandings can the state be 
emancipated from the technostructure and its planning system. And only 
then can the state become the agency for carrying forth the remainder 
of Gal bra i th 's agenda of reform. 
The remaining Galbraith agenda calls for the emancipation of 
women from the menial household competitions that occupy suburban 
populations. Among other things. this means equal educational 
opportunities. equal employment opportunities, equal pay for equal work, 
choices of work week and work year, and child-care centers. The agenda 
calls for enhancement of the power and competence of the market system, 
vis that of the planning system. Likewise, it calls for disciplining 
the purposes and methods of the planning system, and seeing to a more 
equitable distribution of income both within the planning system and 
between that system and the market system. It calls for better social 
balance in the allocation of resources between the private and public 
sectors. Finally, it calls for a new socialism--public provision of 
hoUSing, medical care, and transportation based on need. 29 
What then of Galbraith's institutionalism in the last two 
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guilty of the infamous style change procedure he so deplores among 
01igopo1istic manufacturers. The reader will recognize the 
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IIconventional wisdom ll of The Affluent Society attired as lIaccepted 
sequence ll in New Industrial State. Thus, like the conventional wisdom, 
the accepted sequence is an aspect of ceremonial knowledge in Veblen-
Ayres terms. Likewise, the reader will recognize the IIdependence 
effect" of The Affluent Society disguised as the "revised sequence II 
in New Industrial State. Thus, like the former term. revised sequence 
relates to the human propensity to emulate that was a central theme in 
Veblen's Theory of the Leisure Class. Finally, as already noted, 
Galbraith has dressed up the lIindustrial system l1 of New Industrial 
State as the II planning system" in Economics and the Public Purpose. 
Like Veblen, Galbraith shines as a great popularizer of new expressions. 
Style changes aside, New Industrial State looks in many ways like 
an update of Veblen's Theory of Business Enterprise. Additionally, one 
can almost read the sequel to Veblen IS Engineers and the Price System 
in Galbraith's treatment of the "technostructure." And the techno-
structure sounds very much 1 i ke the IIpower el ite" of C. Wri ght Mi 11 s. 
Likewise, Veblen's lamentations in the Higher Learning in America are 
reaffirmed with a special twist in Galbraith's description of the 
lIeducational and scientific estate. !,30 Finally, Galbraith ' s treatment 
of the state in relation to the industrial system is strikingly similar 
to that of Marx in his critique of capitalism--and Marx is, after all, 
a superb institutional economist when his work ;s measured by the 
criteria stated above. One must, of course, avoid the logical fallacy--
that since Marx was an institutional economist, all institutional 
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In addition to restating a good many old institutional themes 
Galbraith's work possesses other qualities that mark it as 
institutional economics. It involves a very long-run dimension, and 
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it deals with institutional change. It recognizes, but does not dwell 
upon, the function of technology in inducing social change. Moreover, 
it expands incrementally on an understanding of modern techniques for 
innovating new technologies in what Galbraith calls "process 
innovation" or the institutional ization of innovation through the 
research and development programs carried on for the technostructure 
and its planning system by the state and the educational and scientific 
estate. He correctly notes that this is done to insulate the 
technostructure and its planning system by controlling the unstabi1izing 
effects of new technologies. 31 
Finally, Galbraith's work might be viewed as a modern and care-
fully argued restatement of Say's Law--that market demand is created by 
the forces of SUPP1y.32 That is, the supply of goods and services give 
rise to returns of income (rent, wages, interest, and profits) to the 
factors of production that were employed to produce the supply. There 
could, therefore, not be an insufficiency of demand resulting in 
unemployment because the recipients will, in the aggregate, spend their 
incomes on the consumer goods they were employed to produce. Say's 
Law was more or 1 ess up-ended by the so-ca 11 ed new economi cs of John 
Maynard Keynes. 33 Keynes argued that the end of production is 
consumption, and that the level of aggregate consumption may be 
insufficient, resulting in unemployment, if the level of aggregate 
saving is greater than the level of aggregate investment. Thus, 
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production is called forth by market demand. Galbraith's version of 
Say's Law takes the form of the dependence effect. Given institutional 
arrangements to maintain buying power (employment compensation, 
transfer payments, government subsidies, etc.) demand is created by 
producers through adverti sing. 
Notwithstanding its institutional virtues, Galbraith's work 
possesses some disquieting features. First, the entire Galbraithian 
edifice hangs on the dependence effect, and the dependence effect is 
founded on a fallacy of composition--because a part of the economy 
conforms to his model, then his model explains the entire economy. 
He alludes to this in the early pages of The Affluent Society when he 
writes: "This {the dependency effecy is not true of all goods, but 
that it is true of a substantial part is sufficient. ,,34 And he 
proclaims it loudly in the front two-thirds of Economics and the Public 
Purpose where he aCknowledges the existence of a market system that is 
more or less explained by orthodox economic theory. Moreover. a 
substantial part of the goods produced by the manufacturing sector (the 
industrial or planning system) are important subsistence items and they 
likewise escape Galbraith's classification as goods subject to the 
dependence effect. Finally, even the advertising that ;s intended to 
create demand for goods that would otherwise have no apparent demand has 
information value over and above demand cl"eation. Thus, the dependence 
effect might actually apply to as little as one-tenth or less of the 
goods and services consumed in the United States in any given year. 
If the dependence effect cannot stand, then a good bit of that which 
follows in The Affluent Society and in the remaining volumes of 
Ga 1 bra ith' s tri logy may be subj ect to seri ous doubt. 
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Second, Galbraith takes orthodox neoclassical economic theory to 
task for its supposed failure to adequately deal with market 
imperfections--that ;s to deal with them according to the Galbraith 
world view. In fact, a good bit of Galbraith's polemic, including the 
phenomenon he calls the dependence effect, is taken out of contemporary 
neoclassical economic theory or applied economics fields that are 
founded on such theory. More specifically, it is taken from the econ-
omics of market or industrial structure. The field branches into the 
economics of anti-trust and the economics of regulation. And those 
appl ied fields are founded on the microeconomics of imperfect 
competition. 
Regarding Galbraithls agenda for reform, it is not entirely clear 
how the state can be, or whether it should be, emancipated from the 
institutional system of which it is, like all other institutions, a 
component part. As the earlier chapters of this essay attempted to 
demonstrate, and Galbraith faithfully acknowledged in the early chapters 
of The Affluent Society, there is a large and commonly held body of 
received (conventional) wisdom that, right or wrong, binds a stable 
society together. And all of the institutions--the state, the economy, 
the family, the church, etc.--are, for good or bad, in near unanimous 
affirmation of those ceremonial beliefs. Moreover, the various 
components of the institutional system are interrelated and inter-
dependent. They constantly rei nforce one another through the 
ceremonial exchanges of their respective members. And those members 
occupy positions in not one, but a number of the interdependent 
institutions. It is difficult to see how the state can be severed 
from the institutional system and still remain effective in its 
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Moreover, Gal braith I 5 approach to reform comes down essent; a 11y 
to handing over the power to a sovereign state that is liemancipatedU 
from what may be its mcst important constituency and expecting the 
state to effect redistributions of economic and other institutional 
powers on the basis of some higher kind of wisdom--appa.rer.tly the 
unconventional wisdoms flowing from Galbraith's pen. It seems to this 
writer that such an expectation is uncommonly naive. If history 
demonstrates anything, it is that there is no tyranny more oppressive 
than that of an all-powerful sovereign, ar.d no attribute more 
corruptible and corrupting than unrestrained political power. 
Even if the state could be emancipated and it did altruistically 
embark on the mis::.ion of bringing Galbraithian reform to fruition, the 
probabl e outcomes deserve closer examination. Gal braith I 5 prescription 
for redressing an skewed' distribution of institutional powers appears 
to be the creation of countervailing powers in the weaker institutional 
sectors. It seems to this writer that this could be jumping from the 
institutional frying pan into the ceremonial fire. It could lead to 
the escalation of countervailing (and counter-countervailing, etc.) 
powers, and thus to a prol iferation of institutions and successive 
layers of ceremonial crust over a society already burdened with 
oppressive ceremonialism. 
Whether or not one agrees with either his descriptions or his 
prescriptions, Galbraith is to be applauded for presenting relevant, 
timely, controversial, and provocative issues and views in words the 
general publ ic can understand. He is perhaps the most 1 iterary of 
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contemporary economists. He is lucid and articulate. He is sometimes 
satirical, often humorous, always witty--a 11 of which no doubt accounts 
for his popularity with the reading pub1 ie. 
A seemingly disproportionate amount of space has been given over 
to reviewing the principal institutional works of John Kenneth Galbraith. 
This was done because, in the opinion of this author, he is the best 
known and most read institutional economist in the world today. His 
works are also among the best examples of social criticism in the field. 
However, there are a good many other solid institutional economists on 
the contemporary scene. Unfortunately, space does not permit them to 
be given the same treatment accorded here to J. K. Galbraith. However, 
some c1 early deserve more than passing mention. 
Two other important institutional economists who, like J. K. 
Galbraith, tend to concentrate their works on problems of ceremonial 
adjustments, are Gordon C. Bjork and Robert L. Heilbroner. Bjork, who 
is the least published of the two, picked up a thread from John R. 
Commons and has attempted to weave it into whole cloth. The Commons 
thread is an observation that private property is nothing more than 
those assets the personal possession of which the state recognizes and 
stands ready to defend. Bjork develops this notion into a theory of 
institutional change based in part on interest-group pol itics . 
. . . sets of institutional arrangements are vlOrked out by men 
and survive as long as they are perceived to be useful in 
contributing to such individual and social goals as security, 
provision of the material means of existence, and opportunity 
for individual advancement. The arrangements are changed when 
technologica1 advances create new opportunities for economic 
improvement or when they create a demand for protection by 
groups who are able to exercise political power to win grotec-
tion of their interests from other members of society.35 
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The argument about the logic and development of capital ism 
presented in this book, then, is one which emphasizes the social 
util ity of capital ist arrangements for a ·society interested in 
maximizing economic growth while retaining the security of the 
individual. It does not depend on any belief in the I1l1 natural" 11 
or IIlImorall111 rights of men to property in assets or freedom from 
social control of their use. It emphasizes that institutions 
have been changed as individuals have been able to convince the 
rest of society that the rest of society would be better off by 
recognizing certain rights to freedom and property than it would 
be if it did not recognize them. 36 
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Bjork develops these ideas in the remainder of his work. Chapters 
III through V describe the origins of his ideas in political and 
economic thought and in the so-called Illogic of property. It Chapters VI 
through IX develop the freedom and property aspects of his thesis in a 
more or less historical context looking at developments from antiquity, 
through the medieval period, and into modern times. Chapters X through 
XIV examine public regulation of market activities--or limitations on 
the unconstrained uses of property--first by comparisons with medieval 
markets, then in a description of Soviet economic organization, and 
finally with an examination of anti-trust policies, labor legislation, 
and monetary controls in the United States. Chapter XV examines the 
United States record of income distribution and shows that the 
distribution of income is determined by institutional factors and that 
such factors must change if the distribution of income is to change. 
Bjork's work closes in Chapter XVI by encouraging a "capitalist ethic ll 
patterned on the philosophy of the commonwealth adopted in Massachusetts 
by its founding fathers. Bjork observes: 
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In his economic transactions with other members of society, 
each individual was to be free to enrich himself as long as his 
actions also enriched the rest of society. Transactions which 
merely redistributed existing wealth or income were not to be 
socially condoned. The analysis of property and freedom of 
exchange elaborated in preceding chapters have been informed 
with this ethic. This writer believes such an ethic does 
provide a recanc;l iation between private enterprise and publ ic 
interest, bei..ween individual ism and community.37 
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Bjork's work is a superb look at the history and development of 
the institution of private property and the role private property has 
and is playing in the stabilization of social interactions in a 
capitalist system. The work is therefore devoted to the aspects of 
ceremonialism surrounding the institutions involved with private 
property--private markets, the state, the family, etc. This is a 
different, but fruitful, way to study economics, and Bjork is to be 
applauded for expanding knowledge and understanding in this way. 
However, it seems to thi s author that Pr; vate Enterpri S8 and 
Public Interest possesses some weaknesses in terms of the institutional 
theories described in this work. First, it appears to this writer 
that Bjork assumes by implication Il rational economic man. II Such an 
assumption seems unrealistic. and it does not fit well with the concept 
of ceremonialism developed in this essay--unless. of course, one defines 
rational behavior to be any behavior that is ceremonial. Finally, 
Bjork appears to have an inadequate concept of the tensions between 
ceremonial ism and technology in the selection of ends and the employ-
ment of means. Perhaps this is because, like Commons before him, Bjork 
is more concerned with the institutional powers that augur social 
stability than the technological factors that tend toward instability--
even though he does acknowledge the dynamism of technology in inducing 
soci a 1 changes. 
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Robert L. Heilbroner has been a prolific writer with contributions 
to a number of fields in economics. His first publications were very 
popular selections ;n econom;c biography and history. He later turned 
his attentions to economic theory, and several of his works were 
eventually gathered together into a somewhat popular textbook for 
beginning economics students. He gradually shifted his attentions 
toward institutional economics, seemingly in respite from his work in 
theoretical and applied economics. 
Heilbronerls first major journey into institutional economics 
resulted in the publication of The Future as History, subtitled "The 
Historic Events of Our Times and the Direction in Which They are Taking 
America,I1 38 The essay explores what Heilbroner calls the l1inertia of 
ideologies,U or what Veblen and Ayres refer to as "ceremonial 
resistance to change. II Heilbroner claims that coels ideology is a 
product of what he calls a IIphi 1 osophy of histori c expectations, II and 
he describes that philosophy as one of optimism in the United States. 
He argues that a phi 1 osophy of optimi sm tends to equate the movement 
of historic forces with the idea of progress, and to obscure the 
historic possibilities and impossibilities regarding freedom and 
necessity. 
Thus, Americans possess an unrealistically rosy image of what is 
actually a dismal world existing and developing around them. They are 
lulled into complacency by such an ideology, and the complacency leads 
to inertia and the failure to respond with needed change. This 
eventuallY 1 eads to frustration and di si 11 usionment because of what 
Heilbroner calls the "ambiguity of eventsll--people are confounded when 
they achieve goals only to find that their achievements have 
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unexpectedly produced new and different sets of problems. The 
challenge for the West is to somehow produce the fortitude and under-
standing to maintain an outlook of humane optimism. 
Between The Future as History and his next contribution to 
institutional economics, Heilbroner wrote The Great Ascent; The Struggle 
for Economic Development in Our Time. 39 Of course, one might argue 
that Great Ascent was a contribution to institutional economics because 
one can hardly write on the subject of development without taking the 
very long-run view and applying institutional economic analysis. 
However, the book is one in an established field of applied economics 
even though it contains much in the way of institutional theory. Like 
most other writers in the economic development field. Heilbroner makes 
the point that "economic" development is too narrow a term. Develop-
ment actually involves all aspects of society, of which the economy is 
only a part. He also observes that the outlook for significant 
improvements in the 1e35 developed nations in this generation is very 
gl um. 
Heilbronerls next piece of institutional writing is The Limits 
to American Capitalism, which is well described by the title. 40 The 
book contains a superb discourse on the relationship between technology, 
productivity, and social change. Heilbroner argues that technology has 
pushed society to the IIboundaries of the business system," and he 
predicts that capitalism will survive well into the next century, but 
that it will ultimately yield to a very different kind of social order. 
One aspect of that change will be the rise of a I1 scientific elite." 
Heilbroner produced another title in applied economics between 
limits to American Capitalism and his next and most ambitious 
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institutional scholarship. This time, his work was in what is called 
ucomparative economic systems, II another field that is akin to 
institutional economics. The work, Between Capital ism and Social ism, 
is a collection of essays written since 1966, and, like Great Ascent, 
is important to Hellbroner's metamorphosis to institutional economics 
because his study in the applied fields obviously helped shape some of 
his thoughts for his major contribution to institutional economics. 41 
Heilbroner's most ambitious piece of institutional scholarship 
to date is An Inquiry Into the Human Prospect. 42 The inquiry is in 
the vein of his previous institutional works. However, where the 
latter tend to be more descriptivenFuture as History deal ing with the 
inhibitive effects of ceremony, and Limits to American Capitalism 
dealing with the unstabi1izing effects of new techno10gies--the former 
is more predictive. Heilbroner's institutional writings have always 
had a significant international flavor, but Inquiry is cast in the 
international mold, albeit that he views international events from the 
Western vantage point. That is, while his previous institutional 
works dealt primarily, but not exclusively, with internal matters over 
which the United States has some control, Inquiry deals primarily with 
the external challenges over which the U. s. may have very little if 
any contra 1 . 
He argues that the United States and all of Western Civilization 
is gravely threatened by external challenges, or challenges from the 
Third World that will multiply over the years and that cannot be met 
or overcome with the usual industrial solutions. Indeed, it is 
precisely the efforts and successes of the less developed nations in 
achieving industrialization that is and will continue to exacerbate 
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those countries their fair share of world resources and of what has 
come to be viewed as the materially good 1 ife in the West. 
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The external challenge, then, is a combination of affluent West-
ern life styles and continued industrialization of the economically 
depressed nations in the face of dwindl ing world resources and 
burgeoning populations in the latter nations. Obviously, increasing 
populations alone will place insufferable strains on already scant 
resource pools. And each improvement in the livelihood of the poverty-
stricken part of the world will multiply the resource drain. 
Moreover, each improvement for the poverty-stricken will be 
accomplished by expansion of industry, and each expansion of industry 
will add to the technology-induced pollution already choking the 
biosphere. Finally, industrialization must eventually make nuclear 
materials available to all nations, and this can only lead to wide-
spread access to the most gruesome of lIobliterative" weapons. 
According to Heilbroner, such weapons will be great equalizers in a 
world of otherwise unequal nations. 
What, then, is the hUman prospect? Several scenarios occur to 
Heilbroner. The most dismal is a cataclysmic end a few generations 
hence after mankind has integrated and diffused enough technology to 
completely overload and perhaps destroy the life-support capacity of 
the earth. The next and equally dismal scenario is widespread nuclear 
warfare between nations attempting to acquire or preserve parts of the 
shrinking reSources for themselves. The least dismal is a continuing 
series of convulsive changes forced on the West and the rest of 
humanity by the foregoing external forces. Clearly, the meritorious 
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cannot fare well under such circumstances. 
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What does Hei1broner see as the nature of future society if, 
indeed, humanity somehow manages to survive? Heilbroner calls such a 
society "post industrial. II He describes it as one in which the 
institutions will stress parsimony over pf'ofligate consumption, quality 
of life over quantity of goods, and rendering services over production 
of material weal tho He sees a decl ine in scientific endeavor and a 
return to preindustrial introspection and speculations about ultimate 
values. People will be better educated, and they will look upon 
resource consumption and heat generati on as necessary evil s. 
Heilbronerls most recent works are Business Civilization in 
Decline and Beyond Boom and Crash.43 The former is essentially an 
expansion on The Limits of American Capitalism in light of his revela-
tions in An Inquiry Into the Human Prospect, and the latter is little 
more than a progress report on the former in light of the oil crisis. 
Hei 1 broner attempts to construct a time-tab1 e for hi s predi cted dec1 ine 
in industrial capitalism in the United States and the West, and for the 
rise of the so-called post-industrial society. He sees little change 
except in the growth of planning in the near future. However, he 
prophesies the advent of "trans-systemic" challenges during the middle 
range (25-50 years) in which the external challenges he described in 
An Inguiry will start producing institutional changes in both the 
capitalist and socialist economies of the Western World. Finally, 
those same challenges will lead to post-industrial society 100 or 150 
years hence. 
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What can be said of Heilbroner's institutional economics? The 
least is that he has a good comprehension of ceremonial ism--the inertia 
of ideology as it applies to American capitalism". However, he does not 
appear to understand that the same forces are worki ng in every other 
system, be it democratic socialism, Marxian socialism, fascism, 
tribalism, or any other ism that afflicts a people. The less developed 
nations are in a state of deplorable misery today (by Western standards) 
because their peoples vehemently oppose any technological influence 
that may require them to abandon their cherished tribal traditions. 
While there may be emulative pull to development, development will not 
take place without considerable push to overcome institutional 
ba rri ers as well. 
Moreover, Heilbroner appears to be trapped in an embrace between 
straight-line extrapolations and unilinear causality. He has bought 
into the Neo-Malthusian Meadows study--the original study of the so-
called Club of Rome that the Club itself repudiated in recent sequels~4 
It nevertheless appears that Heilbroner has seated himself firmly with 
other doomsday seers who are neurotically searching for the ends of 
the earth from atop the environmental band wagon. Most of those 
passengers suffer the same myopic afflictions. They are straight-
line extrapolators who reason unilinearly. 
The error in this approach is that it overlooks the progressive 
qualities of technologies. The difficulties with modern technology 
are mainly transitory institutional maladjustments in the integration 
and diffusion processes. There is no reason to believe that the needed 
adjustments will not be made, or that the quality of life on earth will 
not be immeasurably improved for more people in the outcomes. 
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substantial increases in per-capita quantities of goods. And all of 
this will occur directly with the pace at which people disabuse them-
selves of mysticism and false notions of mythical supernatural powers 
in control of their lives. 
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Heil broner is certainly not the first person to overlook the 
progressive qualities of new technologies. That oversight afflicted 
both Malthus and Marx and caused their most dire predictions to fail. 45 
Likewise, it accounts for the intellectually bankrupt "stagnation 
thesis" of Alvin H. Hansen a generation or so ago. 46 Indeed, Hansen 
achieved fame in large part for the publications he ground out to 
first rationalize his mistake, then to repudiate it, and finally to 
erect new theories on diametrically opposite assumptions. Finally, 
the gloomy prophesies of the such recent harbingers of doom as Rachel 
Carson, Paul Ebrlich, and the Meadows family have not and are extremely 
unlikely to materialize for the same reasons. 47 
Heilbroner's assumptions aside, this age is not perfectly unique. 
The present human condition is different in at least one absolute 
dimension. It is enormously superior to other ages because of 
technological developments. But problems facing present man are the 
same in substance as those fae; ng other ages even though they are 
different in kind. In substance the problem is to reconcile the 
tensions between tradi tion-bound ceremonialism and dynamic technol 09i es 
in the selection of future ends and the employment of means so that 
progress results in the enhancement of human welfare. 
What then can be said of Heilbroner1s foreboding descriptions 
and ominous predictions? Certainly, he has made the dismal science 
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prescription appears to be that Western man must substitute a 
philosophy of pessimism for his inherently optimistic outlook. Such 
a change does not seem warranted. Hei! braner is undoubtedly correct 
in predicting a different social order in the very long run because 
institutional change follows inevitably when mankind has the courage 
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to innovate new technologies. However, this writer cannot agree, and 
history does not affirm that the induced changes are likely to result 
in diminished human welfare. 
This review cannot end without mention of a number of economists 
who have expanded understanding of the social significance of 
technology. Not all of them can be considered to be institutional 
economists because their analyses ignored institutional arrangements 
and they dealt with technology in terms of the usual orthodox time 
peri ods. Interest in the economi c effects of technology were 
stimulated by revelation in 1928 of the "Cobb-Douglas Production 
Function," the technical characteristics of which need not concern 
this study.48 There foil owed a period of speculation and additional 
research on the Cobb-Douglas findings, but the matter of technical 
change was subordinated to other factors because of certain economic 
characteristics of the aggregate production function. 
After a much too respectable interval (1957), Robert M. Solow 
produced an article dealing with "Technical Change and the Aggregate 
Production Function. ,,49 Solow's work greatly heightened interest in 
the economic effects of technology, and the economic vocabulary 
concerning technical change was greatly expanded by Solow and other 
economists who carried on the research. Finally, Edwin Mansfield 
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produced a book on the subject that summarized and integrated much of 
the work done by others on the economic effects of technical change. 50 
While none of this work was institutional in character, it was important 
to institutional economics because it was giving empirical substan-
tiation to pronouncements made previously by Veblen and Ayres about 
techno logy. 
In the meantime, W. W. Rostow produced The Stages of Economic 
Growth; A Non Communist Manifesto in which he posited a theory of 
traditional society and five stages through which such a society must 
pass in the process of developing itself into a mass-consumption 
ecenomy.5l Rostow drew an analogy between the developing country and 
an aircraft. One of Rostow's stages is therefore called the "take-off," 
the period during which the country makes itself airborne in terms of 
economic growth. The so-called take-off stage is crucial because it 
is the period in which the country is at full throttle, so to speak, 
making heavy investments in the capital goods that will turn it into 
an industrial nation. The capital goods, of course, embody technol-
ogies, and the effects on the country are unstabilizing. 
Rostow's take-off stage captured the imagination of every 
economist who had an interest in economic development and much attention 
focused on the matter of innovation or diffusing new technologies in 
developing countries. One such economist was Simon Kuznets who did a 
survey of the quantitative knowledge of economic growth. 52 Part of 
Kuznets' survey recapitulated data on rates of technical change and 
their effects on gross national product and on other variables. 
Kuznets produced his own writings on economic development in which he 
stressed the importance of technological diffusion and the resulting 
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institutional changes to economic development. Finally, Gerald M. 
Meier wrote The International Economics of Development in which he 
integrated orthodox theories of technical change with international 
trade and exchange theories to show the relationship between those 
factors in the matter of economic development. 53 While these econ-
omists were working in applierl fields of orthodox economic theories, 
their works shed more light on the nature of technology and the 
relationship between technical change and institutional change. 
This review would not be complete without mention of at least 
one more scholar. Donald A. Schon has produced several works with 
significance for institutional economics. The first of such works 
published in the United States is Technology and Change; The New 
Heraclitus. Schon explored the nature of invention and innovation 
in terms of risk, uncertainty, and decision-making in corporations. 
He reviewed the history of American technical change, and examined 
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what he believes to be the ethical issues surrounding national policies 
devi sed to enhance technological advance. 54 
Schon's next title is Beyond the Stable State in which he 
examines the role of "dynamic conservatism"--what he calls a tendency 
to fight to remain the same--in institutional resistance to change. 
He argues that the stable state (institutional constancy and 
predictabil ity) is eternally lost because the innovation of new 
technologies has made continuous institutional transformation a central 
feature of modern society. He asks how institutions can become 
effective fllearning systems II so that the exponential growth in 
information can be managed. He dismisses the so-called rational 
scientific modes of understanding because they depend on the 
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predictability and continuity that are lost in the on-rush of tech-
nology. He advocates an "existential strategy" for managing the flow 
of information and the rapid rate of change. 55 
Schon's stable state is the epitome of institutional rigidity, 
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and his dynamic conservatism is yet another term for ceremonial ways 
of knowing and doing. However, his term is a contradiction of sorts 
because conservatism is not dynamic in the usual sense. Nor is 
dynamism conservative. The words are diametrically opposite in their 
general tenor. Conservative. the adjective form, describes resistance 
to change, while dynamic describes forces in motion, that is, movement 
or change of position. 
Semantics aside, Schon is good on the tensions between cere-
monialism and technology. Even so, his solution to instability is to 
let the institutions manage the flow of information and thereby the 
rate of change. While there can be no other solution--because that is 
the modus operandi anyhow--it is like letting the wolf tend the flock. 
In short, Schon does not appear to understand the nature of institu-
tional change in terms of Commons I "collective action. II 
This somewhat lengthy review of selected literature from 
contemporary institutional economics was accomplished to show how the 
contemporary work relates to the seminal works in the field, and how 
this essay relates to the contemporary· literature. As with all 
scholarship, there is not perfect agreement among scholars. However, 
it is hoped that the reader has been able to detect sufficient 
agreement among contemporary scholars and between them and the works 
of Veblen, Commons, and Ayres to see a consistent and relevant body 
of institutional economic theory. 
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Most contemporary institutional writers have 1 imited themselves 
to t.he application of institutional economics to current problems. 
They have been commentators who describe and explain modern events ;n 
terms of institutional causality, and who criticise their colleagues 
and public policy-makers in the light of institutional theory. Some 
few institutional scholars have sought to expand or to deepen the 
theory by synthesis and testing. These latter scholars have confined 
thei r works to one or another component of the theory. None have 
attempted to bring the elements of theory into a consistent whole. 
As noted above, a necessary step in aChieving the stated purpose 
of this paper was to interpret and give some organization to the 
components of theory heretofore loosely known as institutional 
economics. While this was done with care, the work remains the 
author's interpretations, and whether or not the outcome is satis-
factory remains for others to judge. However, the point is that this 
work differs from other work in the field insofar as it is an 
attempted organization of the essential body of institutional economic 
theory known at this time. 
This review was also made to demonstrate how institutional 
economic theory relates to orthodox economics and to other sacial-
science disciplines. It seems to this writer that institutional 
economics is solidly established in the economics discipline because 
both the field and the discipline share a common concern--the selection 
of future ends from competing possible ends, and the alternative 
employments of resource means to attainment of those ends so that 
human welfare is best served. Moreover. institutional economics adds 
an important dimension--the very long-run--to the understanding of 
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economic phenomena. The field therefore augments both the positive 
and the normative powers of the discipl ine. 
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Finally, it is hoped that this review will so stimulate the 
interest of other scholars that at least some of them will turn their 
considerable research talents to furthering understanding in 
institutional economics. 
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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
537 
11 Ayres, Theory of Economi c Progress, pp. v-xxv. 
120avid Ham; 1 ton, IIVeblen and Commons: Theoretical Convergence, II 
Southwestern Social Science Quarterly, XXXIV (September, 1953), 43-50. 
13particu1ar1y in the applied economics fields of labor economics, 
public finance, economic development, economic history, and compara-
tive economic systems. 
14Aside from those listed above in footnotes (Gambs, Grucby and 
Hamilton), other contemporary economists who come to mind as making 
contributions to institutional economics, but whose works will not be 
reviewed here, include: William Breit, James Buchanan, Neil W. 
Chamberlin, A. W. Coats, l4i11iam P. Culbertson, Jr., Joseph Dorfman, 
S. Herbert Frankel, R. A. Gordon, Gardiner Means, GunnarMyrda1, Macur 
Olson, and Gordon Tu11ock--to name a few. 
15 John Kenneth Gal bra i th, Ameri can Capital ism; The Concept of 
Countervailing Power, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1952), pp. 111-12. 
16John Kenneth Galbraith, The Affluent Society, (New York: The 
New American Library, 1963), p. 18. 
17~., pp. 128-30. 
18Ibid ., p. 201. 
19 Ibid ., p. 204. 
2°F. A. Hayek, liThe Non Sequitor of the 'Dependence Effectl,1I 
Southern Economic Journal, XXVII (April, 1961), 346-48. Henry C. 
Wallich, "Public vs Private: Could Galbraith be Wrong?1I in Private 
Wants and Public Needs, ed. by Edmund S. Phelps, (New York:--w.w-:-
Norton & Co., Inc., 1962), pp. 51-62. 
21 John Kenneth Gal braith, The New Industri a1 State, (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1967), p. 71. 
22 Ibid ., pp. 211-12. 
23 Ibid ., p. 320. 
24 Ibid ., pp. 282-95. 
25 Ibid ., pp. 388-99. 
26 John Kenneth Gal bra i th! Economi cs and the Pub 1 i c Purpose, 
Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1973), pp. 179-212. 
27 Ibid., p. 276. 
28 Ibid., pp. 215-22. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
29Ibid ., pp. 223-324. 
30Thorstein Veblen, The Theor of Business Enter rise. The 
En ineers and the Price S stem, New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 
Inc., 1963. The Higher Learning in America: A Memorandum on the 
Conduct of Universities b Business Men, (New York: Sagamore Press, 
In~., 957. Mills, Power Elite. 
31Ga1braith, Public Purpose, pp. 146-54. 
32Jean-Baptiste Say, Treatise on Political Econo : Or the 
Production, Distribution, and Consumption of Wealth, Boston, Wells 
and Lilly, 1821), pp. 83-93. 
538 
33John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest 
and Money, (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., Inc., 1936). 
34Ga1braith, Affluent Society, p. 130. 
35Bjork, Private Enterprise, p. 20. 
36 Ibid., p. 28. 
37 Ibid., p. 236. 
38Robert L. Heilbroner, The Future as History; The Historic 
Events of Our Time and the Direction in Which They are Taking America, 
(New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1959). 
39Robert L. Heilbroner, The Great Ascent; The Struggle for 
Economic Development in Our Time, (New York: Harper and Row, Publ ishers, 
1963). 
40Robert L. Heil broner, The Limits of American Capital ism, (New 
York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1965). 
41Robert L. Hei1broner, Between Ca italism and Socialism; Essa s 
in Political Economics, (New Yor : Ran am House, Inc., 19 a . 
42Robert L. Heilbroner, An Inquiry Into the Human Prospect, 
(New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1974). 
43Robert L. Hei1broner, Business Civilization in Decline, (New 
York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1976). Beyond Boom and Crash, (New 
York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1978). 
4400nella H. Meadows, et a1., The Limits to Growth; A Report of 
the Club of Rome's Pro 'ect on the Predicament of Mankind, (New York: 
Universe Books, 19 2. or an important, different view, see H. E. 
Goeller and Alvin M. Weinberg, "The Age of Substitutability," American 
Economic Review, LXVI II (December , 1978), pp. 1-11. ---
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
539 
45Thomas Robert Malthus, An Essay on the Principle of Population, 
(London: Macmillan & Co., 1895). Karl Marx, Capital; A Critique of 
Political Econom , ed, by Fhederick Engels, Trans. by Samuel Moore and 
Edward Aveling, New York: Random House, Inc., 1906). 
46Alvin H. Hansen, IIEconomic Progress and Declining Population 
Growth," American Economic Review, XXIX (March, 1939), pp. 1-15. 
47Rachel Carson, Silent Spring, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 
1962). Ellul, Technological Society. Paul R. Ehrlich, The Population 
Bomb, (New York: Ballantine Books, 1968). Meadows, Limits to Growth. 
48C. W. Cobb and Paul H. Douglas, "A Theory of Production," 
American Economic Review, XVIII (1928), pp. 139-65. 
49Robert M. Solow, "Technical Change and the Aggregate Produc-
tion Function,1I Review of Economics and Statistics, XXXIX (August, 
1957), pp. 312-20. 
50Mansfield, Economics of Technical Change. 
51 W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth; A Non Communist 
Manifesto, (London: Cambridge University Press, 1960). 
52Simon Kuznets, Modern Economic Growth; Rate, Structure, and 
Spread, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967). 
53Gerald Meier, The Economics of Development, (New York: Harper 
and Row, Publishers, 1968). 
54Donald A. Schon, Technology and Change; The New Heraclitus, 
(New York: De1acorte Press, 1967). 
55Donald A. Schon, Beyond the Stable State, (New York: W. W. 
Norton & Co., Inc., 1973). 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
SOURCES CONSULTED 
Alonso, Will iam. "A Theory of the Urban Land Market." Papers and 
Proceedings Regional Science Association, VI (1960), 149-57. 
___ "Location Theory,1I Regional Development and Planning; 
A Reader. Edited by John Fri edmann and Wi 11 i am Alonso. 
Cambridge: The M. I. T. Press, 1964. 
540 
"Ameri can Economi c Associati on Charter and Bylaws, 1978 Survey of 
Members Including Classification Listings, Supplementary Infor-
mation and Statistical Summaries. II American Economic Review. 
LXVIII (December, 1978). 
Anderson, Martin. The Federal 8ulldozer. New York: McGraw-Hill Book 
Co., Inc., 1964. 
Anderson, Ronald. Government and Business. 4th ed. Indianapolis: 
South-Western Publlshing Co., 1965. 
Andrews, Richard 8. liThe Mechanics of the Urban Economic Base: 
Historical Developments of the Base Concept." Land Economi cs, 
XXIX (August, 1953), 161-67. 
Annals of America, The. Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1968. 
Arrow, Kenneth J. Social Choice and Individual Values. 2nd ed. New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1963. 
Arrow, Kenneth J.; Chenery, H.; Minhas. 8.; and Solow. R. tlCapital-
Labor Substitution and Economic Efficiency.1I Review of Economic 
Statistics, XLIII (August, 1961), 225-50. 
Ayres, Clarence E. The Theory of Economic Progress: A Study of the 
Fundamentals of Economic Development and Cultural Change. 2nd ed. 
New York: Schoken Books, 1962. 
Bachrach, Peter, and Baratz, Morton S. IITwo Faces of Power. II American 
Political Science Review, LVI (December, 1962), 947-52. ---
Bator, Francis M. liThe Anatomy of Market Failure. 1I Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, LXXII (August, 1958), 351-79. 
Baumol, William J. liOn the Discount Rate for Public Projects,lI Public 
Expenditure and Policy Analysis. 2nd ed. Edited by Robert J. 
Haveman and Julius Margolis. Chicago: Rand McNally College 
Publishing Co., 1977. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Becker, Gary. Human Capital. New York: National Bureau of Economic 
Research, 1964. 
Bell, Daniel. "The Power El1te--Reconsidered." American Journal of 
Sociology, LXXIII (November, 1968), 238-50. 
541 
Bel1ush, Jewel, and Hausknecht, Murray, eds. Urban Renewal: People, 
Politics and Planning. Garden City: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1967. 
on Government and an Introduction to the 
and Le islation. New York: Blackwell's 
Bentley, A. F. The Process of Government. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1908. 
Berry, Brian J. L. "Cities as Systems Within Systems of Cities." 
Bible. 
Pa~ers and Proceedings of the Regional Science Association, 
(1 64), 147-63. 
Birch, David L. The Economic Future of City and Suburb. New York: 
Committee For Economic Development, 1970. 
Bjork, Gordon C. Private Enterprise and Public Interest. The Develop-
ment of American Capitalism. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 
Inc., 1969. 
Black, Alan. liThe Comprehensive Plan. II Principles and Practice of 
Urban Planning. 4th ed. Edited by William I. Goodman and Eric 
C. Freund. Washington, D. C.: International City Managers 
Association, 1968. 
Black, Henry Campbell. Black's Law Dictionary; Definitions of the Terms 
and Phrases of American and English Jurisprudence, Ancient and 
Modern. Revised 4th ed. St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1968. 
Book of Co_n Pra er and 
Rites and C 
Protestant 
To ether With 
Seabury Press, 
. . ration of the Sacraments and Other 
Church Accordi n to the Use of the 
in the United States of America, 
ter or Psa ms of Oavi d. Greenwi ch: The 
Breit, William, and Culbertson, William P., Jr., eds. Science and 
Ceremony; The Institutional Economics of C. E. Ayres. Austin: 
UnlVersity of Texas Press, 1976. 
Buchanan, James M., and Tullock, Gordon. The Calculus of Consent. 
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962. 
Bunke, Harvey C. A Primer on American Economic History. New York: 
Random House, Inc .• 1969. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Burck, Gilbert, The Computer Age; And Its Potential for Management. 
New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1965. 
Carrington, Richard. The Marrma1s. New York: Time, Inc., 1963. 
Carson, Rachel. Silent Spring. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1962. 
Chapin, F. Stuart. Contemporary American Institutions. New York: 
Harper Brothers, 1935. 
542 
Chi1de, V. Gordon. Man Makes Himself. New York: New American Library, 
1951. 
Chinitz, Benjamin. "Contrasts in Agglomeration: New York and 
Pittsburg," American Economi c Revi ew, LI (May, 1961), 279-88. 
Cipolla, Carlo M. Before the Industrial Revolution; European Society 
and Economy, 1000-1700. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1976. 
Cobb, C. W., and Douglas, P. H. IIA Theory of Production,n American 
Economic Review, XVIII (1928), 139-65. ---
Cochran, Thomas C., and Miller, William. The Age of Enterprise; A 
Social History of Industrial America. New York: Harper and Row, 
Publishers, 1961. 
Codere, Helen. "Fi9hting with Property; A Study of Kwakiut1 
Pot1 atchi n9 and Warfare, 1790-1930." Monographs of the American 
Ethnological Society, XVIII (1950), 63-91. 
Columbia Encyclopedia. 3rd ed. New York: Columbia University Press, 
1963. 
Commager, Henry Steele, ed. Documents of American History. 5th ed. 
New York: App1eton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1949. 
Commons, John R. Legal Foundations of Capitalism. Madison: University 
of Wisconsin ?ress, 1957. 
___ . Institutional Economics; Its Place in Pol iti ca 1 Economy. 2 vol s. 
Mad; son: Universi ty of Wi scansin Press, 1961 . 
. Economics of Collective Action. Madison: University of 
--Wisconsin Press, 1970. 
Cou1anges, Numa Denis Fuste1 de. The Ancient City; A Study of Religion, 
Laws, and Institutions of Greece and Rome. Garden City: Doubleday 
& Co., Inc., n.d. 
Oah1, Robert A. "A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model." The American 
Political Science Review, XLVII (June, 1958), 463-69. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
___ ' Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City. New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1961. 
___ . After the Revolution? Authority in a Good Society. New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1970. 
543 
Darwin, Charles. The Origin of the Species by Means of Natural 
Selection, and The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to 
Sex. Vol. XLIX of Great Books of the Western World. Edited by 
Robert M. Hutchins, et a1. 54 vo1s. Chicago: Encyclopaedia 
Britannica, Inc., 1952. 
Davis, Otto, and Whinston, Andre~. I1Economics and Urban Renewal." 
Law and Contemporary Problems, XXVI (Winter, 1961), 106-17. 
Dewey, John. Essays in Experimental Logic. Chicago: University of 
Chi cago Press, 1917. 
___ . Experience as Nature. New York: The Open Court Publishing Co., 
1925. 
The Pub1 ic and Its Problems. Denver: Alan Swallow, n.d. 
Characters and Events. 2 vo1s. Edited by Joseph Ratner. 
---New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1929. 
__ . The Quest for Certainty. New York: Minton Balch, 1929. 
__ Human Nature and Conduct; An Introduction to Soc1a1 PsycholoGY. 
New York: Random House, 1930. 
A Callinan Faith. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1934. 
. Liberalism and Social Action. New York: Minton Balch & Co., 
--1935. 
Experience and Education. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1938. 
Logic: The Theory of Inquiry. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1938. 
__ Intelligence in the Modern World; John Dewey's Philosophy. 
Edited by Joseph Ratner. New York: Random House, Inc., 1939. 
___ ' "Theory of Valuation,1I International Encyclopedia of Unified 
Science. Vol. II. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939. 
Doeringer, Peter B., and Piore, Michael J. Internal Labor Markets and 
Manpower Analysis. Boston: D. C. Heath & Co., 1971. 
Dorfman, Joseph; Ayres, C. E.; Chamberlin, Neil W.; Kuznets. Simon; and 
Gordon, R. A. Institutional Economics; Veblen, Commons and 
Mitchell Reconsidered. Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1963. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
544 
Downs, Anthony. An Economic Theorv of Democracy. New York: Harper and 
Row, Publishers, 1957. 
Druker, Peter F. The Age of Uncertainty. New York: Harper and Row, 
Publishers, 1969. 
Ehrlich, Paul R. The Population Bomb. New York: Ballantine Books, 196& 
Elliott, 3. G., and Consoliver, E. L. The Gasoline Automobile. New 
York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1932. 
Ellul, Jacques. The Technological Society. Trans. by John Wilkinson. 
New York: Random House, Inc., 1964. 
Encyclopaedia Britannica. 15th ed. 30 vols. Chicago: Encyclopaedia 
Britannica, Inc., 1974. 
Fairchild, Henry Pratt, ed. Dictionary of Sociology and Related Sciences. 
Paterson: Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1964. 
Farb, Peter. The Insects. New York: Time, Inc., 1962. 
Ferguson, C. E., and Gould, J. P. Microeconomic Theory. 4th ed. Home-
wood: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1975. 
Fraser, Sir James George. Folk-Lore in the Old Testament; Studies in 
Comparative Religion, Legend and Law. Abridged ed. New York: 
Tudor Publishing Co., 1923. 
Freud, Sigmund. The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud. Edited by A. A. 
Brill. New York: Random House, Inc., 1938. 
__ . An Outline of Psychoanalysis. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 
Inc., 1949. 
Friedmann, Jehosua; Greenberg, Phi1 i p; and Hoffberg, Alan M. 
Fortran IV. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1975. 
Galbraith, John Kenneth. American Capitalism; The Concept of Counter-
vailing Power. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1952. 
The Great Crash, 1929. Boston: Houghton Mi ffl in Co., 1954. 
. Economics and the Art of Controversy. New York: Random House, 
---Inc., 1955. 
The Affl uent Society. Boston: Houghton Miffl in Co., 1958. 
Economic Development. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1962. 
The New Industrial State. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1967. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
___ . Economi cs and the Publ ic Purpose. Boston: Houghton Mi ffl in 
Co., 1973. 
545 
Gambs, John. Beyond Supply and Demand. New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1946. 
Gard, Richard A. ed. Buddhism. New York: Washington Square Press, 1963. 
Gibbon, Edward. The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire. Vols. XL and 
XLI of Great Books of the Western World. Edited by Robert M. 
Hutchins, et a1. 54 vols. Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, 
Inc., 1952. 
Goeller, H. £0, and Weinberg, Alvin M. liThe Age of Substitutability. II 
Ameri can Economi c Revi ew, LXV II I (December, 1978), 1-11. 
Grazia, Sebastian de. The Political Community; A Study of Anomie. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948. 
Grigsby, William G. Housing Markets and Public Policy. Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1963. 
Gruchy, Allan. Modern Economic Thought: The American Contribution. 
New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1947. 
Haberler, Gottfried. "International Trade and Economic Development,lI 
Expansion of World Trade and the Growth of National Economies. 
Edited by Richard S. Weckstein. New York: Harper and Row, Pub-
lishers, 1968. 
Hacker, Louis M., ed. Major Documents in American Economic History. 
2 vols. Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1961. 
Hamilton, David. IIVeblen and Corrunons: Theoretical Convergence. II 
SouthWestern Social Science Quarterly, XXXIV (September, 1953), 
43-50. 
Hanke, Steve H., and Walker, Richa.rd A. "Benefit-Cost Analysis 
Reconsidered: An Evaluation of the Mid-State Project," Water 
Resources Research, X (1974), 898-908. 
Hansen, Alvin H. "Economic Progress and Declining Population Growth. II 
American Economic Review, XXIX (March, 1939), 1-15. 
Haveman, Robert H., and Margolis, Julius, eds. Public Expenditure and 
Policy Analysis. Chicago: Rand McNally College Publishing Co., 
1977 . 
., and Weisbrod, Burton A. IIDefining Benefits of Public Programs: 
---Some Guidance for Policy Analysts." Policy Analysis, XX (1975), 
169-96. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Hay, Denys. The Medieval Centuries. New York: Harper & Row, Pub-
lishers, 1965. 
'546 
Hayek, F. A. "The Non Sequitur of the' Dependence Effect.'" Southern 
Economic Journal, XXVII (April, 1961), 346-48. ---
Heilbroner, Robert L. The Future as History; The Historic Events of 
Our Times and the Direction ;n Which They are Taking America. 
New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1959. 
___ . The Great Ascent; The Struggle for Economic Development in Our 
Time. New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1963 . 
. The Limits of American Capitalism. New York: Harper & Row, 
---Publishers, 1965 • 
. The Making of Economic Society. 2nd ed. Englewood Cliffs: 
---Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968. 
___ • Between Capitalism and Socialism; Essays in Political 
Economics. New York: Random House, Inc., 1970. 
___ . An Inquiry Into the HUman Prospect. New York: W. W. Norton 
& Co., Inc., 1974. 
Business Civilization ;n Decline. New York: W. W. Norton & 
---Co., Inc., 1976. 
___ . Beyond Boom and Crash. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 
1978. 
Herber, Bernard. Modern Public Finance; The Study of Public Sector 
Economics. 3rd ed. Homewood: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1975. 
Herring, E. Pendleton. Group Representation Before Congress. 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1929. 
Herskov;ts, Melville J. Economic Anthropology; The Economic Life of 
Primitive Peoples. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1965. 
Hertzberg, Arthur, ed. Judaism. New York: I~ashington Square Press, 
Inc., 1963. 
Hicks, J. R. liThe Foundations of Welfare Economics." Economic 
Journal, XLIX (September, 1939), 699-712. 
Hoover, Edgar M. The Location of Economic Activity. New York: McGraw-
Hill Book Co., Inc. 
liThe Evolving Form and Organization af the Metropolis. II Issues 
---in Urban Economics. Edited by Harvey S. Perl off and Lowden---
Wingo, Jr. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1968. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
547 
Howard, R. W. The Great Iron Trail. New York: Putnam, 1962. 
Hoyt, Homer. The Structure and Growth of Residential Neighborhoods in 
American Cities. Washington, D. c.: U. S. Government Printing 
Office, 1939. 
. "Homer Hoyt on the Concept of the Economi c Base. II Land 
---Economics, XXX (May, 1954), 182-86. --
Hunter, Floyd. Community Power Structure. New York: Doubleday, 1963. 
Hyman, Herbert H. Political Socialization; A Study in the Psychology of 
Political Behavior. New York: The Free Press, 1969. 
Isaacs, Reginald R. Community Renewal Program, San Juan Metropolitan 
Area, 1964-65. San Juan: Puerto Rico Urban Renewal and Housing 
Administration, 1965. 
Isard, Walter. Location and Space Economy; A General Theory Relating 
to Industrial Location, Market Areas, Land Use, Trade, and Urban 
Structure. Cambridge: The M. I. T. Press, 1956. 
Jacobs, Jane. The Death and Life of Great American Cities. New York: 
Random House, Inc., 196·1. 
James, Will. The Will to Believe. Introductory Readings in Philosophy. 
Edited by Marcus G. Singer and Robert R. Ammerman. New York: 
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1962. 
Johnoon, Carey C. ed. Institutional Adjustment; A Challenge to a 
Changing Economy. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1967. 
Kaldor, Nicholas. IIWelfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal 
Compari sons of Util ity." Economi c Journal, XLIX (September, 
1939), 549-52. 
Keynes, Edward, and Ricci, David M. eds. Political Power, Community 
and Democracy. Chicago: Rand McNally Co., 1970. 
Keynes, John Maynard. The General Theory of Employment, Interest and 
Money. New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., Inc., 1936. 
Kornhauser, Wi 11 i am. II I Power E1 ite' or ,"Veto Groups, I" eu1 ture and 
Social Character. Edited by Seymour Martin Lipset and Leo 
Lowenthal. New York: The Free Press, 1961. 
Kuhn, Thomas S. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. 2nd ed. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970. 
Kuznets, Simon. Modern Economic Growth; Rate. Structure, and Spl~ead. 
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Lasswell, Harold. The Analysis of Pol itical Behavior; An Empirical 
Approach. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, Ltd., 1948. 
Latham, Earl. The Group Basis of Politics. Ithaca: Cornell Univer-
sity Press, 1952. 
Latouche, Robert. The Birth of Western Economy; Economic Aspects of 
the Dark Ages, Trans. by E. M. Wilkinson. New York: Harper & 
Row, Publishers, 1966. 
548 
Lippman, Walter. The Phantom Public. New York: Macmillan Co., 1929. 
Lipsey, R. G., and Lancaster, K. liThe General Theory of Second Best,lI 
Review of Economic Studies, XXIV (1956), 11-32. 
Locke, John. Concerning Civil Government, Second Essay. Vol. XXXV. 
Great Books of the Western World. Edited by Robert M. Hutchins, 
et al. Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1952. 
Losch, August. The Economics of Location. Trans. by W. H. Woglom and 
W. F. Stolper. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1954. 
___ ' liThe Nature of Economic Regions. 1I Southern Economic Journal, 
XXIX (August, 1963), 71-78. 
Lowi, Theodore J. The End of Liberalism; Ideology, Policy and the 
Crisis of Public Authority. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 
1969. 
McConnell, Grant. Private Power and American Democracy, New York: 
Random House, Inc., 1966. 
MacIver, Robert M., and Page, Charles H. Society; An Introductory 
Analysis. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Wlnston, Inc., 1949. 
McLuhan, H. Marshall, Understanding Media; The Extensions of Man. 
New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1964. 
Madison, James. "Number 10." The Federalist. Vol. XLIII of Great 
Books of the Western World. edited by Robert M. Hutchins, et al. 
Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1952. --
Malinowski, Bronislav. Argonauts of the Western Pacific. New York: 
E. P. Dutton & Co., 1932. 
___ The Dynamics of Culture Change. New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1945. 
___ Magic, Science and Religion, and Other Essays. Garden City: 
Doubleday & Co., 1948. 
. Crime and Custom in Savage Society. Paterson: Littlefield. 
---Adams & Co., 1962. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
549 
Malthus, Thomas Robert. An Essay on the Principle of Population. 
London: McMillan & Co., 1895. 
~lansfie1d, Edwin. The Economics of Technological Change. New York: 
W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1968. 
Mantoux, Paul. The Industrial Revolution in the Eighteenth Century; 
An Outline of the Beginnings of the Modern Factory System in 
England. Revised ed. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1961. 
Marshall, Alfred. Principles of Economics. 8th ed. London: Mac-
millan & Co., Ltd., 1920. 
i4artindale, Don. Institutions, Organizations and Mass Society. 
Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1966. 
Marx, Karl. Capital; A Critique of Political Economy. ed. by 
Fr'ie&rich Engels. Trans. by Samuel Moore and Edward Avel ing. 
New York: Random House, Inc., 1906. 
Mead, George Herbert. Mind, Self and Society. edited by Charles W. 
Morris. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934. 
Meadows, Donella H.; Meadows, Dennis L.; Randers, Jordan; and Behrens. 
William W. III. The Limits to Growth; A Report of the Club of 
Rome I 5 Project on the Predicament of Mankind. New York: Universe 
Books, 1972. 
Meehan, Eugene J. The Foundations of Pol itical Analysis; Empirical and 
Normative. Homewood: The Dorsey Press, 1971. 
Meier, Gerald. The Economics of Development. New York: Harper & Row, 
Publishers, 1968. 
Merton, Robert K. Social Theory and Social Structure. Revised ed. 
New York: The Free Press, 1957. 
Meyer, Jerome S. Great Inventions. New York: Pocket Books, Inc .• 1962. 
Michels, Robert. Political Parties; A Sociological Study of the 
01 igarchi cal Tendencies of Modern Democracy. Trans. by Eden and 
Cedar Paul. New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1959. 
;·Iill, John Stuart. Utilitarianism. Vol. XLIII. Great Books of the 
Western World. Edited by Robert M. Hutchins, et al. 54 vo1s. 
Chicago: Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 1952.--
Mills, C. Wri9ht. The Power Elite. New York: Oxford University Press, 
Inc., 1956. 
Mishan, E. J. Cost-Benefit Analysis. New and expanded edition. New 
York: Praeger Publishers, 1976. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
550 
Moses, Leon, and Williamson, Harold F., Jr. liThe Location of Economic 
Activity in Cities." American Economic Review, LVII (May, 1967), 
211-22. 
Murdock, George P. Rank and Potlatch Among the Haida. New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1936. 
Musgrave, Richard A. The Theory of Publ ic Finance; A Study in Publ ic 
Economy. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1959. 
Nevins, Allan, and Hill, F. E. Ford: The Man, The Times, The Company. 
New York: Charles Scri bner' s Sons, 1954. 
Ford: Expansion and Challenge, 1915-1933. New York: Charles 
---Scribnerls Sons, 1957 . 
• Ford: Decline and Rebirth, 1933-1962. New York: Charles 
---Scribner l s Sons, 1963. 
Nietzsche, Friedrich. Also Spake Zarathustra. Trans. by Thomas 
Common. n.p., 18B3. 
North, Douglas C. "Location Theory and Regional Economic Growth. II 
Journal of Political Economy, LXIII (June, 1955), 243-58. 
Packard, Vance. The Status Seekers; An Exploration of Class Behavior 
in America and the Hidden Barriers that Affect You, Your 
Community and Your Future. New York: D. McKay Co., 1959. 
Pareto, Vilfredo. Manuel d'Economie Politigue. 2nd ed. Paris: 
Girard, 1972. 
Park, R. E., and Burgess, E. W. The City. Chicago: Chicago Univer-
sity Press, 1925. 
Parsons, Talcott. The Social System. Glencoe: The Free Press, 1951. 
Perry, Ralph Barton. General Theory of Value. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1926. 
Peterson, Roger Tory. The Birds. New York: Time, Inc., 1963. 
Pirenne, Henri. Medieval Cities: Their Origin and the Revival of Trade. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1925. 
___ . Mohammed and Charlemagne. London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 
1939. 
Polsby, Nelson W. "How to Study Community Power: The Pluralist 
Alternative." Journal of Politics, XXII (August, 1960),478-84. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Prest, R. A., and Turvey, R. "Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Survey. n 
Economic Journal, LXXV (December, 1965), 683-735. 
Protagoras. "Fragments." Treasury of World Philosophy. Edited by 
Daggobert D. Runes. Paterson: Littlefield, Adams Co., 1959. 
551 
Rasmussen, Wayne D., and Baker, Gladys L. UPrograms for Agriculture, 
1933-1965." Agricultural Policy in an Affluent Society. Edited 
by Vernon W. Ruttan, Arley D. Waldo, and James P. Houck. New 
York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1969. 
Remmling, Gunter W., and Campbell, Robert C. Basic Sociology; An 
Introduction to the Study of Sociology. Totowa: Littlefield, 
Adams & Co., 1970. 
Renou, Louis, ed. Hinduism. New YOf~; Washington Square Press, Inc., 
1963. ---
Robbins, Lionel C. An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic 
Science. 2nd ed. London: Macmillan & Co., 1935. 
Rodwin, Lloyd. "The Theory of Residential Gro'lth and Structure." 
The Appraisal Journal, XVIII (July, 1950), 295-317. 
Rostow, w. W. The Stages of Economic Growth; A Non Communist Manifesto. 
London: Cambridge University Press, 1960. 
___ ' IITechnology and the Price System. II Science and Ceremony; The 
Institutional Economics of C. E. Ayres. Edited by William Breit 
and William Patton Culbertson, Jr. Austin: University of Texas 
Press, 1976. 
Rowen, Henry. liThe Role of Cost-Benefit Analysis in Pol icy-Making. II 
Public Expenditure and Policy Analysis. 2nd ed. Edited by 
Robert H. Haveman and Julius Margolis. Chicago: Rand McNally 
College Publishing Co., 1977. 
Runes, Dag90bert D. ed. Treasury of World Philosophy. Paterson: 
Littlefield, Adams & Co., 1959. 
Samuelson, Paul A. Economics. 9th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill Book 
Co., Inc., 197-3.---
Say, Jean-Baptiste. Treatise on Political Economy; Or the Production, 
Distri buti on, and Consumption of Wealth. Boston: Well sand 
Lilly, 1821. 
Schattschneider, E. E. Politics, Pressures and the Tariff. New York: 
Pr~ntice-Hall, 1935. 
Schon, Donald A. Technology and Change; The New Heraclitus. New York: 
Delacorte Press, 1967. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
552 
___ • Beyond the Stable State. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 
1973. 
Schreiber, Arthur F.; Gatons, Paul K.; and Clenmer, Richard B. 
Economics of Urban Problems; An Introduction. Boston: Houghton 
Mifflln Co., 1971. 
Schumpeter, Joseph A. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. 3rd ed. 
New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1962. 
Shannon, Fred A. The Farmer's Last Frontier, Agriculture, 1860-1887. 
New York: Harper and Row, Pubhshers, 1968. 
S6dillot, Rene. Tlie History of the World in Two Hundred and Forty 
~9ges. Trans. by Gerald Hopkins. New York: New American Library, 
53. 
Sjoberg, Gideon. The Preindustrial City, Past and Present. New York: 
The Free Press, 1965. 
Smith, Len Young, and Roberson, G. Dale. Business Law; Uniform 
.Commercial Code. 3rd ed. St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1971. 
Solow, Robert M. "Technical Change and the Aggregate Production 
Function." Review of Economics and Statistics, XXXIX (August, 
1957),312-20. 
Somers, Harold M. "On the Demise of the Social Discount Rate." 
Journal of Finance, XXVI (May, 1971), 565-78. 
Sorokin, Pitrim. Social Mobility. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1927. 
Spencer, Herbert. The Principles of Sociology. Vol. I., 3rd ed. 
New York: O. Appleton & Co., 1885. 
Stigler, George. The Theory of Price. Revised ed. New York: 
Macmillan Co., 1952. 
Sumner, William Graham. Folkways: A Study of the Sociological Impor-
tance of Usages, Manners, Customs, Mores, and Morals. New York: 
the New Ameri can Libra ry, 1960. 
Tei1hard de Chardin, P~re Pierre. The Phenomenon of Man. Trans. by 
Bernard Wall with an introduction by Julian Huxley. New York: 
Harper & Row, Publishers, 1965. 
Thompson, Carey C. ed. Institutional Adjustment; A Challenge to a 
Changing Economy. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1967. 
ThUnen, Johann Heinrich von. Der isolierte Staat in Beziehung auf 
Landwirtschaft und Nationa10konomie. 3rd ed. Berlin: 
Schumacher-Zarch1 in, 1875. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
553 
Tiebout, Charles M. The Community Economic Base Study. Supplementary 
Paper No. 16. New York: Committee for Economic Development, 1962 . 
. ItExports and Regional Economic Growth,lI Journal of Political 
--Economy, LXIV (Apri 1, 1956), 160-69. 
Toff1er, Alvin. Future Shock. New York: Bantam Books, 1971. 
Truman, David B. The Governmental Process. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
Inc., 1951. 
Turner, Frederick Jackson. The Frontier in American History. New York: 
Henry Holt & Co., 1921. 
Ullman, Edward L. itA Theory of Location for Cities. II American Journal 
of Sociology, XLVI (May, 1941), 853-64. 
Unger, Maurice A. Real Estate. 5th ed. Cincinnati: South-Western 
Publishing Co., 1975. 
U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. A Brief History 
of the American Labor Movement. 1970 ed. Washington, D. C.: 
U. S. Government Printing Office, 1970. 
U. S. House of Representatives, Committee on Banking and Currency. 
Basic Laws and Authorities on Housing and Urban Development, 
Revised Through January 31, 1971. Washington, D. C.: U. S. 
Government Printing Office, 1971. 
U. S. National Commission on Urban Problems. Building the American 
City; Report of the National Commission on Urban Problems to the 
Congress and the President of the United States. Washington, 
D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1968. 
U. S. President I s Committee on Urban Housing. A Decent Home; The 
Report of the President's Committee on Urban Housing. Washing-
ton, D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1969. 
Usher, Abbott Payson. A History of Mechanical Inventions. Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1959. 
Veblen, Thorstein. The Theory of the Leisure Class. New York: The 
Macmillan Co., 1899. 
. The Portable Veblen: The Essence of the Work and Thought of 
---One of America's Great Original Minds. Edited by Max Lerner. 
New York: The Viking Press, 1948. 
___ " The Higher Learning in America; A Memorandum on the Conduct 
of Universities by Business Men. New York: Sagamore Press, 1957. 
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.  Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
___ • The Theory of Business Enterprise. New York: The New 
American Library, 1958. 
___ . The Engineers and the Price System. New York: Harcourt, 
Brace & World, Inc., 1963. 
554 
Vernon, Raymond. The Changing Economic Function of the Central City. 
New York: Commi ttee for Economi c Development, 1959. 
Metropolis 1985. New York: Doubleday, 1963. 
Wallich, Henry C. "public ~ Private: Could Galbraith be Wrong?1I 
Private Wants and Public Needs. Edited by Edmund S. Phelps. 
New York: W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1962. 
Walras, Leon. Elements of Pure Economics. Trans. by William Jaffe. 
Homewood: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1954. 
Washburn, Sherwood L. IIToo15 and Human Evolution." Scientific 
American, CCIII (September, 1960), 62-75. 
Weber,,_ Max. The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. Trans. 
by A. M. Henderson and T. Parsons. New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1947. 
Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary of the English Language. 
Unabridged 2nd ed. New York: The World Publishing Co., 1970. 
Went, Fritz W. The Plants. New York: Time, Inc., 1963. 
White, Lynn, Jr. I1Technologyand Invention in the Middle Ages. II 
Speculum, XV (April, 1940), 141-56. 
___ Medieval Technology and Social Change. London: Oxford 
Universlty Press, 1962. 
Williams, Alan. "Cost-Benefit Analysis: Bastard Science? And/Or 
Insidious Poison in the Body Politick?" Journal of Public 
Economics, I (August, 1972), 199-226. 
Winsborough, Hal H. IICity Growth and City Structure. II Journal of 
Regional Science, IV (1962), 35-49. 
Wolff, Robert Paul. The Poverty of Liberalism. Boston: The Beacon 
Press, 1968. 
